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      PREFACE
Those who have read both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are often struck by
the resemblance not only between many of their ideas, but also between their
respective approaches to philosophical thinking. Considered separately, each of
these men reveals himself to be an unusually unique and individual thinker. Yet,
perhaps somewhat oddly, they also resemble each other in several fundamental
ways. Each of these thinkers seems to have something quite valuable to say
about contemporary ethics, understood both as an academic field and as an
everyday practice, and what they say about ethics seems to converge at several
interesting points. As I will discuss shortly, the notion of comparing
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche goes back at least as far as Nietzsche’s lifetime, and
may have even occurred to Nietzsche himself. The compelling force of this
comparison, and the compelling force of their ideas about ethics, was one of the
most important inspirations for 20th Century Existentialism, even if it is the case
that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were often misunderstood by 20th Century
Existentialists, as I will argue later.
However obvious or compelling this comparison may be, for a variety of
reasons specifying the value Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can offer contemporary
ethics, and how exactly they agree and disagree with each other, is not an easy
task. One difficulty is posed by the fact that neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche
presents his ideas in a tidy, systematic way, as philosophers might prefer.
Discussing their ideas in an informed way requires us to navigate through a
complex maze of pseudonyms, personalities, and Socratic masks. It also requires
us to have a discerning eye in order to recognize the same ideas presented under
different labels in different works. In addition, comparing these thinkers
requires discernment in order to recognize the subtle points of intersection at
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which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche consider the same issues, each in his own
vocabulary.
Another difficulty in trying to understand what Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche have to offer contemporary ethics is that their work does not fit neatly
into the kinds of projects, questions, and discussions that usually concern
contemporary ethicists. This is not to deny that there are several valuable points
of intersection between these discussions and the ideas of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche. Indeed, there have been a number of laudable and enlightening
efforts to apply insights of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (either separately or in
unison) to various contemporary discussions. Yet I think we must also address
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on their own terms and try to understand the projects
they themselves are pursuing in their works. What will concern me in this study
is not the question of how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can be applied to various
ethical projects currently pursued in contemporary ethics, but rather the
question: what is the basic ethical project Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pursue? I
am interested in this question because I think it simultaneously addresses the
two central concerns of any comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: what is it
that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche most fundamentally have in common, and how
exactly is this comparison valuable for contemporary thinking? In what follows,
I will show that what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche most fundamentally share is an
ethical project, a basic approach to doing ethics, and I will argue that it is this
project itself that is, or can be, their most valuable contribution to contemporary
ethics.1
1 This is not to say that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche focus all their efforts on only one project. I think they
both pursue a number of different projects, including projects in the fields of aesthetics and religious
studies. But I also think that many of their central ideas and discussions can be best understood as directed
toward a single overarching concern, and that this concern is an ethical concern in the broadest sense of the
word ‘ethical.’ To those who would object that neither Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are philosophers, and
that they therefore cannot be understood as pursuing any such philosophical project, (a position found
among both supporters and detractors of these thinkers) I can only reply that what follows in this study
proves otherwise. As I will suggest in the chapters to follow, and as I think these thinkers would themselves
agree, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both pursue philosophy in the way Socrates might have understood this
term. If the kind of work Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pursue is not recognizable according to some current
understandings of philosophy, I contend that this is the fault of these current understandings of philosophy.
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The ethical project in which I find both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
engaged is the project of illustrating, analyzing, and evaluating different ways of
life considered as a whole. It is in the pursuit of this project that Kierkegaard
illustrates what he calls the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious ‘spheres of
existence.’ It is in the pursuit of this same project that Nietzsche illustrates what
he sometimes calls ‘master morality’ and ‘slave morality’ and sometimes calls the
‘noble mode of valuation’ and the ‘ascetic mode of valuation.’ It is also in the
pursuit of this project that Nietzsche illustrates his portrait of a new ‘higher
type’. Kierkegaard’s thinking about ‘despair’ and Nietzsche’s thinking about
‘nihilism’ are likewise part of this project. Specifically, these notions allow us to
analyze and evaluate a way of life according to the internal collapse by which
this way of life fails according its own evaluative standards. In addition,
Kierkegaard’s thinking about a ‘leap of faith’ or ‘metamorphosis’ and Nietzsche’s
thinking about a ‘self-overcoming’ and new ‘revaluation of values’ explain how
an agent can make a transition between ways of life.
I believe that we will remain unable to fully understand any these central
concepts in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche until we understand the ethical project in
which these concepts are employed. Unlike most normative ethical thinkers,
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do not approach ethics by asking what actions are
right or wrong or what principles can be found to distinguish right from wrong
actions. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche take a much broader approach to ethics,
asking instead about the fundamental existential stance that one takes towards
oneself, towards others, and towards existence as a whole. They are interested
in how an agent’s fundamental stance manifests itself in actuality, in the lived
experience of the agent adopting this stance. For both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, the agent’s particular beliefs, actions, and judgments all flow from this
fundamental stance; what I mean by a ‘way of life’ is the manifestation of this
fundamental existential stance in the agent’s thought, experience and action.
Adopting this broader approach to ethics, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
develop an ethical ideal that can only be understood as a whole way of life, and
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they both diagnose ethical failure as a failure of a whole way of life. Perhaps
most importantly, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche believe that the kinds of ethical
transformations and changes that are ethically most needful must be changes of
one’s way of life as a whole. As I will argue in the concluding chapter, I believe
that adding the ethical project we find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to the
curriculum of projects we currently pursue in contemporary ethics will allow us
to gain a deeper, more comprehensive, and more individual approach to ethics
manifests itself in the actuality of our lives.
This is, of course, not the only way of reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
But I will provide a convincing case for the validity of this reading by looking
closely at some of the central texts of both of these thinkers. Of Kierkegaard’s
works, I will focus on Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and The Sickness Unto Death.
I will also draw extensively from Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
and his various discourses. Of Nietzsche’s works, I will focus on Beyond Good
and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals while drawing extensively from Twilight
of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, and Ecce Homo.
My claim is not that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are unique in pursuing
this ethical project. To the contrary, I believe that something like this project
was one of the central concerns of ancient Greek ethics. For example, a very
similar project can be found in Plato’s Republic, especially in Books VIII and IX
where Plato examines different kinds of constitutions and the individuals who
embody them. This ethical project can be found Plato’s explanations of the inner
workings of the souls of these individuals, and the relationship between their
internal ‘constitution’ and they way they relate to those around them. Plato’s
psychological portrait of the tyrant is particularly interesting in this respect, and
it may have served as an inspiration for some of the portraits developed by
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Something like this ethical project is also one of the
central organizing concerns of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Kierkegaard’s
triad of different ways of life bears a remarkable resemblance, and perhaps also a
debt, to Aristotle’s “three most prominent ways of life”: the life of pleasure, the
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political-military life of social virtue, and the contemplative life of intellectual
virtue (1095b17). Aristotle’s discussion of the relative worth of these ways of
life, and how a way of life relates to the various virtues he discusses, is one of the
most evident precursors to the project I find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I also
think we find something like the notion of a “fundamental existential stance” in
Stoic thinking, specifically in the stance toward oneself and the world adopted by
the Stoic sage. As I will argue in the concluding chapter, despite the centrality of
this ethical project in ancient ethics, I think this project is generally lacking in
contemporary ethical debate, especially in the two dominant contenders in this
debate: deontology and utilitarianism.
As I have already suggested, the idea of comparing Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is also not unique. There have been a considerable number of past
comparisons of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the secondary literature dealing
with these figures. The 20th Century Existentialist Karl Jaspers is generally
credited with being the first to publish a comparison of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, but in fact there were at least three such studies preceding Jasper’s
account, one of which was published within Nietzsche’s lifetime (although after
he had become comatose.)2 In Chapter 5, I will review a dozen of the most recent
or influential studies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but it behooves me to say
something about them here in order to justify undertaking yet another study of
this topic. Perhaps most importantly, many of these studies were written
without the benefit of the kind exacting, quality scholarship with which these
thinkers are now (sometimes) studied. In many of these comparisons, scholars
more familiar with one of these thinkers than the other have tended to
misunderstand and caricature the thinker with whom they are less familiar.
Moreover, scholars already championing one of these figures have often
2 Karl Jaspers, “Kierkegaard und Nietzsche: Leiden oder Lust als letztes” in Psychologie der
Weltanschauungen. (Berlin: Jul Springer, 1919) was preceded by: K. E. Knodt, “Kierkegaard und Nietzsche”
in Monatsblätter für Deutsche Litteratur (Leipzig, 1897), Angelo Rappoport, “Ibsen, Nietzsche, and
Kierkegaard,” in New Age, 3 (1908), Gottlieb Sodeur, Kierkegaard und Nietzsche. Versuch einer vergleichender
Würdigung, (Tübingen: Mohr & Siebeck, 1914).
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approached this comparison as a way of issuing a decisive rebuttal of the other,
or as a way of dismissing any valuable association between the two.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are both revered for the ferocity of their attacks on
other thinkers, and it is perhaps understandable that scholars championing one
of these thinkers want to turn this ferocity against the other thinker.
Unfortunately, this ‘prize fight’ approach tends to have the effect of obscuring
the most fundamental points of agreement between the two; as I hope to show,
unless we understand Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as asking the same kinds of
questions, the contrast in their answers can never be fully understood.
Moreover, since within these studies the confrontation between Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is choreographed by a scholar already championing one thinker over
the other, the results are predictably biased.
In what follows, I will attempt an open-minded and equally informed
comparison of these two thinkers. I show that it is precisely because they are
asking the same fundamental question that they can be in such direct
disagreement with each other. My aim is not to find a decisive reply to one
thinker in the thought of the other, but to explore the dialogue that opens up
when we understand their writings in relation to the shared ethical project
discussed above.
In the first two chapters, I will clarify what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
mean by a ‘way of life’ and establish what way of life each thinks to be best. In
the next two chapters, I will explore their respective conceptions of ethical failure
as an internal collapse of a way of life: Chapter 3 will address Kierkegaard’s
notion of despair (Fortvilve) and Chapter 4 will address Nietzsche’s notion of
nihilism (Nihilismus). In these chapters, I will also address the possibility of a
transition between ways of life, the process of self-transformation that
Kierkegaard sometimes calls a ‘leap’ (Spring) or a ‘metamorphosis’
(Metamorphose) and that Nietzsche calls a redemptive ‘self-overcoming’
(Selbstaufhebung or Selbstüberwindung) and a ‘revaluation of values’ (Umwertung
der Werte). In Chapter 5, I will address other studies of Kierkegaard and
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Nietzsche, and I will explain how each thinker’s conception of internal collapse
can serve as a powerful, if not necessarily fatal, challenge to the ideal way of life
proposed by the other thinker. In Chapter 6, I will consider the fundamental
points of agreement between their respective conceptions of the ideal best way of
life, specifically their respective notions of individuality, spirituality, and life-
affirmation. Finally, in Chapter 7 I will conclude by summarizing the ethical
project I find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and I will present my case for why
pursuing this project alongside the ethical projects we currently pursue can be
valuable for contemporary ethical thinking.
Although my study will not put any weight on establishing a historical
connection between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I will end this introductory
section by briefly discussing this topic. It is worth addressing both because it is
generally misunderstood and because it provides an interesting way of
introducing some of the key points of comparison between Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche that will arise in later chapters. To my knowledge, no other full-
length study of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche has addressed recent and dramatic
discoveries about the historical connections between these thinkers.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were as close to being exactly one generation
apart as any two people could be: Kierkegaard was born in the same year as
Nietzsche’s father, 1813. Kierkegaard died when Nietzsche was only a child, so
there is obviously no chance of Kierkegaard having been familiar with
Nietzsche’s thinking. But how familiar Nietzsche might have been with
Kierkegaard’s thinking is an intriguing question. We know that Nietzsche’s
friend, the great Danish literary critic Georg Brandes (who was the first person to
lecture on Nietzsche’s work) recommended that Nietzsche read Kierkegaard. In a
letter to Nietzsche from January 1888, Brandes writes that Kierkegaard’s work
would interest Nietzsche and that Kierkegaard is, in Brandes’ opinion, “still one
of the deepest psychologists.”3 In reply, Nietzsche wrote that he intended to
3 Letter from Brandes to Nietzsche, January 11, 1888.
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study the “psychological problem” of Kierkegaard, and to renew his familiarity
with Brandes’ earlier work, on his next trip to Germany.4 Most scholars who
have written about Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have concluded that because this
trip never happened, Nietzsche must have never gotten the chance to learn
anything about Kierkegaard or his ideas. Almost certainly, Nietzsche never
owned or read any of Kierkegaard’s books. However, Thomas Brobjer has
recently published convincing evidence that Nietzsche is likely to have been
much more familiar with Kierkegaard’s ideas than has previously been thought.
Brobjer demonstrates that through secondary sources Nietzsche is likely to have
read as much as fifty pages about Kierkegaard, including five pages of
quotations from Kierkegaard’s works.5
Among the sources from which Nietzsche may have gained familiarity
with Kierkegaard, three stand out as particularly important. Brandes’ own
Hovedströmninger i det nittende Aarhundredes Litteratur (Main Currents in 19th
Century Literature) contains several discussions of Kierkegaard and a number of
long quotes from Kierkegaard’s works. We know that Nietzsche had read at
least parts of this work by 1878, and had probably reread it in 1887-1888 (Brobjer,
253). (This may be the earlier work of Brandes that Nietzsche refers to in the
letter quoted above, and if so, it is clear that Nietzsche remembered reading
about Kierkegaard in this work.) We also know that Nietzsche had extremely
high praise for this work, which suggests that he had more than a passing
familiarity with it. In a letter dated August 20th, 1888, Nietzsche recommends
this work to Carl Fuchs, saying that it “is still today the best cultural book
[Kulturbuch] in German on this large subject” (Brobjer, 273).
Several things Brandes says about Kierkegaard in these volumes would
have been of great interest to Nietzsche. For example, Brandes provides an
extended discussion of Kierkegaard’s authorial methods, particularly his use of
4 Letter from Nietzsche to Brandes, February 19, 1888.
5 Thomas Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Knowledge of Kierkegaard,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 4
(2002) 251-63.
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masks and pseudonyms. Brandes includes a full-page quotation from
Kierkegaard’s discussion of his authorship in the Postscript, and explains that
“[t]o keep the general public at a distance, to avoid laying bare his heart, and
most important of all, to avoid the tiresome responsibility entailed by speaking
in his own name, Kierkegaard places as many authors between himself and the
public as possible” (Brandes, Vol. II, 158). Brobjer points out that Nietzsche,
who considered publishing Human, All Too Human under a pseudonym, and who
certainly employed his own tricks to keep the public at a distance, might have
found this discussion interesting (Brobjer, 255).
To give an even more intriguing example, in a discussion of “personal
lawlessness” masquerading as imagination in Romantic literature, Brandes says
that “Kierkegaard’s Johannes the Seducer, the most perfect and the last example
of the type in Danish literature, always keeps within certain bounds; he evades
ethical questions, looking upon morality as a tiresome, troublesome power, and
never attacking it directly” (Brandes, Vol II, 63).6 Nietzsche would obviously
have been interested in this discussion of morality as something that is
“troublesome” and in need of indirect attack, and he was also interested in the
question of the inner constraints or ‘lawlessness’ among creative types.
In a later chapter, Brandes discusses Kierkegaard in relation to the issue of
sickness and Christianity, another central concern for Nietzsche: “Pascal, and our
own Kierkegaard, contented themselves with defining sickness as the Christian’s
natural condition” (Brandes, Vol. II, 188-9). As we will discuss in Chapters 3 and
4, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche use the metaphor of sickness to describe what
they take to be a contemporary crisis of values, a crisis in which contemporary
Christianity plays a primary role. Related to this concern, Brandes quotes
Kierkegaard’s aesthete A as recommending that one refrain from adopting any
“calling or profession” since “[b]y so doing a man becomes simply one of the
mob, a tiny bolt in the great machinery of the state; he ceases to be master. . .”
6 Georg Brandes, Main Currents in 19th Century Literature, (London: William Heinemann, 1901).
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(Brandes, Vol. II, 75). Likewise, Brandes quotes Kierkegaard’s condemnation of
“a very narrow-minded morality” that has “indefatigably striven to make love as
tame, well broken-in, heavy, sluggish, useful, and obedient, as any other
domestic animal – in short, as unerotic as possible” (Brandes, Vol. II, 76). As we
will see in the coming chapters, one of the most important concerns that
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche share is that their fellow Europeans are becoming
progressively more conformist and mediocre, a problem they both find
traditional Western morality complicit in perpetuating.
This portrayal of Kierkegaard as a crusader for individualism and against
mediocrity and social conformity is further developed in the work of Danish
theologian and bishop H.L. Martensen, especially in his widely read and
translated Christian Ethics. In preparing for his attack on Christian ethics in
Daybreak, Nietzsche asked his mother to send him a number of works on this
subject, including Martensen’s. Although it is unclear what volumes of this
work Nietzsche might have owned, we know that he read at least the first
volume in the spring and summer of 1880 (Brobjer, 256). This volume contains a
detailed analysis of Kierkegaard’s thought covering twenty-seven consecutive
pages and containing several important quotations from Kierkegaard’s texts
(Brobjer, 256).
Brobjer is right to say that Nietzsche would have found in Martensen
“both motivation and ammunition” for his attack on Christian ethics, but he does
not sufficiently emphasize that in attacking Martensen, Nietzsche may have
consciously allied himself with Kierkegaard. I think Brobjer understates the case
when he says merely that Kierkegaard “read and criticized” Martensen (Brobjer,
255). As a Professor of Hegelian philosophy (Kierkegaard’s own, who also
served on Kierkegaard’s dissertation defense committee) and, later, the head of
the state-run Danish Church, Martensen bore the brunt of Kierkegaard’s attacks
during Kierkegaard’s final and most vicious polemical period. I think it is fair to
say that of all the figures with whom Kierkegaard feuded publicly, H. L.
Martensen was his greatest arch-enemy. Although Martensen’s treatment of
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Kierkegaard in Christian Ethics is quite civil, it illustrates the central point of
contention between them, namely that Kierkegaard was an advocate of a strong
form of individualism, especially with respect to spiritual matters, whereas
Martensen defended a much more communal (and rationalist) form of religion.
Martensen says of Kierkegaard that he “made it the aim of his life to promote
and carry through the category ‘the individual’” and to pursue “the task of
‘resisting an immoral confusion, which will demoralize the individual by means
of universal humanity’” (Martensen, 219, 228).7 Since Nietzsche’s primary
criticism of Christianity is that it is a ‘herd’ phenomenon with disastrous effects
for individuality, it seems likely that Nietzsche would have found much to
sympathize with in these descriptions of Kierkegaard. Nietzsche would have
also agreed with Kierkegaard’s insistence, quoted by Martensen, that
“Christianity is a vast deception” since those who call themselves Christians
“have their lives in entirely different categories” than the category of Christianity
as it was understood and established by Jesus (Martensen, 225).8
Another interesting point of comparison that Brobjer neglects to discuss
involves Kierkegaard’s concept of “leveling.” “Leveling” (Nivelleringen) is the
name Kierkegaard gives to the process of collapse in which reverence for
qualitative distinctions becomes so eroded that we are left with bland mediocrity
in place of any conception of excellence. Martensen mentions Kierkegaard’s
notion of leveling more than once and explains Kierkegaard’s view that “this age
is the age of breaking up, the age of ‘leveling,’ in which all authority is
undermined by insidious reflection, and becomes daily more so” (Martensen,
232). Nietzsche himself uses the term “leveling” (Ausgleichung)9 to describe the
7 Hans Lassen Martensen, Christian Ethics, transl. C. Spence, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1873).
8 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are in agreement in thinking that contemporary Christianity is an almost
unrecognizable perversion of the original Christian message. Kierkegaard’s own ‘attack on Christendom’ is
no less fierce than Nietzsche’s, even if the scope of Nietzsche’s attack is broader than Kierkegaard’s. For
example, Kierkegaard does not share Nietzsche’s unqualified contempt for Paul, whom Nietzsche blames
for first twisting the Christian message into its opposite.
9Nietzsche uses Ausgleichung rather than Nivellierung, the closest German equivalent of the Danish
Nivelleringen. I have not yet been able to examine a German translation of Martensen’s text to see what term
Nietzsche might have read there.
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same process by which we become mediocre and passionless (see, for example,
BGE:242, GM I:12, GM I:16). Of course this does not in itself prove that
Kierkegaard was the source of Nietzsche’s use of this term, since it is possible
that they both developed this idea independently or inherited this term from
other thinkers, but we cannot rule out the possibility of a direct influence here.
Either way, it is interesting to note that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are both
worried about a modern progression toward mediocrity and conformity, and
that they use nearly equivalent terms to describe this progression.
Martensen’s account also contains other descriptions of Kierkegaard’s
ideas with which Nietzsche would have had sympathy. For example,
Martensen discusses Kierkegaard’s insistence on the close relationship between
truth, individuality, and actual lived existence. Martensen quotes Kierkegaard’s
famous line that “subjectivity is the truth,” which Nietzsche might have also read
in Brandes (Brandes, Vol. II, 72). Martensen reveals what we might call the
“existentialist” element in Kierkegaard’s thinking in explaining that Kierkegaard
“declares war on all speculation,” that “existence and the actual constitute the
passion of Kierkegaard,” and that the “category of the ‘individual’ interests
[Kierkegaard] only in the sense of the individual existing man. He has arrived at
the perception that ‘subjectivity is the truth’” (Martensen, 223,222). Although I
will say very little about Nietzsche’s theories of truth in this study, it is worth
mentioning that Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, expressed frustration at what he
saw as the tendency for philosophers to flee from actuality into abstract thought.
Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche concerned himself with thinking about actual lived
experience rather than abstract theoretical problems.
In keeping with this existentialist orientation, Nietzsche is in agreement
with Kierkegaard that the kinds of truths that really matter to people’s lives can
only be learned individually. He would have agreed with Kierkegaard that “’it
is impossible to edify or to be edified en masse’” (Martensen, 229). Nietzsche
shares Kierkegaard’s contempt for ‘the public’, especially with respect to the
kinds of ‘truths’ by which one lives. Martensen quotes another famous passage
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from Kierkegaard on truth and individuality that Nietzsche would probably
have found quite in keeping with his own views:
‘There is one view of life,’ says he, ‘which entertains the idea, that where
the multitude is, there also is truth, – that there dwells in truth an inherent
necessity to have the multitude on its side; there is another view of life
which holds, that wherever the multitude is, there is untruth’. (Martensen,
228)
Nietzsche might also have been interested in Kierkegaard’s
characterization of the task of bringing about an individual understanding of life,
and individuality itself, as an essentially Socratic task. Martensen quotes
Kierkegaard’s line from The Sickness Unto Death to the effect that what the
modern world really needs is another Socrates (Martensen, 222). In agreement
with Andrea Orsucci10, Brobjer suggests that several passages from Nietzsche’s
Daybreak may have been influenced by his reading of Martensen and that some
of these may include indirect references to Kierkegaard (Brobjer, 256). Most
compelling, perhaps, is Brobjer’s suggestion that Daybreak §9 makes reference to
Kierkegaard as one of (rare) moral thinkers who, in the manner of Socrates,
focuses on ethics as it manifests itself in the lives of individuals (Brobjer, 258).
Whether or not Nietzsche ever made reference to Kierkegaard, it seems
likely that he gained a sympathetic understanding of Kierkegaard from
Martensen’s work. Yet from both Martensen and Brandes Nietzsche would
have learned that Kierkegaard was a Christian, and this placed Kierkegaard in a
rare (if not impossible) category in Nietzsche’s way of thinking: an individualist
Christian. Understood as such, Kierkegaard avoids much of the venom of
Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity, as we will see in Chapter 5. It may be that
Nietzsche’s interest in writing on “the psychological problem of Kierkegaard”
stemmed from the difficulty of fitting Kierkegaard into his usual conceptions of
Christianity.
10 Andrea Orsucci, Okzident-Orient, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 174-177.
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The last source I will discuss offers the most convincing evidence that
Nietzsche knew and took an interest in at least one key concept in Kierkegaard’s
thinking. In the autumn of 1887 Nietzsche read and heavily annotated Harald
Höffding’s Psychologie im Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung (Brobjer, 259). In
this work, the Danish philosopher and psychologist Höffding discusses and
quotes Kierkegaard on only two pages, but we have good reason to believe that
Nietzsche took an interest in what he read there. Nietzsche underlined the
central sentence in Höffding’s description of Kierkegaard’s notion of “repetition”
and wrote “NB” (nota bene) in the margin: “Deshalb ist für S. Kierkegaard die
Möglichkeit der Wiederholung das ethische Grundproblem” (“Therefore the possibility
of repetition is for S. Kierkegaard the fundamental problem of ethics”) (Brobjer,
259). Nietzsche also drew a vertical line in the margin of the footnote to this
passage which quotes from Kierkegaard’s work entitled Repetition:
The one who only hopes, he is cowardly, the one who only wants to
remember, he is voluptuous, the one who wants a repetition, he is a
man…When one has traveled through existence, then it will be clear if one
has the courage to understand that life is a repetition, and if one is willing
to find joy in this. (Brobjer’s translation, Brobjer, 260).
Here we find intriguing evidence that Nietzsche was aware of one of the
more obvious points of comparison between his thinking and the thinking of
Kierkegaard, namely the comparison between Kierkegaard’s notion of
“repetition” and Nietzsche’s own notion of “eternal recurrence.”11 Nietzsche
would have been especially interested in the notion of finding “joy” in the
understanding that one’s life is a matter of repetition since this nicely parallels
his ideal of being able to joyfully say ‘yes’ to the prospect of eternal recurrence.
11 Of course, we should be wary of Höffding’s claim that the notion of “repetition” is for Kierkegaard “the
fundamental problem of ethics.” For the most part, and especially in the book Repetition, the concept of
repetition is central to the aesthetic life of enjoyment. Yet Kierkegaard also develops a notion of repetition
in relation to the ethical life and in relation to the life of faith. For example, Kierkegaard finds a religious
pattern of repetition in Abraham’s regaining of Isaac and in Job’s regaining of his life after his trial has
ended. For a full discussion of this topic, see Edward Mooney, “Repetition: Getting the world back,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, eds. Hannay & Marino, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 292-307.
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Although neither Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘repetition’ nor Nietzsche’s notion of
‘eternal recurrence’ will figure centrally in the chapters to follow, it is worth
noting here that for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the affirmation of one’s life
in the world is a central requirement for the best way of life.
Having reviewed this evidence for a possible historical connection
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I will leave this topic aside. In what
follows, I will also leave aside questions about the historical sources behind
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ideas and questions about the influences they may
have had on later thinkers. My primary concern is to reveal what I take to be a
valuable philosophical connection between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche by
showing how they each develop and respond to the same basic ethical project.
Although the various particular points of agreement between them just
discussed are certainly intriguing, I believe that we can only fully appreciate the
significance of these particular similarities when we have understood the




[EO I] Either/Or Vol.I (Hong & Hong)
[EO II] Either/Or Vol. II (Hong & Hong)
[FT] Fear and Trembling (Hannay)
[GD] Godly Discourses (Lowrie)
[PC] Practice in Christianity (Hong & Hong)
[PS] Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Hong & Hong)
[SUD] The Sickness Unto Death (Hannay)
[SLW] Stages on Life’s Way (Hong & Hong)
[WL] Works of Love (Hong & Hong)
[WA] Without Authority (Hong & Hong)
NIETZSCHE:
[A] The Antichrist [Hollingdale]
[BGE] Beyond Good & Evil [Hollingdale]
[D] Daybreak [Hollingdale]
[EH] Ecce Homo [Kaufmann]
[GS] The Gay Science [Kaufmann]
[GM] On the Genealogy of Morals [Kaufmann]
[HH] Human, All Too Human [Hollingdale]
[TI] Twilight of the Idols [Hollingdale]
[Z] Thus Spake Zarathustra [Hollingdale]
xx
THE ETHICAL PROJECT KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE SHARE:
ILLUSTRATING, ANALYZING, AND EVALUATING
DIFFERENT WAYS OF LIFE
Publication No. ___________
Thomas Paul Miles,II, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2006
Supervisor: Kathleen Higgins
I believe that what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche most fundamentally share
is an ethical project, a basic approach to doing ethics. I argue that it is this project
itself that can be their most valuable contribution to contemporary ethics. Unlike
most normative ethical thinkers, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do not approach
ethics by asking what actions are right or wrong or what principles can be found
to distinguish right from wrong actions. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche take a
much broader approach to ethics, asking instead about the fundamental
existential stance that one takes towards oneself, towards others, and towards
existence as a whole. The ethical project in which I find both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche engaged is the task of illustrating, analyzing, and evaluating different
ways of life where these ways of life are defined by the agent’s fundamental
existential stance. It is in the pursuit of this project that Kierkegaard illustrates
what he calls the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious ‘spheres of existence.’ It
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is in the pursuit of this same project that Nietzsche illustrates what he sometimes
calls ‘master morality’ and ‘slave morality’ and sometimes calls the ‘noble mode
of valuation’ and the ‘ascetic mode of valuation.’ It is also in the pursuit of this
project that Nietzsche illustrates his portrait of a new ‘higher type’.
Kierkegaard’s thinking about ‘despair’ and Nietzsche’s thinking about ‘nihilism’
are likewise part of this project. Specifically, these notions allow us to analyze
and evaluate a way of life according to the internal collapse by which this way of
life fails according its own evaluative standards. In addition, Kierkegaard’s
thinking about a ‘leap of faith’ or ‘metamorphosis’ and Nietzsche’s thinking
about a ‘self-overcoming’ and new ‘revaluation of values’ explain how an agent
can make a transition between ways of life. Despite the centrality of something
like this ethical project in ancient Greek ethics, I think this broader approach is
generally lacking in contemporary ethical debate. I show how pursuing this
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CHAPTER 1 KIERKEGAARD’S WAYS OF LIFE
One purpose of these first two chapters is to illustrate what I mean by a ‘way of
life’ in both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche by looking at the different ways of life each
thinker discusses. Although I have tried to present them as thinking of ways of life
along similar lines (e.g. what one values and how this manifests itself in how one relates
to oneself, others and the world through thought and action), I have also tried to present
the ideas of each thinker in his own terms. My goal is not to force a comparison by, say,
reading Kierkegaard through the lens of Nietzsche’s thought, but to allow a comparison
to come to the fore by carefully examining the texts of each author. Another purpose of
these chapters is to carefully address what the best way of life entails for both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as this is one of the most challenging questions for
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche scholars. Later chapters will analyze the points of
agreement and disagreement between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche regarding these ways
of life, especially the way of life each considers as best.
Kierkegaard is well known for expounding a trilogy of different ways of life (the
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious lives), yet there are various sub-groups within
these categories that it will be important to distinguish.
§1 THE AESTHETIC WAY OF LIFE
Of the different ways of life, the aesthetic is the broadest in scope,
incorporating an abundant range of variations. It is defined most simply as the
life lived for enjoyment. Yet there are different objects and methods of
enjoyment, and within the aesthetic way of life there are numerous subspecies
which are differentiated accordingly. In the second volume of Either/Or, the
representative of the ethical life, Judge Wilhelm, gives a typology of seven
different versions of the aesthetic life differentiated according to the object of
one’s enjoyment: (1) beauty or health, (2) money, honors or status, (3) talent, (4)
the immediate fulfillment of desire, (5) reflective enjoyment, (6) cynical
renunciation, and (7) poetic expression of the “nothingness” and despair of life.
In the first volume of Either/Or we get a close look at only a couple of versions of
the aesthetic life. The pseudonymous representative of this life, known simply as
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A, proposes more than one typology for differentiating a type of life according to
its primary object and method of enjoyment.12 Perhaps most helpfully, he
suggests a fundamental distinction between those who seek enjoyment
“immediately,” in actual experience, and those who seek enjoyment
“reflectively,” in reflection on these experiences. Enjoyment may be pursued in
the immediate experience of actual life (e.g., in the sensuous pleasure of a good
meal) or in the reflective “recollection” of such experiences (e.g. in an aesthetic
critique of the meal, or in a poetic reproduction of it). An example of such a
reflective recollection is found in Stages On Life’s Way: ‘In Vino Veritas,’ subtitled
“A Recollection,” is the account of a lavish banquet related by William Afham,
the pseudonymous representative of the aesthetic life in Stages.13
By his own admission, A is a reflective aesthete, specifically one who lives
a “poet existence” (EO I:36). Yet A is the pseudonymous spokesman for the
aesthetic life as a whole, and his collected writings contain a dialectical
commentary on different attempts to live the life of enjoyment either
immediately or reflectively. In ‘The Immediate Erotic Stages’, A establishes the
figure of Don Juan as the ideal representative of the life of immediate enjoyment.
In the ‘The Rotation of Crops,’ ‘The Unhappiest One’ and ‘Diapsalmata’, A
examines the problems which plague the pursuit of immediate pleasure. He also
proposes an alternate path, that of the reflective aesthete, and reveals himself as a
representative of this way of life.14 In what follows, we will examine the life of
12 For example, in ‘The Immediate Erotic Stages’ A gives a typology of three different “stages” of immediate
enjoyment, and in ‘Silhouettes’ he gives a typology of different reflective methods of coping with
disappointment. Note that A is primarily concerned with the question of which way of life is best, given the
boredom and disappointment of existence. But framing the question in this way leads him to develop a
typology of different ways of living only within the ‘sphere’ of the aesthetic life.
13 William Afham supplies a preface to his “recollection” in which he develops a theoretical explanation of
the nature and value of such recollections. Although Afham’s understanding of recollection is essentially
the same as A’s, Afham lays down certain restrictions which A does not. For example, Afham believes that
recollections should be “accurate” and “happy” (SLW: 9). For our purposes, we will focus on Either/Or’s A
as the main representative of the aesthetic life, noting Afham’s disagreements with A only as these become
relevant in later discussions.
14 The figure of Johannes the Seducer in ‘The Seducer’s Diary’ stands as an unnerving “shadow” or poetic
reproduction of A’s life. Victor Eremita suspects that ‘Johannes the Seducer’ is A’s own poetic creation,
citing as his evidence that otherwise A would show delight in having found a concrete manifestation of his
theoretical category ‘the reflective seducer,’ the reflective “counterpart” to Don Juan (EO I:9). To what
extent A actually lives like Johannes the Seducer is left unclear.
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immediate enjoyment, including A’s critique of this life, and then examine the
life of reflective enjoyment that A proposes as an alternative.
For A, the figure of Don Juan represents a life successfully immersed in
the enjoyment of immediate pleasure. What Don Juan desires most is sensual
love, and this desire is repeatedly satisfied through his seduction of one woman
after another (“1,003 in Spain”). However, A is hesitant to call Don Juan a
“seducer” insofar as this term implies someone who gains satisfaction through
“craftiness and machinations and subtle wiles” (EO I:98). A insists that Don
Juan lacks the “reflection and consciousness” for such efforts, and that Don Juan
does not even take consideration of the “means” of how he will satisfy his desire
(EO I:98, 109). For Don Juan there is never a problematic moment in which his
desire requires some further effort in order to be satisfied. Rather, Don Juan’s
desire is itself seductive for the women seduced: “He desires, and this desire acts
seductively” (EO I:99). Don Juan represents the “incarnation” of sensuality
itself, when “desire is absolutely genuine, victorious, triumphant, irresistible”
(EO I:85).
Moreover, what Don Juan desires is strictly speaking not this or that
particular woman, but sensual love per se. He is therefore not discriminating in
taste when it comes to women, seducing even “coquettes as old as sixty” (EO
I::97). Don Juan’s love may be all-embracing (“’every girl has what makes me
happy, and therefore I take them all’”), but it is also essentially “faithless” in that
as soon as he has seduced one woman he moves on to another (EO I:97). Thus,
while his desires are always immediately satisfied, they are satisfied only
momentarily: “He enjoys the satisfaction of desire; as soon as he has enjoyed it,
he seeks a new object, and so it goes on indefinitely” (EO I:99).
Because Don Juan’s desires are always immediately satisfied without
further effort on his part, the world appears to him as infinitely accommodating,
an abundantly fertile playland for his enjoyment. He meets with no resistance or
disappointment and so his various seductions are the repetition of the same
satisfying event. His life therefore does not progress, it reposes in the continual
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repetition of the same experience: “faithlessness manifests itself in another way
also: it continually becomes only repetition” (EO I:94). For this reason, Don
Juan’s life lacks the experience of time, at least in the sense of having a coherent
progression of events comprising a lifetime. As A remarks, “sensuous love is the
disappearance of time” (EO I:95). Don Juan’s life is lived completely “in the
moment” and his life is the “sum of repellerende [separate] moments that have no
coherence” (EO I:96). The moments of his life do not cohere as the successive
moments of a lifetime; they remain largely identical – yet disconnected – events.
As should be obvious, Don Juan’s relations with other people revolve
around the satisfaction of his own desires. Toward the women the seduces he is
non-judgmental but also essentially “faithless”: they are attracted to him, drawn
into his existence for a moment, and then left for another woman. A admits that
Don Juan deceives women in this way, but still insists that this is not due to any
reflective cunning on Don Juan’s behalf: “I do not think of him slyly laying his
plans, subtly calculating the effect of his intrigues; that by which he deceives is
the sensuous in its elemental originality, or which he is, as it were, the
incarnation” (EO I:101). A contrasts this kind of sensual love with “psychical
love,” in which the other individual’s self or soul is the object of affection. In
seducing a woman, Don Juan does not relate to her as an individual, but simply
as an occasion for sensual pleasure. Moreover, it is not only the women he
seduces that Don Juan treats as a means to his satisfaction; all people with whom
Don Juan has contact are enlisted into the swirling activity of his desire. Thus, he
exploits the efforts of his only male companion, Leporello, “who not only, as he
himself says, must hold watch outside the door but, in addition, must keep
account books so complex that they would give an experienced office secretary
enough to do” (EO I:93).
If Don Juan relates to other people as occasions for his enjoyment rather
than as individuals, this is perhaps because Don Juan is himself not completely
an individual. Although it is indeed Don Juan’s desire that is being continually
satisfied, it seems that there is nothing more to Don Juan than this desire. For
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this reason, A often depicts Don Juan as the “incarnation” of pure sensuality
rather than as a person seeking sensual pleasure. A marvels that Don Juan
“continually hovers between being idea – that is, power, life – and being an
individual” (EO I:92). This elusive, incomplete existence may also be explained
by the fact mentioned earlier, that Don Juan’s life is a series of disconnected
‘moments’, each of which is a repetition of the others. His entire character is
manifested in this repeated gesture of seduction. Yet a momentary gesture, even
if repeated indefinitely, does not constitute individual personhood, even by A’s
standards. He concludes that “Don Juan is a picture that is continually coming
into view but does not attain form and consistency” (EO I:92). Hence, in relating
to himself Don Juan relates to no specific individual; rather, he relates to the
manifestation of “the sensuous in its elemental originality” in the form of his
own desire (EO I:101).
Although A sometimes treats the figure of Don Juan as an ideal, it is
telling that the main object of his praise in ‘The Immediate Erotic Stages’ is not
Don Juan’s successful life of immediate pleasure but Mozart’s successful
depiction of Don Juan in music. Perhaps part of the trouble A has in conceiving
Don Juan as an actual individual is that he finds this life only poetically possible.
A has found that the actual world (and, one suspects, actual women) to be far
less accommodating than Don Juan’s method of enjoyment requires. Only a
poet’s control of fictional circumstances could insure that someone in continual
need of new sources of enjoyment was always immediately satisfied. In the
actual world, the person living for enjoyment must continually strive to arrange
enjoyable circumstances in order to fend off the boredom, displeasure and
disappointment that life in the actual world inevitably brings with it.
This effort is made ever increasingly more difficult by the fact that
whatever entertains the aesthete one moment bores him the next. As a result, the
aesthete must continually scramble for new sources of enjoyment. He cannot
simply repose in enjoyment as Don Juan seems to do; the life of enjoyment in the
actual world requires the aesthete’s unending (and most often boring) effort in
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order to arrange enjoyable ‘moments’. In other words, the actual aesthete is
plagued by that with which Don Juan was so blissfully unconcerned: acquiring
the “means” of satisfaction.
The aesthete may seek surcease of boredom in variety. (The kind of
repetition that entertained Don Juan may easily bore the “sophisticated”
aesthete.) Yet here the problem of means resurfaces since the aesthete still needs
new sources of enjoyment, but he now needs ever more exciting sources of
enjoyment as well. Thus, the problem of acquiring the means to satiate one’s
ever growing appetite is intensified. If it reaches the breaking point at which the
aesthete simply cannot afford to satiate his appetite, he is lost to disappointment
and boredom. If the aesthete has nearly infinite means, he may continue to meet
the demand for greater and greater expenditure in order to fend off boredom.
Yet even then he is bored. A explains that the failure here lies in the fact that
diversions, especially the kind of eccentric diversions that wealthy, desperately
bored aesthetes tend to devise, are themselves boring: a “generally eccentric
diversion has boredom within itself” (EO I:291). Often the very means by which
one seeks to banish boredom only serve to perpetuate and increase it.
To illustrate this dilemma, both A and Judge Wilhelm use the legendary
figure of Nero. Nero has the whole Roman world at the disposal of his aesthetic
desires, and yet Nero’s all-consuming appetite is never satisfied. “One is weary
of eating on porcelain and eats on silver; weary of that, one eats on gold; one
burns down half of Rome in order to visualize the Trojan conflagration” (EO
I:292). Nero’s capacity to continue providing the means of immediate
satisfaction are no match for the consuming power of his boredom. A concludes
that this method of immediate enjoyment brings the aesthete no more (and
probably far less) enjoyment than it does boredom: “This method cancels itself
[...] What, after all, did Nero achieve?” (EO I:292).
Instead, A proposes a method of reflective enjoyment, counseling us to
listen to the words of the “wiser” emperor, Marcus Aurelius: “’You can begin a
new life. Only see things afresh as you used to see them. In this consists the new
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life’” (EO I:292). A recommends a life in which one sees actual experiences
“afresh” through reflective recollection. Specifically, A recommends poetic
recollection in which actual experiences are poetically altered in their
recollection, thereby allowing for infinite variety. He calls this the “crop
rotation” method, comparing it to the farmer’s practice of rotating crops.15 A
teaches that by constantly rotating the way one views the world and one’s own
experiences, one can forever harvest a bounty of reflective pleasure and thereby
fend off boredom.
For A, “boredom is the root of all evil” (EO I:286). Even painful and
unpleasant moments can, through the process of poetic recollection, become
“piquant ingredients” in life (EO I:296). A finds that even the most painful and
horrendous of actual circumstances can be reprocessed into a source of reflective
enjoyment. He therefore deplores the fact that people try to forget only what is
painful and misfortunate, claiming that this method “betrays a total one-
sidedness” (EO I:292). Moreover, he concludes that the method of simply
ignoring the painful and unpleasant is ineffective: “if one behaves as many do
who dabble in the art of forgetting, who brush the unpleasant away entirely, one
will soon see what good that is. In an unguarded moment, it often surprises a
person with the full force of the sudden” (EO I:295). In contrast, the reflective
aesthete “by no means wishes to forget [what is painful] – but forgets it in order
to recollect it” (EO I:294).
With a little aesthetic flattery and poetic reconstruction, any event, no
matter how painful or horrendous, can be reflectively transformed into
something pleasing: “No misfortune, no adversity is so unfriendly, so deaf that it
15 A acknowledges that the attempts to secure new and more exciting sources of immediate enjoyment,
which we’ve just discussed, are also a form of crop rotation (EO I:291). Yet A’s analysis of these attempts
lead him to conclude that merely changing the sources of immediate pleasure (e.g. always having a different
meal, a different lover, a different set of clothes) constitutes a “vulgar inartistic rotation” which is “based on
an illusion” – namely, that boredom could be overcome with this method (EO I:291). Continuing the
project of trying to secure immediate enjoyment is ultimately futile, since scrambling to find or create new
and ever more exciting circumstances is itself boring. Instead of manipulating the world to make it a
pleasurable place, the reflective aesthete merely manipulates his reflections of the world to make these
reflections interesting and reflectively pleasing.
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cannot be flattered a little; even Cerberus accepted honey cakes” (EO I:294). A
explains that for the aesthete “it is not only young maidens one beguiles,” one
beguiles pain, fear and misery as well: “One talks around it and thereby deprives
it of its sharpness” (EO I:294). Since what the aesthete enjoys in a recollection is
not “the immediate object, but something else that one arbitrarily introduces,”
(namely his own poetic additions) he can reconstitute all the misery, pain and
loneliness in his actual life into “piquant” ingredients in a rich banquet of
reflective pleasure (EO I:299). Simply put, what is actually painful may be
reflectively pleasant. A explains that “[w]hen I remember poetically, my
experience has already undergone the change of having lost everything painful”
(EO I:293).
As the greatest evil, boredom is also the source of an immense
motivation for the aesthete, since what the reflective aesthete desires most is to
escape it: “this effect is not of attraction but repulsion” (EO I:285). A claims that
whoever has boredom “behind him must necessarily have infinite momentum
for making discoveries” (EO I:286). Yet the danger, as always, is that fleeing
from boredom through boring diversion only perpetuates boredom. Hence A
warns that in seeking to “conquer” this root of all evil “it is primarily a matter of
calm deliberation, lest, demonically possessed by boredom in an attempt to
escape it, one works one’s way into it” (EO I:291).
The way to escape boredom, A believes, is through the infinite
possibilities that arise when one considers a situation reflectively, when the
recollection of an event is able to be poetically altered such that “forgetting and
recollecting are identical” (EO I:295). Immediate enjoyment requires more and
more control over the circumstances in the world in order to produce the means
of enjoyment. Reflective enjoyment attempts to escape this problem of means by
shifting the focus of pleasure-seeking from what happens in actuality to how this
is recollected in reflection. Reflective enjoyment simply requires control over
one’s own powers of forgetting and recollecting. Thus A declares that all
reflective ‘crop rotations’ fall under “the universal rule of the relation between
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recollecting and forgetting. It is in these two currents that life moves, and therefore
it is a matter of having them properly under one’s control” (EO I:292).
Being able to control how one forgets and recollects experiences
constitutes a curious kind of self-control. It requires what A calls “the principle
of limitation, the sole saving principle in the world” (EO I:292). The reflective
aesthete avoids indulging so much in any experience that he cannot become
reflectively detached from it: “From the beginning, one curbs enjoyment and
does not hoist full sail for any decision; one indulges with a certain mistrust” (EO
I:293). A specifies that this detachment requires the abandonment of all hope,
since hope interferes with an aesthete’s ability to become reflectively detached
from actuality. Hope expresses some non-arbitrary concern for something in
actuality; it thereby opens the door to disappointment. Therefore, A declares,
“Not until hope is thrown overboard does one begin to live artistically; as long as
a person hopes, he cannot limit himself” (EO I:292). For this same reason, A
recommends refraining from valuing anything too highly: “The person who runs
aground with the speed of hope will recollect in such a way that he will be
unable to forget. Thus nil admirari [marvel at nothing] is the proper wisdom of
life. No part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot
forget it any moment he wants to” (EO I:293).
Instead, A recommends selecting arbitrary events and treating them as if
they were absolutely important – at least for a moment, then one should forget
them. Limiting oneself to arbitrary interests insures a “resourcefulness” in
finding reflective amusement even in a boring world. He gives the example of
the solitary prisoner for whom “a spider can be a source of great amusement”
and schoolchildren subjected to a boring teacher for whom even raindrops can
serve as great entertainment: “How entertaining it can be to listen to the
monotonous dripping on the roof! What a meticulous observer one becomes”
(EO I:292). He also adds an example from his own life. He is periodically
obliged to listen to the boring philosophical ramblings of an acquaintance (could
it be Judge Wilhelm?). On the verge of despair, he discovered that by
10
concentrating on the rivulets of sweat that rolled down the philosopher’s
forehead and converged on the end of his nose, he was able to remain completely
fascinated: “From that moment on, everything was changed; I could even have
the delight of encouraging him to commence his philosophical instruction just in
order to watch the perspiration on his brow and nose” (EO I:299). The key to
finding enjoyment in such mundane events is the arbitrary way that they are
selected:
Arbitrariness is the whole secret. [...] One does not enjoy the
immediate object but something else that one arbitrarily introduces.
One sees the middle of a play; one reads the third section of a book.
One thereby has enjoyment quite different from what the author so
kindly intended. One enjoys something totally accidental; one
considers the whole of existence from this standpoint; one lets
reality run aground on this. (EO I:299)
As we have seen, A explains that only completely arbitrary interests allow
one to make an accidental part of a boring world into something worthy of
absolute admiration: “It is very advantageous to let the realities of life be
undifferentiated in an arbitrary interest like that. Something accidental is made
into the absolute and as such into an object of absolute admiration” (EO I:299-
300). He reports that “[f]or many people this method is an excellent means of
stimulation. Everything is regarded as a wager, etc. The more consistently a
person knows how to sustain his arbitrariness, the more amusing the
combinations become” (EO I:300). Thus while the reflective aesthete’s highest
value is reflective enjoyment, this requires a renunciation of all lasting values
and attachments. One must instead view all of existence from the detached
stance of arbitrariness in order to secure reflective enjoyment.
What does it mean that the reflective aesthete “lets his reality run
aground” on arbitrariness? It means that for him all of existence is considered
according to his method of selecting arbitrary and accidental occasions to
reflectively enjoy. Just as Don Juan treated the world as a playland for the
satisfaction of his desire, A treats the world as a collection of arbitrary, accidental
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occasions which can be forgotten and poetically recollected at will in order to
satisfy his desire for reflective enjoyment. As a result, A is not really at home in
actuality. A compares himself with a bird of prey which lives aloft and only
swoops down into actuality in order to capture morsels of actual experience to
enjoy in the safety of reflection: “I swoop down into actuality and snatch my
prey, but I do not stay down there. I bring my booty home” (EO I:42).
A does not abide in actuality because he sees the actual world as
thoroughly saturated with the greatest evil, boredom. For A, boredom has a
ubiquitous, ”pantheistic” existence in the world: “Boredom rests upon the
nothing that interlaces existence [Tilvaerelsen]; its dizziness is infinite, like that
which comes from looking down into a bottomless abyss” (EO I:291). He
poetically describes boredom as a cosmic curse which only grows with the
passing generations:
The gods were bored; therefore they created human beings. Adam
was bored because he was alone; therefore Eve was created. Since that
moment, boredom entered the world and grew in exact proportion to
the growth of the population. Adam was bored alone; then Adam and
Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel were
bored en famille. After that, the population of the world increased and
the nations were bored en masse. (EO I:286)
A proposes to escape the curse of boredom by escaping actuality and
fleeing into reflective recollection. This method does not ignore actuality
altogether, but it reconstructs it poetically in such a way that the aesthete has
control over what parts of actuality he will experience and how he will
experience them. Such control is essential for the aesthete since, as A remarks,
“enjoyment consists not in what I enjoy but in getting my own way” (EO I:31).
The reflective aesthete’s tools for getting his own way are forgetting and
recollection. These are utilized together in an artistic reconstruction of the world
in which the reflective aesthete plays Creator: in recollection he creates the world
exactly as he wants it to be, transforming actual circumstances into fantastical
ones. The “artistically achieved identity” between forgetting and recollecting “is
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the Archimedean point with which one lifts the whole world” (EO I:295). A
therefore claims that when “the individual has perfected himself in the art of
forgetting and the art of recollecting in this way, he is then able to play
shuttlecock with all existence” (EO I:294).
Regarding others, A has strict regulations insuring detachment and
freedom from any close relationships. For example, A warns that one should
guard against friendship, which he finds boring. Instead, one should form
‘interesting contacts’ with people, letting these relationships “take a deeper turn
now and then, provided that one always – even though keeping the same pace
for a time – has the reserve speed to run away from them” (EO I:296). Such
parting may be unpleasant and may be thought to leave “unpleasant
recollections,” but A claims this is a misunderstanding since “unpleasantness is
indeed a piquant ingredient in the perverseness of life. Moreover, the same
relationship can regain significance in another way” (EO I:296). Actual
relationships do not need to be cultivated or maintained: even if in actuality the
relationship comes to an end, through reflection it may be sustained and even
enhanced.16
A also warns against marriage: “Never become involved in marriage”
since one “must always guard against contracting a life relationship by which
one can become many” (EO I:296)17. (A waves off as “mysterious talk” any
mention of marriage partners becoming unified.) The problem with ‘becoming
many’ is that the aesthete loses his freedom to pursue enjoyment in whatever
arbitrary way strikes his fancy:
If an individual is many, he has lost his freedom and cannot order his
riding boots when he wishes, cannot knock about according to whim.
16 It is interesting to apply this idea to Kierkegaard’s own relationship with Regine Olsen. Their
engagement became the occasion for numerous reflections in Kierkegaard’s writings and Kierkegaard
developed the idea that, although he had broken the engagement and she had married another man, they
were still bonded in a higher spiritual union. See, for example, Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography,
(Cambridge, 2001 ), 201.
17 A’s worry about ‘becoming many’ is perhaps irony on Kierkegaard’s part, since the aesthete is notoriously
multifarious, lacking any unity within himself.
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If he has a wife it is difficult; if he has a wife and perhaps children, it
is formidable; if he has a wife and children, it is impossible. (EO I:297)
Lastly, A warns against taking any “official post” by which one becomes
“just a plain John Anyman, a tiny little cog in the machine of the body politic”
(EO I:298). One problem with taking such a position is that it is boring: “The law
under which one slaves is equally boring no matter whether advancement is
swift or slow” (EO I:298). Having an official position also means that the
“individual ceases to be himself the manager of the operation, and then theories
can be of little help” (EO I:298). In other words, like marriage, an official position
prevents the reflective aesthete from limiting himself to completely arbitrary and
accidental interests. But A makes clear that “one should nevertheless not be
inactive” (EO I:298). Rather, he recommends busying oneself with “all the
pursuits that are compatible with aimlessness; all kinds of unprofitable pursuits
may be carried on” (EO I:298).
These restrictions obviously leave the reflective aesthete without genuine
companionship of any kind. They also leave him relating to himself in a very
odd way. His actuality, like all other actuality, is consumed in the satisfaction of
his desire for reflective enjoyment: the actual facts and events of his life are
forgotten by him in order to be poetically recollected in his mind. In other
words, the reflective aesthete engages in a deliberate effort to deceive himself in
order to entertain himself. He forgets his actual experiences in order to entertain
himself with a poetically enhanced version of his own life. But his
“recollections” are poetically enhanced precisely in order to avoid facing the
actual reality of his daily life (i.e., to avoid boredom). The reflective aesthete
would like to be present in his poetic recollections rather than in the actuality of
the present moment: he avoids his actual life and actual self by ‘recollecting’ a
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poetically invented life and self.18 Therefore, A’s relationship with his own
actuality is one of evasion.
The reflective aesthete seeks to solve the immediate aesthete’s self-
perpetuated ‘problem of means’ by establishing a kind of reflective self-
subsistence. The mechanism of recollection can entertain indefinitely, needing
only arbitrary bits of actuality as occasion for reflection – a fuel readily found
even in a boring world. By being present to himself in recollection (and absent to
himself in actuality) the reflective aesthete hopes to live blissfully free from the
boredom and disappointment that so haunted the immediate aesthete.
As we have discussed, being present in one’s “recollections” rather than in
the actual circumstances of one’s life requires a detachment from actuality. This
detachment of the reflective aesthete is not unlike that of the devoted ascetic: it
requires renouncing substantial relations with others and all concerns within the
world. Both asceticism and reflective aestheticism also demand the renunciation
oneself as an actual particular person. Yet the ascetic renounces the world and
himself for some higher good in which he passionately believes, whereas the
reflective aesthete renounces the world and himself only in order to reconstruct it
for himself. More significantly, the aesthete abstains from having the kind of
deeply held commitments which motivate the ascetic. Unlike the ascetic, the
reflective aesthete must refrain from attaching any non-arbitrary value or
meaning to anything.
In living as if everything were arbitrary, the reflective aesthete must also
regard himself as something arbitrary. That A considers his own life under the
concept of arbitrariness is revealed in his philosophy of ‘either/or.’19 In the
Diapsalmata A delivers an “ecstatic discourse” in which he compares various
18 In ‘The Unhappiest One” A poses the problem that unless recollections have reality for the one who
recollects, the reflective aesthete cannot become present in them (EO I:223). In this case, he is present to
himself in neither actuality nor recollection; he is lost to himself, a fate A deems the unhappiest of all.
19 Both the aesthete A and Judge Wilhelm have a theory of ‘either/or’. The aesthetic conception of
‘either/or’ signifies the arbitrariness between two (or more) options whereas the ethical conception of
‘either/or’ signifies a fundamental choice between dramatically different options.
15
options for how to act and cynically concludes that it is arbitrary which option
one chooses:
Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you will also regret
it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way. Laugh at the
stupidities of the world, and you will regret it; weep over them, and
you will regret it. [...] Whether you laugh at the stupidities of the world
or you weep over them, you will regret it either way. [...] Hang
yourself, and you will regret it. Do not hang yourself, and you will
regret it. Hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it
either way. (EO I:38)
A declares this philosophy of ‘either/or’ is “the quintessence of all the
wisdom of life” and therefore recommends that one remain “continually aeterno
modo [in the mode of eternity]” by remaining reflectively detached from any
actual circumstance. To this end the reflective aesthete must be willing to
continually vary not only his interests, he must continually vary himself: “The
eye with which one sees actuality must be changed continually” (EO I:300). A
goes so far as to say that this poetic invention or alteration of one’s self is the key
to the success of his ‘crop rotation’ method: “so also must one continually vary
oneself, and this is the real secret” (EO I:298).
In order to vary oneself, one must be in control of oneself. To this end, A
states that “it is essential to have control over one’s moods” (EO I:299). Why does
A think control over one’s moods is so essential? Perhaps because it is only in
certain moods that A can be fascinated by arbitrary morsels of actuality. When
certain unfavorable moods strike him he cannot bring himself to find any interest
(let alone absolute interest) in the arbitrary. Yet A admits that he has no more
control over his moods than the sailor has control over the storm at sea. At most,
he can simply anticipate the coming of a mood and calculate its probable effect:
To have them [one’s moods] under control in the sense that one can
produce them at will is an impossibility, but prudence teaches us to
utilize the moment. Just as an experienced sailor always scans the sea
and detects a squall far in advance, so one should always detect a
mood a little in advance. Before entering into a mood, one should
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know its effect on oneself and its probable effect on others” (EO I:298-
299)
Whether or not the reflective aesthete can successfully escape the storm
of his own uncooperative moods, the important question remaining is: What is
the self that the reflective aesthete thinks he must continually vary? For A this
self is nothing but the “eye with which one sees actuality,” that which
experiences and enjoys, first immediately and then reflectively. The self which is
subjected to actual experience is treated like a stage actor: its sole value and
purpose is to entertain the self which reflectively enjoys recollecting this
experience. This split within the aesthete’s self is something the project of
reflective enjoyment cannot do without. Both immediate actor and reflective
audience are required, and a strict separation between them is necessary to
insure reflective detachment. Moreover, the split grows more manifold: there
must also be a part of the aesthete’s self which acts like a stage director, selecting
arbitrary occasions from actuality, directing the actor in his arbitrary actions, and
poetically reconstructing these occasions for himself in recollection. Looking
more closely at the passage in which A introduces his ‘bird of prey’ analogy will
reveal the multiplicity into which A’s self disintegrates:
I swoop down into actuality and snatch my prey, but I do not stay
down there. I bring my booty home, and this booty is a picture I
weave into the tapestries at my castle. Then I live as one already
dead. Everything I have experienced I immerse in a baptism of
oblivion unto an eternity of recollection. Everything temporal and
fortuitous is forgotten and blotted out. Then I sit like an old gray-
haired man, pensive, and explain the pictures in a soft voice, almost
whispering, and beside me sits a child, listening, although he
remembers everything before I tell it. (EO I:42)
Although the reflective aesthete flees his actual self, he is also dependent
on it, just as the director and audience depend upon the actor. This dependency
is apparent in the way A discusses the need for self-awareness: “In order to be
able to recollect in this way, one must be aware of how one lives, especially of
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how one enjoys” (EO I:293). The reflective aesthete would like to vacate his
actual life, and yet he must continue to peer into his actual life as the object of
absolute (if momentary) interest. He must continually “swoop down” into his
own actuality in order to feed his appetite for reflective enjoyment. Like Don
Juan, the reflective aesthete treats others as a means to ‘having his own way’ and
yet, oddly enough, the reflective aesthete also treats himself as a means to this
end.
Whereas the immediate aesthete tries to immerse himself in immediate
enjoyment, the reflective aesthete tries to immerse himself in himself; he tries to
dissolve his actuality in the universal solvent of his own reflection. The actual
part of himself is absorbed in the role of an arbitrary actor, existing merely as a
means of reflective entertainment. In turn, the reflective parts of himself try to
become absorbed in poetic fascination with the arbitrary experiences of his actual
self. A thinks that the immediate aesthete’s life lacks continuity, but the same
could be said of him. His life might be even more fragmentary than Don Juan’s,
for he lacks even the consistency afforded by Don Juan’s single-minded desire or
by the repetition of the same gesture of seduction. Within the reflective
aesthete’s self, everything must be variable in order to insure detachment and the
freedom to recreate himself as he wishes to be. Thus, his life plan requires that
he be infinitely multifarious, fluid, and variable.
As promised, I will end this section by discussing the “poet existence”
manifested by A himself. So far we have described the reflective aesthete as
someone who attempts to entertain himself with reflective recollections of his
life. The ‘poet,’ in A’s sense, is someone who has succumbed to boredom and
has given up all hope of entertaining himself.20 Although A is lost to boredom, he
nonetheless transforms the torture of his boredom into writings which others
20 When A proposes the reflective escape from actuality in ‘The Rotation of Crops’ he assures us that “the
fakery is successful for the adept” (EO I:295). Yet there are subtle indications throughout his writings (and
explicit indications in ‘The Unhappiest One’ and ‘Diapsalmata’) that in fact this project of reflective escape
fails. For example, A complains that his way of life is “utterly meaningless,” and “dreadful, not to be
endured” (EO I:36, 24). I will defer the analysis of the failure of the reflective aesthetic way of life for the
chapter on despair.
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find interesting. Boredom and suffering torture poetic productions out of the
poet, and these bring aesthetic pleasure to others. A’s favorite metaphor for the
‘poet existence’ is the victims roasted inside the tyrant Phalaris’ bronze bull,
whose screams escape the mouthpiece of the bull in the form of pleasing music:
What is a poet? An unhappy person who conceals profound anguish in
his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over
them they sound like beautiful music. It is with him as with the poor
wretches in Phalaris’s bronze bull, who were slowly tortured over a
slow fire; their screams could not reach the tyrant’s ears to terrify him;
to him they sounded like sweet music. (EO I:19)
I should immediately add that Kierkegaard does not think that every poet
or artist lives an aesthetic way of life. (Especially when comparing Kierkegaard
to Nietzsche, there is a temptation to draw a hasty contrast by saying that a
thinker like Nietzsche values the artistic life quite highly, whereas Kierkegaard
regards the artistic life as the lowest.) As Mackey points out, the aesthetic life is
called “aesthetic” not in reference to artwork or the study of art and beauty
(aesthetics), but in reference to aisthesis “sense perception.”21 For Kierkegaard,
someone who is a poet or artist may be living an aesthetic, ethical, or religious
way of life. (This holds for any other profession or pursuit; as we have seen, what
defines a way of life is not some external role, but an internal evaluative
orientation.) Some of Kierkegaard’s own pseudonyms are presented as non-
aesthete poets (Johannes de Silentio, for example, is a poet living a life of
resignation.) Likewise, Kierkegaard often regarded himself as a religious kind of
poet, or at least upheld this as an ideal for himself.
Thus, what makes the ‘poet existence’ in A’s sense unique is not the act of
poetic production, but the fact that this poetic production is put in the service of
the highest aesthetic value: alleviating boredom. The specifically aesthetic poet
like A no longer strives to be interested or entertained by anything in life. But
the value of entertainment and surcease of boredom is not given up. The poet
21Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 3.
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resigns himself to a life of boredom and suffering, but reserves for himself the
rare and privileged position of being able to entertain others even as he remain
bored (EO I:288).
§2 THE ETHICAL WAY OF LIFE
As we saw in the last chapter, the aesthetic way of life could be divided
into an immediate and a reflective approach to obtaining enjoyment; the
reflective approach to enjoyment is an attempt to correct the failure of the
immediate approach while remaining within aesthetic categories. In the same
way, the ethical way of life can be divided into the life of self-responsibility
advanced by the pseudonym Judge Wilhelm and the life of resignation (also
called “Religiousness A”) advanced by Johannes de Silentio of Fear and Trembling
and Johannes Climacus of Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript. The life of resignation can be understood as an attempt to correct the
failures of the life of ethical self-responsibility while remaining within ethical
categories.
It may seem odd to include the way of life described as “Religiousness A”
within the ethical rather than the religious way of life, but this designation is
Kierkegaard’s own. What both approaches have in common such that they are
both “ethical” in Kierkegaard’s thinking is that they are both grounded in self-
reliance (what Kierkegaard sometimes calls the domain of “immanence.”)22 Judge
Wilhelm believes that every individual can, by his own will, achieve a secure,
happy and ethically upright existence in the world by taking responsibility for
himself. As a first step, taking responsibility for oneself requires what he calls
“repentance,” accepting one’s guilt for past wrongdoings. Having repented, the
ethical “individual rests with confident security in the assurance that his life is
ethically structured” (EO II:257). Writers representing the life of resignation
believe that self-reliance can take the individual only as far as repentance and no
22
See, for example, PS:559,532,560-1.
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further. Each of these manifestations of the ethical way of life will be explained
in turn.
Judge Wilhelm is known to us primarily through two lengthy epistles he
sends to the aesthete A; these letters, along with a sermon sent to the judge from
a priest in Juttland, comprise the second volume of Either/Or. In addition, Stages
on Life’s Way includes a manuscript by Judge Wilhelm entitled “Some Reflections
on Marriage.” (According to its introduction in Stages, this manuscript has been
stolen from the judge’s study by Victor Eremita, the pseudonymous editor of
Either/Or, after a night of merriment and speeches on erotic love by various
aesthetes.) As is his usual practice, Kierkegaard has carefully crafted his
spokesman for this way of life to stand as a concrete representation of it. The
judge is a stolid middle-class burgher, a married man and a father. For him,
marriage is the primary example of the type of ethical commitment by which a
person gains a joyful, secure place in the everyday world through his own self-
reliant strength of resolve.
Judge Wilhelm approaches A from the standpoint of the ethical “life-
view” (as he calls it), but he is sensitive to the fact that A does not share this life-
view. He therefore generally refrains from criticizing A on ethical grounds.
Instead, he employs a two-fold method for wrenching A from his adherence to
the aesthetic way of life. First, he presents the ethical way of life as valuable
according to aesthetic categories. Thus, his first letter to A is entitled “The
Aesthetic Validity of Marriage.” He argues that it is only in the ethical way of
life that the world becomes the beautiful and happy place the aesthete wants it to
be (EO II:178,275). As the judge explains, it is only when enjoyment is no longer
one’s highest goal, only when one achieves a confident, secure place in the world
through one’s own ethical will and commitment that one can actually enjoy life
and see it according to its beauty. "If only the choice is posited, all the aesthetic
returns, and you will see that only thereby does existence become beautiful” (EO
II:178). Judge Wilhelm promises that the ethical person can "save his own soul
and win the whole world” (EO II:178). Thus, the ethical way of life incorporates
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the aesthetic telos and fulfills it for the first time. The ethical way of life is
enjoyable precisely because within it the aesthetic telos is no longer the highest
telos of one’s life.
Secondly, Judge Wilhelm wants to reveal to A how the life lived for
enjoyment undermines itself, how it collapses internally and fails to satisfy its
own criteria. To a large extent this task is already done for him: as we’ve seen, A
realizes that the life of enjoyment inevitably leads to the antithesis of enjoyment:
boredom. But A understands this failure aesthetically, as a fact about the world
rather than a fact about himself and the way he lives. As he makes humorously
evident in the ‘boredom of the gods’ passage, A reads boredom into the heart of
existence, as an inescapable evil. The same pattern of interpreting aesthetic
failure according to the aesthetic categories is found in A’s “poet existence.” As
explained in the last section, A’s remedial solution to the collapse of the aesthetic
life is to live in such a way that the torture of living this failed way of life
produces aesthetic pleasure for others.
Judge Wilhelm’s aim is to get A to despair of the aesthetic way of life in
the right way, to have the despair which brings the aesthetic way of life to an end
rather than the halfhearted despair utilized by the poet for entertainment value,
i.e., aesthetic value. Although a full explanation of the internal collapse of the
aesthetic way of life will have to wait until the chapter on despair, we will need
to understand the basics of Judge Wilhelm’s notion of the despair of the aesthetic
way of life in order to understand the contrast he draws with the ethical way of
life. According to the judge, “the person who says that he want to enjoy life always
posits a condition that either lies outside the individual or is within the individual in
such a way that it is not there by virtue of the individual himself” (EO II:180).
Despair, according to Judge Wilhelm, is living in such a way that what one
values most in life, the conditions for one’s success in life, lie outside of oneself.
In contrast, what is valued most in the ethical life (ethical goodness, having one’s
life “ethically structured”), and the condition for success in this way of life
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(strength of resolve, a sense of ethical commitment, etc.), always lie within the
individual.
While A prefers to think of the aesthetic way of life as rare and refined,
Judge Wilhelm explains that he shares the aesthetic way of life with a variety of
people whom A looks down upon as ‘not knowing how to enjoy life’ (EO
II:180,191-7). As discussed in the last chapter, the judge outlines seven versions
or “stages” of the aesthetic way of life differentiated according to the external
condition for which a person lives: (1) beauty or health, (2) money, honors or
status, (3) talent, (4) the immediate fulfillment of desire, (5) reflective enjoyment,
(6) cynical renunciation, and (7) poetic expression of the “nothingness” and
despair of life. As Judge Wilhelm’s definition of despair indicates, some of these
conditions certainly lie within the individual (e.g. talent), but even here the
question is whether or not the person takes responsibility for developing and
exercising this talent. The person who fails to do so remains in the aesthetic
sphere as someone who is merely “absorbed in his own accidental traits,”
whereas the person who takes the development and exercise of his talent as a
task lives ethically (EO II:260).
According to Judge Wilhelm, the “life nerve” of the ethical way of life is
the act of “choosing oneself” (EO II:211). Simply put, ‘choosing oneself’ means
taking responsibility for oneself. This involves taking responsibility for one’s
present and future actions, as well as for all one’s past actions. Responsibility
thereby grants the ethical person the continuity in time that the aesthete lacks.
While the aesthete seeks to lose himself in the dispersion of enjoyment, the
ethical person seeks to gain possession of himself through self-responsibility.
Judge Wilhelm is careful to point out that choosing oneself means choosing to
take responsibility for the concrete, particular person one actually is; he
repeatedly warns against confusing the need to choose oneself with the idea that
one can create oneself (EO II:215,217,258,260,332). As he explains:
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[T]he person who chooses himself ethically chooses himself concretely as
this specific individual [...] with these capacities, these inclinations, these
drives, these passions, influenced by this specific social milieu, as this
specific product of a specific environment. But as he becomes aware of all
this, he takes upon himself responsibility for it all. (EO II:251)
Choosing oneself entails accepting oneself as a product of various external
influences and yet acknowledging oneself as an agent responsible for how these
influences manifest themselves in present and future action. Although Judge
Wilhelm thinks that most of what a person is as an individual is given by factors
beyond the individual’s control, he believes every individual has the ability to be
“his own editor” whose task “it is chiefly to order, shape, temper, inflame,
control – in short, to produce an evenness in the soul, a harmony” (EO II:262).
The Judge notes a continuity between the ethical duty to act responsibly and the
ethical duty to form oneself, since performing responsible actions also helps to
develop oneself into a responsible agent: “he engages in the affairs of life as this
specific personality. Here his task is not to form himself but to act, and yet he
forms himself at the same time” (EO II:263).
By taking responsibility for himself as a task in these ways, the individual
gains possession over himself as a whole. He thereby achieves what Judge
Wilhelm calls “sovereignty over himself”:
An individual thus chooses himself as a complex specific concretion and
therefore choose himself in his continuity. This concretion is the
individual's actuality, but he chooses according to freedom , it may also
be said that it is his possibility or, in order not to use such an esthetic
expression, it is his task. [...] in seeing his possibility as his task, the
individual expresses precisely his sovereignty over himself, something
he never surrenders. (EO II:251).
As mentioned above, Judge Wilhelm thinks a necessary step in choosing
oneself is taking responsibility for one’s past wrongdoings; this is what he calls
“repentance.” In choosing oneself, one does not get to start with a ‘clean slate’,
ethically speaking. Judge Wilhelm assumes that every actual person has at least
some things of which they are guilty; to pretend otherwise would be to try to
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‘create oneself.’ Therefore, in choosing myself ethically I choose myself as
guilty, and in taking responsibility for myself I take responsibility for this guilt:
“for only when I choose myself as guilty do I absolutely choose myself, if I am at
all to choose myself absolutely in such a way that it is not identical with creating
myself” (EO II:216-7).
Somewhat oddly, Judge Wilhelm thinks that it is not only one’s own
wrongdoings that must be repented. He adds: “And even though it was the
father’s guilt that was passed on to the son by inheritance, he repents of this,
too.” (EO II:217). He even suggests that the ethical individual repents of
everything that is “hard” and “painful” in the entire history of the human race
preceding him since “he is the person he is only through this history” (EO II:216).
According to Judge Wilhelm, the ethical person gains possession of himself
through self-choice only by refusing to quibble over what aspects or conditions
of his self he includes in the scope of his responsibility and freedom (EO II:218).
In contrast to those who refuse “to repent of the guilt of the forefathers” out of “a
faintheartedness of the soul” or “lack of magnanimity,” Judge Wilhelm sees it as
a “sign of a high-minded person and a deep soul if he is inclined to repent, if he
does not take God to court but repents and loves God in his repentance" (EO
II:218,237).
As this quote suggests, Judge Wilhelm believes an ethical person’s
relationship to God is primarily expressed in this act of repentance (EO II:216).
Yet elsewhere he adds that an ethical person’s love of God is expressed by
joyfully accepting his or her life in the world (EO II:244). Here Judge Wilhelm
draws a contrast between the ethical way of life he recommends and the ascetic
life (that of the pagan “Stoic“ or Christian “mystic”), a distinction he emphasizes
in both Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way. In contrast to the ‘positive’
commitment of the person who takes responsibility for his activities in the world,
the ascetic life is structured by a ‘negative’ commitment to renouncing himself,
his life in the world, and the world as a whole (SLW:108). Judge Wilhelm
criticizes the ascetic for “rejecting the existence, the actuality, in which God has
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placed him, because he thereby actually rejects God’s love or demands another
expression for it than that which God wills to give” (EO II:244). In addition, the
judge regards it as a “deception” for the ascetic to pretend that he has the right to
reject his relationships with other people, especially the particular individuals
with whom his life is “bound” (EO II:244).
In contrast, the ethical person as Judge Wilhelm conceives him has the
“cheerful boldness” to accept his life in the world with joy and love. Judge
Wilhelm repeatedly points out that the ethical person who claims his life by
taking responsibility for it “loves man's life in this world" (EO II:327,328,332).
Having achieved “absolute continuity with the actuality to which he belongs,"
the ethical person is at home in the world and is able to perceive “the significance
even of the insignificant” (EO II:248,222). In becoming at home in the world in
this way, Judge Wilhelm’s ethical person distinguishes himself from the aesthete
as well as the ascetic. As the judge explains to the aesthete A, "the world is an
oppression to you because it seems to want to be something different for you
than it can be, so it is also true that when in despair you have found yourself you
will love it because it is what it is” (EO II:208).
Joyfully accepting one’s life in the world entails accepting one’s
relationships with other people and becoming open and sympathetic with them
(EO II:322). In taking responsibility for his particular actuality, the ethical
person relates to other people according to the roles and duties he finds himself
within: e.g. as father, as husband, as judge. In agreement with Aristotle, the
judge also points out that true friendship is possible only within an ethical way
of life (EO II:321-3). As Judge Wilhelm explains, a person finds his duty
internally, within the concrete particular circumstances of his life, not within the
“abstract-categorical” in the manner of Kant’s ethics (EO II:322). What is
universal about ethics is the general requirement to do one’s duty, but each
person has his or her own duties (EO II:263). Thus, Judge Wilhelm notes a
significant difference between his ethics and traditional formulations of ethics in
that for him ethics does not require that one abrogate one’s particularity in order
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to attain ethical goodness (‘the universal’): “the person who lives ethically
expresses the universal in his life. He makes himself the universal human being,
not by taking off his concretion, for then he becomes a complete non-entity, but
by putting it on and interpenetrating it with the universal” (EO II:256).
Therefore the Judge finds that “[e]very person, if he so wills, can become a
paradigmatic human being, not by brushing off his accidental qualities, but by
remaining in them and ennobling them. But he ennobles them by choosing
them” (EO II:262). Echoing Pindar’s call to “become what you are” (an idea
much beloved by Nietzsche), the Judge declares that the person who ennobles
the traits and circumstances of his particular life by taking responsibility for
them “becomes the person he becomes” (EO II:225). The aesthete, by contrast,
views himself as what he immediately is (a collection of needs, desires and
talents over which he refuses to assume responsibility). Judge Wilhelm sums up
this point by saying that the aesthetic “is that in a person whereby he
immediately is the person he is; the ethical is that whereby a person becomes
what he becomes” (EO II:225).
In taking responsibility for his life as a task, the ethical person finds both
his duties and his place in the world. Because this can all be achieved self-
reliantly, “the truly ethical person has an inner serenity and sense of security”
(EO II:254). For this reason, Judge Wilhelm claims that the ethical way of life
“makes the individual infinitely secure within himself” (EO II:255). As
mentioned above, the judge believes it is only in this state of self-reliantly
achieved security that life becomes beautiful and enjoyable. As the he says to A,
"Life then becomes rich in beauty for me, not impoverished in beauty, as it
actually is for you" (EO II:275). He presses his case against A by showing that
the ethical life “is so far from depriving life of its beauty that it expressly gives it
beauty. It gives life peace, safety, and security” (EO II:323).
Having explained the highest telos of Judge Wilhelm’s ethical way of life
and how one relates to oneself, others and the world when pursuing this telos,
we turn now to the second manifestation of the ethical life: the life of resignation.
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While a full accounting of the despair of Judge Wilhelm’s life of self-
responsibility will have to wait until the chapter on despair, we will need to
introduce some of its basic faults in order to understand the life of resignation.
The basic flaw in Judge Wilhelm’s way of life can be discussed according to two
inter-related issues: guilt and the inability, through one’s own efforts, to gain a
serene and happy existence at home in the world. Although Judge Wilhelm’s
goal of having such a happy, secure existence and a love of everyday life is
preserved (and fulfilled) in the life of faith, there are indications even within the
Judge’s own letters that his claim to have achieved this kind of existence is a
fraud. For example, he confesses:
It sometimes happens to me – to be sure, very rarely now, for I try to
counteract it, since I consider it a husband’s duty to be of about the
same age as his wife – it sometimes happens that I sit and collapse
[sinker sammen, literally to ‘sink together’] into myself. I have taken care
of my work; I have no desire for any diversion, and something
melancholy in my temperament gains the upper hand over me. I
become many years older than I actually am, and I practically become a
stranger to my home life. I can very well see that it is beautiful, but I
look at it with different eyes than usual. It seems to me as if I were an
old man, my wife my happily married younger sister in whose house I
am sitting. In such hours, time almost begins to drag for me. (EO II:307)
At such times, the judge feels “desolate and lost,” a “stranger” to the
everyday world he has claimed to achieve through self-responsibility. As he
admits, his only salvation in such times is to watch his wife, who remains busily
engaged in everyday tasks. The judge complacently explains that as a woman,
his wife’s domain is the finite, and thus she is at no risk of becoming a stranger to
everyday existence like he does: “Now if my wife were a man, the same thing
would perhaps happen to her, and we might both come to a halt, but she is a
woman and in harmony with time” (EO II:307). Only by watching his wife’s
happy immersion in household tasks is the judge able to regain his own sense of
being at home in the world and in time: “When I am sitting this way, desolate
and lost, and then I watch my wife moving lightly and youthfully around the
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room, always busy...I participate in everything she is doing, and in the end I find
myself within time again, time has a meaning for me again, and the moment
hurries along” (EO II:307). The judge theorizes about dependence on his wife in
general terms: “Woman explains the finite; man pursues the infinite. This is the
way it must be” (EO II:311).
The extent of this dependence is revealed in his admission that “[t]he
reason she is everything to man is that she presents him with the finite; without
her he is an unstable spirit, an unhappy creature who cannot find rest, has no
abode.” (EO II:313). The fact that the judge depends on his wife to rescue him
from becoming desolate and lost to the world obviously contradicts his claim to
gain the world through his own self-reliant efforts. The extent of this
dependence on his wife, and perhaps also his worries about being so dependent,
are reflected in his uncharacteristically angry – even hateful – response to the
issue of women’s liberation.23 This dependence indicates that the judge’s own life
clearly runs afoul of his own warnings against despair, understood as having the
condition of one’s success in life outside oneself.
A challenge to Judge Wilhelm’s treatment of the issue of guilt can be
found in the Ultimatum of Either/Or. The Ultimatum is a sermon sent to the judge
by a Juttland priest on the theme that “in relation to God we are always in the
wrong.” Although the judge claims that the sermon “has grasped what I have
said and what I would like to have said,” the emphasis on the fact that ‘before
God’ we are always guilty has subtle but devastating implications for Judge
Wilhelm’s ethics (EO II:338). As we have seen, Judge Wilhelm understands as
the first step toward self-choice the act of recognizing one’s guilt (“choose oneself
as guilty”) and repenting of this guilt. This first step is then immediately
23 Having explained how woman is “man’s deepest life” in that she “explains finitude” he goes on: “This is
why I hate all that detestable rhetoric about the emancipation of women. God forbid that it may ever
happen. I cannot tell you with what pain the thought can pierce my soul, nor what passionate indignation,
what hate, I harbor toward anyone who dares to express such ideas [...]if this infection were to spread, if it
pushed its way through even to her whom I love, my wife, my joy, my refuge, the root of my life, yes, then
my courage would be crushed, then freedom’s passion in my soul would be exhausted. Then I know very
well what I would do – I would sit in the market place and weep, weep like that artist whose work had been
destroyed and even he could not remember what it represented.” (EO II:311-2)
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followed by the second step of claiming one’s place in the world, made
“infinitely secure” and serenely happy through one’s own self-reliant powers of
ethical vigilance and self-responsibility. The question remains: how, having
repented and having found oneself guilty, could one possibly move on to the
second step of living happily and securely in the world, serenely trusting in one’s
own ethical rectitude? How could it be, as the judge claims, that the ethical
individual faces his guilt and yet “rests with confident security in the assurance
than his life is ethically structured”? Representatives of the life of resignation
claim that a genuine recognition of one’s guilt in fact precludes this second step:
having faced one’s guilt, one simply cannot live serenely confident in one’s own
powers of ethical vigilance and self-responsibility. Instead, the most one can do
is to genuinely repent, to live a life of repentance which entails a renunciation of
the world, substantial relations with others, and oneself.
In contrast to Judge Wilhelm, the Juttland priest and other representatives
of resignation do not think the individual can go beyond repentance and
resignation. The priest’s sermon indicates the most you can do is face your own
guilt and repent, finding “rest and joy only in this, that you might always be in
the wrong” (EO II:349). The same point is put more forcefully by Johannes de
Silentio, the pseudonymous author and ‘knight’ of resignation who ponders the
Abraham story in Fear and Trembling. As he explains in a footnote: “once sin
makes its appearance ethics comes to grief precisely on the question of
repentance. Repentance is the highest ethical expression but for that very reason
the most profound ethical self-contradiction” (FT:124fn). The self-contradiction
within ethics lies in the fact that what ethics (in Judge Wilhelm’s sense) values as
highest is the morally upright life, achieved self-reliantly by taking responsibility
for oneself. But truly taking responsibility for oneself leads inevitably to the
conclusion that one has failed to live the morally upright life, since anyone who
looks hard enough will find at least something of which he or she is guilty. In
other words, pursuing the highest telos of the ethical life leads only, and at most,
to the acknowledgment that one has failed to attain this highest telos.
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The inevitability of failure to live the self-reliant moral life Judge Wilhelm
recommends can be explained by considering a fundamental asymmetry that
exists with respect to self-reliance: one can, by one’s own self-reliant actions, get
oneself into a state of guilt but one cannot, by one’s own self-reliant actions, get
oneself out of a state of guilt. In Kierkegaard’s thinking, what is needed to get out
of a state of guilt is forgiveness. But one cannot forgive oneself24, nor can further
good deeds necessarily annul the guilt of previous misdeeds. The fact that one
has self-reliantly gotten oneself into a state of guilt, and that one cannot get
oneself out of a state of guilt, becomes progressively clearer to the one who takes
seriously the need to assume full responsibility for oneself. Self-reliance leads to
guilt; self-reliance can then reach its limits in the act of repentance. Whereas
Judge Wilhelm thinks he can go one step further and, having fully repented
himself, regain himself on the strength of his own self-responsibility, the person
of resignation is content to dwell in the mode of repentance and considers any
thought of going beyond repentance as mere presumption. Thus, the life of
resignation retains the emphasis on self-reliance that marks the ethical way of life
generally. But in resignation one acknowledges that self-reliance can lead no
further than repentance and that which a life of genuine repentance entails:
renunciation, suffering, and the consciousness of one’s guilt. In this second
manifestation of the ethical life, self-reliant resignation replaces self-reliant
responsibility as one’s fundamental orientation toward oneself, the world, and
others.
Judge Wilhelm seems to believe that one can repent ‘before God’ and then
simply assume that one is forgiven. From the standpoint of theoretical ethics,
this assumption is not unreasonable. Genuine repentance, one might think,
merits forgiveness. An all-good and forgiving God could be reliably counted on
24 We do sometimes talk about ‘forgiving oneself’ in the psychological sense, meaning that one ceases to
dwell on some past action or event. But the idea that one could commit some ethical wrongdoing and then
annul the guilt of this wrongdoing by simply ‘forgiving oneself’ is, of course, absurd. An interesting
question remains about whether the forgiveness of other people is sufficient to annul the guilt of your
wrongdoings, or whether divine forgiveness is required for this. This issue will be discussed in the chapter
on despair.
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to forgive someone who genuinely repented; therefore, one is justified in moving
from the step of repentance to the step of regaining a happy, secure place in the
world.25 As Kierkegaard might say, while this reasoning looks good on paper,
when applied to life its failings become apparent. The Juttland priest’s sermon
points to the presumption in this leap: genuine repentance requires that we
assume just the opposite, that ‘before God’ we are always in the wrong.
Understood from the viewpoint of Judge Wilhelm’s ethics, God is nothing
but a reliable forgiveness-mechanism. Understood from the viewpoint of
resignation, God is a terrifying judge before whom one works out one’s salvation
in “fear and trembling.” Interestingly, Fear and Trembling does not attempt to
address the issue of salvation through forgiveness directly, as Johannes explains
in the footnote quoted above.26 This work mainly deals with the related issue of
renouncing the world (infinite resignation) in contrast to faith, in which one
gains a happy, secure place at home in the world by trusting in God. Johannes
is, by his own admission, a ‘knight’ of resignation (FT:64, 66). He admits that
“God’s love is for me, both in a direct and inverse sense, incommensurable with
the whole of reality. I am not coward enough to whimper and moan on that
account, but neither am I underhanded enough to deny that faith is something
far higher” (FT:63).27 In the life of resignation, one understands one’s highest
duty to be the practice of self-denial, the renunciation of one’s place in the world
and, perhaps most importantly, the renunciation of one’s relations with other
people.
25 While Judge Wilhelm does not explicitly make this argument, it seems that some such reasoning is behind
his leap from repentance to claiming a happy, secure existence in the world.
26 (FT:124fn). At most, these topics are indirectly represented: just as Abraham’s faith represents Christian
faith ‘in a figure’, Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac and God giving Isaac back again may be taken as
a metaphor for repentance and divine forgiveness.
27 This quote illustrates how well the life of resignation matches the ascetic life of “negative commitment”
that Judge Wilhelm criticizes (discussed above). Both Johannes and Judge Wilhelm contrast the life of
resignation with a life of joyful participation in the world, and both rank the latter above the former. Their
disagreement is over how this life of joyful participation in the world can be attained. Judge Wilhelm thinks
it can be attained through self-reliance whereas Johannes thinks it can only be attained by abandoning self-
reliance in the mode of faith.
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Johannes illustrates this way of life, and contrasts it with the life of faith,
by retelling the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac. His inability to come to
terms with the story is expressed by the four versions of the story with in the
“Attunement” at the beginning of Fear and Trembling. In each case, we are
presented with a ‘false Abraham’ who reacts to the trial not with faith but out of
some other existential stance. As the text progresses, Johannes also explains
what he would do in Abraham’s situation. As a self-professed knight of
resignation, Johannes admits “The moment I mounted the horse I would have
said to myself: ‘Now everything is lost, God demands Isaac, I sacrifice him, and
with him all my joy – yet God is love and for me continues to be so.’ For in the
temporal world God and I cannot talk together, we have no common language”
(FT:64). The second and third of the four ‘false Abrahams’ Johannes describes in
the “Attunement” also represent what Abraham might have done had he been a
knight of resignation rather than a knight of faith. The second ‘false Abraham’
sadly but resolutely resigns himself to sacrificing Isaac as God demands. The
steadfastness of his resignation means that when God provides the ram to
sacrifice instead, this Abraham is unable to accept Isaac back again with joy:
“From that day on, Abraham became old, he could not forget that God had
demanded this of him. Isaac throve as before; but Abraham’s eye was darkened,
he saw joy no more” (FT:46). Like Judge Wilhelm in his moment of collapse, this
Abraham becomes prematurely old, joyless and a stranger to his own life.
The third false Abraham understands God’s test according to the ethical
categories of guilt and repentance. He thinks the proper response to the test is to
repent of having even considered killing Isaac: “It was a tranquil evening when
Abraham rode out alone, and he rode to the mountain in Moriah: he threw
himself on his face, he begged God to forgive his sin at having been willing to
sacrifice Isaac, at the father’s having forgotten his duty to his son. He rode more
frequently on his lonely way, but found no peace” (FT:47). In contrast to the real
Abraham, whose faith entails trusting absolutely in God, these false Abrahams
trust in their own capacities for renunciation and repentance.
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Further explanation of the life of resignation in contrast to the life of faith
is found in the work of Johannes Climacus, particularly in the Concluding
Unscientific Postscript to his earlier work, Philosophical Fragments. In the Postscript
Climacus gives a careful analysis of three essential features of the life of
resignation: renunciation of all relative ends and the world (“dying to
immediacy”), suffering, and the consciousness of guilt.
Climacus resolutely disagrees with Judge Wilhelm’s suggestion that the
ethical person "can save his own soul and win the whole world” (EO II:178).
Adopting a more traditional penitential stance, Climacus believes that saving
one’s soul (which he calls “eternal happiness”) requires losing the world.
According to Climacus, the highest telos of one’s life ought to be the absolute
telos: one’s eternal happiness, or (what he takes as equivalent) one’s relationship
to God. Climacus thinks that most people live for some relative end (e.g. status,
wealth, comfort, pleasure) or perhaps for a series of relative ends. He notes that
some people also recognize the value of one’s relation to God and one’s eternal
happiness, but this “also” is precisely what indicates their failure to relate to this
absolute telos absolutely. Climacus believes that to merely include one’s eternal
happiness in a list of other concerns is to treat it as something with relative,
rather than absolute, importance. Climacus seems to have Judge Wilhelm in
mind when he declares: “I do not know whether one should laugh or weep on
hearing the enumeration: a good job, a beautiful wife, health, the rank of
councilor of justice – and in addition an eternal happiness” (PS:391). By merely
including the absolute telos among one’s highest ends, one in fact treats it as
relative and excludes it as the absolute. Climacus believes we should relate to
every relative telos relatively and the absolute telos absolutely. But relating to this
absolute telos absolutely requires being willing to renounce every relative telos in
life: “Now, if to him an eternal happiness is the highest good, this means that in
his acting the finite elements are once and for all reduced to what must be
surrendered in relation to eternal happiness” (PS:391).
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The reason why relating absolutely to the absolute telos requires
renunciation of all relative ends is because from the viewpoint of resignation
what is absolute and godly is mutually exclusive of worldly, relative ends: “one
cannot make the finite commensurate with it” (PS:484). From the perspective of
this way of life, one must give up the world in order to cling to God. Climacus
calls this renunciation “dying to immediacy”: “The effect that a person’s
conception of God or of his eternal happiness should have is that it transforms
his entire existence in relation to it, a transformation that is a dying to
immediacy. [...]This is the cessation of immediacy and the death warrant of
annihilation” (PS:483).
Climacus recognizes that this stance of renunciation has been historically
manifested in the monastic life. While he applauds the devotion and
renunciation of this life, he finds fault with it on the grounds that the ‘monastic
movement’ seeks to outwardly express the inward relation of religiousness: “the
Middle Ages wanted a little cubbyhole in order to be able to occupy itself with
the absolute; but it was precisely by this that the absolute was lost, because it still
became something outward” (PS:408). In contrast, Climacus thinks the proper
life of resignation involves remaining within the everyday world while becoming
inwardly detached from it: “all the passions of finitude must be dead” (PS:472).
The man of resignation becomes dead to the world and a stranger to his own life,
but he remains within it: “He lives in the finite, but he does not have his life in it.
His life, like the life of another, has the diverse predicates of a human existence,
but he is within them like a person who walks in the a stranger’s borrowed
clothes. He is a stranger in the world of finitude” (PS:410).
As a way of life, resignation involves renouncing not only the world, but
oneself and others as well. As Climacus declares, “self-annihilation is the
essential form for the relationship with God.” (PS:460) In addition to
renouncing all of one’s relative ends and becoming a stranger to one’s own
everyday life, this self-annihilation requires the “strenuous consciousness that
[one] is capable of nothing” (PS:430). Whereas Judge Wilhelm sought to achieve
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ethical goodness, and thereby achieve serenity and happiness, Climacus explains
that “the task is to comprehend that a person is nothing at all before God or to be
nothing at all and thereby to be before God, and he continually insists upon
having this incapacity before him, and its disappearance is the disappearance of
religiousness” (PS:460).
Becoming dead to the world and detached from one’s everyday affairs
obviously entails giving up substantial relations with others. Citing the example
of marriage, Judge Wilhelm maintained that a happy, close relationship with
others could be attained through ethical commitment. In contrast, the life of
resignation isolates each individual and treats relationships between individuals
as insignificant. Thus, Climacus’ understanding of marriage is that, as a
relationship between two individuals in the world, it is merely a joke. He thinks
the earnestness of marriage stems from the fact that both partners are separately
relating to God. The marriage relationship between these two particular, existing
individuals, husband and wife, has no significance in itself: “Marriage is still a
jest, a jest that must be treated with all earnestness, except that earnestness does
not therefore inhere in marriage itself but is a reflection of the earnestness of the
relationship with God, a reflection of the husband’s absolute relation to his
absolute telos and of the wife’s absolute relation to her absolute telos” (PS:456).
Another central feature of the life of resignation is suffering. Climacus
believes that suffering necessarily results from trying to live a life devoted to the
absolute telos while remaining in the finite world: “the absoluteness of the
religious placed together with the specific, a combination that in existence is the
very basis and meaning of suffering” (PS:483). The person of religiousness A
suffers because he estranges himself from, yet remains within, the finite world.
To use Climacus’ metaphor, he is like a fish out of water: “just like the fish
(which undauntedly cuts through the water and unerringly steers between the
enchanted regions in the shoals) when it is lying on the ground outside its
element, so too, the religious person is captive, because absoluteness is not
directly the element of a finite existence” (PS:483).
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Climacus therefore holds suffering as essential to the life of resignation. In
contrast, suffering is seen as a merely accidental part of life for the aesthete and
for Judge Wilhelm. For the aesthete, suffering (whether immediate pain, or
reflective boredom) is precisely what one strives to avoid. For Judge Wilhelm
whether one suffers or not is merely accidental: the person who chooses himself
takes responsibility for himself despite suffering, or rather he takes responsibility
for how his suffering, or lack of it, manifests itself in his actions. In contrast to
both the aesthete avoidance of pain, and the ethical attempt to make pain
insignificant, the life of resignation welcomes pain as a sign that life is oriented
against the world and toward God: “the religious person continually has
suffering with him, wants suffering in the same sense as the immediate person
wants good fortune, and wants and has suffering even if the misfortune is not
present externally” (PS:433-4).
Thus, what is fatal for the aesthetic way of life proves essential for the life
of resignation: “Immediacy expires in misfortune; in suffering the religious
begins to breathe” (PS:436). This is in part because for the man of resignation,
suffering is edifying and uplifting. (Suffering further strengthens his resolve and
his willingness to renounce the world and others. It also gives him further cause
to seek self-annihilation. So in a sense, the man of resignation becomes stronger
through his resignation.) But Climacus is careful to distinguish this idea from
the worldly wisdom which claims that suffering makes us stronger or more
capable in a wordly sense: “Aesthetic maundering, worldly wisdom or worldly
sagacity wants to let suffering have its significance in a finite teleology; through
adversities a human being is trained to become something in the finite”(PS:451).
For Climacus, suffering has its significance in that it is a sign that one lives a life
of resignation and because it strengthens this will to renounce the world, not
because it allows one to achieve strength or some finite ends within the world.28
28 Climacus is opposed to the notion of suffering as potentially valuable in the way that Nietzsche suggests,
e.g. in his famous dictum “whatever does not kill me makes me stronger,” (TI: “Maxims” 8), a claim that I
will discuss further in Chapter 4.
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Likewise, suffering does not have its significance as the (finite) achievement of a
monastic self-severity and self-torture: “Suffering as dying to immediacy is,
therefore, not flagellation and other such things; it is not self-torment. In other
words, the self-tormentor by no means expresses that he is capable of nothing
before God, because he considers self-torment to be indeed something”
(PS:463).29
The final aspect of the life of resignation Climacus presents is the
consciousness of guilt. We have already discussed the problem of guilt (that
every individual is guilty of at least some past wrongdoing) and we have seen
how Judge Wilhelm failed to adequately address this problem. Climacus
intensifies this problem of guilt by explaining that any particular wrongdoing
leads to total and absolute guilt, and that this guilt then defines one’s relation to
God. He begins by making the distinction between quantitative and qualitative
conceptions of guilt. According to the former, one person or action may be more
guilty than another person or action; according to the latter, any amount of guilt
whatsoever imparts the quality ‘guilt’ indelibly upon the individual. Climacus
believes that when considered ‘before God’ and in relation to our prospects of
eternal happiness, one’s guilt cannot be understood comparatively and
quantitatively. Rather, one must accept one’s guilt as an absolute quality of who
one is as a person. If a person is at all guilty, he is totally guilty:
The totality of guilt comes into existence for the individual by joining his
guilt, be it just one, be it utterly trivial, together with the relation to an
eternal happiness. That was why we began by saying that the
consciousness of guilt is the decisive expression for the relation to an
eternal happiness. ...The slightest guilt, even if the individual henceforth
were an angel, when joined together with the relation to an eternal
happiness is sufficient, because the joining together yields the qualitative
category. (PS:529).
29 Nietzsche makes a similar point in saying that “He who despises himself still nonetheless respects himself
as one who despises” (BGE:78).
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Because one’s ‘eternal happiness’ is jeopardized by even one guilty act,
when the discovery of any amount of guilt is understood in relation to one’s
eternal happiness30, the conclusion is that one is guilty as a whole person (i.e.
qualitatively) and not simply ‘a little guilty’ for this one act of wrongdoing.
While we commonly talk about guilt in comparative and quantitative terms,
Climacus points out that to avoid the totality and absoluteness of one’s own
particular guilt by hiding behind such comparisons is itself unethical :
Comparatively, relatively, before a human court, perceived in memory
(instead of in the recollection of eternity), one guilt (collectively
understood) is not at all adequate for this; neither is the sum of all of
them. The snag, however, is that it is simply unethical to have one’s
life in the comparative, the relative, in the external, and to have the
police court, the conciliation court, a newspaper, or some of
Copenhagen’s dignitaries, or the urban rabble, be the highest court
with regard to oneself. (PS:530)
As Climacus points out, one only grows more and more guilty the more
one denies or avoids one’s guilt. Using the metaphor of interest on a debt that is
continually compounded, thereby adding usuriously to the principle, Climacus
says that for one who fails to properly address his guilt from the beginning, guilt
only becomes continually greater: “from that moment the total guilt, which is
decisive, practices usury with new guilt” (PS:526). Anyone who protests his
innocence also betrays an avoidance of guilt, since Climacus believes each person
is guilty of at least some wrongdoing; this protest of innocence then becomes just
one more thing of which one is guilty. This phenomenon is what we might call
the ‘guilt trap’, in reference to Climacus’ observation that “if it is true of any
category, it is true of guilt: it traps [fange]. Its dialectic is so cunning that the
30 There is a lot of controversy over what Climacus means by “eternal happiness” or “eternal blessedness,”
but many scholars insist that he is not referring to an afterlife. One’s eternal state of being is something ‘out
of time’ and thus something that exists not just after one dies but now, in ‘this’ life. I think perhaps the best
way to understand this phrase is as naming something like ‘who you really are as a person.’ Kierkegaard’s
point seems to be that if you are guilty at all, then you are guilty as a whole person, and that attempts to see
your guilt in comparative terms only plunge one further into guilt by attempting to avoid one’s guilt.
39
person who totally exonerates himself simply denounces himself, and the person
who partially exonerates himself denounced himself totally” (PS:529).
Instead of avoiding our guilt through comparisons with other people, we
should consider our guilt in relation to ourselves alone, and this means
considering our guilt absolutely. Climacus acknowledges the temptation to
excuse ourselves of guilt, but maintains that such excuses have no place in the
highest life: “In the agreement of silence with the ideal, a word is lacking that is
not missed, because what it designates does not exist, either – it is the word
‘excuse’” (PS:549). He also considers as childish the desire to make guilt go
away. This hope follows from the childish and aesthetic conception of guilt, that
“the individual is without guilt, then guilt and guiltlessness come along as
alternating categories in life; at times the individual is guilty of this or that and at
times not guilty” (PS:537). One can neither hide in the comparative view that all
people are guilty and therefore one’s own guilt is not so special, nor can one
escape in the hope that one will somehow become ethically good again:
Therefore this is not a childish matter of beginning all over again, of being
a good child again, but neither is it a matter of universal indulgence, that
all people are like that. As I have said, just one guilt – then with this the
existing person who relates himself to an eternal happiness is forever
imprisoned (PS:533).
Climacus also distinguishes his notion of a life of repentance for one’s
total guilt from any attempt at rectification through self-inflicted penance. The
problem with self-inflicted penance is that it assumes that through penance one’s
guilt can be erased. This treats one’s guilt as something finite and as equivalent
to the suffering of the penance: “All self-inflicted penance is a lower satisfaction,
not only because it is self-inflicted, but because even the most enthusiastic
penance makes guilt finite by making it commensurable”(PS:542). Penance may
also be practiced by doing good deeds, but here the objection is the same: one’s
guilt is not something equivalent and commensurable such that some amount of
good deeds could be enough to annul it. Climacus finds that “it is deeply rooted
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in human nature that guilt requires punishment” and remarks: “How natural,
then, to think up something by oneself, a toilsome task, perhaps, even if it is
dialectical in such a way that is can possibly benefit others, charity to the needy,
denying oneself a wish, etc.” (PS:549). Climacus finds this attempt at
rectification “childish and beautiful” but ultimately naïve: “this is indeed
analogous to self-inflicted penance, but, however well intentioned it is, it still
makes guilt finite. There is in it a childlike hope and a childlike wish that
everything could be all right again” (PS:549).
The real significance of guilt is found in the guilty individual’s relation to
the absolute, i.e. his relation to God and the prospect of his own eternal
happiness. Climacus believes that guilt establishes a distance between oneself
and God. In repentance, we acknowledge this “abyss” but also orient ourselves
once again toward our eternal happiness and God: “In the eternal recollecting of
guilt-consciousness, the existing person relates himself to an eternal happiness,
but not in such a way that he now has come closer to it directly; on the contrary,
he is now distanced from it as much as possible, but he still relates himself to it”
(PS:535). The man of resignation insists upon his guilt and the distance it places
between himself and God and himself because by steadfastly doing so, and
repenting of it all, he can once again at least relate himself to God and to his
eternal happiness. In other words, repentance at least orients oneself toward
God even if it also acknowledges an unbridgeable gulf of guilt separating oneself
from God.
This insistence on finding oneself guilty indicates that the person of
resignation has not given up the goal of self-reliance. This person believes that
one cannot attain goodness self-reliantly, but one can self-reliantly acknowledge
one’s failure to do so and repent of it. As we shall discuss in the chapter on
despair, the person of resignation’s insistence on his own guilt might seem like
humility, but in the face of the offer of divine forgiveness, this insistence on one’s
guilt is in fact a form of defiance.
41
§ 3: THE RELIGIOUS WAY OF LIFE
In the previous section, we saw how the domain of ‘the ethical’ encompasses
both a life lived according to Judge Wilhelm’s ethics of self-responsibility and the life
of resignation. Spokesmen for the life of resignation, Johannes de Silentio and
Johannes Climacus, both admit that the life of resignation is inferior to another way of
life, and both give us a glimpse of a way of life that is superior to either version of the
ethical life. This superior alternative is the “life of faith,” the religious way of life that
Climacus calls “Religiousness B,” “paradoxical religiousness,” or simply
“Christianity.” The principal difference between the life of faith and Religiousness A
is that Religiousness A remains entirely in the domain of self-reliant human
achievement (what Climacus calls the domain of ‘immanence’). The essential defining
factor in ‘the ethical life’ (broadly conceived to include the ‘ethico-religious’) is the
uncompromising insistence on self-reliance, whether this be the self-reliance required
by Judge Wilhelm’s ethics of self-responsibility or the self-reliance required for the
resignation, suffering and guilt of Religiousness A. As Johannes de Silentio explains,
from the ethical point of view, human existence is an “entirely self-enclosed” sphere
in which “the ethical is at once the limit and completion. God becomes an invisible,
vanishing point, an impotent thought, and his power is to be found only in the ethical,
which fills all existence” (FT:96). By insisting on self-reliance, the ethical conception
of life therefore excludes the reality of God; insisting on self-reliance also means
refusing outside help, which includes the possibility of forgiveness.31
In contrast, the life of faith requires that we surrender this insistence on self-
reliance. Living by faith means putting one’s trust absolutely in God, not in one’s
own strengths and abilities. Moreover, by asking us to relate to a particular historical
figure and by insisting that our eternal happiness depends not on our own
accomplishments but on the accomplishments of this figure (i.e., the Atonement),
Christianity posits conditions for the good life which are external to the individual.
Self-reliance may be necessary for getting as far as Religiousness A, but self-reliance
31 Johannes points out that this leads to a “curious comedy” since ethics includes the problem of guilt but not
its solution (forgiveness) (FT:124).
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must be abandoned if a person is to cross the threshold into the life of faith. In many
ways faith simply is this abandonment of self-reliance. More exactly, faith is a way of
living in which one relates to oneself, other people and the world through one’s
loving trust in God.
Contrary to the usual gloomy caricature, Kierkegaard envisioned the life of
faith as one in which love of God manifests itself in loving, joyful engagement with
others and the world. As Kierkegaard understands it, this life of joyful, genuine
participation in the world is a stance gained only through accepting one’s life as a gift
and task from God. This insistence that the life of faith is a life of joy is a central
message of Fear and Trembling, and is further worked out in later discourses such as
the Three Devotional Discourses (‘The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air’), The
Woman Who was a Sinner, and Three Discourses at Communion on Fridays. In order to
establish an understanding of the life of faith, I will first turn to Johannes de Silentio’s
Fear and Trembling, which provides what is probably the most concrete and expansive
portrait of the life of faith in the Kierkegaard literature. In order to fill out further
details of Kierkegaard’s conception of the life of faith, and to justify my life-affirming
reading of this conception, I will then turn briefly to the other works just mentioned.
Before proceeding, it is worth addressing what Kierkegaard means by calling
the life of faith “paradoxical.” Kierkegaard is famous for claiming that the domain of
faith lies beyond the bounds of philosophical inquiry by declaring that faith is a
“paradox”: “Philosophy cannot and should not give us an account of faith, but should
understand itself and know just what it has indeed to offer” (FT:63). If this is the case,
one might reasonably wonder how my task in this section could ever be carried out.
To address this worry, we must first realize that by “philosophy” Kierkegaard means
systematic rational thought in the manner of Hegel, as the context of the previous
quote makes clear. The kind of existential philosophical exploration undertaken by
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms is not able to provide a systematic explanation of
faith (i.e. a rational theology), but neither does it try to do this. Instead, it attempts
(and I think ultimately succeeds) in developing a basic portrait of a life of faith,
specifically how faith might manifest itself in the contemporary world.
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We should also realize that Kierkegaard has several notions of paradoxes in
the life of faith, but none of them preclude him from sketching a workable portrait of
the life of faith, as he does in several works. By paradoxes he means something which
is not only beyond rational comprehension, but which rational thought will most
likely condemn as a contradiction or as nonsense. For the most part these paradoxes
are theological, or rather, anti-theological in the sense that they make impossible any
attempt to understand the nature or workings of God. For example, Kierkegaard
thinks the central Christian notion of an eternal God becoming a human being in time
is, logically speaking, a contradiction. Likewise, he thinks there is something
paradoxical in the Christian notion of forgiveness, as I will discuss later in this
chapter. With respect to Abraham, Johannes thinks that it is paradoxical for
Abraham to be willing to sacrifice Isaac out of faith while simultaneously having faith
that God will not demand this sacrifice, or will restore Isaac. (The idea that an
unchanging, omniscient God might change his mind and call off the request might
itself seem paradoxical. This apparent contradiction is compounded by the fact that
God has already promised Abraham that through Isaac he will be ‘the father of a
multitude of nations,’ so his demand that Isaac be sacrificed would entail God
breaking his promise, which may be another paradox.) Although Kierkegaard thinks
that these aspects of the life of faith can never be rationally explained, this obviously
does not stop him from pursuing what he finds more pressing than these theoretical
concerns, namely drawing a portrait of how faith would manifest itself in a way of
life.
Even aside from these difficulties regarding ‘paradoxes’, the religious way of
life is by far the most difficult to describe. Perhaps the greatest success in Fear and
Trembling is the demonstration of this difficulty through Johannes’s successive failures
to come to terms with the story of Abraham either poetically or dialectically. As
Johannes’ efforts reveal, some things about the life of faith simply cannot be
explained. In particular, one can explain neither the nature of the divine being nor
how a person comes to make the internal ‘leap’ by which she comes to have faith in
this divine being. What can be said about the life of faith, in Johannes’ account, is
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something about the kind of internal orientation faith represents (i.e. one of love, trust,
joy, etc.). Moreover, Johannes has much to say about the benefits of living by faith:
namely, a life of loving, secure, and happy engagement with others in the everyday
world. Thus, Johannes gives us a character sketch of the person of faith, not a
roadmap to how one comes to have faith.
Looked at externally, the person of faith may take on a wide variety of roles
and appearances. Johannes rejects the idea that a person of faith necessarily takes on
set external roles, such as those of the clergy or the monastic orders. Faith does
indeed manifest itself in external action; it is not mere “hidden inwardness,” as
Climacus suggests.32 (As Kierkegaard claims in Works of Love, faith requires that we
follow the example of Jesus in loving others, and for Jesus love was “pure action”
(WL:106).) Yet such actions may be ambiguous when seen from the outside (like
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, which could appear as a sign of faith or its opposite).
Hence, faith manifests itself in external action, yet there is no definitive external mark
of faith. The definitive mark of faith is the internal “movement” of faith which the
person makes: his orientation toward God and, thereby, toward himself, the world,
and others. This internal movement lies behind whatever external acts of devotion or
works of love faith requires of him.
One of the central points in Fear and Trembling is that faith, far from requiring
world-renunciation, requires an active, joyful engagement in one’s ‘worldly’ affairs.
Johannes insists that the person of faith “minds his affairs” and “takes part, takes
pleasure” in everything life in the world has to offer (FT:68). We have already
described in broad strokes the contrast Johannes draws between resignation and faith.
As Johannes explains, for the ‘knight’ of resignation there is an incommensurability
between the world (‘finitude’) and his internal orientation (‘infinitude’). In contrast,
the knight of faith as no conflict reconciling his internal orientation with a life fully
32 Kierkegaard later rejected the emphasis on ‘hidden inwardness’ as part of his campaign against the
complacency and lack of ‘works of love’ he saw in Christendom. In his biography of Kierkegaard, Joakim
Garff notes that “from having been the implacable defender of inwardness, Kierkegaard became its no less
implacable prosecutor. This is why his writings can be read retrospectively as an elaborate history of the
abolition of inwardness” Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard, Transl. Bruce Kirmse (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005), 265.
45
engaged in the world, since his internal orientation directs him back to a loving, active
engagement with his ‘affairs’ in the world: “One detects nothing of the strangeness
and superiority that mark the knight of the infinite. This man takes pleasure, takes
part, in everything, and whenever one catches him occupied with something his
engagement has the persistence of the worldly person whose soul is wrapped up in
such things” (FT:68). Whereas the knight of resignation remains in the finite world
only as a stranger, the knight of faith is fully at home in the world. Thus, living by
faith does not mean ceasing to engage in the affairs of ‘this’ world or engaging in them
only as one who is inwardly ‘dead to the world.’ Faith means fully engaging in these
affairs with faith as one’s guide. Johannes reveals that the life of secure, happy
participation in the everyday world – a life which Judge Wilhelm thought could be
attained through ethical self-reliance – is in fact attainable only through faith.
How does faith in God allow for this happy, secure life? The person of faith
participates in worldly affairs ‘on the strength of the absurd,’ meaning that he does so
guided by a faith in an absolutely transcendent God who nonetheless loves and cares
for him and for every seemingly insignificant moment of his life. As Johannes
explains, the person of resignation steadfastly refuses to “burden God with his petty
cares”; he dares not ask God for anything in this world, humbly desiring only to
‘’gaze upon his love” for God and to “keep its virginal flame pure and clear” (FT:64).
In contrast, the person of faith remains “convinced that God troubles himself about
the smallest things” (FT:64). Because he trusts absolutely in God and believes God
cares for his life in this world, the knight of faith walks through life confidently, even
more at home in the world than the worldly aesthete or Judge Wilhelm’s devoted man
of duty and self-responsibility. Through faith, one can enjoy life for the first time since
this enjoyment stems from neither an aesthetic need to escape boredom, nor from the
ethical person’s (fraudulent) sense of security regarding his own moral merit.
Johannes provides an extended character sketch of the contemporary person of
faith strolling around Copenhagen, passionately engaging in everyday affairs with a
joyful and care-free confidence gained through faith: “Carefree as a devil-may-care
good-for-nothing, he hasn’t a worry in the world, and yet he purchases every moment
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that he lives, ‘redeeming the seasonable time’ at the dearest price; not the least thing
does he do except on the strength of the absurd” (FT:69). The person of faith is
‘carefree’ because he trusts absolutely in God. He enjoys a happy, secure place in the
world not through his own achievement, but by trusting in God. Johannes continues:
“His stance? Vigorous, it belongs altogether to finitude, no smartly turned-out
townsman taking a stroll out to Fresberg on a Sunday afternoon treads the ground
with surer foot; he belongs altogether to the world, no petit bourgeois belongs to it
more” (FT:68).
Naturally, someone so passionately engaged in the world is also passionately
engaged in relations with other people. The contemporary knight of faith is described
as joyful, open and affable with others, inspiring of their trust, and loving toward his
wife (FT:68-70). In order to learn more about the way faith manifests itself in
relationships with others, we will now turn to the central representative of the life of
faith in Fear and Trembling, Abraham. As Johannes sees it, Abraham proves his faith
by being willing to sacrifice Isaac but also retaining hope that Isaac will be spared or
restored to him. The life of faith’s loving engagement in the world is illustrated by
Abraham’s love of Isaac (without which his sacrifice of Isaac would mean nothing)
and, moreover, by his joyful acceptance of Isaac after God provides the ram to be
sacrificed instead. As Johannes points out, viewed externally Abraham’s binding of
Isaac and raising the knife seems like an act of murder. That it is instead an act of love
(love of God, love of Isaac, and thereby also love for the meaning of his own life)
cannot be made clear externally, at least not in the decisive moment. This is why
external appearances are at best an ambiguous sign of the life of faith.
For Johannes, the Abraham story shows that the person of faith relates to others
not through the ‘mediation’ of ethical duty, but directly and with love. Regarding
Abraham’s relation with Isaac, Johannes says it is “but a poor expression to say that
he faithfully fulfilled the father’s duty to love the son” (FT:54). He goes on to
describe Abraham’s love of Isaac in such a way that “not many a father in the realm
would dare maintain he loved his son thus” (FT:61). Externally, it may seem that
Abraham is not even living up to this duty: his willingness to sacrifice Isaac seems like
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an obvious breach of this duty. Nonetheless, Johannes thinks that Abraham fulfills
his duty to his son not by obeying this ethical duty, but by trusting in God. This trust
guides Abraham to an even more perfect expression of love for his son than those
who (merely) fulfill their ethical duty.
This is one aspect of the famous and much-misunderstood “teleological
suspension of the ethical.” What is suspended in this suspension is not the ethical per
se, but its teleological status as the most important concern. In Abraham’s trial the
ethical does not cease to press its demands, and this is one of the things that makes
Abraham’s situation so horrifying. But these ethical demands are suspended as the
most important telos by the demands of faith. Johannes is clear that Abraham’s faith
does not give him any kind of ‘moral holiday’ in which the laws of ethics cease to
apply to him. Rather, he remains perilously in opposition to the demands of the
ethical: “now when the ethical is thus teleologically suspended, how does the single
individual in whom it is suspended exist? He exists as the particular in opposition to
the universal” (FT:90). What Johannes finds paradoxical about this situation is that
somehow the demands of the ethical are fulfilled after all, although not in the way
demanded by ethics: “Faith is just this paradox, that the single individual as the
particular is higher than the universal, is justified before the latter, not as subordinate
but as superior” (FT:84).
One consequence of Abraham’s ‘going beyond’ the ethical is his inability to
fully communicate with others. Johannes points out that when undergoing such a
spiritual trial, the knight of faith seems to violate the ethical law, and he must
therefore forgo sympathy or support from others. In such moments, he exists in
“absolute isolation” (FT:106). A knight of faith cannot even get help or sympathy
from other knights of faith (FT:99). In fact, the knight of faith can do nothing to
communicate to others that he is being tested by God. In the longest of his three
Problemata, Johannes explains that because Abraham puts himself outside the
universal, he cannot communicate his plight in a way that would be understood by
others: “Abraham is silent – but he cannot speak, therein lies the distress and anguish.
For if when I speak I cannot make myself understood, I do not speak even if I keep
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talking without stop day and night” (FT:137). The knight of faith’s absolute relation
to the absolute cannot be explained by reference to universal duties, nor can it be
explained in the universal terms of a common language.
Despite the isolation imposed by the inability to explain matters of faith,
Johannes emphasizes the person of faith’s continuity with the world and love of
others. The crux of Johannes’ meditation on Abraham is that true faith is faith for this
life, not a faith in some other-worldly afterlife. Likewise, although faith may involve
‘hidden inwardness’ it is not a withdrawal into inwardness as resignation is. Faith is
therefore not something that sets a person apart from or opposed to the everyday
world. It is a way of life in which one’s internal relationship to God leads back to an
external engagement with one’s daily affairs. Faith simply is a way of relating to God
such that one participates actively and lovingly in this world:
But Abraham had faith, and had faith for this life. Yes, had his faith only
been for a future life it would indeed have been easier to cast everything
aside in order to hasten out of this world to which he did not belong. But
Abraham’s faith was not of that kind, if there is such, for a faith like that is
not really faith but only its remotest possibility, a faith that has some
inkling of its object at the very edge of the field of vision but remains
separated from it by a yawning abyss in which despair plays its pranks.
But it was for this life that Abraham believed, he believed he would
become old in his land, honoured among his people, blessed in his kin,
eternally remembered in Isaac, the dearest in his life. (FT:53-4)
As it will be an important point later when we compare Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, it is worth emphasizing here that Kierkegaard’s conception of religious
faith is not a matter world-renouncing, other-worldly asceticism, as Nietzsche might
expect of any form of Christianity. In fact, as other scholars have pointed out,
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are in agreement in condemning the ascetic life of world-
and self-renunciation.33 In fact, for Kierkegaard, faith is understood specifically in
contrast to resignation.
33 For example, James Kellenberger’s Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (MacMillan Press, 1997) contains an extensive
argument for this point.
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The example of Abraham illustrates this point nicely. Abraham is the paragon of
faith because he was both able to make the movement of resignation, preparing
himself earnestly for the sacrifice of Isaac as God demanded, and yet he was also able
to maintain hope that through God’s help he would not lose Isaac after all. This hope
is certainly absurd, if only because it is absurd to think that God would demand
Isaac’s life and yet also spare it. It is also absurd because it is not based on any
calculation of what is probable, nor is it based on Abraham’s own ability to save Isaac.
Abraham’s entire energy was focused on obeying God by sacrificing Isaac. His hope
for Isaac’s survival is therefore not a hope in his own abilities, but in God’s abilities.
As Johannes explains, since ‘for God all things are possible,’ Abraham can maintain
his hope in God even when all worldly wisdom tells him such hope is absurd:
All along he had faith, he believed that God would not demand Isaac of
him, while he was still willing to offer him if that was indeed what was
demanded. He believed on the strength of the absurd, for there could be
no question of human calculation, and it was indeed absurd that God who
demanded this of him should in the next instant withdraw the demand.
He climbed the mountain, even in that moment when the knife gleamed he
believed – that God would not demand Isaac. Certainly he was surprised
by the outcome, but by means of a double movement he had come back to
his original position and therefore received Isaac more joyfully than the
first time. (FT:65)
The “double movement” characterizing the life of faith is the movement of
resignation followed by the movement of faith, in which what was renounced in the
movement of resignation is nonetheless hoped for and received again with joy in the
movement of faith. Therefore, for Johannes the issue of Abraham’s joy in accepting
Isaac back again is central to understanding the life of faith. Both the ‘knight of
resignation’ and the ‘knight of faith’ are willing to sacrifice Isaac. This willingness
represents an absolute obedience to God and shows that a person is earnest and
strong enough to concentrate the whole of his being in the task God demands, even
when this task involves destroying the meaning of his life. But faith requires an
additional step, that the person who has made this movement of resignation
nonetheless maintain hope that God will not demand this sacrifice. Faith requires not
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only that he hope for this, but also (what is perhaps more difficult for one who has
become passionately resigned) that he joyfully accept his life in the finite, everyday
world with joy, as a gift and a task from God. This is represented by Abraham’s being
able to accept Isaac back again with joy after having resigned himself to sacrifice him.
Such joyful acceptance is in keeping with the hope he had always maintained, that
God would not take Isaac after all. Since his resignation was accompanied by this
hope, his overall stance is in harmony with both the sacrifice of Isaac and the return of
Isaac.
Thus, the person of faith has all the self-control and devotion of the knight of
resignation; he is willing to sacrifice everything for the absolute telos. What
distinguishes the knight of faith and the knight of resignation is the second
‘movement’ in the two-step dance of faith Johannes describes. Abraham’s joy, “really
heartfelt joy,” in his life with Isaac, and the fact that “he needed no preparation, no
time to adjust himself to finitude and its joy,” signifies that he has gone beyond the
movement of infinite resignation (FT:66). He performed this movement of
resignation dutifully. (Many readings of the Abraham story consider this obedience
the proof of Abraham’s faith. Johannes goes beyond the traditional interpretations of
Abraham by insisting that the real test of faith is not whether Abraham was willing to
sacrifice Isaac, but whether he could do so and yet also accept Isaac back with joy.)
Like Abraham, the person of faith is willing to sacrifice everything for God, but he
also retains hope and faith that God will not demand the sacrifice, or will somehow
reverse it. Thus, the life of faith avoids the world-renunciation and self-denial that
mark the life of resignation. The person of faith is willing to sacrifice everything if
God demands it, but also accept his life in the world as a gift from God and as
something God cares about. It is for this reason that love of a transcendent God
manifests itself in loving engagement in the finite world.
The Abraham story also illustrates that faith goes beyond self-reliance of either
the life of self-responsibility or the life of resignation, although the person of faith
properly accepts his responsibilities in life and is willing to renounce even what is
dearest to him if God demands it. Devotion to the ethical law implies, and in fact
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requires self-reliance: the responsibility for fulfilling the ethical law must necessarily
fall on the individual alone. Any attempt to defer this responsibility, or to deny that
fulfilling the ethical law is always within one’s ability, constitutes a neglect and
violation of the ethical law. The ethical hero, whether he be Judge Wilhelm’s stolid
burgher or Johannes’ knight of infinite resignation, is the paragon of self-reliance: all
that he is, at least in relation to what he values the most, is his own doing. He turns to
no one else for help and would regard doing so as a sign of weakness and failure.
In contrast, the person of faith has given up this belief in self-reliance; he is
humble enough to admit that he needs help. As Johannes says, the person of faith is
“humble enough to demand” God’s help. Johannes emphasizes the humility of this
stance in part because such a demand can so easily look like arrogant
presumptuousness. Indeed, claiming such special attention from God, remaining
“convinced that God troubles himself about the smallest thing” in your life seems like
a sign of megalomania.34 Moreover, Johannes reveals a deep danger in this “demand”:
throwing oneself helplessly before God and demanding his help in the name of faith
appears to be testing God. Even the thought of doing so provokes dread in Johannes:
“an immense anxiety seizes my soul, for what is it to test God?” (FT:76) Thus the
absolute trust in God that is constitutive of faith can appear as fatalism and
megalomania, if not also a direct affront to God.
The person of faith’s “demand” for God’s help only reveals itself as humble
when we consider that this absolute trust in God comes not out of a hopeless fatalism
or a desire to shirk one’s responsibilities, but out of an absolute devotion to God
which includes an obedient willingness to do whatever He demands. Abraham takes
on the “terrible responsibility” invested in him by God’s demand that he sacrifice
Isaac while still maintaining his responsibility as a loving father. He accepts these
responsibilities as absolutely his own and fulfills them both perfectly, despite the
apparent conflict between them. He can do this, and thereby pass the test of faith,
34 Alternately, we might think that this conception demeans God. Nietzsche, for example, talks about the
caring God of the Gospels as a “petty deity” who “finds nothing nauseous in the most miserable small
service” (GS:277).
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precisely because he has both the courage and strength to do whatever God demands
and the hope that God will save or restore Isaac through His own divine omnipotence.
Since “for God all things are possible,” Abraham’s absolute relation to God
grants him access to an endless source of strength and courage which he can call upon
in acting to fulfill his responsibilities. It also brings with it an inexhaustible well of
hope that God will both continue to grant this strength and courage and insure that
the meaning of his life is preserved, even when this God-given courage and strength
are not sufficient to preserve it. Thus, the person of faith ventures far beyond what she
can do by her own strength and courage or understand by her own strength of mind
(i.e. far beyond what Climacus calls ‘the immanent’.) In relation to this point, one
might say that a person of faith is continually making the movement of resignation at
least in the sense that he is continually renouncing hope in his own abilities to gain
happiness or security in a life engaged in the world. He renounces his “claim” on the
world. But for the person of faith, this resignation is a necessary prerequisite for being
able to trust absolutely in God. Only by giving up his own insecure claim on the
world is he able to fully accept his life in the world as a gift and task from God. The
result is an even more secure (and thereby, joyful) engagement with the world than
that found in other ways of life.35 Johannes de Silentio explains that only by
continually making the movement of resignation and the movement of faith can one
live a life fully, joyfully and securely engaged in the finite world:
this man has made and is at every moment making the movement of
infinity. He drains in infinite resignation the deep sorrow of existence, he
knows the bliss of infinity, he has felt the pain of renouncing everything,
whatever is most precious in the world, and yet to him finitude tastes just as
good as to one who has never known anything higher, for his remaining in
the finite bore no trace of a stunted, anxious training, and still he has this
sense of being secure to take pleasure in it, as though it were the most
certain thing of all. (FT:69-70)
35 The aesthete retains only a fleeting and insecure relationship to the finitude in which he tries to lose
himself. The ethical person thinks he can achieve a secure relation to the world through self-responsibility,
but becomes shipwrecked on the problem of guilt. The resigned person thinks he can genuinely address the
problem of guilt through repentance and renunciation, but as we will see, this amounts to a defiant rejection
of God’s help.
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This twofold movement of giving up the finite and then accepting it back as a
gift from God is what demarcates the person of faith. It follows a familiar pattern of
renunciation and return found in the religions and myths of many cultures. In many
of these myths the world to which the hero returns is on one hand the same world in
the sense that the basic facts of the world are not changed. On the other hand, by
returning to it through the journey of his renunciation the hero’s world is somehow
fundamentally changed. This is also true with the hero of faith. Johannes insists, as
we said earlier, that the finite world which the person regains through faith is “exactly
the same finitude” that he renounced, and this is true in the sense that all the concrete
facts of this person’s everyday world remain as they were.36 The movement of faith
does not magically rid life of all the misfortunes or suffering which normally
accompany it. Nor does the person of faith return to the life of immediacy lived by
the aesthete. As Johannes explains, “faith is not the first immediacy but a later one.
The first immediacy is the aesthetic [...] But faith is not the aesthetic” (FT:109).
Because the person returns to these facts of the everyday world with the orientation of
faith, the world now presents itself in a very different way:
And yet, and yet the whole earthly form he presents is a new creation on
the strength of the absurd. He resigned everything infinitely, and then
took everything back on the strength of the absurd. He is continually
making the movement of infinity, but he makes it with such accuracy and
poise that he is continually getting finitude out of it, and not for a second
would one suspect anything else. (FT:70)
The life of faith attains a unity between the sacred and the mundane, the
religious and the everyday. Johannes expresses this by saying that to make the
‘movement’ of faith is “to transform the leap in life to a gait, to express the
sublime in the pedestrian absolutely – that is something only the knight of faith
can do – and it is the one and only marvel” (FT:70). How it is that a person can
36 Here we have the religious version of Kierkegaard’s notion of repetition: what is sacrificed is regained in
full. As discussed in the introduction, it is interesting to compare this notion of repetition with Nietzsche’s
notion of eternal recurrence.
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regain finitude after renouncing it and thereby “express the sublime in the
pedestrian absolutely” is not only a marvel for Johannes: it is a mystery and a
paradox.
This explains the life of faith’s existential stance toward the world, but what
exactly is faith’s existential stance toward oneself? We have already discussed how
the person of faith relates to his own life as a gift and task from God. Fear and
Trembling also contains an important discussion of the peculiar form of egoism found
in the life of faith. As we have said, the person of faith is motivated by an absolute
devotion to God; his absolute relation to the absolute is his highest telos. Although he
may fulfill the ethical law, doing so is not his highest telos and he does so in a very
different way than the ethical person. The person for whom ethical status is the
highest telos relates to God either abstractly, as synonymous with ‘duty’, or indirectly
as the creator and enforcer of the ethical law. This person relates to himself as an
instantiation of a universal “human.” In contrast to the superficial egoism of the
aesthete, the ethical person prides himself on a life of altruism and respect for duty.
Fulfilling the demands of the ethical means embracing some form of self-denial,
whether this means the ‘abrogation’ of the particular self when it conflicts with the
law or the complete renunciation of the world through infinite resignation.
Undoubtedly there is also an element of self-denial in the absolute devotion of faith,
but Johannes explains that this devotion to a personal relationship with God, a
relationship whose claim is based on one’s particular life, also represents a form of
egoism. Abraham’s actions contain “the expression of extreme egoism (doing this
dreadful deed for his own sake) and on the other the expression of the most absolute
devotion (doing it for God’s sake)” (FT:99). Johannes insists on the unity of these two
motivations:
Then why does Abraham do it? For God’s sake, and what is exactly the
same, for his own. He does it for the sake of God because God demands
this proof of his faith; he does it for his own sake in order to be able to
produce the proof. The unity here is quite properly expressed in the
saying in which this relationship has always been described: it is a trial, a
temptation. (FT:88)
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As Johannes suggests, the key to understanding the unity of Abraham’s
extreme egoism and his absolute devotion to God lies in the particular nature of
Abraham’s trial. Usually in such a trial the temptation is to stray from the ethical,
whereas in Abraham’s case it is precisely the ethical which is the temptation. Had
Abraham clung to the demands of the ethical as the highest telos, he would not be the
father of faith, as the third of the four ‘false Abrahams’ illustrates. Instead, Abraham
clings to God and thereby passes the test.
Before leaving Fear and Trembling, one further point merits discussion. It might
seem that Johannes de Silentio presents two conflicting portraits of the person of faith:
on one hand there is Copenhagen’s blithe wanderer and on the other hand there is
Abraham journeying to Mt. Moriah in fear and trembling. How can these two very
different images of faith be reconciled?
The first point to realize is that the knight of faith strolling around Copenhagen
is not the superficial aesthete or bourgeois philistine he may appear to be. True, his
life is joyful and carefree, but he attains this joy and security not through aesthetic
hedonism but through faith, and this requires the preliminary movement of
resignation. As quoted above, this seemingly carefree man of leisure “has made and
is at every moment making the movement of infinity. He drains in infinite resignation
the deep sorrow of existence...he has felt the pain of renouncing everything, whatever
is most precious in the world” (FT:69). The wonder of faith is that one can be
continually making this movement of resignation and yet, through making the
additional movement of faith, live happily and at home in the world.
Perhaps a more important point to realize is that the test of Abraham’s faith on
Mt. Moriah is not the only occasion in which he has faith: it tests whether he has lived
by faith all along. Abraham is not ‘the father of faith’ because he had faith in a
moment of crisis, but because he always lived by faith. Thus although Fear and
Trembling focuses on the story of Abraham’s trial, Johannes also mentions other
moments in Abraham’s life when his faith becomes especially apparent: “It was by his
faith that Abraham could leave the land of his fathers to become a stranger in the land
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of promise”( FT:50), “It was faith that made Abraham accept the promise that all
nations of the earth should be blessed in his seed” (FT:51), “the wonder of faith lies in
Abraham and Sarah’s being young enough to wish, and in faith’s having preserved
the wish” (FT:52), “He accepted the fulfillment of the promise, he accepted it in faith,
and it happened according to expectation and according to faith” (FT:52).
What his ‘trial’ at Mt. Moriah tests, even as it asks him to give up the meaning
of this life in the world, is whether he lives in the world by faith or by adherence to
ethical duty. Generally speaking, the demands of ethics and the demands of faith
may be perfectly aligned, and to all external appearances the person of faith may
simply be following the ethical law. Abraham’s relationship to God usually manifests
itself in what Johannes calls “the ethical life”: the fulfillment of his duties to his family
and the society or state that he has founded through Isaac. But for this very reason, it
is not immediately apparent whether Abraham lives by faith or by adherence to ‘the
universal’. The juxtaposition of the demands of faith and the demands of the ethical
in a trial such as Abraham’s offers a way of distinguishing one who lives by faith from
one who lives by adherence to ethical duty. The faith that Abraham manifests in
passing God’s test is the faith that he lives by all along. When Johannes describes how
Abraham has “faith for this life” it is clear that this faith is something that Abraham
lives by every moment of his life. It is his way of living everyday life in the world.
Thus Johannes ends Fear and Trembling by explaining that the person who attains faith
does not come to a ‘standstill’ thereafter but continues to live by his love of God,
insisting: “’I’m by no means standing still in my love, for I have my life in it.’ (FT:146).
As mentioned above, the portrait of the life of faith that we get from Fear and
Trembling is not sufficient unto itself. In order to fill out further details of the life of
faith, we turn first to the only author in Kierkegaard’s stable (including the venerable
‘Magister Kierkegaard’) who writes from the point of view of this highest way of life:
Anti-Climacus. He is the pseudonymous author of The Sickness Unto Death which
establishes an understanding of faith in the context of the development of the self, the
dialectics of which were so central to our discussion of the aesthetic and ethical ways
of life. We have already discussed how the life of faith entails relating to oneself and
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one’s life as a gift and a task from God. Anti-Climacus centers The Sickness Unto
Death around the question of how one should properly relate to oneself. The
conclusion he reaches is that only faith constitutes a proper relation to oneself (namely
by relating to oneself as something ‘established’ by God) and therefore only faith is
consistent with true selfhood. As Anti-Climacus explains, a human self is not a self-
enclosed entity. The human self is a relation to itself which includes a relation to “the
power which established it,” i.e., God (SUD:44). Anti-Climacus begins the work by
defining the human self as “a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation
which is its relating to itself” and as a “synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the
temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity” (SUD:43). Although these
definitions are largely correct, they are not complete: “Looked at in this way a human
being is not yet a self” (SUD:43).
What is missing from these definitions is the fact that this self-relation includes
a relation to God. Anti-Climacus explains that because the human self did not create
itself, but was established or “derived” by something else, in relating to itself it also
relates to that which established it: “Such a derived, established relation is the human
self, a relation which relates to itself, and in relating to itself relates to something else”
(SUD:43). The rest of The Sickness Unto Death is a penetrating analysis of different
kinds of despair, understood as ways that the self can misrelate to itself and to God.
The opposite of despair, the proper way to relate to oneself and God, is faith.
Anti-Climacus concludes the work by showing that attaining true selfhood and
having faith are one and the same. Thus he gives “the formula for that state in which
there is no despair at all: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is
grounded transparently in the power which established it. Which formula in turn, as
has been remarked, is the definition of faith” (SUD:165). Note that this non-
despairing self must be grounded “transparently” in the power that established it.
We might assume that since the self has been established by God, it is always in a
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sense grounded in God. But a proper relation to oneself must include a conscious
awareness of this relation to God.37
Thus, one way of describing the despair of other ways of life is that they each
involve a particular way of misrelating to oneself and to God. The aesthete would
like to ignore his relation to God and the responsibility this might entail, preferring to
lose himself in pleasure instead. The ethical person in Judge Wilhelm’s model treats
God as a purely theoretical entity, as something either synonymous with duty or as a
reliable forgiveness mechanism. The person of resignation relates to God through
repentance, insisting that his guilt puts an infinite distance between himself and God.
In contrast to all of these, the life of faith humbly abandons pretensions of self-reliance
and accepts both God’s forgiveness and life in the world as a gift and task from God.
For Kierkegaard, faith solves the problem of guilt that shipwrecked the ethical
way of life. Forgiveness means that the demands of the ethical are fulfilled in a way
other than what ethics demanded. Ethics demands that the agent achieve ethical
goodness by the strength of the agent’s own self-reliant willpower. Forgiveness
somehow restores the agent’s ethical status, ‘washing away his sins,’ although not as a
matter of the agent’s own achievement. How forgiveness is able to do this is one of
the things that makes it paradoxical. Faith entails a new relation to one’s self,
including one’s responsibility and guilt. Repentance remains a part of the life of faith,
but it is displaced from the center of one’s relation to one’s responsibility and guilt.
Instead, the fundamental stance toward one’s guilt is one of gratitude for forgiveness
and joy in the forgiven life (WA, 157). As Kierkegaard knew personally, often this
message of joy and gratitude, the ‘good news’ of the gospels, is one that is hardest to
accept. As we will discuss at length in the chapter on despair, resistance to this
acceptance constitutes one of the most intense forms of despair. (The life of
resignation and religiousness A is one in which this message is demonically avoided.)
But as Kierkegaard concluded to himself in his journals, the one who “doubts whether
37 Anti-Climacus states from the beginning that the human self is “spirit,” and later equates spirit with
consciousness, arguing that the devil’s despair is the most intense since “the devil is pure spirit and to that
extent absolute consciousness and transparency “ (SUD:72).
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his sins also are forgiven, he will surely find comfort in hearing, as it were, Christ say
to him: Just believe it; I have laid down my life in order to gain for you the forgiveness
of your sins; so just believe it, a stronger assurance is impossible” (WA:159).
Accepting this forgiveness, the person of faith happily accepts his life in the
world as a gift and task from God and he sets to work fulfilling whatever
responsibilities this entails. Importantly, this entails a stance of joy towards one’s
everyday existence. This point is expressed nicely in Practice in Christianity:
each individual in quiet inwardness before God is to humble himself under
what it means in the strictest sense to be a Christian, is to confess honestly
before God where he is so that he still might worthily accept the grace that is
offered to every imperfect person – that is, to everyone. And then nothing
further; then, as for the rest, let him do his work and rejoice in it, love his wife
and rejoice in her, joyfully bring up his children, love his fellow beings,
rejoice in life. (PC:67)
This life of humble devotion, love and joy is perhaps best illustrated in the
three Devotional Discourses Kierkegaard began writing in the spring of 1848. At times
Kierkegaard was aware that he was himself guilty of rejecting God’s forgiveness; the
melancholy and self-reproach inherited from his father made this a very difficult task
indeed. Like the two Johanneses, Kierkegaard could make the ‘movement’ of
resignation and repentance, but he stumbled on faith’s requirement of openness and
acceptance. During Holy Week in 1848, Kierkegaard had a religious experience (what
he called a ‘metamorphosis’) in which he was moved with “the instantaneous
apprehension that God had forgotten his sins – as well as forgiven them” (GD: xi). A
journal entry dated the Wednesday of Holy Week, April 19th, expresses the
magnitude of this revelation: “My whole being has changed. My concealment and
reserve are broken – I must speak out” (Journals: VIII A640). He once again
entertained hope of being saved from his melancholy. For Kierkegaard at this time,
this meant accepting a position in the church: “Now I shall with God’s help become
my self, I now have faith that Christ will help me overcome my melancholy, and that I
will become a minister” (Journals:VIII A641).
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It was in this spirit that Kierkegaard began work on his Devotional
Discourses on what we can learn from “the lilies of the field and the birds of the air,”
namely to live a life of silence, obedience and joy (GD:xvi)38. The scriptural text upon
which these discourses are based exhorts us not to worry but to trust in God, who
cares even for the lilies and the birds and who cares even more for us: “Be not
therefore anxious for the morrow; for the morrow will be anxious for itself” (GD:317).
The “silence” learned from the lilies and the birds is the inward quietness and
stillness in which one can be free from the busyness, distraction and noise of life
amidst ‘the crowd.’ It is only in silence that one can pause and listen. Hence, silence
is the only mode of being in which the individual can come to be ‘before God’: “out
there with the lilies and the birds thou dost sense that thou are before God, a fact which
is generally so entirely forgotten in speech and conversation with other men”
(GD:328). The silence of nature, which remains unbroken “not only when everything
holds its peace in the silent night, but also when day is vibrating with a thousand
notes and all is like a sea of sound,” expresses a deep reverence before God: “It
expresses reverence before God, that it is He who disposes, and He alone, to whom
belongeth wisdom and understanding. And just because this silence is reverence
before God, it is (so far as it can be in nature) worship” (GD:324, 328). In silent
reverence a person learns to defer to God’s wisdom and understanding, to trust in
God rather than in his own wisdom and efforts.
This is the renunciation of self-reliance discussed earlier; faith requires us to
recognize that we can do nothing to secure our own happiness or salvation. It follows
that faith itself does not begin with some action or accomplishment on behalf of the
faithful: “then in a certain sense it is nothing I shall do. Yes, certainly, in a certain
sense it is nothing; thou shalt in the deepest sense make thyself nothing, become
nothing before God, learn to keep silent“ (GD:322). Kierkegaard explains that even
worship and prayer are not primarily a matter of saying or doing something, but of
38 In this section, I will use Lowrie’s more poetic translation rather than the Hong version, since for
Kierkegaard it is important that these discourses be poetic in the sense that they are meant to elucidate faith
‘in a figure’ (the lilies and the birds, the woman who was a sinner, etc.) rather than directly, which would be
fruitless, given Kierkegaard’s own understanding of faith.
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silently waiting to hear what God demands of us: “to pray is not merely to be silent
but to hear. And so it is; to pray is not to hear oneself speak, but it is to be silent, and
to remain silent, to wait, until the man who prays hears God” (GD:323).
Yet faith requires us ‘to do nothing’ only in the first instance. In silence one
comes to hear God, but to listen to God with reverence means to obey whatever it is
that God commands. Silence is therefore “the first prerequisite for being able truly to
obey” (GD:336). This is true not only because silence allows us to hear God’s
command, but also because in silence one apprehends the “thou” in the “thou shalt”
of God’s command:
thou dost apprehend that it is ‘thou,’ thou who shalt love God, thou, thou
alone in the whole world, thou who art alone in the environment of solemn
silence, so alone that every doubt, and every objection, and every excuse, and
every evasion, and every question, in short, every voice, is reduced to silence
in thine own inward man, every voice, that is to say, every other voice but
God’s, which about thee and within thee talks to thee by means of the silence
(GD:336).
A person earnestly gathers himself together ‘before God’ by reducing to silence
the noise of the crowd and all the anxious worries, doubts and evasions within
himself. In this state he finds himself faced with an absolute ‘either/or’: ‘either love
God/ – or hate Him’, ‘either hold to Him/– or despise him’ (GD:333,4). Kierkegaard
uses the metaphor of erotic love to illustrate why the terms of this either/or must be
so extreme, with no possibility of an intermediate position: with mere acquaintances
other possibilities exist (indifference, a slight affection or aversion, etc.), but between
lovers “the rule holds good: either we hold to one another/or despise one another”
(GD:334). Yet unlike erotic love, loving and holding to God requires absolute
obedience: “What then does this either/or signify? what does God demand? For
either/or is a demand […] He demands obedience, unconditional obedience”
(GD:335). The lilies and birds, as well as all of nature, serve as illustrations of
absolute obedience: in the natural development of creatures and the lawlike constancy
of physical bodies Kierkegaard finds the principle of obedience to God: “His will is
the only will” (GD:337). Kierkegaard employs the same notion of natural flourishing
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found in Aristotle’s ethics (the lily “became actually its whole possibility”), to argue
that human beings can likewise ‘flourish’ only through an absolute obedience to God,
since the realizing of natural potential is an obedience to the Creator’s will (GD:340).
Kierkegaard entertains the objection that the absolute obedience he sees in
nature is merely the result of the fact that plants, animals and natural bodies have no
choice but to “obey” the laws of nature, whereas man supposedly has the free choice
to obey or disobey God. Kierkegaard does not deny the limits of his metaphor, since
strictly speaking the notion of being obedient or defiant ‘before God’ only arises for
beings who have free choice (or, in his language, are ‘spirit’). He points out that in the
human capacity to choose we also find the potential for great danger, since free will
can be used to choose what is wrong or contrary to God’s will (GD:345).
Nonetheless, Kierkegaard thinks that there is a way that we can apply the
notion of ‘making a virtue of necessity’ to beings with free will. Paraphrasing
Luther’s declaration at the Diet of Worms (“I cannot do otherwise, here I stand”),
Kierkegaard urges us to “strive to make a virtue of necessity by submitting with
absolute obedience to God’s will” such that we can say, “in relation to doing God’s
will or submitting to it, ‘I can do nothing else, I can do no otherwise’” (GD:341). In
contemporary ethical debate Luther’s proclamation is used as an example of what it
means to have a strong character: although the freedom to do otherwise is exercised in
the development of strong character, eventually the strength of one’s character insures
that one cannot do otherwise than act according to one’s character and convictions.
Kierkegaard seems to be suggesting something similar, although he insists the self-
mastery behind this strength of character is learned only through absolute obedience
to something absolute, i.e. God: “By learning to obey, one learns to rule, it is said: but
still more certain it is that by being oneself obedient one can learn obedience from
oneself” (GD:336).
It may be objected that the ethical way of life also includes (and requires)
absolute obedience, especially if we concede that within an ethical way of thinking the
moral law is the absolute. But there is a crucial difference between the ethical and the
religious understanding of obedience, and this may be summed up in one word: love.
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The ethical law presses its demand for absolute obedience coldly: it follows as a
matter of principle, or (as in Kant) from logical necessity, that the ethical law demands
the same absolute obedience from each person. In contrast, Kierkegaard explains that
“it is precisely out of love that God requires absolute obedience” (GD:345). The
absolute obedience that God requires is not the dispassionate ‘pure’ respect for duty
demanded by ethics, but rather a passionate, deeply personal love for God which,
because this love is for God, manifests itself in an absolute willingness to let ‘His will
be the only will’. This love fundamentally alters the nature of obedience to the law:
“Therefore the Gospel asserts authority and says, Thou shalt. But at the same instant
this is softened so that it might be capable of moving the hardest heart; it takes thee as
it were by the hand – and does as a loving father does with his child – and says,
‘Come, let us go out among the lilies and the birds.’” (GD:346)
Devoted silence and unconditional obedience before God lead to a life of joy.
In fact, Kierkegaard explains that through silence and obedience we can become, like
the lilies and the birds, “joy itself” (GD:348). To be joy itself implies that this notion of
‘joy’ does not signify a mood, nor it is synonymous with pleasure. Joy is the state of
being attained in living the best way of life. Like the joy of Abraham, this is not a joy
in some hereafter, but joy in and for ‘this’ life. So, for example, Kierkegaard discusses
the joy over existence and one’s own coming into existence, over being a human, and
over our ability to experience the world through our senses (GD:350). Hence, this is a
joy of gratitude to God, an overabundant gratitude for one’s life in ‘this’ world and for
the means to sustaining and enhancing this life. Suffering, sorrow, and all the
vicissitudes of everyday life do not disappear, but neither do they form a barrier to a
joyful life. In fact, Kierkegaard explains that a joy that is conditional upon the
removal or this or that sorrow or disappointment can never be unconditional: whether
this condition is fulfilled or not, the joy in question remains conditional (GD:348).
Yet how is it that a life of silence and obedience attains unconditional joy,
even in the midst of sorrow and suffering? As Kierkegaard explains, one attains ‘joy
itself’ because in opening oneself to God in silence and obedience, one attains a
closeness and trust in God which allows one to obey the call to “’Cast all your care
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upon God.’” (GD:352). Just as absolute obedience means giving one’s own will
completely over to God, trusting in God means giving one’s cares completely over to
God. Once again the decisive factor is love. The ethical law demands absolute
obedience, but one cannot ‘cast all care’ upon the ethical law. At most one can adopt a
Stoic position in caring only for one’s moral rectitude, renouncing other cares and
suffering as alien to one’s ‘true’ self. In contrast, Kierkegaard’s person of faith accepts
such suffering, anxiety and sorrow as truly a part of himself, but also accepts that this
self is loved by God. Accepting that God loves and cares for him does not mean that
his suffering is immediately eradicated, but the anxiety and burden of struggling with
this suffering and sorrow is now cast upon God. Just as Fear and Trembling presented
faith as a conviction, albeit absurd and seemingly pretentious, that “God troubles
himself about the smallest things,” likewise faith is here presented as the willingness
to trust in God’s love for you, a willingness “adoringly to dare to believe that ‘God
careth for thee’” (GD:353).
In order to understand more clearly Kierkegaard’s notion of joy in the face of
suffering and sorrow, and in order to fill out the portrait of faith as a way of life found
in these discourses we now need to examine his concept of “simplicity,” an idea
discussed in each of the three discourses. In the discourse on silence, simplicity is the
quietness of mind in which one is free from society’s distracting talkativeness and
one’s own anxiety about the future. Both distraction and anxiety can prevent one
from simply being in the present moment. Consumed by such worries and
distractions, a person’s self becomes dispersed over time and caught up in the
ambitions and petty busyness of life amidst ‘the crowd.’ The result is that the self
never comes to dwell in what Kierkegaard calls “the instant.” ‘The instant’ for
Kierkegaard means that intersection between the temporal and the eternal in which
the human self, as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, properly dwells. It is
not this or that particular time, but a way of being in which one is ‘on good terms with
time’ in the sense that one has plans for the future (and memory of the past) but one
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can also be fully at home in the present.39 He laments that it “is the misfortune in the
lives of the great majority of men, that they never sense the instant, that in their lives
the eternal and the temporal are merely separate things. And why? Because they
could not keep silent” (GD:326).
As a result of the simplicity of mind acquired through silence, suffering is
stripped of the anxiety and the “misapprehending sympathy of others,” which
Kierkegaard believes makes suffering so hard to bear. In silence, one does not
become exempt from suffering, but one does become exempt from “that which makes
suffering harder, the misapprehending sympathy of others, from that which makes
suffering more protracted, the much talk about suffering, from that which makes
suffering more than suffering, the sin of impatience and acidia” (GD:326). Thus, one
key to living a joyful life even amidst suffering is to refrain from making suffering
more than it is, either by becoming anxious about it, or by prolonging and
exaggerating it in the company of others, or by allowing suffering to become a catalyst
for resignation.40 When a particular instance of suffering is taken to be the definite
thing it is, it becomes a bearable part of life. In contrast, when suffering becomes a
vast indefinite presence in one’s life, as when it becomes prolonged or aggrandized by
taking on extraneous meanings or social significance, it can quickly become
unbearable. Kierkegaard explains this point with reference to the lily:
Suffering for the lily is simply suffering, neither more nor less than
suffering, is suffering as possible narrowed down and simplified and made
as small as possible. Less than this, suffering cannot become, for it
nevertheless is, and is what it is. But on the other hand, suffering can
become endlessly greater when it is not exactly neither more nor less than
it is. When suffering is neither more nor less, when it is merely that
definite thing which it is, then, even though it were the greatest suffering, it
is the least that it can be. But when it become indefinite, however great the
39 Recall that Abraham, in absolute obedience to God’s command, ‘came neither too early nor too late’ to his
appointed task on Mt. Moriah. In contrast, the ‘false Abrahams’ either came too early (out of resignation,
trying to get the task done with quickly) or too late (out of weakness, trying to delay in order to avoid the
command).
40 Kierkegaard’s journals from the time he was writing these discourses reveal that he was aware that his
own suffering, his melancholy and reserve, held this dreadful possibility of “becoming an occasion for sin”
namely the sin and despair of resignation (Journals:VIII A, 645). This sin or despair of resignation will be
explained more fully in Chapter 3.
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suffering really is, this indefiniteness increasing the suffering endlessly.
And this indefiniteness emerges precisely with man’s ambiguous
advantage of being able to talk. On the other hand, the definiteness of
suffering, the experience that it is neither more nor less than it is, is
attained only by being able to keep silent. (GD:327-8)
If the simplicity gained through silence is a simplicity of mind in which
suffering is accepted for what it is, the simplicity gained through obedience is a
simplicity of will in which even tragic misfortune does not interfere with the
constancy of one’s will to obey God. The opposite of this simplicity of will is what
Kierkegaard calls “the ambiguous”: “if thou art absolutely obedient to God, then there
is no ambiguity in thee, and if there is no ambiguity in thee, then art thou mere
simplicity before God” (GD:344). ‘The ambiguous’ includes all of the relative ends
which may tempt one away from an absolute devotion to the God. To have one’s will
tempted by these distractions, rather than keeping one’s will unified in willing only
obedience (i.e. willing only that ‘His will is the only will’) is the root of disobedience:
“Where the ambiguous is, there is temptation, and there it proves only too easily the
stronger. But where the ambiguous is, there also, in one way or another, is
disobedience down at the bottom” (GD:344). Included in this notion of ‘the
ambiguous’ would obviously be all the cares and concerns one has for oneself in daily
life. As discussed above, faith requires us (or lovingly invites us) to ‘cast’ all these
cares ‘upon God’ by trusting that absolute obedience to God is all that is required for
us to live a joyful life.
Just as the simplicity of silence allows one to gain self-possession in the present
time (what Kierkegaard calls ‘the instant’), the simplicity of obedience allows one to
gain self-possession in whatever circumstances are at hand (what he calls ‘the spot’),
regardless of whether these circumstances are disadvantageous or even tragic. Thus,
Kierkegaard discusses being completely present to oneself in ‘the spot’ where one is:
“Only by absolute obedience can one with absolute accuracy hit upon the ‘spot’ where
one is to stand, and when one hits upon it absolutely one understands that it is
absolutely indifferent whether the spot be a dunghill” (GD:339). Attaining this
harmony with the circumstances at hand also entails becoming unified as a person,
67
becoming completely present to oneself through the unity of one’s will to obey.
Kierkegaard gives the example of the wild lily which blooms even in the most
inhospitable environment: “in such an environment which does everything to hinder
it, in such an environment to be completely oneself and to preserve one’s identity, to
deride the power of the environment – no, not to deride, that the lily does not do, but
to be perfectly care-free in all its beauty!” (GD:339) Because absolute obedience to
God also means an absolute trust in God, a person of faith can remain, like the lily,
absolutely self-composed and care-free even in adverse circumstances: “For the lily
is, in spite of the environment, itself, because it is absolutely obedient to God; and
because it is absolutely obedient to God, therefore it is absolutely care-free, as only the
obedient (especially under such conditions) can be” (GD:339). This absolute
obedience also results in the courage necessary to persist in the face of tragedy and
death. The faithful lily blooms even in the face of immediate destruction: “with
destruction before its eyes, to have courage and faith to come into being in all its
beauty – that only absolute obedience is capable of” (GD:340).
The discourse on joy seems to combine the ideas of being present to oneself in
‘the instant’ and in ‘the spot’ when it introduces the definition of joy as the state in
which one can be present to oneself in “being today”: “What is joy? or what is it to be
joyful? It is to be present to oneself; but to be truly present to oneself is this thing of
‘today’, that is, this thing of being today, of truly being today” (GD:349). Kierkegaard
once again uses the lilies and birds to illustrate this notion of joy: “therefore it is that
the lilies and the birds are joy, because with silence and unconditional obedience they
are entirely present to themselves in being today” (GD:349). Kierkegaard’s concept of
joy as ‘being today’ can perhaps be best understood in relation to the scriptural text
upon which these discourses are based: “But seek ye first his kingdom and his
righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you. Be not therefore anxious
for the morrow; for the morrow will be anxious for itself” (GD:317). Anxiety for ‘the
morrow’ betrays a lack of trust in God, and thereby a misrelation to oneself, one’s
circumstances and to time itself. The life of faith does not hedonistically ignore the
future, but neither does it indulge in the distracting temptation to disperse oneself in
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future needs and plans. The simplicity of being oneself in the present time and
circumstances is necessary in order to stand ‘before God.’ Coming to stand ‘before
God’ requires a person to gather himself together in what Kierkegaard calls
‘collectedness’ (GD:353). That means being present to oneself in the current time
and circumstances, even if as one stands before God one also claims possession of the
whole of one’s past (in repentance and in gratitude) and the whole of one’s future (in
hope and in obedience.) In this state of ‘collectedness’ one gathers oneself together
‘before God’, and at the same time one divests all one’s cares upon God through
absolute trust and obedience (GD:353).
For Kierkegaard, the state of being fully oneself ‘today’ is contrasted with the
state of being distracted and dispersed in ‘the morrow.’ Simplicity is what allows the
state of ‘collectedness’ in which one can ‘cast all cares upon God’ (GD:353). It is for
this reason that simplicity is the key to understanding how the life of faith is lived in
joy, even amidst sorrow and adversity: “in the deepest sorrow to be unconditionally
joyful, when there is such a dreadful tomorrow, nevertheless to be – that is, to be
unconditionally joyful today – how do they comport themselves? They behave quite
simply and with simplicity (as the lilies and the birds always do), and they get this
tomorrow out of the way as if it were non-existent” (GD:352).
Hence, the lesson that we learn from the lilies and the birds is a further
clarification from the lesson we learn from Abraham: to stand reverently ‘before God’
in openness and absolute obedience, to trust absolutely in God rather than in oneself,
and to accept one’s existence in this world as a gift from God (and therefore
something to rejoice over) and as a task from God (for which one should obediently
take responsibility). Anti-Climacus adds to this picture that obedience to Christ
means overcoming, or at least acknowledging, the difficulties in relating to Christ as a
particular historical figure. This includes the acknowledgment of failure (confession,
‘the consciousness of sin’) and the grateful acceptance of God’s forgiveness. The
result of this acknowledgement and acceptance is a way of living in the world which
is marked by abiding love and joy even amidst suffering and adversity. More
specifically, the life of faith involves a fundamental existential stance of openness and
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love toward God, and through this God-relationship, toward oneself, others, the
world.
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CHAPTER 2 NIETZSCHE’S DIFFERENT WAYS OF LIFE
Having outlined how Kierkegaard approaches ethics (broadly construed) by
comparing different ways of life, we are now in a position to see how Nietzsche
might be said to adopt a similar approach to ethics. Certainly there are differences
in the way Nietzsche conceives of these ‘ways of life’, the most obvious of which is
that Nietzsche often portrays these ways of life on a broader historical and
sociological scale. Nonetheless, Nietzsche presents this historical background as a
way of orienting individuals in their thinking about what way of life they should
live in the present. Thus, despite this difference in conception and method,
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard converge with respect to their central ethical concern or
project.
Nietzsche’s thinking about ethics in terms ethical types (different ‘types’ of
moralities which correspond to different ‘types’ of people) goes back at least as far
as Human, All Too Human. In the section entitled “Twofold prehistory of good and evil”
Nietzsche presents the notion of two different moralities corresponding to two
different types of people. He states that there is a conception of “good and evil” that
originates with members of the “ruling tribes and castes,” those who can “requite,”
and one which originates with those who cannot “requite”: “the subjected, the
powerless” (HH:45). As we will see in the first section of this chapter, these ideas
are further explained and developed in Beyond Good & Evil and again in the On the
Genealogy of Morals.
Throughout this investigation we should bear in mind the purpose behind
Nietzsche’s presentation of these ethical types. As I suggested above, what
Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts of different moralities and ethical types is meant
to offer his contemporary readers is a way of thinking for themselves about the values
that they hold and the way they relate to these values. As historical socio-economic
types, the masters or nobles are not possible or even desirable in the present age.41
As ethical types Nietzsche’s figures of both ‘master’ and ‘slave’ stand as
41
See, for example, TI “Expeditions”43.
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generalizations and “signposts” in relation to which a contemporary person might
locate herself. Nietzsche would like us to have a conscience for the question: what
kind of person am I? Since N. recognizes that many people contain a mixture of
these two types, and in keeping with his call to “become who you are,” the question
might be better put: “what kind of person am I moving toward becoming?” I believe
Nietzsche offers his historical ethical types as a way of orienting his readers in
relation to this question and to the task to “become who you are.”
In addition to his portrayal and analysis of historical ethical types (the masters and
nobles, slaves and ascetics) Nietzsche’s writings contain what he calls “pointers” toward
present and future possibilities for a new, higher ethical type (EH: ‘Beyond Good and Evil’,
2). In the second and third parts of this chapter, I will explore Nietzsche’s vision for these
new and higher possibilities for humankind. In the second section I shall present the figures
of the Übermensch of Thus Spake Zarathustra and the “free spirit” discussed in most of
Nietzsche’s works as formulations of the ethical type Nietzsche hopes will emerge in the
present and future. Then in the third section I will give a careful analysis of the “new
philosopher” in Beyond Good and Evil and the “sovereign individual” and “creative spirit” in
the Genealogy as representing Nietzsche’s mature formulations of this new, higher ethical
type. My analysis will reveal that these different formulations constitute Nietzsche’s
evolving thoughts on the same single figure, a figure that he presents using different labels
but which he consistently identifies with certain core concepts such as independence, the
revaluation of prevailing values, and a new kind of conscience.
§1 HISTORICAL FORMULATIONS OF DIFFERENT WAYS OF LIFE
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche proposes the task of developing a
“typology” of different moralities; later, he introduces two fundamental types that
have been seen in history: “master morality” and “slave morality.” Similarly, in On
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche traces the genealogy of two “modes of valuation,”
the “noble mode of valuation” and the “ascetic mode of valuation.” The process of
elucidating these ethical types will clarify what I mean by a ‘way of life’ in
Nietzsche’s philosophy. To this end, it will be necessary to examine what a
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“morality” or a “mode of valuation” is in general, such that Nietzsche can compare
different moralities and modes of valuation.
Nietzsche begins Part Five of his Beyond Good and Evil, “On the Natural
History of Morals,” by stating that what is needed for any eventual “science of
morals” is an "assembly of material, conceptual comprehension and arrangement of
a vast domain of delicate value-feelings and value-distinctions which live, grow,
beget and perish - and perhaps attempts to display the more frequent and recurring
forms of these living crystallizations - as preparation for a typology of morals"
(BGE:186). Later, Nietzsche introduces his famous and often misunderstood
typology of different moralities:
In a tour of the many finer and coarser moralities which have ruled or still
rule on earth I found certain traits regularly recurring together and bound
up with one another: until at length two basic types were revealed and a
basic distinction emerged. There is master morality and slave morality - I
add at once that in all higher and mixed cultures attempts at mediation
between the two are apparent and more frequently confusion and mutual
misunderstanding between them, indeed sometimes their harsh
juxtaposition - even within the same man, within one soul. The moral
value-distinctions have arisen either among a ruling order which was
pleasurably conscious of its distinction from the ruled - or among the
ruled, the slaves and dependents to every degree. (BGE:260)
This passage already provides several clues to understanding what Nietzsche
means by a “morality” generally, such that there could be a comparison of “master
morality” and “slave morality.” In defining a morality, Nietzsche looks to “certain
traits regularly recurring together and bound up with one another.” As we shall
see, these “traits” tend to be formal traits (e.g. the origin, use, or place of this
morality in the lives of those upholding it) rather than the specific virtues or values
which may constitute the content of a morality.42 For Nietzsche, a “morality” is not
so much a set of values as it is a way of holding one’s values: it describes the
42 Nietzsche is not making the claim that there are basically only two sets of values or codes of conduct
developed throughout all of human history, or that the highest (or lowest) strata from every society
essentially uphold the same moral tenets. Rather, he has found that despite the variety of content in
different moralities, they can be grouped according to certain formal traits.
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motivation, constraint, and attitude toward existence out of which one formulates
and upholds these values. This passage also suggests that a morality is something
which may be held by a culture or society as a whole, but is more often held by a
certain class within a society. A morality can also be held by a single individual.
Alternately, a single individual may hold what amounts to an admixture of two
different moralities, representing a “mediation” or even a “harsh juxtaposition”
between them.
The most obvious formal trait distinguishing master and slave moralities is
their respective origins. “Master morality” originates in the “masters,” those who
are powerful and form the ruling class of a society; “slave morality” originates
among the “slaves,” those who are ruled.43 Nietzsche is careful to note that those
who became the rulers of society at its inception did so not just through physical
might: “their superiority lay, not in their physical strength, but primarily in their
psychical [strength] – they were more complete human beings” (BGE:257).
It is important for Nietzsche that a “type” of morality always corresponds to
a “type” of person. This is in keeping with his claim that a “human being's
evaluations betray something of the structure of his soul and where it sees its
conditions of life, its real needs" (BGE:268). It is also in keeping with his insistence
that it is “immediately obvious that designations of moral value were everywhere
first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions” (BGE:260).
But what exactly is the relationship between a ‘type’ of morality and the ‘type’ of
person with whom Nietzsche associates it? As Nietzsche explains in the Genealogy,
it is a mistake to think that a person can freely “choose” one of these moralities
rather than another (GM:I.13). One’s type of morality is a direct result and
expression of the type of person one is. Likewise, for Nietzsche a personal type is
43 Nietzsche uses the term slave (Sklaven) not to pick out those who are owned by other people, but in the
broader, classical sense denoting anyone among the vast lowest classes of a society. Historically ‘slaves’ of
any society would be those who are disenfranchised, powerless, and oppressed. Ethically, those who are
‘slavish’ with respect to values are those who relate to their values with the attitudes which Nietzsche thinks
originated with these historical ‘slave’ classes, e.g. resignation, resentment, and ‘herd’ conformity.
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defined ethically, in reference this person’s values and all that contribute to them44.
In Nietzsche’s thinking, we cannot imagine a disembodied ‘morality’; a set of values
must be understood in the context of a whole way of life in which it arises and takes
hold. Thus, a ‘way of life’ as we shall come to understand this term can be discussed
as either a ‘morality’ or a ‘type of person’.
The difference between master and slave morality does not simply consist in
the difference in social position of their adherents. More significant for defining
these moralities and distinguishing between them is the evaluative orientation
(toward themselves, others and the world as a whole) of those who uphold them.
Nietzsche indicates that master morality is the product of a ruling order which is
“pleasurably conscious of its distinction from the ruled” (BGE:260). He goes on to
explain that the evaluative orientation of master morality is one of self-affirmation:
the nobles honor themselves as “good” and their lives as worthy of living.
The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does
not need to be approved of, he judges 'what harms me is harmful in itself',
he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honour to
things, he creates values. Everything he knows to be part of himself, he
honours: such a morality is self-glorification. (BGE:260)
Master morality originates in a “creation of values” in which the nobles
establish themselves and their lives as standards of value. The concept of a
“creation of values” introduced here is often misunderstood, and it requires some
clarification. It might be said that the nobles “create” their own values rather than
conform to values established by some moral code existing independently of them.
But it is important to note that the values of the nobles are not created arbitrarily or
ex nihilo. When Nietzsche says that the “noble type of man feels himself to be the
determiner of values” he does not mean that the noble type is free to determine
44 In contrast, one might classify personal ‘types’ according to things like occupation. Aaron Ridley
mistakenly attributes this kind of classification to Nietzsche in his Nietzsche’s Conscience: Six Character Studies
from the ‘Genealogy’ (1998). Ridley discusses types such as ‘The Philosopher’ and ‘The Artist.’ He thereby
overlooks the crucial distinction Nietzsche draws between those philosophers and artists still under the
sway of the herd mentality and ascetic values and those philosophers and artists who are ‘emancipated’
from these values and are thus truly ‘free spirits’ in Nietzsche’s ethical sense (to be discussed shortly).
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whatever values he wishes. Rather, he means that the noble type feels himself to be
the standard which determines what is valuable, as the rest of the passage clearly
indicates. There is no arbitrariness in the determination of the nobles’ values: they
establish the traits they find in themselves (e.g. strength, integrity) and their
fundamental stance toward life (e.g. joyful affirmation) as standards of value. They
subsequently hold themselves and each other responsible for upholding these
standards. Such standards may then become an ethos among the nobles, an ethos
in which they recognize each other and to which they hold each other accountable.
Such an ethos, whatever its specific evaluative content, is what Nietzsche calls ‘noble
morality’ or ‘master morality’.45
This creation of values flows from an immediate feeling of self-worth on
behalf of the nobles. A sense of honor, respect, and reverence for oneself is perhaps
the primary and most lasting characteristic of all nobility. Thus Nietzsche discusses
the defining characteristic of what is noble today as “faith” in oneself: the
“fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to itself...The noble
soul has reverence for itself" (BGE:287). For the nobles, this reverence for oneself
necessarily includes a reverence for one’s equals, for those who are similarly
constituted. It also includes a contempt for what is harmful or antithetical to this
way of life. Their creation of values involves the condemnation of all that is harmful
to this way of life as “’harmful in itself,’” and (presumably) revering themselves and
all that is conducive to their lives as ‘good in itself.’ In honoring and despising in
this way, the nobles thereby assign what might be called ethical values for the first
time: they honor themselves not just as powerful or well-positioned, but as “good.”
Hence Nietzsche’s claim: “It is the powerful who understand how to honor, that is
their art, their realm of invention” (BGE:260).
45 It may seem that Nietzsche would have to draw a distinction between those original nobles who first
created ‘noble morality’ and those later, non-value-creating nobles who merely adopt (i.e. conform to) this
morality. I think this objection rests on a misunderstanding. What Nietzsche means by a ‘creation of
values’ is not necessarily the historical origination of certain values for the very first time. It seems to be the
fundamental stance of self-affirmation and self-reverence out of which an affirmation and reverence for this
noble (i.e. self-affirming) morality arises.
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It should also be said that the self-affirmation of the nobles does not simply
celebrate their power or position in society; they do not merely gloat over their
might and social rank. Master morality establishes its order of moral rank not only
on the basis of a person’s power or social standing, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, on the basis of the “states of soul” which the nobles find among
themselves: “when it is the rulers who determine the concept ‘good’, it is the exalted
proud states of soul which are considered distinguishing and determine the order of
rank” (BGE:260). Likewise, master morality does not condemn those who are not
nobles for being powerless, but rather for having the opposite “states of soul” from
those honored among the nobles:
The noble human being separates from himself those natures in which the
opposite of such exalted proud states find expression: he despises
them…The cowardly, the timid, the petty, and those who think only of
narrow utility are despised; as are the mistrustful with their constricted
glance, those who abase themselves, the dog-like type of man who lets
himself be mistreated, the fawning flatterer, above all the liar – it is a
fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are liars. ‘We
who are truthful’ – thus did the nobility of ancient Greece designate
themselves. (BGE:260)
The nobles’ “creation of values” also involves labeling as “good” and
“worthy” all the traits of personal excellence which the nobles find in themselves.
Nietzsche explains: “The noble human being honours in himself the man of power,
also the man who has power over himself, who understands how to speak and how
to keep silent, who enjoys practicing severity and harshness upon himself and feels
reverence for all that is severe and harsh” (BGE:260). The nobles honor the
conditions of their existence not out of a view to “narrow utility,” but out of a
superabundant strength and gratitude: “In the foreground stands the feeling of
plenitude, of power which seeks to overflow, the happiness of a high tension, the
consciousness of a wealth which would like to give away and bestow” (BGE:260).
In contrast, Nietzsche states that “[s]lave morality is essentially the morality
of utility” (BGE:260). Slave morality develops not out of a feeling of plenitude and
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strength, but of a desperation in which "those qualities which serve to make easier
the existence of the suffering will be brought into prominence and flooded with
light” (BGE:260). This desperation among the suffering is the origin of many of the
virtues Nietzsche finds still honored in his own time: “here it is that pity, the kind
and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness
come into honour - for here these are the most useful qualities and virtually the only
means of enduring the burden of existence" (BGE:260).
Whereas master morality flows from an overabundant happiness and feeling
of self-affirmation, slave morality is born out of desperation, a desperation that can
easily lead to a pessimistic condemnation of human existence as a whole:
Suppose the abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of
themselves and weary should moralize: what would their moral
evaluations have in common? Probably a pessimistic mistrust of the
entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of
man together with his situation. (BGE:260).
Such universal, life-denying pessimism is obviously challenged by the
happiness and self-affirmation of the nobles. For this reason, the slave “would like
to convince himself that happiness itself is not genuine among them” (BGE:260).
Even more challenging to the desperate and pessimistic outlook of the slaves are the
nobles’ values, which establish the happiness and strength of these nobles as
“good.” Thus the slave “is suspicious of the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical
and mistrustful, keenly mistrustful, of everything ‘good’ that is honoured among
them” (BGE:260). But the slaves are not able to simply create their own values; as
we have seen, the creation of values flows from an immediate feeling of self-worth
and self-reverence. According to Nietzsche, “in all strata which were in any way
dependent the common man was only that which he counted as – in no way
accustomed to positing values himself, he accorded himself no other value than that
which his master accorded him (it is the intrinsic right of masters to create values)”
(BGE:261).
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What is necessary for the slaves to meet the challenge of the nobles’ morality
is what Nietzsche calls “the slave revolt in morals” (BGE:195). This slave revolt
involves the “inversion of values” in which all that is honored by master morality
becomes condemned, and all that is despised by master morality is renamed and
considered a virtue. As an example, Nietzsche points to the ancient Hebrews, who
in his account, “achieved that miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on
earth has for a couple of millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination – their
prophets fused ‘rich’, ‘godless’, ‘evil’, ‘violent’, ‘sensual’ into one and were the first
to coin the word ‘world’ as a term of infamy” (BGE:195). Thus the self-affirmation
at the heart of master morality is condemned by the powerless as “vanity” and the
masters themselves are condemned as “evil.” In fact, the notion of “evil” (rather
than merely “bad” in the sense of despicable) is the primary value-concept utilized
in this “slave revolt in morals.” The power of the nobles and the fear they inspire
insures that they will be respected (even if hated) by those without such power; the
nobles cannot be despised or held in contempt. So the slaves condemn the nobles,
together with their power and fearfulness, as ‘evil’:
Here is the source of the famous antithesis ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – power and
danger were felt to exist in evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety and
strength that could not admit of contempt. Thus, according to slave
morality the ‘evil’ inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely
the ‘good’ who inspire fear and want to inspire it, while the ‘bad’ man is
judged contemptible. (BGE:260)
The slaves invert the values of the nobles, revaluing all the noble virtues as
vices. More fundamentally, slave morality represents an inversion of the nobles’
evaluative orientation. Slave morality is born out of a pessimistic mistrust and
condemnation of life and of those who rejoice and prosper in it. The slaves do not
joyfully affirm themselves; they desperately try to preserve themselves, most of all
from the powerful and happy whom they fear and resent. Slave morality begins
with a vengeful condemnation of these nobles and a reactive inversion of their
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values. Only then, as an afterthought, do the slaves credit themselves with being
‘good’ since they are unlike the nobles.46
To review, we have examined three formal traits which define master and
slave morality and distinguish them from each other: (1) the type of person in whom
they originate (those who are instinctive, powerful, and honest vs. those who are
clever, impotent, and deceitful), (2) the evaluative orientation toward oneself, others
and the world as a whole manifested by this type (self-reverence, mutual respect,
and life-affirmation vs. a resentful condemnation of others and pessimism regarding
life as a whole), and (3) the activity by which values are established (an affirming
“creation of values” vs. a condemning, reactive “inversion of values”). In order to
build upon our understanding of what Nietzsche means by a “morality” we will
turn to the Genealogy in which he again takes up the task of exploring the differences
between these two “moralities,” now often discussed as differing “modes of
valuation.”47
In his preface to this work, Nietzsche writes that his thoughts on the origin of
different moralities have hopefully become “riper, clearer, stronger, more perfect”
since he first began to pursue these questions (GM:P2). It is not difficult to see that
Nietzsche’s ideas regarding noble and ascetic “modes of valuation” in the Genealogy
represent an expansion and development of his ideas of master and slave
“moralities” introduced in Beyond Good and Evil, written the previous year. As with
Nietzsche’s concept of a “morality,” his concept of a “mode of valuation” can be
understood primarily as a form of one’s evaluative judgments and values, i.e., how
one’s values are formulated and upheld. Only secondarily does a mode of
valuation, as Nietzsche presents it, include the content of these beliefs and values.
As with his analysis of master and slave morality, Nietzsche’s analysis of the
noble and the ascetic modes of valuation and their differences can be explained in
46 In taking this stand, the slaves insinuate that they could be like the nobles if they wanted to be, but that
they refrain out of duty and virtue. They thereby cleverly imply that they have precisely what they lack:
both power (the efficacy to be like the nobles if they so wished) and freedom (to choose to be like the noble
or to freely refrain from doing so, thereby showing moral merit).
47 In fact, Nietzsche often uses “mode of valuation” (Wertungs-Weise) and “morality”(Moral) interchangeably
in the Genealogy.
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terms of: (1) the type of person in whom they originate, (2) the evaluative orientation
toward oneself, others and the world, which they manifest, and (3) the activity by
which their respective values are established. In the Genealogy, even more than in
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche presents these formal traits as cohering together as
an interconnected whole. He also takes a closer look at how exactly these two
different ways of holding values developed and how they relate to each other.
One of the most noteworthy changes in Nietzsche’s thinking on the origin of
morality between Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy is the introduction of the
figure of the ascetic priest. Previously the “slave revolt in morals” was attributed to
the slaves alone, but in the Genealogy Nietzsche suggests that this is the work of the
ascetic priests, who share with the slaves an impotence in the world and the
resulting feelings of brooding hatred and resentment. Unlike the slaves, these
ascetic priests form the highest caste in some societies, but the relationship between
the “priestly aristocracy” and the “knightly aristocracy” is left largely unclear.
Nietzsche simply asserts that “One will have divined already how easily the priestly
mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop
into its opposite” adding that “this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and
the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come
to terms” (GM I:7).
Instead of elaborating further on the connection between these two
aristocratic castes, Nietzsche proceeds to a discussion of the fundamental differences
between their respective ‘modes of valuation’. Whereas the knightly aristocrats
distinguished themselves by their “powerful physicality” and “flourishing,
abundant, even overflowing health,” Nietzsche notes that “[t]here is from the first
something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies and in the habits ruling in them
which turn them away from action and alternate between brooding and emotional
explosions” (GM I:7, I:6).48 Nietzsche finds that it is precisely their impotence that
48
This turn away from action (and thereby involvement in worldly affairs which requires such action) is
perhaps one reason Nietzsche labels these priests “ascetics”; another is their tendency to promote contempt
for the natural world and emphasis on a transcendent ‘beyond.’
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makes these priestly aristocrats “the most evil enemies”: “It is because of their
impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the
most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred” (GM I:7). This festering hatred, born of
an inability to vent one’s aggressive natural drives physically and a resentment of
those who can, is what Nietzsche calls ressentiment. As we’ve said, it is this
impotence and poisonous hatred that the ascetic priests and the slaves have in
common such that despite differences in social rank, Nietzsche thereafter groups
them together as one ethical type: “the man of ressentiment” in contrast to the
“nobles” (GM I:10). Likewise, Nietzsche alternately calls the values produced from
this ressentiment “slave morality” or “the ascetic mode of valuation,” or simply “the
ascetic ideal.” The fact that Nietzsche finds this mode of valuation shared by both
the lowest classes and the “priestly aristocracy” indicates once again that his ethical
types are not reducible to social or political classes, even if their origins lie in the
conflicts between such classes.
Nietzsche explains that the ascetic mode of valuation begins when
“ressentiment itself become creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of
natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves
with an imaginary revenge” (GM I:10). The priests exact a “spiritual revenge” on
their enemies through a revaluation of their enemies’ values. Nietzsche refers back
to Beyond Good and Evil in citing his example of the Jews, “that priestly people,”:
who in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied
with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies’ values…It
was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the
aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy
= beloved of God)…saying “the wretched alone are the good; the poor,
impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly
alone are pious, alone are blessed by God… - and you, the powerful and
noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the
godless to all eternity” (GM I:7)
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According to Nietzsche, Christianity inherited this inverted value schema
and it became the dominant (and eventually singular) source of Western values. By
means of a mode of valuation which allowed the powerless and resentful to vent
their feelings of vengeance on the happy and powerful, the ascetic priest became the
“predestined savior, shepherd, and advocate of the sick herd…Dominion over the
suffering is his kingdom” (GM III:15).
In contrast, the noble mode of valuation originates in a creation of values
among those who are powerful and self-affirming. Nietzsche once again argues that
the concept of goodness originated in the self-evaluation of those who are powerful
and well-positioned in society:
it was “the good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-
stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and
their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all
the low, low-minded, common and plebian. It was out of this pathos of
distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names
for values (GM I:2).
In labeling themselves and their character traits as “worthy” and “good,” the
nobles “create values” for the first time. Originally what was affirmed was the
strength, power and position in society which distinguished these “nobles” from
those without power. But, as with master morality, the noble mode of valuation
does not consist of these (merely) prudential or social-hierarchical values. The
original aristocratic notion of goodness as power and social position deepens into
what is more recognizably an ethical notion of goodness. Nietzsche clarifies that, as
a “rule,” “a concept denoting political superiority always resolves itself into a
concept denoting superiority of soul” (GM I:6). He explains that a “conceptual
transformation” takes place in which the ethical notion “‘good’ in the sense of ‘with
aristocratic soul,’ ‘noble,’ ‘with a soul of a higher order,’ ‘with a privileged soul’
necessarily developed” out of the concept of “‘noble,’ ‘aristocratic’ in the social
sense”( GM I.4). Likewise, Nietzsche notes a parallel development in which the
concepts “’common,’ ‘plebian,’ ‘low,’ are finally transformed into the concept ‘bad’”
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(GM I:4). Thus, the creation of values characteristic of the noble mode of valuation
reaches beyond a mere (factual) recognition of social rank or physical, military or
political power. Those with power and social nobility also affirmed themselves as
“noble” in the ethical sense described above. They thereby created the notion of
“nobility” as an ethical value.
So far, we have briefly sketched the origins of the noble and ascetic modes of
valuation on a broad historical and sociological scale. Yet Nietzsche also gives an
account of how these modes of valuation originate within the people who come to
uphold them. Nietzsche believes that the nobles live according to their “regulating
unconscious instincts” and that the noble mode of valuation springs spontaneously
from an instinct and feeling of self-affirmation (GM I:10). In fact, living according to
one’s instincts is one of the recognizable marks of those “noble souls” whom this
mode of valuation affirms as “good.” Nietzsche cites the ”enthusiastic
impulsiveness in anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge by which noble
souls have at all times recognized one another” (GM I.10). He states that the noble
man “lives in trust and openness with himself” and “conceives the basic concept
‘good’ in advance and spontaneously out of himself” (GM I:10, 11). This concept of
‘good’ arises from the immediate feelings of happiness, gratitude and self-respect
which arise in the noble man and which he instinctively affirms as belonging to any
“good” and “worthy” way of life.
In contrast, the powerless and resentful live by cleverness and their mode of
valuation is the product of clever deception: “the man of ressentiment is neither
upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself…A race of such men
of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will
honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the
first importance” (GM I:11).49 Such cleverness is necessary for the revaluation of
49 In discussing a noble “race” or a “race” of men of ressentiment, Nietzsche does not mean to pick out any
particular ethnic group. That Nietzsche believes these ethical types can be found in a range of societies is
confirmed in his catalogue of noble types: “the Roman, the Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the
Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings” (GM I:11). Most generally, Nietzsche wants to distinguish those
people who have in common either a ‘noble’ affirmation of existence or a ‘slavish’ ressentiment toward it.
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values since, as part of this process, the values of the nobles must be subtly and
counter-intuitively reconceived as vices. Similarly, the impotence and suffering of
the weak must be subtly and counter-intuitively reconceived as virtues. Nietzsche
imaginatively portrays the “workshop” where such “ideals are manufactured” and
describes how: “Weakness is being lied into something meritorious… and
impotence which does not requite into ‘goodness of heart’; anxious lowliness into
‘humility’; subjection to those one hates into ‘obedience’” (GM I:14). Likewise,
those who are miserable and suffering must cleverly deceive themselves into
thinking that they are happy, in contrast to the nobles: “The ‘well-born’ felt
themselves to be the ‘happy’; they did not have to establish their happiness
artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive
themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of
doing)” (GM I:10).
The Genealogy reveals important developments in Nietzsche’s thinking on the
formal differences between “creation of values” by which the nobles establish their
values and the inversion of these values performed by the ascetic priests. What is
especially significant, in Nietzsche’s view, is whether one’s mode of valuation is
established by an activity which is primarily active and self-affirming or one that is
primarily reactive and other-denouncing. In Nietzsche’s terms, the noble mode of
valuation is primarily ‘Yes-saying’ while the ascetic mode of valuation has as its
primary concept the ‘No’ by which it reactively condemns the nobles:
While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of
itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” to
what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative deed.
This inversion of the value-positing eye – this need to direct one’s view
outward instead of back to oneself – is of the essence of ressentiment: in
order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world;
it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all –
its action is fundamentally reaction. (GM I:10)
One external stimulus to which slave morality is a reaction is the presence of
the powerful, joyful and much-feared nobles. The purpose of slave morality for
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those who uphold it is primarily to exact a “spiritual revenge” upon these nobles by
denouncing them as “evil.” Slave morality thus begins with its negative concept: the
notion of the nobles as an “evil enemy.” Nietzsche explains that slave morality does
in a sense affirm those who uphold it, but this affirmation is only a secondary
afterthought: “picture ‘the enemy’ as the man of ressentiment conceives him – and
here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived ‘the evil enemy,’ ‘the Evil
One,’ and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he evolves, as an afterthought
and pendant, a ‘good one’ – himself!” (GM I:10) In contrast, the noble mode of
valuation’s primary concept is affirming and self-directed, and it only subsequently
develops its negative concept (‘bad’ in the sense of ‘contemptible’). In keeping with
its fundamental stance of self-affirmation, the noble mode of valuation “seeks its
opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly – its negative
concept ‘low,’ ‘common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently-invented pale, contrasting
image in relation to its positive basic concept” (GM 1:10).
As we have seen, one distinction in form between noble and ascetic modes of
valuation is found in whether the activity establishing their values is primarily self-
referential or primarily a reaction to others. Another distinction is found in whether these
modes of valuation begin with an affirmation or a condemnation, a Yes or a No. Still
another formal distinction is the way that a mode of valuation’s negative concept is
conceived and posited.
The negative concept of the ascetic mode of valuation is precisely the positive
concept of the noble mode of valuation: “one should ask rather precisely who is ‘evil’ in the
sense of the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the ‘good
man’ of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man” (GM I:11). Conceived
through the ‘venomous eye’ of ressentiment, the noble way of life is understood as ‘evil’.
There may seem to be a self-contradiction in the way the ascetic mode of valuation
establishes its negative concept, indulging in its hatred, vengefulness, and rancor against the
powerful and joyful members of their society. If this were done openly, it would naturally
be condemned by the ascetic values of humility, meekness, etc. For this reason, those who
are powerful must be reconceived as an evil, monstrous enemy. Then the fierce opposition
against the powerful can be interpreted as ‘justice’: “what they desire they call, not
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retaliation, but ‘the triumph of justice’; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate
‘injustice,’ they hate ‘godlessness” (GM I:14). Slave morality must therefore invent the
notion of “evil” and cleverly construct a caricature of the nobles as evil “monsters.”
Here we see the vast difference between the noble concept of “bad” in the sense of
despicable, contemptible, or unworthy and the ascetic concept of “evil”. This is the
difference between a negative concept born out of contempt and one born out of hatred.
The nobles do not hate those who are powerless and ‘tamed,’ nor do they consider them
“evil” monsters. Nietzsche explains that there is “indeed too much carelessness, too much
taking lightly, too much looking away and impatience involved in contempt, even too much
joyfulness, for it to be able to transform its object into a real caricature and monster” (GM
I:10). He uses the example of Greek nobility to illustrate that the noble’s conception of ‘bad’
is free from any resentment or rancor. It can even express a benevolent consideration of
those who are less fortunate:
One should not overlook the almost benevolent nuances that the Greek
nobility, for example, bestows on all the words it employs to distinguish
the lower orders from itself; how they are continuously mingled and
sweetened with a kind of pity, consideration, and forbearance, so that
finally almost all the words referring to the common man have remained
as expressions signifying “unhappy,” “pitiable” (GM I:10).
Thus, the noble mode of valuation does not caricature as “evil enemies” those
whom it condemns as “bad.” On the contrary, the nobles acknowledge only other
nobles, those who are equally powerful and high-minded, as worthy adversaries.
The nobles feel hatred and resentment neither toward those they consider ‘bad’ nor
toward their enemies. In fact, it is a distinguishing mark of the nobles that they are
free from the gnawing resentment50 which lies at the heart of slave morality: “To be
incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for
very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the
power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget” (GM I:10). Nietzsche notes, not
50
Nietzsche remarks that “Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and
exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the other hand, it fails to appear
at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent” (GM I:10). Given
that ressentiment is usually described as a gnawing unsatisfied hatred caused by the impotence to requite
wrongs immediately, it seems that the nobles who can immediately requite wrongs do not have ressentiment
at all in the usual sense that Nietzsche gives this term.
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without some irony, that it is only among such nobles that ‘love of one’s enemies’
may become possible:
here alone genuine ‘love of one’s enemies’ is possible – supposing it to be
possible at all on earth. How much reverence has a noble man for his
enemies! – and such reverence is a bridge to love.– For he desires his
enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction; he can endure no other
enemy than one in whom there is nothing to despise and very much to
honor!” (GM I:10)
Hence, the nobles relate to others, whether their friends, enemies or those for
whom they have contempt, in a much different way than the men of ressentiment.
The noble affirmations and condemnations differ not just in content, but in form,
from those born out of what Nietzsche calls “the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred.”
The noble mode of valuation begins with an instinctive self-respect and self-
affirmation by those who openly and honestly celebrate themselves and their peers
as joyful, capable, and proud. This mode of valuation only subsequently formulates
its negative concept ‘bad’ out of a contempt for those who are not similarly joyful,
capable, or proud – and even then it often mingles this negative judgment with
benevolent consideration and forbearance. The nobles have no need to falsify their
understanding or evaluations of themselves or others, and they are free from the
pessimistic weariness with life or ressentiment which plague the impotent and form
the basis of their mode of valuation.
The preceding comparison makes it clear that a ‘mode of valuation’ in the
Genealogy is a further development of the concept of a “morality’ as found in Beyond
Good and Evil. We have also shown the important unity between a ‘type’ of morality
or mode of valuation and the ‘type’ of person in whom it is found. The term ‘way of
life’ as it applies to Nietzsche’s thinking indicates precisely this unity between a type
of person and a type of morality or mode of valuation. In concluding this section, it
will now be helpful to summarize what we’ve learned about what a ‘way of life’ is
in general for Nietzsche, such that a typology comparing different ways of life could
be possible.
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A way of life is defined not only by what is most important and motivating for
a person, but also the affects, drives, and dispositions which are fundamental to her
character and life.51 It encompasses a person’s self-conception and self-evaluation,
as well as her conception and evaluation of others. It constitutes the fundamental
evaluative orientation toward oneself, toward others, and toward the world which
manifests itself in the judgments, values, and purposes one formulates and upholds.
Importantly, a way of life is not merely a way of thinking or a theory of values for the
one who holds it. It is also the motivational basis of all of one’s actions, goals, and
projects. Thus, a way of life is a way of thinking, judging, and acting – a way of being
as a person.
§2 EARLY FORMULATIONS OF NIETZSCHE NEW ‘HIGHER TYPE’
Nietzsche’s interest in the historical development of different moralities and
ethical types is by no means purely ‘academic’. His purposes are, as the subtitle to
the Genealogy makes clear, polemic. One of his polemic aims is to alarm us about the
impending crisis of values caused by the lingering predominance of ascetic ideals;
Nietzsche thinks that ascetic ideals have slowly weakened and demeaned us until
we have lost any reverence for ourselves. (This is the crisis of ‘nihilism’ to be
discussed at length in chapter four). A related polemic aim is to pry us from our
allegiance to ascetic and slavish values. He does this by portraying the ascetic and
slavish type in a way calculated to repulse his readers, readers who are currently in
the sway of such values (e.g. by portraying them as dishonest, hateful, and cowardly
– contrary to the professed Christian-Platonic virtues of honesty, love and courage.)
I believe Nietzsche’s much-discussed ‘critique of morality’ can be best understood in
relation to this polemic aim.
51 Of course a way of life is never found in this merely formal sense; it is always instantiated by a particular
person. Different people who share a ‘way of life’ generally may have very different specific goals, beliefs,
affects, etc. A ‘way of life’ considered generally (e.g. the noble way of life) may indeed encompass the
content of some values which every particular person living this way of life might be expected to uphold
(e.g. courage, strength) but even then, what these terms mean may vary dramatically from individual to
individual. Moreover, the explanation for why these particular values are shared by all who live this way of
life becomes apparent only when we look at the formal aspects of this way of life (e.g. courage and strength
as requirements for independence, or as manifestations of self-affirmation).
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Yet Nietzsche also has the polemic aim of presenting us with an attractive
“new hope,” a hope for a ‘higher’ way of life which overcomes this crisis of nihilism.
To this end, he presents his readers with enticing portraits of new ethical types. In
the next two sections, I will attempt to sketch a clear portrait of the figures Nietzsche
introduces as embodying a new, “higher,” “more spiritual” way of life (GM I:16).
As I will explain, this way of life is primarily characterized by independence, the
revaluation of prevailing values, and a new kind of conscience and self-mastery.52
The most popularly recognized formulation of this type is perhaps the
Übermensch mentioned in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra says very
little about the Übermensch, but we can discern that this figure represents the
“overcoming” of mankind, the tearing down of old values and the ‘creation’ of new
values in which meaning and value is restored to the earth and to human life (Z:
Prologue). Although the nature and content of these ‘new values’ is left unclear,
Zarathustra proclaims that any such creator will need the ability to command and
obey himself (Z:“Of the Way of the Creator,” “Of Self-Overcoming”). Although
many scholars focus on the Übermensch figure as the central formulation of
Nietzsche’s ideal type, this approach can be dangerously misleading. As Nietzsche
scholars have pointed out, there is very little textual evidence to clarify the
Übermensch figure.53 Additional uncertainty is introduced by the fact that the
Übermensch is a dramatis persona employed by Zarathustra, who is himself a dramatis
persona employed by Nietzsche. For these reasons, it is difficult if not impossible to
substantiate claims about Nietzsche’s hopes for future based on the scant
Übermensch descriptions in Zarathustra. Perhaps more troublesome, it is all-too easy
for scholars to read into the Übermensch figure whatever traits they would like to
applaud or condemn in this figure. However, this danger or temptation (depending
52 It should be said from the start that Nietzsche’s descriptions of these new ‘types’ are far less detailed than
the figures he traces historically, and perhaps for good reason. Nietzsche’s task, as always, is to prompt
creativity and independence in others, not to give them a blueprint for how they should live their lives.
Here Nietzsche faces the same challenge that led Kierkegaard to sometimes extravagant uses of ‘indirect
communication’: how to teach independence of thinking, acting and evaluating and then withdraw such
that the teacher does not become a new obstacle to this independence.
53 For example, see Solomon & Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, (New York: Schocken Books, 2000), 215.
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on how you look at it) can be easily avoided since the traits that can be identified as
belonging to the Übermensch are often discussed more clearly in other formulations
of Nietzsche’s highest ethical type.
The formulation of this ‘type’ that occurs most often is the ‘free spirit,’ a
figure first introduced in Human, All Too Human “A Book for Free Spirits,” and
discussed in almost every work thereafter. The importance of this figure, and of
Nietzsche’s positive project of offering his readers a new ideal ‘type,’ is
demonstrated by the fact that Nietzsche had the following words printed on the
back cover of The Gay Science: “This book marks the conclusion of a series of writings
by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE whose common goal it is to erect a new image and
ideal of the free spirit.” He then listed all the works from the first volume of Human,
All Too Human through The Gay Science.54
It may be objected that the ‘free spirit’ does not represent Nietzsche’s highest
hopes for the future. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, he introduces the
prospect of ‘new philosophers’ who are free spirits yet not “merely free spirits, but
something more, higher, greater and thoroughly different” (BGE:44). All ‘new
philosophers’ seem to be free spirits even if some free spirits lack something of what
it takes to be ‘new philosophers’. What these ‘mere’ free spirits lack compared to the
new philosophers, and the exact relationship between these two figures, remains
unclear. For our purposes, it will suffice to review some of the basic features of the
‘free spirit’ in order to understand the conceptual context for Nietzsche’s later
formulations of his new, higher type: the “new philosophers” of Beyond Good and
Evil, and the “sovereign individual” and “creative spirit” of the Genealogy. The
defining aspects of these later formulations, which can be found in at least
54 In the later preface to Human, All Too Human, written eight years after the first volume, Nietzsche declares
that he “invented once upon a time the ‘free spirits,’” and that there “are no such " free spirits" nor have there
been such” but that “such free spirits will be possible some day. . . Already I see them coming” (D, Preface, 2).
It is clear that Nietzsche primarily intends the free spirit to represent an ideal for the present and future, yet
he cannot resist crediting some figures from the past with free spiritedness. For example, Socrates is
mentioned as a free spirit (HH:433). In discussing Human, All Too Human in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche also
associates Voltaire with the free spirits, calling him a “grandseigneur of the spirit – like me” (EH “Books”
HH: 1). Moreover, that Nietzsche saw himself as a free spirit is evident throughout his works and by his
frequent epithet “we free spirits”(e.g. HH: P7, BGE:61, A:13).
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precursory form in the ‘free spirits’, are: independence, the revaluation of prevailing
values, and a new kind of conscience (i.e. new and different from the ascetic
manifestations of conscience Nietzsche finds in the present age.)
Many early descriptions of the free spirit depict this figure as a scholar or
“man of knowledge,” although it is clear that Nietzsche does not want us to
narrowly identify his ideal type with ‘academics’. He discusses the “refined heroism”
of those “who live for the sake of knowledge alone,” who disdain to seek “the
veneration of the masses,” and are instead “content with, for example, a minor office
or an income that just enables them to live” and pursue their scholarly interests
(HH:291). As thinkers, these free spirits are “liberal-minded” not in the political
sense, but in that they adhere to the value of a diversity of perspectives (HH: P6).
The free spirit stands as an exception to the fact that in the modern world “time for
thinking and quietness in thinking are lacking, one no longer ponders deviant
views: one contents oneself with hating them” (HH:282).
Free spirits are also distinguished by a devotion to the pursuit of knowledge
so passionate that they will continue to pursue it even when this leads them into
direct conflict with the social mores and predominant morality of their day. Their
independence of mind thereby opens the door to the discovery of truths which
challenge these mores and this morality. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche discusses
flaunting the ideals of one’s age (regarding them as ‘human, all too human’) and
declares: “The term ‘free spirit’ here is not to be understood in any other sense: it
means a spirit that has become free, that has again taken possession of itself” (EH
“Books” HH: 1). Nietzsche recognizes that to “take possession of oneself” as an
individual, to have one’s thinking and evaluating “free” of the mores and morality
of one’s day, is necessarily to face the opposition of these mores and morality. This
is because “[t]he prescriptions called ‘moral’ are in truth directed against individuals
and are in no way aimed at promoting their happiness” (D:108). Human, All Too
Human discusses Socrates as a free spirit (HH:433), and a passage describing Socrates
in Daybreak helps to clarify why Nietzsche might think so:
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[T]he individual is to sacrifice himself – that is the commandment of
morality of custom. – Those moralists, on the other hand, who, following
in the footsteps of Socrates, offer the individual a morality of self-control
and temperance as a means to his own advantage, as his key to personal
happiness, are the exceptions – and if it seems otherwise to us that its
because we have been brought up in their after-effect: they all take a new
path under the highest disapprobation of all advocates of morality of
custom – they cut themselves off from the community, as immoral men,
and are in the profoundest sense evil. (D:9)55
The free spirit’s pursuit of knowledge may unwittingly lead him outside the
realm of accepted beliefs and values, but insofar as the truths he discovers lead him
to challenge these beliefs and values, he has begun what Nietzsche calls a
“revaluation of values.”56 As we will discuss in depth later, the devotion to truth is
itself an inheritance from this challenged morality, and thus the ‘revaluation of
values’ is something of an internal critique. Nietzsche declares of Daybreak “in this
book faith in morality is withdrawn – but why? Out of morality!” He calls this
process “the self-sublimation of morality” (D: P4). Nietzsche discusses the free
spirit’s “decisive experience” as a “great liberation” from “all but unbreakable bonds”
(HH: P3). He is clear that “in the case of men of a high and select kind” these bonds
“will be their duties: that reverence proper to youth, that reserve and delicacy before
all that is honoured and revered from of old, that gratitude for the soil out of which
they have grown, for the hand which led them, for the holy place where they
learned to worship” (HH:P3). As this quote makes clear, these “duties” from which
the free spirit is liberated include not only the demands of religion and morality, but
also the mores established by tradition and “revered from of old.”
Nietzsche believes that this “great liberation” from the bonds of prevailing
morality must involve an attack on the bad conscience which promotes and binds us
55 Thomas Brobjer, in his groundbreaking work “Nietzsche’s Knowledge of Kierkegaard,” cites this passage
as a possible reference to Kierkegaard (as a strongly individualist moral thinker “in the footsteps of
Socrates”) – a comparison Kierkegaard may have welcomed. Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 40, no.
4 (2002) 261-63.
56 In The Antichrist he declares: “Let us not underestimate this: we ourselves, we free spirits, are nothing less
than a ‘revaluation of all values’” (A:13). Yet in earlier writings the association of the free spirit with such a
revaluation is much less explicitly stated. It seems that Nietzsche often read back into the ‘free spirit’ figure
traits and tasks which he only fully developed long after this figure was ‘invented.’
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to this morality. Thus, he declares as a goal which “ought to be recognized and
furthered by all men who are honest and seek the truth” that “a tremendous burden
of bad conscience shall be expelled from the world” (D:164). That Nietzsche
recognizes this as one of his own goals is evident in his proclamation: “we shall
restore to men their goodwill toward the actions decried as egoistic and restore to
these actions their value – we shall deprive them of their bad conscience!” (D:148).
The free spirit is one who stands free of the “prejudices of morality” but this
does not mean that the free spirit is a libertine without a conscience, or just ‘lets
himself go.’ To the contrary, Nietzsche is clear that the free spirit is “hostile” not
only toward the constraints of religion and morality (including the bad conscience),
but also toward “pleasure-seeking and lack of conscience” (D:P4). The free spirits
live as ‘men of conscience’: “there is no doubt that a ‘thou shalt’ still speaks to us
too, that we too still obey a stern law set over us” (D:P4). Nietzsche includes
himself in this description, insisting: “in this if in anything we too are still men of
conscience: namely, in that we do not want to return to that which we consider
outlived and decayed” (D:P4). This free spirit’s conscience is sometimes described
as an “intellectual conscience,” which directs him to pursue truth even when this
entails opposition to the mores and morality of those around him (GM III:24). It
directs him to refuse the way of life he finds “outlived and decayed,” namely the
way of life lived according to traditional morality and mores.
Nietzsche recognizes that reverence for tradition and morality have been
useful, until now even indispensable, instruments in the history of humankind. As
he says in Beyond Good and Evil: “The essential and invaluable element in every
morality is that it is a protracted constraint” (BGE:188). He admits that this
constraint may ultimately be a ‘tyranny of arbitrary laws’ but also notes “the strange
fact” that “all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance and
masterly certainty [...] has evolved only by virtue of the ‘tyranny of such arbitrary
laws’” (BGE:188). One of the great and penetrating questionsthat Nietzsche poses
in Human, All Too Human is how a ‘free spirit,’ who by definition lacks this reverence
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for traditional mores and morality, can have the constraint necessary to obey his
own values and ‘proceed along his own path’:
Esprit fort.— Compared with him who has tradition on his side and
requires no reasons for his actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially
in action; for he is acquainted with too many motives and points of view,
and has, therefore, an uncertain and unpracticed hand. What means exist
of nonetheless making him relatively strong, so that he will, at least, manage
to survive, and will not perish ineffectually? What is the source of the
strong spirit (esprit fort)? This is especially the question as to the production
of genius. Whence comes the energy, the unbending strength, the
endurance with which the one, in opposition to accepted ideas, endeavors
to obtain an entirely individual knowledge of the world? (HH:230)
As we shall see, Nietzsche’s understanding of the goal and task of his ‘higher
type’ evolves from obtaining an “entirely individual knowledge of the world” to
obtaining an entirely individual way of living in the world. If the free spirit is to
stand on his own, without the benefit of tradition and “in opposition to accepted
ideas,” and yet still have the constraint necessary to live according to some values,
he needs great strength. Obeying one’s own conscience requires the strength of
self-mastery, a strength Nietzsche attributes to the free spirits: “ ’ You shall become
master over yourself, master also over your virtues. Formerly they were your
masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other instruments. You shall
get control over your For and Against and learn how to display first one and then
the other in accordance with your higher goal’” (HH:P6).
Self-mastery allows a kind of self-sufficiency in which one can rely on one’s
own conscience, rather than a respect of traditional mores and morality, as the
constraint by which one lives. This allows the ‘free spirit’ to engage in what
Nietzsche calls “experiments in living”: living according to one’s own values and
plan for how to live rather than according to the values and plans given by society
or a (supposedly) transcendent source. Nietzsche declares as another goal which
“ought to be recognized and furthered” by all honest, truth-seeking men that
“numerous novel experiments shall be made in ways of life and modes of society”
(D:164). Indeed, Nietzsche takes it as “precisely the sign of great health, that
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superfluity which grants to the free spirit the dangerous privilege of living
experimentally and of being allowed to offer itself to adventure: the master's privilege
of the free spirit!” (HH:P4).
The ability to command and obey oneself also allows one to have the ability
to influence or lead others. Thus, Nietzsche declares that as a scholar the free spirit
has the “higher task of commanding from a lonely position the whole militia of
scientific and learned men and showing them the paths to and goals of culture”
(HH:282). By successfully living according to one’s own conscience and values, one
becomes a paragon and standard of value, not only of one’s own particular
conception of greatness, but also more generally of independence and free-
spiritedness. Thus, Nietzsche proposes as an alternative to pitying our fellow man,
helping him by “creating something out of oneself that the other can behold with
pleasure” (D:174). This notion of ‘creating something out of oneself’ will become a
key part of what Nietzsche later calls a new ‘creation of values’.
§3 MATURE FORMULATIONS OF NIETZSCHE’S NEW HIGHER ETHICAL TYPE
Having reviewed how the free spirit figure embodies or at least prefigures
independence, a revaluation of values, and a new kind of conscience, let us proceed
to a discussion of how Nietzsche presents these ideas through the figure of the ‘new
philosophers’ in Beyond Good and Evil. As explained above, these ‘new
philosophers’ seem to be free spirits of a special kind (perhaps the “the perfect free
spirit” Nietzsche mentions in Human, All To Human §231). It is therefore not
surprising that the independence of these ‘new philosophers’ is described in much
the same way as it was for the ‘free spirits.’ Nietzsche states that “today, being
noble, wanting to be by oneself, the ability to be different, independence and the
need for self-responsibility pertains to the concept ‘greatness’” (BGE:212).
Undoubtedly the most important way that these ‘new philosophers’ are
independent lies in their being “beyond good and evil” (BGE:212). They are free
from the slavish and world-renouncing values of ascetic morality, free from “the
mob and its virtues and duties” (BGE:213).
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Like the free spirits, the new philosophers are often described as scholars, yet
Nietzsche insists that they not be confused with the scholars prevalent in his day
(and, we might add, our own). In several passages, Nietzsche draws a sharp
contrast between his ‘new philosophers’ and those scholars he calls “average”
scientific “specialists” or “philosophical laborers after the noble exemplar of Kant
and Hegel” (BGE:205, 206, 211, 213). Among the traits of these lesser scholars that
Nietzsche finds undesirable are a petty narrowness of interests, a lack of creativity,
and a tendency to promote mediocrity and conformity. They also have a stultifying
tendency to make their scholarship into a matter of oppressive and ostentatious
weightiness, rather than as a ‘joyful science,’ as Nietzsche believes it should be.
Nietzsche also faults these scholars for their adherence to certain ‘herd’ values
(“industriousness, patient acknowledgement of his proper place in the rank and file,
uniformity and moderation in abilities and requirements”) and for having other
“ignoble” traits such as being “subservient, unauthoritative and un-self-sufficient”
(BGE:206). In the Genealogy, Nietzsche will clarify that such scholars are but the
latest manifestation of ascetic ideals (GM:III:24).
In contrast, the new philosopher employs the rigorousness required of good
scholarship, but he also enjoys his work as a ‘joyful science’: Nietzsche discusses the
“bold, easy, delicate course and cadence of his thoughts,” which are fitting for the
“lordly task and lordliness of philosophy” (BGE:213, 204). The new philosophers
employ “that genuinely philosophical combination of a bold exuberant spirituality
which runs presto and a dialectical severity and necessity which never takes a false
step,” a combination Nietzsche finds unknown to most contemporary thinkers and
scholars (BGE:213).
The notion that Nietzsche’s hoped-for type represents great spirituality is an
important one. In Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche often refers to spirituality without
ever clearly defining what he means by this (e.g., BGE:188,201,213,219,227). But we
can deduce that by “spiritual” Nietzsche does not mean anything transcendent or
other-worldly; his spirituality expresses the inner richness, depth and joy which can
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be found in this life.57 The new philosopher’s spirituality stands in contrast to the
mediocrity and spiritual stagnancy that Nietzsche finds pervasive in the modern
age.
Also in contrast to the mediocrity and smallness of modern men, the new
philosophers are marked by a “readiness for great responsibilities” (BGE:213).
They represent the “rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the
higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative fullness of power and mastery” to
which the mediocrity and world-renouncing ideals of the age are opposed
(BGE:212). Nietzsche honors a breadth of responsibility as belonging to the very
nature of ‘greatness.’ He speculates that the new philosopher would see “the
concept of ‘greatness’” “precisely in his spaciousness and multiplicity, in his
wholeness in diversity: he would even determine value and rank according to how
much and how many things one could endure and take upon oneself, how far one
could extend one’s responsibility” (BGE:212). Here we find additional evidence
against the common misconception that Nietzsche is an advocate of a narrow, selfish
egoism. As we shall see, one of the “great responsibilities” these new philosophers
take upon themselves involves the attempt to save humankind from the self-hating
‘bad conscience’ and nihilism of ascetic morality.
Diversity of perspectives and a freedom from dogmatism are hallmarks of
greatness for the new philosopher, just as they were with the free spirits (BGE:43,
212). Yet Nietzsche is also careful to state that the new philosopher has certainty
regarding his own standards of value. Although the new philosopher may
sometimes take on the role of a skeptic, Nietzsche is wary of construing him as a
skeptic per se (BGE:210). Likewise, Nietzsche is careful to emphasize that the new
philosopher is not a critic per se, even though he shares certain traits with the critic
which distinguish the critic from the skeptic :
57As we will see shortly, the idea that Nietzsche’s hoped-for type represents a greater spirituality is also
evident in the Genealogy (e.g. GM I: 16). Nietzsche’s notion of spirituality will also be discussed in Chapters
5 and 6.
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I mean certainty in standards of value, conscious employment of a unity
of method, instructed courage, independence and ability to justify oneself;
indeed, they confess to taking a pleasure in negating and dissecting and to
a certain self-possessed cruelty which knows how to wield the knife with
certainty and deftness even when the heart bleeds. They will be harder
(and perhaps not always only against themselves) than humane men
might wish. . . (BGE:210)
We have already discussed the new philosopher’s independence, but it will
be useful to look more closely at the other traits described here in order to clarify
what this independence involves or requires. Certainty in standards of value is of
pivotal importance for the new philosopher. Without a sense of certainty regarding
his own standards of value, he would not be able to “stand alone” (Alleinstehn); he
would not be able to stand on his own, living independently of prevailing values and
traditional constraints for upholding values. Those who attack the prevailing ascetic
values without a certainty about their own values become nihilists in the sense
Nietzsche most detests58: they conclude that a world devoid of transcendent value is
a world devoid of value per se. As Nietzsche acknowledges, the truly difficult task
is to free oneself from these values and constraints and yet still be able to uphold
values, namely one’s own. Hence Nietzsche believes that it is a “faith” in oneself,
even more than the greatness of one’s accomplishments, which determines whether
one is a ‘noble’ today: “It is not the works, it is the faith which is decisive here, which
determines the order of rank here, to employ an old religious formula in a new and
deeper sense: some fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to
itself. . .The noble soul has reverence for itself” (BGE:287).
Self-reverence is one of the factors allowing for the new philosopher’s ability
to live on his own, constrained only by his own self-responsibility: he is constrained
by reverence for himself rather than reverence for some external authority or set of
commands. Of course, there is something odd about calling this faith he has in
himself a ‘constraint,’ since it is also a joyful good conscience he has in regard to his
58 As Solomon explains, Nietzsche is opposed to nihilism as the abandonment of all values and nihilism as
hostility to life (the first and seventh of the ten types of nihilism Solomon discusses). Robert Solomon,
“Nietzsche, Nihilism, and Morality” in Robert Solomon, Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays. (Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 205.
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life and the affirmation of himself and existence a whole. Yet this self-responsibility
also requires severity with oneself, so the term ‘constraint’ is perhaps appropriate.
As we shall see, it is a combination of self-severity and self-reverence which enable
the new philosopher to take on “great responsibilities” while severed from
traditional constraints, i.e. the ascetic guilty conscience and conformity to “the mob
and its duties and virtues” (BGE:213).
Nietzsche advocacy of a “conscious employment of a unity of method” may
surprise those who see his own aphoristic style as an disorganized and
undisciplined ‘grasping’ at truths. Reading Nietzsche’s accounts of his own works
in Ecce Homo makes it clear that he considered himself to be using a unity of method.
It may be that Nietzsche only discovered this unity of method in retrospect, but
whether or not his own self-assessment is correct, it is evident that employing a
unity of method is something he considered desirable. The notion of consciously
employing a unity of method can also be understood as a corrective to
misunderstandings of Nietzsche’s call for the new philosophers to be
“experimenters” and “attempters.” Insofar as they venture to stand independently
of (and opposed to) the traditional values and constraints for upholding values, the
new philosophers do indeed perform a kind of “experiment.” Before venturing to
go beyond traditional values and constraints, they lack any assurance that they will
succeed in living by their own values or even that successfully living by these values
would prove satisfying. Yet Nietzsche indicates that one could be wrong in calling
these new philosophers “attempters,” that this name was itself “in the end only an
attempt and, if you will, a temptation” (BGE:42). One evident danger in thinking of
the new philosophers as ‘attempters’ and ‘experimenters’ is that these terms can
have connotations of a “mere trying,” or a haphazard guessing when it comes to how
to live life. Obviously, a new philosopher armed with a sense of self-certainty and
faith in herself regarding her standards of value should not be thought of as an
‘attempter’ in this sense.
As with all experiments, there is a risk involved in the new philosopher’s
experiments in living by his own values. Nietzsche says that the new philosopher
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“bears the burden and duty of a hundred attempts and temptations of life – he risks
himself constantly, he plays the dangerous game” (BGE:205). The new philosopher
risks himself in venturing to go beyond traditional values and constraints since, as
we have said, he has no assurance that he will succeed in living by his own values.
If he fails, he will either face the nihilism of a world without any values, or he will
face a guilty verdict according to his own values and according to the traditional
values he has sought to replace. Due to this risk, the new philosopher will need
great courage. Courage is often listed by Nietzsche as a virtue, but here the
specification that this courage is “instructed” (gewitzten) may indicate that this
courage is not some innate character trait, but rather something that the new
philosophers have learned from their own experiences. There is also a connotation
of sharpness, shrewdness, or wittiness in the term gewitzten. Perhaps by “courage,”
Nietzsche has in mind the fearless wit of a critic like Voltaire rather than the stalwart
courage of a Prussian military man.
For Nietzsche, the “ability to justify oneself” (Sich-verantworten-können) is
closely related to the ability to live by one’s own responsibility (Verantwortung), i.e.
the ability to uphold one’s own values out of a sense of responsibility and self-
reverence. In general, the term “to justify oneself” may mean no more than
showing that one stands ‘in the right’ in relation to the value judgments of
prevailing morality. In other words, justifying oneself may simply mean justifying
oneself to others on the basis of what Nietzsche calls the values of the ‘herd’. But
for these new philosophers, justifying oneself is a different and much more
challenging task. It means to justify oneself to oneself according to one’s own
values. In other words, it is the ability to successfully live by one’s own values such
that one can affirm oneself as justified in relation to them. Especially if one sets high
expectations for oneself in these values, this can be quite challenging. Thus
Zarathustra warns: “many a one can command himself but be very remiss in
obeying what he commands!” (Z: “Of Old and New Law-Tables”). Moreover, to
take responsibility for oneself entails the need to judge oneself fairly and honestly, to
evaluate whether one has succeeded and to determine what is to be done if one has
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not succeeded. In pointing out what is required to meet this challenge and how it
relates to the idea of ‘experimentation’ and ‘risk’ discussed a moment ago, Nietzsche
has Zarathustra proclaim:
commanding is more difficult than obeying. And not only because the
commander bears the burden of all who obey, and that this burden can
easily crush him. In all commanding there appeared to me to be an
experiment and a risk: and the living creature always risks himself when
he commands. Yes, even when he commands himself: then also must he
make amends for his commanding. He must become judge and avenger
of his own law.” (Z:“Of Self-Overcoming”).
To justify oneself in Nietzsche’s sense requires becoming “judge and avenger
of one’s own law.” For this reason, the attempt to live by one’s own self-
responsibility is always beset by the danger of self-indulgence: one might think that
one could succeed best by simply setting one’s expectations comfortably low, by
altering one’s values to reflect any change of whim or circumstance, or by
generously pardoning or overlooking any lapses in one’s adherence to one’s own
values. But then this living by one’s own values becomes nothing more than
another instance of “letting oneself go,” a nihilistic collapse into mediocrity. In
contrast, Nietzsche is clear that successfully living according to one’s own values
requires great hardness and severity with oneself. He states: “Today the taste of the
age and the virtue of the age weakens and attenuates the will. . .consequently, in the
philosopher’s ideal precisely the strength of will, the hardness and capacity for
protracted decisions, must constitute part of the concept ‘greatness’” (BGE:212).
Moreover, the new philosophers may apply the same severity and hardness
to others and their values that they do to themselves. As quoted above, Nietzsche
thinks these new philosophers “will be harder (and perhaps not always only against
themselves) than humane men might wish” (BGE:210). In particular, the new
philosophers display hardness, cruelty and self-severity as they cut into the heart
and values of their age: “they confess to taking a pleasure in negating and dissecting
and to a certain self-possessed cruelty which knows how to wield the knife with
certainty and deftness even when the heart bleeds” (BGE:210). The image of a
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surgeon vivisecting a living body is one which Nietzsche often employs the describe
the ethical task of the philosopher. He may be consciously borrowing this image
from Socrates, and he certainly associates this task of vivisecting values with
Socrates. Nietzsche describes how Socrates, in order to counter the “wearied
instincts” of “conservative ancient Athenians who let themselves go,” employed
“that Socratic malicious certitude of the old physician and plebian who cut
remorselessly into his own flesh as he did into the flesh and heart of the ‘noble’”
(BGE:212). The result of the philosopher’s vivisection of values is twofold: to reveal
the weakness, self-indulgence and hypocrisy behind the values of one’s age, and to
reveal a higher possibility for human values:
By laying the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues of the
age they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of
man, a new untrodden path to his enlargement. Each time they revealed
how much hypocrisy, indolence, letting oneself go and letting oneself fall,
how much falsehood was concealed under the most honoured type of
their contemporary morality (BGE:212).
This vivisection of values revealing the weakness of prevailing morality and a
new, higher possibility for humankind is part of the great task Nietzsche elsewhere
calls a “revaluation of values.” He suggests that it is the new philosophers who
will perform this task, and it is therefore to them that we should turn our hopes
when facing “man in decay, that is to say in diminishment, in the process of
becoming mediocre and losing his value”:
whither must we direct our hopes? – Towards new philosophers, we have
no other choice; towards spirits strong and original enough to make a start
on antithetical evaluations and to revalue and reverse ‘eternal values’;
towards heralds and forerunners, towards men of the future who in the
present knot together the constraint which compels the will of millennia
on to new paths. (BGE:203).
As this quote reveals, the revaluation of values involves more than simply
reversing or assigning new value to ‘eternal’ (i.e., ascetic, world-renouncing) values.
It also means ‘knotting together’ a new “constraint.” Nietzsche explicitly connects
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this notion of constraint to the concepts of conscience and responsibility, specifying
the need for “a revaluation of values under whose novel pressure and hammer a
conscience would be steeled, a heart transformed to brass, so that it might endure
the weight of such a responsibility” (BGE:203). The new revaluation of values that
Nietzsche calls for does not involve establishing new universal values, as the earlier
revaluation of values had done. To the contrary, it primarily involves the
development of a new, individual kind of conscience and sense of responsibility.
The nature of this new “conscience” and “responsibility” merit further discussion.
Likewise, I will explore how Nietzsche understands the task of developing
“antithetical evaluations.”
The first thing to point out is that this “conscience” is clearly not the “bad
conscience” from which Nietzsche hopes the free spirits will deliver us (HH:148,
164). The new philosopher’s conscience is formed from the revaluation of precisely
those so-called ‘eternal’ values which currently foster (and thrive on) this ‘bad
conscience.’ The conscience formed from the revaluation of ascetic morality would
obviously be a new and different form of conscience compared with the bad
conscience of ascetic morality. (There does seem to be a genealogical relation
between them, but an account of this relation will have to wait until we discuss the
Genealogy, where Nietzsche discusses a “variety of forms of conscience.”)
What is this conscience of the new philosophers and how does it differ from
the ‘bad conscience’ Nietzsche opposes? This conscience is a “constraint” on the
new philosopher, one which enjoins him to the tasks for which he is responsible. It
also seems to be an inner source of strength, perhaps the strength of his convictions,
which prompts him to “endure the weight of such a responsibility” (BGE:203). In
these respects, the new philosopher’s conscience seems to resemble a conscience in
the ordinary sense.59 However, Nietzsche might insist upon an important difference:
59 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines “conscience” as: “1 a: the sense or consciousness of the
moral goodness or blameworthiness of one’s own conduct, intentions, or character together with a feeling of
obligation to do right or be good b: a faculty, power, or principle enjoining good acts.”
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the conscience as we ordinarily find it binds us to what he calls “the virtues and
duties of the mob.”
In contrast, the new philosopher’s conscience enjoins him to the virtues and
duties which he sets for himself in the revaluation of ‘eternal values.’ To put the
matter differently, the conscience ordinarily acts as a kind of fetter binding a person
to the values and judgments of the ‘herd’ or of those who manipulate the herd. In
contrast, the new philosopher’s conscience is precisely what allows him to live
independently of such a fetter. In Zarathustra’s language, this conscience is what
binds ‘he who commands himself’ to obey what he commands of himself. For
Nietzsche only this kind of self-constraint (contraining oneself to obey one’s own
commands) represents genuine self-mastery.
We have already discussed the importance of self-severity and self-reverence
as factors contributing to the new philosopher’s conscience. These concepts can
also help clarify the difference between the new philosopher’s conscience and the
‘bad conscience’ it replaces. The ‘bad conscience’ is indeed a manifestation of self-
severity: a severity with which one tortures oneself. (As Nietzsche makes clear in the
Genealogy the ‘bad conscience’ is primarily a means of self-torture rather than a
means of self-governance). The new philosopher’s conscience is a manifestation of
his self-severity – yet unlike the ‘bad conscience’, it is also a manifestation of self-
reverence and self-affirmation. Hence, this form of self-severity functions not to tear
oneself down but to build oneself up, to make one stronger, more self-severe, and
ready to take on the ‘great responsibilities’ of which one feels oneself worthy. This
new form of conscience bids one to obey out of a reverence for oneself rather than
from a hatred of oneself, as is the case with the slavish ‘bad conscience’.
The conscience of the new philosopher, then, is a form of self-constraint and
self-mastery born out of a severity and reverence toward oneself. At this point the
question may be asked: does this revaluation of ‘eternal’ values involve developing
new values and a new kind of conscience only for the new philosopher who
performs this revaluation of values? If so, it is hard to see how these new
philosophers fulfill Nietzsche’s broader mission to deprive men of their ‘bad
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conscience’ or expel the ‘bad conscience’ from the world (HH:148, 164). In order to
answer this question, we must first turn to what Nietzsche says about the task to
“make a start” (die Anstösse geben, alternately: ‘take the initiative’) on “antithetical
evaluations.” I believe that it is in relation to this task that we can best understand
Nietzsche’s proclamation of these new philosophers as “commanders and law-givers,”
as those who “create values” and can “command and lead in the realm of
knowledge” (BGE:211, 205).
The creative and legislative task of the new philosophers may be understood
in contrast to the task of ‘philosophical laborers’ which is “to take some great fact of
evaluation—that is to say, former assessments of value, creations of value which
have become dominant and are for a while called "truths"—and identify them and
reduce them to formulas, whether in the realm of logic or of politics (morals) or of
art” (BGE:211). In other words, most philosophers presuppose the correctness of
prevailing values (or they simply presuppose that there are no other values).
Nietzsche finds that even some of the greatest skeptics and philosophical critics
work under a presumption of obedience to prevailing morality. They understand
their work as being in the service of this morality, and they take upon themselves
the task of reducing this morality to formulas in order to make it “clear, distinct,
intelligible and manageable” (BGE:211). At most, such philosophers can also take on
the task of acting as the “bad conscience of their age” if, for example, they take the
present generation to task for not abiding by these accepted values (BGE:212). In
contrast, Nietzsche says that the task of the new philosophers “demands that he
create values”:
Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law givers: they say "thus it
shall be!," it is they who determine the Wherefore and Whither of
mankind, and they possess for this task the preliminary work of all the
philosophical laborers, of all those who have subdued the past—they
reach for the future with creative hand, and everything that is or has been
becomes for them a means, an instrument, a hammer. Their "knowing" is
creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is—will to power.
(BGE:211)
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There is much here that Nietzsche leaves unexplained. The notion of a
‘creation of values’ we have discussed before, in relation to the ancient ‘nobles.’
There we said that a ‘creation of values’ was not an arbitrary labeling of some things
as ‘good’ nor was it the ex nihilo creation of new things to be revered as good.
Rather, it was the immediate self-affirmation of the noble who feels himself to be
strong, well-constituted, and happy and who therefore honors himself and those like
him as ‘good.’ The new philosophers do seem to be self-affirming. (One might
even say: certainty regarding one’s one own standards of value and the ability to
justify oneself according to them necessarily yields self-affirmation.) But the new
philosopher’s self-affirming ‘creation of values’ is not immediate like the ancient
noble’s ‘creation of values.’ Rather, it takes place through a revaluation of values, a
second revaluation of values in which the values forged in the first revaluation of
values (“the slave revolt in morals”) are themselves revaluated. The ‘creation of
values’ Nietzsche hopes for in the future involves reclaiming oneself from the ascetic
ideal and its self-hating guilty conscience and coming to see oneself in a new light,
according to new values. Those who are strong enough to do so thereby gain the
ability to see themselves as ‘good’ and ‘worthy.’ Thus, Nietzsche remarks upon the
“second innocence” that the modern advent in European atheism may bring (despite,
Nietzsche might add, the ressentiment and lingering asceticism among many of the
“pale atheists” themselves) (GM II: 20).
It is obvious to Nietzsche that not everyone who seeks to throw off the
constraints of prevailing values thereby gains the ability to affirm himself as ‘good’
and ‘worthy,’ and we have already seen some reasons why. But an important
question remains: are the values ‘created’ in the new philosopher’s ‘creation of
values’ for himself alone, or are they also to be proffered to others in some way?
This returns us to the question we deferred earlier about whether the new
philosopher could be understood as fulfilling Nietzsche’s broad mission to expel the
‘bad conscience’ from the world. Is the new philosopher to be a single shining light
in a world otherwise darkened with the “gloomy skies” of asceticism and nihilism,
or does he bring this ‘light’ of a good conscience and self-affirmation to others?
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I think the answer lies in seeing the unity of these two propositions: to live
by your own values can be to set a new standard and challenge for others, not a
challenge to adopt your particular values, but to develop and live by their own
values. Nietzsche is clear that the new philosopher is proud that his values are not
for everyone: “’My judgement is my judgement: another cannot easily acquire a right
to it’ – such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say. One has to get rid of the
bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many” (BGE:43). On the other hand,
by standing on his own, as an example of successful independence and as a paragon
of his own virtues, the new philosopher is able to help others. He is not only able to
give them hope, he is also able to give them an example of how living by one’s own
values is a concrete possibility. Perhaps more importantly, he gives others a
challenge. He warns them of the dangers of lingering asceticism and ‘bad
conscience’ and forces them to admit that there are higher possibilities which they
could attempt to attain. This challenge leaves those who have ears for such things
with a task: to ‘create out of oneself’ this higher possibility, to live by one’s own
values and ‘become who you are.’ 60 The new philosopher does not act as the voice of
conscience for his readers beyond challenging them to liberate themselves from that
which prevents them from thriving as individuals. The great liberation from the
‘bad conscience’ promoted by ascetic morality does not involve the imposition of
another collectively-held sense of conscience. It involves an exhortation to have
one’s own independent conscience, and it provides a demonstration of this way of
life as a concrete possibility in contemporary life.
We have been discussing the new philosopher’s ‘creation of values’ as if the
values created were necessarily ethical values. (Perhaps with good reason: this
creative process may need to include the creation of ethical values if it’s going to
serve as a serious challenge and replacement of ascetic values.) Yet Nietzsche gives
examples which indicate that these new values could be of other kinds: for example,
60
I believe this is also what Nietzsche means by the “One thing needful. – To ‘give style’ to one’s character, a
great and rare art!” (GS:290). Nietzsche describes this process as organizing oneself into a unity in which all
of one’s strengths and weaknesses into an “artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason
and even weaknesses delight the eye.”
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aesthetic values, or values regarding what makes for good quality work in
scholarship. A literal reading of the new philosopher as a “commander and law-
giver” might make it seem that he is a leader in a political or military sense, and
perhaps Nietzsche allows this as a possibility. But other passages indicate that
Nietzsche is thinking of someone who will “command” and “lead as a man of
knowledge” (BGE:205). Whether Nietzsche is thinking of himself here, we can use
him as an example. To whatever extent scholars after Nietzsche been influenced by
him, have heeded his warnings and attacks on both specific ideas and methods of
scholarship, we could say that he is a “leader” in the realm of knowledge.
Artistic creation may be the central metaphor underlying Nietzsche’s
conception of a ‘creation of values,’ yet artistic creation need not be merely analogous
to a creation of values. We can easily see from what we have said so far that a great
artist may be said to ‘create’ aesthetic values. Great innovators in the arts such as
Wassily Kandinsky, James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, or Miles Davis do more than just create
artworks; they create values by proposing ‘this way of doing things is beautiful,
interesting, of the highest quality.’ An example closer to Nietzsche’s heart might be
Goethe. Nietzsche’s great “reverence” for Goethe is partly an admiration for Goethe
as a man (i.e., ethically) (TI “Expeditions” 51). We find in his description of Goethe
many of the characteristics of the new philosopher. He represents a “self-
overcoming” of his age, a man with great courage, a breadth of responsibility and a
love of life who “did not sever himself from life, he placed himself within it; nothing
could discourage him and he took as much as possible upon himself” (TI
“Expeditions” 49). He also stands as a paragon of independence: “he disciplined
himself to a whole, he created himself” (TI “Expeditions” 49). Yet it is undeniable
that Nietzsche also admired Goethe as an artist. By producing masterworks like
Faust, Goethe had raised the bar for what counts as greatness in German literature
(and literature generally). Perhaps the ‘creation’ of any kind of value may be
understood in a similar way: one does not simply excel in relation to prevailing
values, one sets a new standard for value which others are now challenged to meet.
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As a final word on the new philosopher’s way of life, let us consider another
aspect of artistic creation that Nietzsche urges us to bear in mind. We have
discussed the “tasks” required to live independently: the task of ‘knotting together’
a new constraint (the self-severity and self-reverence of a conscience) and task of
‘creating’ new values. But one need not consciously seek to fulfill these tasks.
Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of what is instinctive and unconscious as
guides for life, bidding us to follow the example of artists, who “know only too well
that it is precisely when they cease to act ‘voluntarily’ and do everything of necessity
that their feeling of freedom, subtlety, fullness of power, creative placing, disposing,
shaping reaches its height” (BGE:213). Nor should the new philosopher approach
these tasks with the self-severity one who forces himself to do some odious job. In
rejecting the ascetic way of life, the hoped-for alternative to ‘letting oneself go’ is not
a grinding, conscious self-control, but what Nietzsche calls letting oneself “flow”
(strömen) (BGE:206).
In order to clarify how a self-constraint can also be a ‘letting oneself flow,’ we
will need to turn to Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, which Nietzsche
introduced as: “A Sequel to My Last Book, Beyond Good and Evil, Which It Is Meant
to Supplement and Clarify.” There Nietzsche clarifies important issues left
unaddressed in his account of the new philosophers, including the question: what
goes on in the revaluation of ascetic values such that a way of life constrained only
by one’s own conscience (i.e. an autonomous way of life) becomes possible?
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche does not return to the label ‘new philosophers’
although this work also contains ‘pointers’ toward a higher way of life at three key
places in the text. At the end of the first essay, Nietzsche discusses the person with
a “higher,” “more spiritual nature” who is a “genuine battleground” between the
conflicting values of the ascetic and noble modes of valuation (GM I:16). Then at the
beginning of the second essay, Nietzsche introduces the figure of the “sovereign
individual,” a paragon of independence, autonomy and self-reverence who lives by
his own conscience. Lastly, the second essay ends with references to a ‘creative
spirit’ who is “strong and original enough” to reverse the ascetic bad conscience and
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redeem us from the “hitherto reigning ideal” (GM II:24) Nietzsche does not
explicitly link these descriptions and it may be tempting to see them as descriptions
of three separate figures. Yet I will demonstrate that the better interpretation takes
them to be three descriptions of the same figure. Moreover, our examination of the
figure which emerges as Nietzsche ideal type in the Genealogy will reveal how
closely this figure matches the ‘new philosophers’ and ‘free spirits’ already
discussed. I will end the chapter by making this case and by giving a summary
portrait of Nietzsche’s new, higher ethical type.
Nietzsche concludes the first essay of the Genealogy by explaining:
The two opposing values ‘good and bad,’ ‘good and evil’ have been
engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years; and though
the latter value has certainly been on top for a long time, there are still
places where the struggle is as yet undecided. One might even say that it
has risen ever higher and thus become more and more profound and
spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a ‘higher
nature,’ a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and
a genuine battleground of these opposed values. (GM, I: 16).
Nietzsche says very little else about what this higher nature might be like
except to suggest as a “symbol” for this struggle “inscribed in letter legible across all
human history”: “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome” (GM I:16). He admits
that Judea has “won for the present” although he finds in the Renaissance “an
uncanny and glittering reawakening of the classical ideal” and he reveres Napoleon
as a “last signpost to the other path”: “the ideal of antiquity itself stepped incarnate
and in unheard-of splendor before the eyes and conscience of mankind” (GM I: 16).
Clearly Nietzsche favors the ancient ideal (the noble mode of valuation) over its
counterpart, yet the description his “higher” “more spiritual nature” as a
‘battleground’ between these two values makes it clear that Nietzsche’s hopes do
not lie with any atavistic or reactionary ‘return of the masters’. As we shall see, his
hoped-for type could not have this higher, more spiritual nature without the
influence of the “long reign” of ascetic ideals.
111
As we mentioned above, one of the questions addressed in the Genealogy is
how self-constraint and a conscience become possible. Nietzsche addresses this
question genealogically as well as psychologically. He begins the second essay of
the Genealogy by introducing the “task nature has set itself in the case of man” and
“the real problem regarding man” as the task to “breed an animal with the right to
make promises” (GM I:1). According to Nietzsche, the ability to make and keep
promises is pivotal for the earliest relations between humans (that between creditor
and debtor), and later for life within society (in exchange for which one promises
“five or six ‘I will not’s’”). The “highest manifestation” of this development is the
ability to ‘stand as one’s own guarantor’ and promise like a sovereign, i.e.
constrained only by one’s own sense of responsibility and conscience. Nietzsche
calls the sovereign individual the “ripest fruit” of this process, employing a
metaphor that he had earlier used to describe the new philosophers (BGE:205) and
the free spirits (BGE:P2).
Many Nietzsche scholars overlook the dramatic differences between the two
promise-makers discussed in the first sections of the second essay, so it may be
helpful to clarify these differences. The man of “five or six I will not’s” keeps
promises out of a fear of punishment which has been “burned” into his memory
through the gruesome tortures (or threat thereof) that Nietzsche describes. In
contrast, the sovereign individual keeps promises out of an instinctive sense of self-
affirmation and self-reverence. As Nietzsche makes clear, the development of the
man of “five or six I will not’s” is necessary for the earliest development of society,
whereas the sovereign individual is a “late fruit,” “the ripest fruit” of society and the
morality of mores. Thus while both types of promise-makers might be considered
products of the morality of mores, the sovereign individual is an “emancipated
individual” “liberated” from the morality of mores and is “like only unto himself.”
In contrast, the man of ‘five or six I will not’s’ seems to be the ‘herd man’ Nietzsche
derides elsewhere, fully under the reign of the morality of mores which makes men
“like among like” (GM II:2). Needless to say, this figure can hardly be imagined to
possess the other characteristics attributes to he sovereign individual: having
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independent will, autonomy, the right to affirm oneself, respect and reverence for
oneself and others, etc.
Before discussing the sovereign individual further, we should briefly clarify
the “preparatory task” necessary for any ability to make promises: “that one first
makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and
consequently calculable. The tremendous labor of that which I have called ‘morality
of mores’” (die Sittlichkeit der Sitte) (GM II:2). Nietzsche directs us to several
passages in Daybreak (§ 9, 14, 16) in which the ‘morality of mores’ is discussed. In
his preface he had mentioned the morality of mores as “that much older and more
primitive species of morality which differs toto caelo from the altruistic mode of
evaluation” and directed us to Human, All-Too-Human Vol. I §96, 99 and Vol. II §89.
Yet reading these passages does not yield a unified picture of what the morality of
mores is, beyond establishing a basic, formal definition: “to be ethical means to
practice obedience towards a law or tradition established from of old” (HH:96).
In particular, it is difficult if not impossible to decisively place the morality of
mores in a historical timeline or in relation to the noble and ascetic moralities
already discussed. Sometimes the morality of mores is described as a “prehistoric
labor,” a “primitive” form of morality which differs dramatically from the altruistic
(i.e. slavish, ascetic) mode of valuation which Nietzsche says has been dominant “for
a long time” (GM II:2, GM P:4, GM I:16). Yet Nietzsche also describes the morality
of mores as that “under which all the communities of mankind have lived, many
millennia before the beginnings of our calendar and also on the whole during the
course of it up to the present day (we ourselves dwell in the little world of
exceptions and, so to speak, in the evil zone)” (D:14). Sometimes the morality of
mores is described as having values we would associate with ‘master morality’ (e.g.,
an advocacy of cruelty and a denunciation of pity in Daybreak §18) and sometimes,
to the contrary, it is described as having values we would associate with ‘slave’ or
‘ascetic’ morality (e.g. holding “benevolence, pity, and that sort of thing” as good)
(HH:96).
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For our purposes, it is not necessary to resolve these contradictions
completely, but for the sake of understanding references to the morality of mores in
the texts cited, I offer the following explanation. The morality of mores should not
be steadfastly identified with either master or slave morality. Rather, it should be
understood as a formal description of how values are learned or acquired, namely
through conformity to established customs and customary beliefs. As such, the
content of these values may be those of the ‘nobles’ or those of the ‘slaves.’ Thus,
Nietzsche indicates that there was a historical context (e.g. in the Greek and Roman
world) in which master morality was predominant and established the values and
mores to which the populace conformed. He portrays Socrates and Jesus as free
spirits61 of a sort who oppose the morality of mores as they find it. Both establish
values antithetical to the content of the values of their day (the values of master
morality) and to the form in which this morality was acquired (conformity to
established beliefs). Yet in time the values that these thinkers proposed (or at least
their derivative in the form of “Christian-Platonic values”) became dominant in
European society and were thereafter acquired by conformity. Thus, it may be
helpful to distinguish between Nietzsche’s attacks on the morality of mores per se (as
conformity to a established mores in opposition to self-constraint and independence)
and his attacks on what is perhaps only the latest determinant of the morality of
mores, slave and ascetic morality (as self-hating, life-denying and world-
renouncing.) As we shall see, Nietzsche’s remarks about the sovereign individual
in the beginning of the second essay tend to address this opposition to conformity to
‘herd values’ (the morality of mores per se) and his remarks about the ‘creative spirit’
at the end of the essay tend to address this opposition to ascetic world-renunciation
and self-hatred. Since the ‘herd values’ of today are ascetic values, these paths of
opposition are ultimately unified.
61 cf. Human, All Too Human I:433, Daybreak §9, and Antichrist §32.
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Nietzsche begins his description of the sovereign individual by speaking of
his independence from the morality of mores.62 He characterizes this independence
in terms of autonomy.
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree
at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last
reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the
ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again
from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral (for "autonomous"
and "moral" are mutually exclusive). In short, the man who has his own
independent, protracted will and the right to make promises and in him a
proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been
achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his own power and
freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion. (GM II:2)
Nietzsche notes the necessary opposition between autonomy63 and being
“moral” in the customary sense (Sitte). This is perhaps an allusion to Kant’s much
bedeviled efforts to reconcile autonomy with the duty to obey universal ethical laws.
Nietzsche presents it as obvious that the opposite is the case: to be autonomous, to
give oneself laws as an individual, is to eschew (and be condemned by) any morality
which demands universal obedience to ethical laws. This is a further elaboration on
the opposition between independence and prevailing societal values discussed
above in relation to the ‘free spirits.’ There we also discussed Nietzsche’s concern
that those who free themselves from the traditional constraints of conformity to
mores and ‘herd’ morality would need to be especially strong (as he says, they
would need to be esprit fort - strong spirits) in order not to be “weak” and
“ineffectual” compared with those who cling to these constraints.
62 In labeling this figure as ‘sovereign’ Nietzsche is undoubtedly drawing on our understanding of
‘sovereign nations’ that are free from external control. But he may also be thinking back to what Aristotle
says about the noble egoist in the Nicomachean Ethics: “Just as a state and every other organized system
seems to be in the truest sense identical with the most sovereign element in it, so it is with man.
Consequently, he is an egoist or self-lover in the truest sense who loves and gratifies the most sovereign
element in him” (NE 1168b32). For Aristotle the sovereign element in a man is reason, whereas for
Nietzsche it is a dominating instinct.
63 This autonomy distinguishes the sovereign individual not only from the slavish conformist and ‘herd
man’, but also from the ancient nobles, who “are held so sternly in check inter pares by custom,” and from
the ‘original masters’ and founders of states who lack all notion of “responsibility” (GM I:11, II:16).
Moreover, the sovereign individual is distinguished from the ascetic priest by the fact that he is self-
affirming and outwardly masterful rather than self-hating and outwardly impotent.
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I believe that the account of the sovereign individual can be understood in
relation to Nietzsche’s search for the “source of the strong spirit (esprit fort)”
(HH:230). The source of the esprit fort may be found in a kind of self-strengthening
or self-reinforcing cycle between three aspects of the sovereign individual’s way of
life: self-affirmation, sovereignty with respect to oneself (self-mastery, autonomy),
and sovereignty in the world (‘mastery’ over circumstances and the ‘right’ to make
promises.) After thoroughly reviewing the textual description of the sovereign
individual, I will explain this cycle in greater detail.
One important discovery in this search for the source of a ‘strong spirit’ is
that having self-mastery allows for mastery beyond oneself, for great efficacy in the
world64 and the ability to command and lead others:
This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this
master of a free will, this sovereign man—how should he not be aware of
his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and
stand as their own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how
much reverence he arouses—he "deserves" all three—and of how this
mastery over himself also necessarily gives him mastery over
circumstances, over nature, and over all more short-willed and unreliable
creatures? (GM II:2)
The concept of ‘mastery’ presented here merits further discussion. Obviously
having “mastery over” something in this sense is not to be understood as having
complete control over it. (It would be absurd to think that self-mastery grants
omnipotent control over circumstances or nature.) ‘Mastery’ here seems to mean a
great competency and determined efficacy made possible by a protracted,
independent will.65 Likewise, as I have suggested, ‘mastery’ over others need not
64Nietzsche returns to this point in Twilight in his discussion of Thucydides, whom he credits with precisely
this kind of self-mastery: “Courage in the face of reality ultimately distinguishes such natures as Thucydides
and Plato: Plato is a coward in the face of reality – consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has
himself under control – consequently he retains control over things” (TI “Ancients” 2).
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As Nietzsche explains elsewhere, the essential thing for every morality is to provide a constraint in the
sense of enforcing “protracted obedience in one direction” (BGE:188). Yet not every morality yields
mastery. The difference lies in the fact that Nietzsche’s highest types have their own independent will,
whereas the vast majority are constrained to follow the will of the ‘herd’ or the ascetic priests as the
shepherd of this herd. Here we may draw a distinction between self-mastery and mere self-control: one
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signal a return to the oppression of the original masters or the feudal conditions
which made the power of later ‘nobles’ possible. Nietzsche’s point, as I take it, is
that the ability to command and obey oneself yields the ability to lead others. Even
self-mastery is not to be understood as ‘complete control over oneself.’ One does
not get to create oneself in tota as one might wish to be. Nietzsche would be the first
to suggest that there is much about oneself that one must simply accept and even
love (amor fati) as inevitable facts of one’s existence as a human being. As we have
discussed, the kind of self-constraint Nietzsche favors is that of the artist who
allows her creative drive to dominate over her other drives and thus guide her
actions.
As we shall discuss shortly, the psychological or physiological explanation of
the sovereign individual’s self-mastery is that it is a state in which a certain kind of
dominating drive sets one’s other drives to order. But it is important to note here
that it is precisely the ability to affirm oneself as one actually is that prompts one to
‘let oneself flow’ in the sense of letting one’s dominant drive or passion guide one’s
life. Nietzsche contrasts the kind of internally antagonistic self-control of the ascetic
with the more internally harmonious self-mastery of his ideal type. The ascetic
holds his chaotic instincts in check by lashing out at them and attempting to deny
their expression with the “tyranny” of reason or ascetic practices. (That one’s natural
‘drives’ or instincts can lead one to temptation is one of the staples of the ascetic
mindset, evidenced in Plato’s tripartite soul and in the Christian wariness of the
bodily ‘drives.’) As part of the general stance of self-denial and self-opposition, the
ascetic stance is fundamentally opposed to the idea of letting oneself be dominated
by one’s instincts. Although this is one way of avoiding ‘letting oneself go’,
Nietzsche thinks there is a better alternative. Someone whose stance toward
themselves is fundamentally self-affirming welcomes the life lived on the basis of
her instincts and lets herself ‘flow’ in the sense that she allows her guiding passion
may control oneself in obeying the will of others, but genuine self-mastery requires obedience to a will of
one’s own.
117
to flow freely and to shape her life, unifying her other instincts and passions in the
pursuit of excellence and creative achievement.
There is also an important connection between self-mastery and the
sovereign ‘right to make promises.’ Both require a strong, “independent, protracted
will.” As Nietzsche had noted in Beyond Good and Evil, the “essential thing ‘in
heaven and upon earth’ seems, to say it again, to be a protracted obedience in one
direction” (BGE:188). Promise-making requires a “memory of the will” such that
“between the original "I will," "I shall do this" and the actual discharge of the will, its
act, a world of strange new things, circumstances, even acts of will may be
interposed without breaking this long chain of will” (GM II:1). To have this
“protracted obedience” be an obedience to oneself is to have the ability to stand as
one’s own guarantor when making promises. One who cannot obey himself keeps
promises only by some external constraint, e.g., threat of punishment. Moreover,
one who can only obey others will break a promise if and when commanded to do
so. Building on our earlier discussion of the difference between the two promise-
makers discussed in these sections, we can make the distinction between promise-
making simpliciter (in which promises may be kept only out of fear or compulsion
and are therefore guaranteed only by the strength of this fear and only insofar as
those one obeys don’t interdict against the promise) and promise-making as a
sovereign (in which promises are kept by means of one’s own independent,
protracted will and upheld out of a reverence for oneself.)
We also find in the description of the sovereign individual a formulation of
what Nietzsche had earlier called a ‘creation of values.’ Like the ‘nobles’ who
created values by affirming themselves as good and taking themselves as the
standard of goodness, the sovereign individual reveres himself as a measure and
standard of ethical value:
The "free" man, the possessor of a protracted and unbreakable will, also
possesses his measure of value: looking out upon others from himself, he
honors or he despises; and just as he is bound to honor his peers, the strong
and reliable (those with the right to make promises)—that is, all those who
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promise like sovereigns, reluctantly, rarely, slowly, who are chary of
trusting, whose trust is a mark of distinction, who give their word as
something that can be relied on because they know themselves strong
enough to maintain it in the face of accidents, even "in the face of fate"—he
is bound to reserve a kick for the feeble windbags who promise without
the right to do so, and a rod for the liar who breaks his word even at the
moment he utters it. (GM II:2)
At this point it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the “right to make
promises.” The English translation may lead to the mistaken notion that this is some
kind of political or natural right. The German simply says that the sovereign
individual may make promises (versprechen dürfen). Nietzsche describes promising
as a sovereign as more than an ability; it is also a privilege (Privilegium) which those
who have this ability honor in each other. We should also consider what kind of
promises Nietzsche might have in mind here. The only examples of promises he
gives are of a debtor’s promises to a creditor, but it would be odd if the sovereign
individual were merely a very reliable debtor (indeed, it is hard to imagine this
‘masterful’ figure as a debtor at all). Likewise, it would be odd for Nietzsche to
lavish so much praise on this new, highest manifestation of conscience if it were
simply put to use fulfilling contractual or social promises. It seems more likely that
the sovereign individual’s promises also include ethical commitments, promises to
uphold values and faithfully pursue the tasks and goals for which he has assumed
responsibility.
It should be clear that upholding oneself as a standard of ethical value is a
manifestation of the sovereign individual’s self-reverence and self-affirmation. Yet
there is a potentially problematic ambiguity in the notion of taking oneself as
standard of value. It is the same ambiguity in the notion of “affirming oneself as one
actually is” and in the call to “become who you are.” The obvious response is: “but I
already am who I am, so have I already attained Nietzsche’s ideal?” (Brian Leiter
advocates precisely this reading of the call to “become what you are,” although
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without acknowledging the objections which this reading entails.) 66 Likewise, it
may seem like affirming oneself as one actually is and upholding one’s actual self as
the standard of ethical value invites complacency, stagnancy, and through these:
mediocrity. How could there be any place for “becoming,” for personal growth and
development, if one has always already attained one’s highest ethical ideal?
The resolution to this ambiguity comes from the realization that who you
actually are includes all of your natural abilities and potential, including abilities
and potential which Nietzsche thinks millennia of ascetic values have repressed and
slandered to such an extent that we may be unaware or averse to them. His hopeful
insistence that “the greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted” can be
applied to individuals as well as the whole human race. So to affirm oneself as one
actually is, and to uphold one’s actual self as a standard of value, is not to invite
complacency, but to challenge oneself and others to bring these “greatest
possibilities” to fruition. The sovereign individual judges others by the same
standard that he judges himself, namely himself (including whatever natural
abilities and potential remain unfulfilled in him.) Of course this formulation might
engender the opposite worry: that in relation to his standard of value the sovereign
individual always ‘comes up short’ and is therefore always condemned by his own
standard of value. Yet we know that simply in virtue of becoming a sovereign
individual, he has already fulfilled at least some of these ‘greatest possibilities’ (e.g.
independence, self-mastery and “the highest, almost astonishing, manifestation” of
conscience). So rather than saying that he is always condemned by his own
‘measure of value’, it is better to say that in relation to his ‘measure of value’ the
66
Leiter cites Nietzsche’s use of Pindar’s ‘become what you are’ as evidence that Nietzsche thought of life
(including his own) in terms of the kind of fatalism Leiter calls ‘causal essentialism’ (Brian Leiter, Nietzsche
on Morality, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 83). Remarking on Ecce Homo, Leiter says: “We now have the
answer to the book’s subtitle: how one becomes what one is. The answer: by making no special effort
directed toward that end, because one becomes what one is necessarily.” (Leiter, 86). Yet Nietzsche’s actual
uses of this phrase becomes completely inexplicable if we ascribe to Leiter’s reading. Nietzsche uses this
phrase as a kind of exhortation to his readers or, as in his August 1882 letter to Lou Salome , as an “deep,
heartfelt plea”: “Lastly, my dear Lou, the old, deep, heartfelt plea: become the being you are!” (quoted from
Solomon & Higgins, Reading Nietzsche, 93).
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sovereign individual always finds his task: to continue to become who he is by
continuing to develop his natural abilities and potential.
In this way I think Nietzsche’s thoughts on the sovereign individual help to
clarify his call to “become who you are.” Nietzsche is calling us to develop the
potential for excellence within ourselves. On one hand, this ideal calls us to accept
who we are, i.e. to adopt an affirming stance towards ourselves. On the other hand,
this ideal calls us to change who we are, including changing our stance from an
aversion or antagonism towards ourselves to a stance of self-affirmation. As I shall
discuss at length in Chapter 4, Nietzsche thinks that these two tasks are intimately
related. The fact we utilize potential strengths and skills gained in the long history
of ascetic ideals in liberating ourselves from these ascetic ideals is precisely what
makes possible a total affirmation of ourselves in the mode of amor fati and saying
‘yes’ to eternal recurrence. But contrary to Leiter’s suggestion, these developments
and changes are not ‘necessary’ or inevitable; in fact, Nietzsche clearly expresses his
worry that his call to “become who you are” by throwing off the ascetic stance may
never be heeded.
Another important point that the sovereign individual passage clarifies is that
to promise as a sovereign does not simply mean to have the strength to keep one’s
promises; it also means that one promises only with the greatest caution and care.
One is careful to make only those promises one can fulfill. Without this
qualification, we return to the absurdity of needing to think of the sovereign
individual as omnipotent in order to make sense of the claim that he can fulfill his
promises despite accidents and adverse circumstances. (I take it that Nietzsche puts
the phrase “in the face of fate” in quotes to indicate the voice of another, perhaps
one who is powerless and therefore regards all or most circumstances as inevitable.
Alternately, Nietzsche may simply mean that the sovereign individual does his
utmost to keep his promises even when all circumstances seem opposed to his doing
so.) It is the sovereign individual’s extreme caution in making promises, as well as
his ethical strength to uphold them, that makes him trustworthy.
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The last aspect of the sovereign individual I will discuss is his new form of
self-constraint or “conscience”:
The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the
consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate,
has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct,
the dominating instinct. What will he call this dominating instinct,
supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt:
this sovereign man calls it his conscience. (GM II:2)
Aware of how different this notion of conscience is from our common
understanding of the term, Nietzsche goes on to clarify:
His conscience?— It is easy to guess that the concept of "conscience" that
we here encounter in its highest, almost astonishing, manifestation, has a
long history and variety of forms behind it. To possess the right to stand
security for oneself and to do so with pride, thus to possess also the right to
affirm oneself—this, as has been said, is a ripe fruit, but also a late fruit...
(GM II:3)
In the rest of the essay, Nietzsche goes on to trace the genealogy of the
historical process which eventuates in this “highest manifestation” of conscience. In
this passage we get something like a psychological (or even physiological)
explanation for how this conscience becomes possible within the individual who
possesses it. The sovereign individual’s conscience is not some kind of superego or
‘inner voice’ in his mind, issuing guidance or condemnation from a reflective
standpoint. Rather, this conscience is an instinct, the sovereign individual’s
“dominating instinct.” Nietzsche often presents the self as a collection of drives,
instincts and emotions; e.g., in Beyond Good and Evil he suggests that the concept of a
“soul” may be retained if it is thought of as “a social structure of the drives and
emotions” (BGE:12). The sovereign conscience, as we shall call it, is the “dominating
instinct” which governs the whole of this ‘social structure’ of drives and emotions.
The first question to ask is what it means that this instinct is “dominating.”
Here I think we can learn from Nietzsche’s own comparison of a dominating instinct
with a dominating ‘ruling class’ in a society (e.g., in BGE:19). The dominating class
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satisfies its own interests and imposes its own values, goals and interpretations on
the society as a whole. But just as importantly, the dominating class is what first
organizes people into a unity such that there could be a ‘society as a whole’ (GM
II:17). Likewise, a “dominating instinct” is one which directs the self as a whole
toward its own satisfaction. In order to do so, this dominating instinct must not
only win out over the other competing drives, it must also set these drives to order
in a more-or-less unified whole. Therefore, a sovereign conscience is on one hand
that by which one gives oneself guidance and direction. On the other hand, it is also
that which secures the integrity necessary to pursue one’s projects, goals and
commitments as a unified self.
Although an instinct, the sovereign individual’s conscience is not an innate
instinct (as we might expect all instincts to be.) Thus, we must try to understand
what Nietzsche means by certain things ‘becoming’ instinct and what it is that
becomes an instinct for the sovereign individual. Although prima facie it may seem
that instincts are typically considered to be innate, there are common examples in
which what is at first consciously learned eventually ‘becomes instinct.’ For
example, we might talk about an athlete’s instincts and mean not simply the reflexes
or coordination with which she was born but more primarily the instinctive skills
she has developed through training, concentration, and practice. Likewise, we
might talk about the instincts of a sailor, a soldier, or a teacher and mean not some
innate predisposition or knowledge but the learned techne of seamanship, soldiering
or teaching gained through conscious instruction and years of experience. Training
which is at first consciously understood can “become instinct” as it becomes
incorporated into a person’s unconscious through repeated practice until it becomes
an immediate, unreflective impulse or drive. (Often this training process even
involves unlearning or learning to ignore some instincts and predispositions which
are innate.67) Thus, the notion of something ‘becoming instinct’ is not so odd after
67 As Nietzsche explains in relation to the task of ‘giving oneself style’: “Here a large mass of second nature
has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed – both times through long practice and
daily work at it” (GS:290).
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all; a conscious understanding may “penetrate to the profoundest depths” of a
person and become an unconscious guide for action and judgment.
But what is it that ‘becomes instinct’ in the case of the sovereign individual?
Nietzsche says it is the “proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of
responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and
over fate” (GM II:2). Note that the sovereign individual is free not just in the
(negative) sense that he is “emancipated” from the directives and constraints of
custom and traditional morality. He is also free in the (positive) sense that he
possesses the power over himself and efficacy in the world required to fulfill the
responsibilities with which he entrusts himself. This freedom is a rare privilege, the
“privilege of responsibility”: the ability to uphold promises and commitments as a
sovereign (i.e., by one’s own self-constraint.)
The sovereign individual knows himself to have this rare “privilege” because
he is aware of the facts of his situation: he knows that has the power over himself
and efficacy in the world necessary to stand as his own guarantor. But this
awareness of the facts of his situation is precisely what allows him to have “faith in
himself” when taking on new responsibilities and commitments. Moreover, as we
have discussed, an awareness of his power and abilities (and what he can
accomplish with them) also reinforces his self-reverence and justifies his revering
himself as an ethical ‘measure of value.’ Thus, what has become instinct in him is
both his conscious self-reverence and the awareness of what justifies this self-
reverence: his actual power, efficacy and integrity in action, in ‘the world’. His
‘conscience’ is the instinctive respect and trust he has in himself, the honor which he
realistically accords himself. This ‘sovereign conscience’ bids him to uphold his
promises and commitments out of an instinctive reverence for himself rather than
out of fear or ‘pangs’ of guilt.
Of course what we have described here are merely the formal aspects of any
sovereign conscience. The particular promises and commitments upheld will differ
for each sovereign individual. To use two examples from above, this sovereign
individual may be an artist taking on the responsibility of some artistic project or a
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philosopher taking on the responsibility of some philosophical project. In either
case, sovereign self-constraint is necessary both for the quality of the work produced
(else it will tend to be unoriginal, not yet liberated from conformity and obedience to
traditional morality) and for the actual production (else the constraint to finish the
task may be lacking.) What is essential to both is a ‘dominating instinct’ which bids
the person to take on this great task and to complete it as promised, an instinct
formed by an internalized awareness of one’s own abilities and potential.
It is here that we can understand how a self-constraint can also be an
instinctive ‘letting oneself flow’ (as opposed to ‘letting oneself go’.) ‘Letting oneself
go’ means lacking any self-constraint and letting oneself be pulled along by this or
that desire or external influence. Those who let themselves go may have one
dominating instinct after another, but they lack the kind of dominating instinct
Nietzsche requires: an instinctive self-reverence and responsibility that sets the
other drives to order, establishes the unity of the self as a whole, and thereby makes
possible the kind of ‘protracted will’ necessary to execute great tasks. (In Twilight of
the Idols, Nietzsche defines decadence as precisely this kind of “anarchy of the
instincts” (TI “Socrates” 4).) In contrast, those who ‘let themselves flow’ let
themselves be unified and directed by this dominating instinct.
Having completed our analysis of the inner workings of the sovereign
individual, we are in a position to explain what we earlier called a self-strengthening
cycle within this ethical type. Nietzsche explains that the sovereign individual’s
self-mastery and self-constraint allows a mastery in the world and the ability to
make and keep promises. This mastery and integrity in the world gains the
sovereign individual the reverence of others and reinforces his own self-reverence.
He is aware that his self-reverence and the reverence of others accord with the facts
of the world: his power over himself and the sovereignty in actions this allows.
This allows him to affirm and have reverence for himself as he actually is. His self-
reverence and the awareness of its concrete justifications have ‘become instinct’ for
him. His conscience is an instinctive self-reverence, a guiding and dominating
drive which sets his other drives, goals and values to order teleologically. His self is
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thereby unified in the service to his highest calling, whatever ‘great responsibilities’
he takes upon himself. But this unification and direction of the self by an instinctive
conscience is precisely the self-mastery and self-constraint with which the cycle
began. Thus, in summary: self-affirmation and self-reverence become instinct and
thereby allow for sovereignty with respect to oneself (self-mastery, self-constraint,
autonomy); this sovereignty with respect to oneself allows for sovereignty with
respect to the world (efficacy in action, the ability to promise as a sovereign and be
trusted and revered as one) which in turn allows for (justifies, reinforces) self-
affirmation and self-reverence.
What Nietzsche does not say is how this cycle gets started in the first place68
or what discrete steps can be taken to become a sovereign individual. As we have
seen, there is a great difference between the poor wretch who, facing the gruesome
“mnemotechnics” of torture and punishment, finally developed a ‘memory of the will’
for “five or six ‘I will not’s’” – and the ripest fruit of this development, the sovereign
individual. An important difference that has emerged is that from the newly tamed
man to the contemporary ‘herd’ man, Nietzsche finds the majority of people to hate
themselves and existence as a whole, whereas his highest types affirm themselves
and existence. Nietzsche’s genealogical work in the rest of the essay traces the
development of the internalization of conscience and the historical grounds for the
possibility of a reorientation from hatred of life to love of life.
There are actually two separate but sometimes intersecting genealogies traced
in the second essay. They are the genealogy of the ability to make promises (what
eventuates in what we might call a ‘promise-making conscience’) and the genealogy
of the ‘bad conscience’ and its current ascetic manifestation, what we might call the
‘guilty conscience’:
1) The ability to make and keep promises originates in the debtor/creditor
relationship, established long before the advent of social organizations. This
68 There may be worry about this self-strengthening cycle requiring some logically questionable
bootstrapping, yet there is nothing more mysterious about this cycle than the self-reinforcing relationship
which may exist between the organs of a growing organism.
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requires that a person first become uniform and be able to measure himself; it also
requires a shared understanding of equivalent values (II:1-3). The concept of “guilt”
comes from the conception of “debt” and at first has no moral connotations (II:4).
After the advent of social organizations, the society as a whole is regarded as kind of
creditor: in exchange for the benefits of society one promises “five or six ‘I will
not’s’” and faces punishments if these promises are broken (II:9). As a society’s
power increased a feeling of indebtedness to it founders intensified, reaching a
“maximum” when these founders become regarded as deities (II:20). Then, after a
great gap, the sovereign individual emerges with the ability to make and keep
promises by his or her own self-constraint or ‘conscience’.
2) The ‘bad conscience’ begins with the advent of social organizations, which
occurs when the ‘original masters’ conquer and organize an otherwise nomadic
people. As a result of being confined within society, the “tamed man” cannot vent
his aggressive natural drives. These drives are repressed but cannot be eliminated;
they become redirected against the only victim within his power: himself (II:16-17).
The ‘bad conscience’ is at first simply the self-laceration of this newly tamed man,
the outpouring of ressentiment against himself. In particular, what the 'tamed' man
most vehemently hates and attacks in himself are these natural and aggressive
instincts themselves. The bad conscience is thus "a declaration of war against the
old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and terribleness had rested hitherto"
(II.16). The great process in which these instincts are turned inward, against
themselves and their possessors, Nietzsche calls "the internalization of man…The
entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes,
expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height" (II:16).
Although Nietzsche regards the bad conscience as an illness, "the gravest and
uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man's suffering of
man, of himself," he also adds that this development is "pregnant with a future" (II:16).
These genealogies have intersected in at least two places historically, and may
potentially intersect at a third. First, the system of equivalent punishments
established in the debtor/creditor relationship are employed in enforcing the laws of
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society once societies are formed (II:9,10). Equivalent punishments indirectly
contribute to the formation of the ‘bad conscience’ insofar as they keep the person
confined within the bounds of society and thereby prevent the exercise of the
natural aggressive drives. But Nietzsche is careful to point out that punishment
rarely produces feelings of guilt in the one punished, in part because the criminal
finds that the practices of justice and crime are often the same (II:14). Punishments
may also hinder the development of ‘bad conscience’ insofar as the creditor vents his
aggressive drive in punishing the delinquent debtor and insofar as the rest of society
gets to enjoy the “festive cruelty” of public punishment (II:5).
The next point of intersection comes when the concept of debt to God is
borrowed from the history of the debtor/creditor relationship and is used a tool for
the self-torture of the ‘bad conscience’ (II:22). As Nietzsche explains in the third
essay of the Genealogy, this is the work of the ascetic priest. The resulting guilty
conscience gives suffering a meaning (‘I suffer because I am guilty’), thereby saving
suffering humanity from “suicidal nihilism” brought about by suffering without
meaning, the real “curse” under which mankind suffered (III.28). Yet the great
sense of shame and self-hatred promoted by this guilty conscience, together with the
weakening effects of ascetic ideals generally, has led to the nihilism that Nietzsche
finds in the present age (II:7,21).
This leads us to the third, merely potential intersection between the
genealogy of the promise-making conscience and the genealogy of the ascetic ‘guilty
conscience’. It comes when the heirs to the conscience-vivisection promoted by
ascetic ideals reverse the ascetic bad conscience, wedding it to all the unnatural
drives behind asceticism (the drive to the beyond) and to ascetic ideals, ideals which
are “one and all hostile to life and ideals that slander the world” (II:24). I believe
that this reversal is what makes the sovereign individual’s kind of promise making
possible by creating an internalized, self-affirming ‘sovereign conscience’. In order
to establish this connection, however, let us review the description of this reversal
and the ‘redeeming man’ who accomplishes it. Nietzsche ends the second essay by
suggesting that his polemic goal is both to tear down the ‘hitherto reigning ideal’
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(i.e., ascetic ideal) and to erect a new one. He describes this task as the work of a
‘creative spirit’ who inherits from the long reign of ascetic ideals and ‘bad
conscience’ the courage, strength and skill necessary for a conscience-vivisection
which is used against, rather than in the service of, the ascetic ‘bad conscience’:
We modern men are the heirs of the conscience-vivisection and self-
torture of millennia: this is what we have practiced longest, it is our
distinctive art perhaps, and in any case our subtlety in which we have
acquired a refined taste. Man has all too long had an "evil eye" for his
natural inclinations, so that they have finally become inseparable from his
"bad conscience." An attempt at the reverse would in itself be possible—
but who is strong enough for it?—that is, to wed the bad conscience to all
the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that
which runs counter to sense, instinct, nature, animal, in short all ideals
hitherto, which are one and all hostile to life and ideals that slander the
world. To whom should one turn today with such hopes and demands?
(GM II:24)
The allusion to “conscience-vivisection” should bring to mind the vivisection
metaphor discussed above in relation to a revaluation of values. Indeed, this
reversal of the ascetic bad conscience seems to mark the beginning of the revaluation
of ascetic values. The ascetic sense of guilt is turned against itself and against all
ascetic ideals and the ‘unnatural drives’ from which they spring, thereby initiating
an internal collapse of the ascetic mode of valuation.69 The person who is able to
perform this reversal of conscience has inherited the internalization and conscience
formed in the ‘long history’ of the bad conscience and ascetic ideals. But contrary to
all previous forms of conscience, this new conscience would seem to be joyful and
self-affirming – exactly like the conscience previously attributed to the sovereign
individual.
Another point of comparison between the sovereign individual and the
creative spirit is that both stand in stark contrast to the tendency to ‘let oneself go’
Nietzsche finds endemic to the modern era. Nietzsche therefore recognizes that the
69 In the fourth chapter, we will also explore another explanation Nietzsche offers for the internal collapse of
ascetic values: the value of truthfulness promoted by ascetic (Christian/Platonic) ideals also promotes a
discovery of the worldly ‘will to power’ at the heart of these ideals. The full force of condemnation by
which ascetic ideals attack worldly power and ambition is thereby turned back on these ideals themselves.
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reversal of the ‘bad conscience’ “would require a different kind of spirit from that
likely to appear in this present age” (GM II:24). Both the sovereign individual and
the ‘creative spirit’ are distinguished by an independent self-constraint and self-
reverence lacking in ‘modern man.’ Nietzsche again makes the point, earlier
presented in relation to the ‘free spirits’ and the ‘sovereign individual,’ that this
independent self-constraint will earn a person the opposition of ‘herd’ and a
condemnation by prevailing values:
One would have precisely the good men against one; and, of course, the
comfortable, the reconciled, the vain, the sentimental, the weary.
What gives greater offense, what separates one more fundamentally, than
to reveal something of the severity and respect with which one treats
oneself? And on the other hand—how accommodating, how friendly all
the world is toward us as soon as we act as all the world does and "let
ourselves go" like all the world! (GM II:24)
Nietzsche ends his description of the ‘creative spirit’ by making more explicit
the connection between this reversal of conscience and what he elsewhere calls the
“revaluation of values” (cf. BGE:203) by which humankind can be saved from the
impending threat of nihilism:
Is this even possible today?— But some day, in a stronger age than this
decaying, self-doubting present, he must yet come to us, the redeeming man
of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength
will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is
misunderstood by the people as if it were flight from reality—while it is
only his absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he
one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of
this reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal
has laid upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from
the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of
it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of
noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its
goal to the earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist and antinihilist; this
victor over God and nothingness—he must come one day. (GM II:24)
Perhaps aware that such prophetic statements go beyond his polemic
intentions for the Genealogy, Nietzsche adds: “But what am I saying? Enough!
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Enough! At this point it behooves me only to be silent; or I shall usurp that to which
only one younger, "heavier with future," and stronger than I has a right—that to
which only Zarathustra has a right, Zarathustra the godless.—“ (GM II:25).
Nietzsche does not explicitly link this ‘creative spirit’ figure to the ‘sovereign
individual’ discussed above, and perhaps the similarities already noted are not
conclusive proof of their unity. I therefore offer three additional arguments for the
thesis that descriptions of the sovereign individual of the creative spirit are but two
perspectives on the same single figure. The first and most decisive concerns the
concept of a conscience. The sovereign individual is described as being the “highest,
almost astonishing manifestation” of the concept of “conscience,” a concept that
“has a long history and variety of forms behind it” (GM II:2). The ‘creative spirit’ of
GM II:24 clearly has a conscience (among other things he has a conscience against
ascetic tendencies) and is clearly the inheritor of the “long history” of the conscience,
a history including a “variety of forms” (the ascetic guilty conscience and its
precursor, the self-torturous ‘bad conscience’ of the newly tamed man.) Therefore,
as part of the long history of the conscience which eventuates in the sovereign
individual’s conscience, the ‘creative spirit’ must either come before the sovereign
individual or be identical with this figure. It seems unlikely, given the fanfare
Nietzsche lavishes on the ‘creative spirit’ (“this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor
over God and nothingness”) that this figure is merely a precursor to the sovereign
individual. The far more likely reading is that they are same figure, presented from
different perspectives.70
70 Someone may object that the creative spirit may have the same conscience as the sovereign individual
(i.e., the highest form of conscience) but that the creative spirit is somehow a further development, going
beyond a (mere) sovereign individual. It is certainly appealing to think of Nietzsche’s ideal figure as not
merely someone who can keep her commitments with a sovereign conscience, but as also someone who is
creative and outstanding in what she accomplishes thereby. But this wider sense of being ‘creative’ is
neither precluded from our understanding of the sovereign individual nor is it especially implied in the
description of the ‘creative spirit’ at GM II:24. The ‘creativity’Nietzsche refers to here is simply the
redeeming overthrow of the ascetic bad conscience, its values, and its resultant nihilism. That is to say, this
‘creativity’ seems to be that overcoming which produces the sovereign conscience. Since it would be odd to
think of Nietzsche’s ideal as merely being creative in this sense, or as merely being a sovereign promise-
maker, I think we need to take what we learn from these descriptions to be a bare, formal outline of
Nietzsche’s ideal. It is an outline formulated specifically to understand Nietzsche’s ideal in relation to the
ascetic ideal and bad conscience which Nietzsche opposes.
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Moreover, the conscience of the creative spirit would naturally inherit the
great development of internalization from the long history to which he is an heir.
Yet unlike the tamed man’s ‘bad conscience’ and its successor, the ascetic guilty
conscience, the creative spirit’s conscience is clearly self-affirming. As we have seen,
internalization and self-affirmation are precisely the attributes which distinguish the
sovereign individual’s promise-making from that of the newly tamed man of “five
or six ‘I will not’s.’” Thus, both the sovereign individual and the creative spirit
share an internalized conscience and a sense of self-affirmation. The account of the
creative spirit explains how these attributes were developed, which is precisely what
is left unexplained in the account of the sovereign individual. In turn, the account
of the sovereign individual explains how independence, autonomy and a self-
constrained conscience are possible, which is precisely what is left unexplained in
the account of the creative spirit. Thus, each figures represents a partial
perspectives which require the other perspective in order to portray this ethical type
as a whole.
This brings us the third argument, which concerns the wider context of
Nietzsche’s conception of a new, higher ethical type. As we have seen in relation to
the ‘free spirits’ and ‘new philosophers’, the defining attributes of this type can be
grouped together under three descriptions: independence, a revaluation of
prevailing values, and a new form of conscience. The sovereign individual is a
paragon of independence and has a new form of conscience. Regarding a
revaluation of values, Nietzsche tells us that the sovereign individual has been
“liberated again from the morality of mores” but says nothing of how this liberation
took place or (what amounts to the same thing) how the sovereign individual’s
conscience developed out of the long history which precedes it. Having traced this
history, Nietzsche ends by describing a type of person who is likewise independent71
and who develops a new form of conscience from the reversal of the ascetic
71 In addition to describing the creative spirit as strong enough to reverse the ascetic conscience and to stand
up to the opposition by societal mores, Nietzsche’s describes this figure’s “supremely self-confident
mischievousness in knowledge” – a phrase which perfectly describes free spirits on the model of Socrates
(GM:II:24).
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conscience, a reversal Nietzsche explicitly ties to the revaluation of values by which
nihilism is to be averted. Thus, both the sovereign individual and the creative spirit
fit the description of Nietzsche’s highest ethical type as this had been presented in
earlier works. As I have sought to show, the difference between their descriptions
is a matter of emphasis, and this difference in emphasis allows these accounts to
explain and clarify each other in important ways.
If these arguments are correct, then there is indeed a single, coherent picture
of a higher ethical type emerging in Nietzsche’s thought, even if he sometimes views
this ethical type from different perspectives and using different labels.72 We might
try to define this type by listing certain virtues (e.g. independence, courage, and
perhaps even “conscientiousness,”) but other defining traits (e.g. the revaluation of
values) do not present themselves as virtues per se. Moreover, as we have seen,
what distinguishes this type is not so much the particular values he or she upholds
or embodies, but the way these values are upheld or embodied (with sovereign self-
constraint and out of a creative, world-affirming self-affirmation.) This way of
relating to values also describes how Nietzsche’s higher type will relate to himself or
herself, to others, and to existence as a whole: the sovereignty with which one
upholds values is a manifestation of one’s attitude toward oneself and the world,
and this sovereignty with respect to oneself in turn allows a sovereignty in action
and with respect to others. As we have discussed in relation to a self-strengthening
cycle within this way of life, this sovereignty with respect to oneself and others in
the world in turn reinforces the self-affirming attitude toward oneself and actuality.
Earlier we defined a ‘way of life’ as the evaluative basis for one’s thinking and acting
which defines the way that a person relates to herself, others and the world. It
72
In works after the Genealogy, Nietzsche does not discuss this ideal type at any length, although one
passage in particular is worthy of note. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche describes Goethe’s ideal of an
“emancipated individual” in terms very much like the descriptions of the sovereign individual and other
figures representing his own highest ethical type: “Goethe conceived of a strong, highly cultured human
being, skilled in all physical accomplishments, who, keeping himself in check and having reverence for
himself, dares to allow himself the whole compass and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough for this
freedom. . .” (TI “Expeditions” 49).
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should now be clear that this new, higher ethical ‘type’ represents a new, higher
‘way of life’.
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CHAPTER 3 KIERKEGAARD’S NOTION OF DESPAIR
Having completed the first two chapters, I hope an understanding has
emerged as to how both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pursue the ethical question
of the best way of life. By ‘way of life’ Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both mean,
roughly, the manifestation of one’s highest values in the way one relates to
oneself, others, and the world. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche approach ethics by
developing a broad typology of different ways of life and exploring the internal
strengths or weaknesses of these ways of life. As has become apparent, neither
Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche puts any emphasis on the finality or precision of these
typologies. Kierkegaard explores several sub-categories and “borderline” cases
within his typology of different ways of life and Nietzsche conceives of a range
of possible manifestations and combinations within his typology of different
ways of life.
Although there are some similarities in the ideal ‘best way of life’
illustrated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (e.g. individuality) and although both
have harsh rebukes for both the life of conformist mediocrity and the life of
ascetic world-renunciation, I do not mean to suggest any neat parallel between
ethical ways of life in these respective typologies. What I hope my explication in
the first two chapters has established is that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche share a
common approach to ethics, a holistic approach that looks to the value of a ‘way
of life’ as a whole and asks the question of the best way of life. In these chapters,
special emphasis was placed on explaining what way of life each respectively
takes to be best. It is perhaps natural at this point to want to contrast these
answers, to pit Kierkegaard’s life of faith against Nietzsche’s life of creative
sovereignty. Yet it is only when we acknowledge that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
are asking the same question that their respective answers to this question come
into sharpest contrast. Moreover, the areas of divergence or disagreement
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche cannot be understood until we carefully
explore the critiques each thinker supplies against ways of life he considers
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inferior; only this will allow us to understand what critiques each thinker can
supply against the other’s conception of the best way of life.
In the next two chapters I will explain how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
critique certain ways of life on the basis of some notion of internal collapse, what
Kierkegaard calls ‘despair’ (Fortvivle) and what Nietzsche calls “nihilism”
(Nihilismus). I will explore not only the nature of this internal collapse, but also
how such a collapse makes possible a transition to another, better way of life.
Thus, I will explore what Kierkegaard sometimes calls a ‘leap’ (Spring) but more
often a ‘metamorphosis’ (Metamorphose) and what Nietzsche sometimes calls
“self-overcoming” (Selbstaufhebung or Selbstüberwindung) involving a
“revaluation of values” (Umwertung der Werte).
As I hope to demonstrate, one of the benefits of adopting the ethical
project pursued by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is that it yields a deeper and more
comprehensive analysis of ethical failures than traditional ethics can offer. I
believe their analysis is deeper in that instead of just focusing on particular acts of
wrongdoing, they explore the failure within one’s fundamental stance toward
life which gives rise to these actions. It is more comprehensive in several ways, but
partly in that both thinkers explain why some ways of life that are blameless or
even praiseworthy according to traditional ethics are nonetheless failures. In
addition, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer a deeper understanding of what
is most often ‘the one thing needful’ with respect to ethics, namely the transition
to a better way of life.
§1 DESPAIR CONSIDERED IN GENERAL
It may help to introduce this chapter by addressing one obvious objection
to the holistic ‘way of life’ approach to ethics I am advocating. This might be
called the ‘Moral Monster Objection,’ and it may be stated as follows: ‘It may
seem like an advantage of this ‘way of life’ ethics that because it takes a broad
formal approach, looking at how one relates to one’s values whatever these may be,
this way of doing ethics can appeal to people holding a range of different beliefs
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and values. But without more substantial principles for yielding fixed ethical
laws and decisive prescriptions for actions, how can this ethics exclude and
condemn ‘moral monsters’ like Adolf Hitler and Charles Manson? It may seem
that Hitler is a good candidate for Nietzsche’s ideal of the strong, “supra-moral”
individual and that Manson is a good candidate for Kierkegaard’s ideal of an
irrationally obedient ‘knight of faith’ who stands beyond ethics. But if this
approach to ethics is helpless to condemn such men, and may even be used to
justify them, how can it constitute an acceptable standard for ethical
evaluations?’
The first thing to say in reply to this objection is that the approach to ethics
I offer here is not mean to replace the more traditional action-centered forms of
ethical thinking. I merely submit that in addition to these ways of thinking, ethics
should also consider the question of the worth of different ways of life. There are
certainly cases in which the formal approach to ethics presented here is not
sufficient for grounding ethical judgments we are called upon to make (e.g. in
many specific situations in medical ethics). Yet this formal approach is
sufficient to address the objection as it stands, since there is more than sufficient
content in the ideals presented by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to condemn moral
monsters such as Hitler and Manson.
Kierkegaard seems to have anticipated this objection as early as Fear and
Trembling, where he wonders whether he can discuss Abraham’s binding of Isaac
without risking that someone will “go off the rails and do likewise” (FT:60). His
reply is that while it may be easy enough to commit wrongdoings such as
murder on the pretense of having faith, to actually have faith is quite a different
thing: “If one makes faith the main thing – that is, makes it what it is – then I
imagine one might dare speak of it without that risk in this day of ours which
can hardly be said to outdo itself in faith, and it is only in respect to faith that one
achieves resemblance to Abraham, not murder” (FT:61). Kierkegaard’s best of
way of life is to actually have faith, not simply the profession of faith, and to
actually have faith requires a genuine humility, selfless obedience, and
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surpassing love of others not found in the egomaniacal moral monster: “if you
simply remove faith as a nix and nought there remains only the raw fact that
Abraham was willing to murder Isaac, which is easy enough for anyone without
faith to imitate; without faith, that is, which makes it hard” (FT:60). Likewise,
Nietzsche’s best of way of life requires us to be free of ressentiment, self-hatred
and hatred of others, conditions hardly met by moral monsters such as Hitler
and Manson. What is deeply mistaken in the association of Nietzsche with
Nazism is not just that it overlooks Nietzsche’s frequent and scathing attacks on
anti-Semitism and German nationalism, but that it overlooks much of the content
that Nietzsche builds into his ideal figure.
Far from being unable to formulate a condemnation of ‘moral monsters’
such as Adolf Hitler and Charles Manson, I would argue that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche can offer an even deeper analysis of the ethical failure in these cases
than traditional ethics can. One way of describing what is wrong with the
‘moral monster’ is that the ethical law has been violated a number of times,
where this ethical law is conceived in terms of deontology, utilitarianism, or any
other principle. But I think that the deeper problem is the fundamental stance of
hatred, resentment, rage, petty self-interest and fear that constitutes the way of
life of the moral monster and his followers. Thus, Kierkegaard would condemn
a religious fanatic like Manson and his followers in the strongest terms, as
representing a demonically defiant form of despair which makes an open
mockery of God by simply using the name of God as justification for pursuing
one’s own dubious ends. Far from the knight of faith’s humility, obedience in
fear and trembling, and love of others, Manson’s religion was one of self-
glorification and violent hatred. Likewise, Nietzsche would condemn a political
fanatic like Hitler and his followers in the strongest terms, as representing one of
the worst manifestations of ressentiment, herd-mentality, and nihilism. The
“Third Reich” represented the culmination of the rise of German nationalism,
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militarism, and anti-Semitism which had already begun in Nietzsche’s day and
against which he directed his most potent scorn and venom.73
While it is true that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can offer powerful
critiques of these extreme cases of wrongdoing, their insights are perhaps even
more penetrating and valuable when it comes to analyzing ethical failures of a
much more common variety. As mentioned above, for Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche the real challenge for ethical thinking is to be able to recognize and
diagnose deeper failures within the everyday life of actual people, even people
who might be considered blameless or praiseworthy in the eyes of traditional
ethics. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss Kierkegaard’s
understanding of this failure as despair. In doing so, I will take as my guide The
Sickness Unto Death, although I will also look at what Judge Wilhelm says about
despair in the second volume of Either/Or. I will first discuss what Kierkegaard
means by despair as a general concept, and then I will look to applications of this
concept in particular cases, paying special attention to the despair within the
ways of life already discussed in chapter one. Having examined these
manifestations of despair, I will discuss in what way despair is understood as
“the corridor to faith” (SUD:98). Lastly, I will say a few words about how
despair is a valuable concept for ethics generally and how it is useful for finding
an internal critique of Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms.
By Kierkegaard’s own stipulation, Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous
author of The Sickness Unto Death, writes from the viewpoint of Christian faith
(Papirer X1, 517, p332). Thus, in Part II of the book, he gives specifically Christian
qualifications to his concept of despair, e.g. as sin ‘before God’ and as defiance of
God. Yet as Anti-Climacus makes clear from the outset, exploring
manifestations of despair in order to edify the reader represents “the ethical side
of Christianity” (SUD:35, cf. also SUD:153). Thus, despair is an ethical concept in
the broad sense of the term ‘ethical’ I have been using here (not to be narrowly
73 For examples, see HH I:175, BGE:251, TI “Germans” 1, A:24, A:55, EH “Books” HH:2.
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identified with Judge Wilhelm’s ‘ethical life’). What despair means for Anti-
Climacus is not a feeling of depression or anxiety, but the failure of one’s whole
way of life. It is the state of internal collapse which exists within a self that
misrelates to itself in thought and action, by pretending to be a self that it is not
and by avoiding living as the self that it is. Importantly, because the human self
is not self-enclosed, this misrelation to oneself is also a misrelation to God, others
and existence as a whole.
A good way of introducing this misrelation of despair is by way of a
contrast with its opposite, the non-despairing way of relating to oneself that
Anti-Climacus calls faith. In his notoriously difficult definition of the human
self, Anti-Climacus declares: “The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that
in the relation which is its relating to itself. The self is not the relation but the
relation’s relating to itself” (SUD, 43). For Anti-Climacus, the proper way for a
self to relate to itself is to want to be the self that it actually is, which includes
living up to the potential within this self to become something excellent. In
contrast, a self might relate to itself in one of two fundamental forms of despair:
not wanting to be oneself or wanting be another, self-created self that one would
prefer to be instead. Anti-Climacus finds these two forms of despair related
since a person who tries to create a new self does so in order to avoid being the
self he actually is.74
Anti-Climacus admits that “if the human self were self-established, there
would only be a question of one form [of despair],” the despair of not wanting to
be oneself. A self-established self would not be misrelating to itself in wanting
to be the self that it creates or establishes, so there could be no question of a
despair of wanting to be oneself, what Anti-Climacus calls “defiant despair”
(SUD:43). But according to Anti-Climacus, the human self is not self-
established; it is created and established by a power outside it. For Anti-
Climacus this power is God. That the self is not self-established means that in
74 Anti-Climacus toys with the question of which form of despair is more fundamental, but ends up without
a consistent answer to this question (see SUD, 44, 50).
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relating to itself as the self it actually is, the human self must also relate to this
power that established and created it. Anti-Climacus’ definition of “the state of
the self when despair is completely eradicated,” which is also his definition of
faith, is the life in which “in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is
grounded transparently in the power that established it” (SUD:44,79).
From what we learned about the life of faith in the first chapter, we know
that to be “grounded transparently” in God means to live as one whose life is a
gift and a task from God. For Anti-Climacus, one must recognize one’s self as
that “whose task it is to become itself, which can only be done in the relationship
to God” (SUD: 59). Presumably, every human self is already “grounded” in God
insofar as God created it, but in saying that to be free of despair one must be
grounded “transparently” in God, Anti-Climacus indicates that the non-
despairing person is aware of this grounding and enacts this awareness in actual
life. In contrast, the despairing person relates to himself and wants to be himself
in a way that does not relate to God as the power which established him. What
is despairing about such a life is not that it lacks a belief in God, and in fact many
of the forms of despair sketched by Anti-Climacus may involve a belief in God.
Rather, despair is always a matter of underestimating or overestimating one’s
self in relation to God, by avoiding being the self God created (and cares for) or
by pretending to be the creator and judge of one’s own self.
Thus, for Anti-Climacus despair is always an internal problem, a
misrelation to one’s self, even if it also involves a misrelation to what exists
independently of the self (God, and through God, other people and the world at
large). Despair can be called the internal collapse of a way of life in that a self
which avoids itself or pretends to be what it is not is internally divided within
itself. This is not just a matter of a divided will, or a division within the self
between will and intellect, but rather a fundamental will not to be one’s self at
all. A life defined by a fundamental evaluative stance in which one is turned
against and away from one’s actual self represents a continual state of instability
and collapse. As we shall see shortly, the despairing self is constantly plagued
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by whatever of the self it tries to avoid or falsely presuppose (i.e. by its inability
to be rid of itself or to create a new self in order to be rid of its actual self.)
As the title The Sickness Unto Death indicates, the central metaphor for
despair throughout the work is that of physical sickness. This metaphor is
helpful for explaining an important distinction between the collapse and failure
of a way of life and the noticeable effects of this failure. As I mentioned above,
things like feelings of despair, frustration, anxiety, and depression do not
constitute despair strictly speaking. These can be, at most, merely symptoms of
the disease of despair, and for Anti-Climacus it is important not to confuse the
symptoms with the disease. After all, one could be in despair without feeling
despair, as is the case with the person whose immersion into conformity,
mediocrity or pleasure is successful enough to avoid any such unpleasantness.
“Not to be in despair may mean precisely to be in despair,” Anti-Climacus
warns, “A sense of security and repose may mean that one is in despair; that
very security, that very peace, can be despair” (SUD:54-5). Equally as worrisome
are those who do experience feelings of despair, frustration and anxiety, and thus
realize that something is wrong in their lives, but who seek to ameliorate only
these symptoms without addressing the disease itself. For Anti-Climacus such
symptomatic treatments can only perpetuate and intensify the disease of despair.
Trying to simply feel better about oneself while refusing to actually become better
or live better simply entrenches oneself further in despair. In fact, as we shall see
shortly, several of the types of despair Anti-Climacus sketches are constituted by
some way of dealing with the symptoms of despair in a despairing way.
This brings us to a related distinction between despair properly
understood and whatever difficulty, frustration, or “stumbling block” a person
living a despairing life may encounter. This stumbling block or scandalon may
involve the feelings of anxiety, despair, or frustration just mentioned, but it is not
so much these feelings themselves as what these feelings pertain to: that which
one is anxious or frustrated about. For example, Anti-Climacus talks about the
person who “despairs over something earthly” such as a financial loss, meaning
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that this person is brought to the point of emotional desperation and crisis over
this loss (SUD:80). Such a person is unlikely to take this feeling itself as the root
problem, but he would also be incorrect to think that the cause of his despair is
this financial loss. According to Anti-Climacus, that a person is brought to the
point of hopeless anxiety over a financial loss indicates that the real despair was
present even before this loss occurred. What is really wrong here is not the loss
of money or the feelings of despair which followed, but that one had such a
stance toward money in the first place.75
Simply put, the scandalon of a way of life always takes the form of a failure
to attain one’s highest telos, while the despair of this way of life is that one has
this as one’s highest telos in the first place. Anti-Climacus sometimes
distinguishes the scandalon of a way of life from its despair by talking about
despairing over something versus despairing of something: “One despairs over
whatever binds one in despair; over one’s misfortune, over the earthly, over the
loss of one’s fortune, etc.; but of whatever, rightly understood, releases one from
it: of the eternal, of one’s salvation, of one’s own strength, etc.” (SUD:92fn).
What one despairs over is not the real cause of failure in one’s life, but that one
despairs over this particular scandalon is a useful indication as to what the real
despair and failure of one’s life might be.
As much as he relies upon the metaphor of sickness to describe despair,
Anti-Climacus is careful to point out some important differences between
despair and physical sickness. One difference is that the “sickness unto death”
that is despair does not in fact lead to a terminus in death. Rather, despair is a
way of living such that one is continually dying in a spiritual sense: ”dying in
despair transforms itself constantly into a living. The despairer cannot die; no
more than ‘the dagger can kill thoughts’ can despair consume the eternal, the self
that is the source” (SUD:48). The death of the self may be exactly what one who
75 As we will see shortly, Anti-Climacus would classify this stance as the “despair of immediacy” in which
one undervalues one’s deeper spiritual self and puts too much value in things like financial security (cf.
SUD, 54, 80).
143
does not want to be himself may hope for, and this makes it all the more
frustrating that despair cannot ever succeed in destroying this self. Despair is
like the biblical fire which burns without consuming that which it burns; thus it
is one more torment and frustration to the despairing person that he “cannot
consume himself, cannot be rid of himself, cannot become nothing” (SUD:49).
Another difference is that physical sicknesses are most often not the result
of a person’s own will, and are therefore not the sick person’s fault. In contrast,
Anti-Climacus is clear that despair is always the result of the will of the
despairing person. This is not to say that the person wants to be in despair, but
that he has taken a willful stance towards life that simply is despair: the stance of
wanting not to be himself or of wanting to be the self he creates. Thus, unlike
physical sickness despair is never a matter of misfortune. Freedom is an
essential condition for despair: “Where then does despair come from? From the
relation in which the synthesis relates to itself, from the fact that God, who made
man this relation, as it were lets go of it” (SUD:46). Although Kierkegaard does
not work out any detailed theory of what this freedom might entail, he is clear
that each person is at every moment free to relate to him- or herself in despair or
in faith. Thus, no one is in despair once-and-for-all; the person who continues to
live in despair does so freely: “Every actual moment of despair is to be referred
back to its possibility; every moment he despairs he brings it upon himself”
(SUD:47).
In emphasizing the will in relation to despair, Anti-Climacus does not
deny that knowledge also plays an important role. We have already seen how
despair can be understood as lacking an awareness or “transparency” of one’s
grounding in God. Indeed, the central typology of despair in The Sickness Unto
Death differentiates ways of life according to “self-consciousness”: consciousness
of what one’s self actually is, of whether one is in despair, the nature of this
despair, etc. (SUD:59). But Anti-Climacus refuses to excuse any form of despair
on the grounds of complete ignorance of what the self is or of how it ought to
relate to itself and the power which established it. In a lengthy discussion on the
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“Socratic notion of sin” (sin as ignorance), Anti-Climacus brings up the
important issue of self-deception: “sin must really consist in something other
than ignorance; it must consist in the activity whereby a person has worked at
obscuring his knowledge. [...] What then is the missing component in Socrates’
specification of sin? It is: the will, defiance” (SUD:120-1). If Socrates insists that
we fail to will what is good because we are ignorant of what is good, Anti-
Climacus thinks Christianity goes a step further by insisting that we remain
ignorant of what is good because of a deeper will to avoid the good:
“Christianity goes a little further back and says: ‘It is because he won’t
understand it, and that in turn because he is unwilling to do what is right.’”
(SUD:127). Anti-Climacus believes that all actual despair involves some degree
of self-knowledge and some will to resist knowing this self and being this self
(SUD:72,78).
Before turning to the typologies of despair illustrated in The Sickness
Unto Death, one final word on despair as a general concept is in order. In
keeping with Kierkegaard’s usual stance against comparative evaluations in
ethics, Anti-Climacus refuses to categorize some manifestations of despair as
objectively “worse” than others. As one comes to have a greater degree of
consciousness of the self and its despair, there is less “obscurity which might
serve as a mitigating excuse,” and a continuation of despair is increasingly a
matter of open defiance. Anti-Climacus describes this as the “intensification” of
despair: “the level of consciousness intensifies despair. The truer a person’s
conception of despair, while still remaining in despair, the more clearly
conscious he is of being in despair, the more intense the despair” (SUD:79). But
to say that one form of despair is more “intense” than another is not to say that it
is “worse” by any kind of objective standard. Anti-Climacus explains that the
person with the least degree of consciousness is to some extent less guilty of
open defiance (insofar as his or her ignorance may serve as a “mitigating
excuse”), but on the other hand this ignorantly despairing person is “simply one
negativity further from the truth and from deliverance” (SUD:74). Although less
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intense, this ignorant despair “can be the most dangerous form of despair. In his
ignorance, the despairer is, though in a way to his own undoing, made safe from
becoming aware – which means he is safely in the hands of despair” (SUD:75).
§2 TYPES OF DESPAIR
Interestingly, Anti-Climacus offers more than one typology of despair in
The Sickness Unto Death. As mentioned above, the typology of despair he offers
as decisive differentiates ways of life according to the agent’s degree of
“consciousness, that is to say, self-consciousness” (SUD:59). But Anti-Climacus
also offers a typology of despair according to what he calls the “the factors which
constitute the self as a synthesis”: infinitude/finitude and possibility/necessity
(SUD:59). It is worth discussing this other typology briefly, as it further
illustrates an important idea discussed above. We have said that the life of faith
is a life in which one relates to one’s self as gift and task from God and that this
task of the self is, most broadly, “to become itself.” (This is Kierkegaard’s version
of Pindar’s call to ‘become what you are’, which is also a central ideal for
Nietzsche.) Anti-Climacus clarifies that “[t]o become oneself, however, is to
become something concrete. But to become something concrete is neither to
become finite nor to become infinite, for that which is to become concrete is
indeed a synthesis” (SUD:59).
“Infinitude” is what Anti-Climacus calls “the expanding factor” in the
self, and it seems to mean an abstraction in which one conceives of the human
self in its most abstract and generalized form. “Finitude,” by contrast,” is “the
confining factor” of the self and it seems to mean one’s factual existence as a
particular person. To become “concrete” is to become a synthesis of these
factors, which means one relates to oneself according to both the abstract
possibilities and the factual realities of one’s life. One can be in despair by
overemphasizing either of these factors at the expense of the other. A person
who overestimates her infinitude at the expense of finitude becomes “fantastic.”
Anti-Climacus gives the example of the person who becomes “emotionally
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fantastic,” meaning that this person’s emotions are directed toward entirely
abstract and fantastical entities. This person “becomes an abstract sensitivity
which inhumanly belongs to no human, but which inhumanly participates
sensitively, so to speak, in the fate of some abstraction, for example, humanity in
abstracto” (SUD:61). At the other extreme, someone who overestimates her
finitude at the expense of infinitude suffers from “despairing confinement,
narrowness” and “finds it much easier and safer to be like the others, to become
a copy, a number, along with the crowd” (SUD:64).
While the factors of finitude and infinitude help to explain what it is to
become a self that is concrete, the factors of possibility and necessity help to
explain this process of becoming oneself: “For the purposes of becoming (and the
self must become itself freely) possibility and necessity are equally essential”
(SUD:65). Anti-Climacus says of the self that “although it is indeed itself, it has
to become itself. To the extent that it is itself, it is necessary; and to the extent
that it must become itself, it is a possibility” (SUD:66). Actual freedom is not just
the openness of one’s possibilities, but the enacted balance or synthesis of these
possibilities within the necessities of one’s life. Put another way, enacting one’s
freedom in actuality always means finding the synthesis of one’s possibilities
(what one can potentially become) and one’s necessity (what in one’s self is fixed
or given). Anti-Climacus defines actuality, personhood, and freedom all in the
same way, as the proper balance of possibility and necessity (SUD:59,66,70).76
Once again, despair can take the form of overemphasizing either factor at
the expense of the other. In one case, one ignores one’s necessity in a
pretentious overestimation of one’s possibility, with the result that nothing ever
becomes actualized: “possibility seems greater and greater to the self; more and
more becomes possible because nothing becomes actual” (SUD:66). Anti-
Climacus analyzes this way of life to be missing “the strength to obey, to yield to
76 “The self is freedom. But freedom is the dialectical element in the categories of possibility and necessity,”
“actuality is the unity of possibility and necessity,” “Personhood is a synthesis of possibility and necessity”
(SUD:59,66,70).
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the necessary in one’s self, what might be called one’s limits” (SUD:66-7). In the
other case, one underestimates one’s possibilities with the result that the self
becomes stifled and stymied. In this category Anti-Climacus discusses the “petty
bourgeois” who is “devoid of imagination,” or a “fatalist” who feels trapped or
suffocated in the necessities of his life. Importantly for Anti-Climacus, the self’s
“possibilities” are not just possibility of what one can accomplish for oneself, but
also the possibilities that are opened to the self by God, since “for God
everything is possible” (SUD:68). As we shall see, for Kierkegaard an important
part of ‘becoming oneself’ is to go beyond what is possible by oneself alone (i.e.
beyond self-reliance).
The typology of despair according to the factors of the self helps to clarify
what it means for the self to have the task of becoming itself and how it may fail
in this task. It also establishes a pattern that can be seen in the typology of
despair according to consciousness, namely that what the despairing self tends to
stumble over in life is brought about either by the presence of whatever of its self
it despairingly tries to avoid, or by the absence of whatever of its self it
despairingly pretends to have. In contrast to the typology according to the
“factors” of the self, the more “decisive” typology takes into account the different
levels of intensity in the different forms of despair. For Anti-Climacus, despair
considered under the aspect of consciousness can take three broad forms,
depending on the level of self-consciousness of the agent: the despair of
ignorance, the despair of weakness, and the despair of defiance. (As discussed
earlier, each increase in self-consciousness corresponds to an increase in the
intensity of despair, so these three forms also indicate a progression of the
intensity of despair). It is within this typology that we find Kierkegaard’s
analysis of the failure of the ways of life discussed in the first chapter.
Anti-Climacus leading his reader down through the levels of despair
reminds one of the guided descent through the levels of hell in the Dante’s
Inferno, and this is a useful analogy for understanding the tour of different forms
of despair in The Sickness Unto Death. In the Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard
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expresses admiration for Dante as a poet who does not neglect “ethical
judgment,” and it fair to say this is an ideal he himself aspires to in works like
The Sickness Unto Death (CA:153). Both writers present us with a vividly
imaginative typology of different ways of being a sinner and the consequences of
these sins. Like Dante, Kierkegaard writes from a devout religious stance, but
both writers also avail themselves of much humor and irony in portraying these
forms of sin. (It may also be fair to say that neither writer is above settling
personal vendettas in absentia within these works, e.g. against the clergy.)77
Dante’s hierarchy of sinners in hell ranges from those who are ignorant of
or indifferent to the demands of faith to those who are most directly and
treacherously defiant of God. Likewise, Anti-Climacus’ hierarchy of despair
(which for him is the same as sin) ranges from naïve ignorance to outright
defiance. Dante and Kierkegaard are both also interested in the dialectical
relation between a person’s sin and the ‘fruit’ of this sin. The punishments
Dante depicts for each type of sinner in hell matches the sin being punished
according to what Dante calls contrapasso (“fit punishment”).78 Contrapasso is the
system of equivalent punishments, the justice of the lex talionis (“an eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth”) in which the punishment is a grotesque
exaggeration or inversion of the corresponding sin. Thus, for example, the lustful
are punished by being blown about in all directions by a unceasing wind. Those
who were hypocrites must wear heavy cloaks which are brightly gilded on the
outside but dull grey lead on the inside. Likewise, those who sowed divisive
advice in life are punished by being hewn apart in hell.
On one hand, these punishments may seem to represent precisely the
criticism Kierkegaard often gives of the Middle Ages: that it loses sight of
77 For example, see SUD:150 and Inferno Canto XIX, and XXIII.
78 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Transl. Robert Hollander, (Random House: New York, 2000) [XXVIII.142]. The
term contrapasso traces back to Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics 1132b in which the
Latin contrapassum is used to translate the Greek antipeponthos (“reciprocity,” “suffering in return for one’s
action”). For a discussions of the concept of contrapasso, see commentary by Hollander, esp. p.55-6, 486, and
Singleton, p. 522-523. Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Transl. Singleton, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970). Vol. I.2.
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inwardness by trying to manifest it outwardly. But what Dante gives his readers
in Inferno is not an outward expression of something that should be inward, but a
poetic expression which, among other things, constitutes a meditation on the
inner nature of human sin. Thus, one of the things that makes Dante’s poetic
portrayals of these punishments so interesting is what they say about the sins
being punished. Specifically, we can learn something about how Dante
conceives of a sinner as misrelating to himself, to others, or to God through this
sin. Here we see Dante and Kierkegaard pursuing very similar projects. For
Kierkegaard sin is always a misrelation of this kind; his challenge is to express
this inward misrelation in words, which he often does through poetic imagery.
One obvious difference between these writers is that for Dante these
punishments take place only after one’s life has ended. By contrast, Kierkegaard
shows the spiritlessness, torment, or stumbling block within the lived experience
of the sinner. Another difference is that for Kierkegaard this stumbling block or
torment is not really the punishment for the deeper sin of despair; rather it a
symptom of this despair, its outward eruption which is brought about by the
underlying sickness of despair. Unlike the relation between Dante’s sins and
their punishment, there is no external form of justice or “fit punishment” at work
here: the punishment, if there is one, is simply to be in despair, to have a
despairing misrelation to God and to oneself. For Kierkegaard, despair is an
organic failure, a misrelation within the organism of the self in which a
fundamental sickness manifests itself in experienced difficulties and problems in
life.79 Despair is a form of hell within the person who despairs; it is quite literally
a ‘living hell’ for the one who despairs. Yet there is neither divine justice nor
‘poetic justice’ at work behind the presence of the stumbling block in one’s life; it
follows from despair as a symptom follows from a disease.
Like Dante (and some of his humanistic medieval contemporaries),
Kierkegaard faces the problem of how to judge the Greek and Roman pagans,
79 One might say that there is no notion of justice at all within this organic conception of ethical failure, but of
course for Plato justice within the individual is precisely an organic failure of this kind.
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especially the “virtuous pagans,” in relation to the Christian notion of sin. This is
a delicate question because of the love and respect these writers have for their
heroes of antiquity, and because many of these heroes predated the historical
figure of Jesus and thus had no possibility of living the life of Christian faith.
Just as Dante reserves a place for the virtuous pagans in the first and most benign
level of hell, Anti-Climacus reserves the first and most benign level of despair for
what he calls the “spiritlessness” of paganism (SUD:72). Anti-Climacus says
that we might even be tempted to exempt this form of despair from any blame,
since in purely “human terms” it may be considered “a state which in a kind of
innocence does not even know that it is despair” (SUD:72). Anti-Climacus
explains that the same spiritless “paganism” exists in Christendom, even by
those who profess to be Christians. But he credits the pagans of antiquity with
an orientation toward spirit that the spiritless of Christendom lack; he insists that
“there is and remains” a “difference in kind between paganism in the stricter
sense and paganism in Christendom,” namely that “although paganism lacks
spirit, it is pointed in the direction of spirit, while paganism in Christendom
lacks spirit in the opposite direction, away from it or in a defection, and is
therefore in the strictest sense spiritlessness” (SUD:77).
Anti-Climacus considers pagan spiritlessness and Christian spiritlessness
two manifestations of the despair he calls the despair of ignorance, the “despair
which is ignorant of being despair, or the despairing ignorance of having a self
and an eternal self” (SUD: 73). While we may doubt the fairness of this charge
against all ‘pagans,’ it is worth trying to understand what exactly Anti-Climacus
means in claiming that the pagans and many in Christendom are “spiritless” and
despairingly “ignorant of having a self.”80 He elaborates that this ignorance is to
be found in every “human existence not conscious of itself as spirit, or not
personally conscious of itself before God as spirit, every human existence which
80 These passages seem to imply that all “pagans” suffered this form of despair, yet it is unclear how
Socrates, who is referred to positively in this same section, might fit into this category. Moreover,
Kierkegaard associates the Stoics with a later form of despair.
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is not grounded transparently in God, but opaquely rests or merges in some
abstract universal (state, nation, etc.)” (SUD:76). This ignorance of selfhood is to
be found not just in these mistaken theoretical self-conceptions, but also in any
self that is “in the dark about itself, simply takes its capacities to be natural
powers, unconscious in a deeper sense of where it has them from, takes its self to
be an unaccountable something” (SUD:76).
Despairing ignorance is a self-conception which refuses to acknowledge
the self’s grounding in God. Lacking this “transparency,” one “opaquely”
conceives of one’s self as merging into the abstraction of the state or polis, or one
simply takes oneself to be an “unaccountable,” naturally occurring something.
There are indications that it is some form of the aesthetic way of life that Anti-
Climacus has in mind here.81 For example, he admits that the pagans also had a
conception of despair and spiritlessness, but he argues that “the aesthetic
conception of spiritlessness in no way provides the criterion for judging what is
despair and what is not [...] since it is impossible to specify aesthetically what
spirit truly is. How could you expect the aesthetic individual to answer a
question which for him simply does not exist!” (SUD:76). Anti-Climacus also
describes the life of despairing ignorance in a way that matches well with what
we learned about the life of the immediate aesthete: “He is totally dominated by
his sensuous and psycho-sensuous reactions; he lives in the categories of the
sensate, the pleasant and the unpleasant, poo-poos spirit, the truth, etc.; he is too
sensate to have the courage to risk and endure being spirit” (SUD:73).
In the main, however, the despair of the aesthetic way of life finds its
fullest expression in the next level of despair to be discussed, what Anti-
Climacus calls the despair of weakness. The despair of weakness is “in despair
not wanting to be oneself” (SUD:80). Here one is to some degree conscious of
81 Alternately, this despair may apply to those who have not even progressed as far as the aesthetic life. A
hint that this pre-aesthetic way of life might exist is found in Judge Wilhelm’s discussion of people of “quiet
lostness”: "so many live out their lives in quiet lostness [...] they live, as it were, away from themselves and
vanish like shadows” (EO I:168) These people “do not live aesthetically, but neither has the ethical become
manifest to them in its wholeness; nor have they actually rejected it” (EO I:168-9).
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one’s self and conscious that one is in despair, even if one has only a “dim idea”
of what this despair is (or of what the self is ‘as spirit’, ‘before God’, etc.). 82 This
despairer tends to misdiagnose his despair: as discussed earlier, he mistakes the
scandalon of his life for the despair itself. Under the heading “Despair over the
earthly or over something earthly” we find the despair of “pure immediacy”
and the despair of “immediacy with some degree of reflection.” As these labels
suggest, it is here that we find the despair of the immediate and reflective
aesthetic ways of life we discussed in chapter one. Like Judge Wilhelm, Anti-
Climacus insists on grouping both the conformist petty bourgeoisie and the
refined “aesthete” together in what is called the immediate or the aesthetic way
of life. (EO II:180)
In some ways the despair of the immediate person resembles the despair
of ignorance discussed above. Just as the despairingly ignorant person “lives in
the categories of the sensate, the pleasant and the unpleasant,” Anti-Climacus
says that the “dialectic” of the immediate way of life is: “the pleasant and the
unpleasant; its concepts: good fortune, misfortune, fate” (SUD:73,82). The
difference between these two forms of despair is that the immediate person runs
up against some stumbling block such that he becomes to some degree conscious
of being in despair: “Now something happens to this immediate self; it runs up
against something (or something runs up against it) which brings it to despair.
[...] That which for the immediate person is his whole life or, provided he has a
modicum of reflection, that part of it to which he is peculiarly attached, is
snatched away from him by ‘a stroke of fate’” (SUD:82). The immediate aesthete
has tried to make his self “something included in the scope of the temporal and
worldly” and has tried to live in “immediate continuity” with the world in the
mode of “desiring, craving, enjoying, etc.” (SUD:81). But he now finds that he
82 Although Anti-Climacus uses the distinction between conscious and ignorant despair as a broad
typological tool, he also indicates that every person has some degree of self-conciousness and some degree
of ignorance about his or her despair: “Actual life is too complex to turn up contrasts as abstract as that
between a despair that is completely ignorant of being in despair and one that is completely conscious of
being so. One must assume that in most cases the state of the despairer is one of having only a dim idea,
though again with countless nuances, of what that state is” (SUD:78).
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cannot have whatever he most desires or enjoys, and he considers this loss his
despair: “through a strange tergiversation and total mystification concerning
himself, he calls it despair. But to despair is to lose the eternal – and of this loss
he says nothing, he doesn’t dream of it. To lose the earthly is not in itself to
despair, and yet that is what he speaks of and he calls it despair” (SUD:82).
In taking the satisfaction of his earthly desires as that in which his “whole
life” or “peculiar attachment” lies, the immediate person despairingly misrelates
to himself, avoiding anything more deeply spiritual in his self and treating this
self as something entirely in the domain of the worldly and temporal. As Anti-
Climacus explains, this person treats his self as if it were his coat, something
purely external (SUD:84). On one hand this constitutes ‘not wanting to be
oneself,’ not wanting to be the spiritual self one actually is, even if it is also true
that this self “presents only an illusory appearance of having anything eternal in
it” (SUD:81). Prima facie, this may seem like a contradiction. How can someone
be faulted for not wanting to be his actual spiritual or eternal self if his self in fact
lacks anything spiritual or eternal in it? The key to resolving this conflict is to
remember what we said before about human actuality as a synthesis of
possibility and necessity. For Kierkegaard, what a self actually is includes what
it potentially can become. Thus, a self that currently lacks the spiritual in itself
can also be classified as not wanting to be its actual, spiritual self. Potentially
and thus in actuality there is always something spiritual and eternal about the self
‘before God,’ as Anti-Climacus reminds us: “next to God there is nothing so
eternal as a self” (SUD:84). But Anti-Climacus also suggests that the immediate
aesthete has effectively lost the “eternal” in himself by currently relating to
himself as something without anything eternal in it, by being a self-relation that
excludes the eternal: “Immediacy really has no self” (SUD:83). Exclusion is, of
course, also a way of relating to what is eternal or spiritual within oneself;
specifically, it is a way of turning against and away from anything potentially
spiritual in one’s self.
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This misrelation to oneself is the immediate person’s despair, but it is also
the source of the scandalon over which the immediate person stumbles. It is
precisely because he tries to live in “immediate continuity” with the worldly and
temporal that the immediate person is vulnerable to every change of fortune.
What this person invests in worldly pursuits is not just money, time, etc., but his
whole self, and so he cannot avoid despairing as a whole self over whatever
losses and changes of fortune life in the world inevitably brings. He has sought
to dissolve himself in immediate continuity with the world, but he thereby
deprives himself of the distance or detachment from worldly fortune necessary
to face misfortune without completely despairing. Moreover, when bad luck
inevitably happens, the immediate person understands this stumbling block only
according to the despairing aesthetic categories: he blames the world for being
boring, disappointing, or painful instead of blaming himself for attaching himself
to enjoyment as his highest value. The despairing immediate person does not
take this stumbling block for what it is, a symptom of the deeper despair of
making earthly desires and enjoyment one’s “whole life” or central “attachment”
in life.
Anti-Climacus sketches some possible paths that now lay open to the
immediate person facing such a stumbling block. If there is some change in
external circumstances such that his desire is fulfilled after all, then he continues
as before, at least until he hits another stumbling block: “he begins where he left
off, he neither was nor became a self but now carries on living, merely in the
category of the immediate” (SUD:83). If there is no such change, he may give up
his “peculiar attachment” to whatever special enjoyments he had hoped to get
from the world and instead settle for life as a conformist: “He now acquires a
modicum of understanding of life; he learns to imitate other people, how they
conduct their lives, and proceeds to live as they do” (SUD:83). (Alternately, one
might think, the despairer may take up a different “peculiar attachment” in the
manner of the ‘crop rotation’ method discussed in Chapter 1). Anti-Climacus
explains that this life of conformity also involves the despair of not wanting to be
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oneself, specifically in the mode of wanting to be someone else: “When
immediacy despairs, it has not even enough self to wish or dream that it had
become what it has not become. The immediate person helps himself in another
way: he wishes he were someone else” (SUD:83). This wish is, of course, a
fantasy. Anti-Climacus explains that “immediacy really has no self; it doesn’t
know itself and so cannot recognize itself either, and therefore usually it ends in
fantasy” (SUD:83).83
Another path open to the despairing aesthetic person is to try to find the
necessary detachment from worldly fortune in his own reflection, i.e. to live a
reflective aesthetic life. In chapter one, we discussed the reflective aesthete’s
strategy of escaping any vulnerability to the contingencies of chance and fortune
by taking possession of himself reflectively. Anti-Climacus explains that the
despair here lies once again in the fact that the self does not want to be its actual
self. The self is not pure reflection, nor does it become its actual, spiritual self by
reflecting on its immediacy. The move toward reflective enjoyment represents
an attempt to escape from, rather than deal responsibly with, the factual realities
of one’s life. The despair here lies in the fact that this person fails to relate to
himself as something eternal or spiritual:
He has no consciousness of a self that is won by infinite abstraction from
all externality. This self, naked and abstract, in contrast to the fully
clothed self of immediacy, is the first form of the infinite self and the
progressive impulse in the entire process through which a self infinitely
takes possession of its actual self along with its difficulties and
advantages. (SUD:86)
The reflective immediate person remains more dependent upon his
immediacy (and thus changes of fortune) than he pretends to be. Herein lies the
despair of this way of life, but also its stumbling block:
83 Comparing this despairing fantasy to the “fantastic” despair discussed earlier (the despairing lack of the
self’s necessity) yields an interesting shift in Anti-Climacus’ dialectics (cf. SUD:67). Earlier the fantastic
person was described as refusing to “yield to the necessary in one’s self.” Now the fantastic person is
accused of overemphasizing necessity to the loss of possibility (cf. SUD:71).
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With this certain degree of reflection begins that act of separation in
which the self becomes aware of itself as essentially different from the
environment and the external world and their effect on it. But only to
a certain degree. If the self which has some degree of reflection in itself
now wants to take possession of the self, it may stumble upon one
difficulty or another in the composition of the self, in the self’s
necessity. For just as no human body is perfect, so neither is any self.
Whatever this difficulty is, he recoils from it. Or something happens to
him that infringes on the immediacy in him more profoundly than in
reflection. Or his imagination lights on some possibility which, if it
came about, would then become that break with immediacy (SUD:85).
The person who wants to take possession of himself in the mode of
reflective enjoyment still treats his factual self as source of entertainment rather
than as something spiritual ‘before God’: the “difficulty he has stumbled on
requires a complete break with immediacy, and he does not have the self-
reflection or the ethical reflection for that” (SUD:85-6). Anti-Climacus says that
this person treats his self as if it were a place of residence which he finds
untenable for some reason: he leaves it, but returns to it again and again to see if
the problem has happened to pass: “Until that time he comes only now and then,
as though on a visit to himself, to find out whether the change has occurred”
(SUD:86).
Once again, Climacus discusses several paths open to the person
confronted with the stumbling block of this way of life. As always, one may
react to this stumbling block as a symptom of despair, treating it as a prompt
toward the inwardness of faith, relating to it as part of “the progressive impulse
in the entire process through which a self infinitely takes possession of its actual
self” (SUD:86). Alternately, one may react to this scandalon passively, that is to
say despairingly, in a number of ways, depending on whether or not the scandalon
happens to pass on its own. If this does happen, the person may begin where he
left off: the reflective aesthete “’is himself once more’, as he puts it, though this
simply means he begins where he left off; he was a self up to a point and went no
further” (SUD:86). If the stumbling block does not pass on its own, this person
may turn “completely away from the inward direction, the path he should have
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followed in order truly to become a self” and instead throw himself into worldly
wisdom and worldly pursuits: “He takes possession of what, in his language, he
calls his self, that is to say, whatever aptitudes, talent, etc. he may have been
given, all this he takes possession of but in the outward direction of what is
called ‘life’, real life, active life” (SUD:86).
In other words, the introverted person who fails to secure enjoyment by
reflecting on his immediacy may instead become an extrovert, adopting the
reflective standpoint of worldly wisdom and trying to forget any realization of
his inner despair:
He deals very warily with the modicum of reflection he has in himself, lest
this thing in the background [i.e., his despair] comes up again. Then
gradually he manages to forget it. In the course of the years he comes to
think of it as well-nigh ridiculous, especially when in the congenial
company of other capable men with a sense and aptitude for real life
(SUD:87).
Anti-Climacus finds it typical of this approach that despair is considered a
mere phase of youth, not something that those concerned with ‘real life’ worry
about. This treats despair as if getting out of despair were something that just
naturally happens to self over time. While this view accords with ‘worldly
wisdom,’ Anti-Climacus insists that “it is extremely foolish, and shows lack of
insight into what spirit is – as well as failure to appreciate that man is spirit and
not just an animal” (SUD:89). Specifically, he thinks it is foolish “to suppose it
should really be such an easy affair with faith and wisdom that they just arrive
over the years as a matter of course, like teeth, a beard and that sort of thing”
(SUD:89).
For Anti-Climacus, both forms of the aesthetic life relate to the despair of
this life passively, as something which happens to the self and which may or may
not happen to go away. Anti-Climacus sees this passivity as a form of
weakness, and this explains why both manifestations of the aesthetic life are
classified as “the despair of weakness.” As usual, Anti-Climacus adds the
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qualification that no absolute difference exists between this passive level of
despair and the active level of despair Anti-Climacus calls “defiant despair”: “the
opposition is only relative; no despair is entirely without defiance, indeed
defiance is implicit in the very formulation: not wanting to be; while, on the other
hand, some weakness is to be found even in despair’s most extreme defiance”
(SUD:80).
Under the heading “despair of weakness”, Anti-Climacus also discusses
the despair “of the eternal or over oneself” in which the despairer becomes aware
of the weakness of being so attached to earthly enjoyment, but now despairs over
this weakness: “The despairer himself understands that it is weakness to be so
touchy about the earthly, that it is weakness to despair” (SUD:93). Although this
realization is an important step toward overcoming this despair, it is not
sufficient, since one can simply despair over one’s weakness instead of humbling
asking for God’s help in getting rid of it: “instead of now definitely turning away
from despair in the direction of faith, humbling himself before God under his
weakness, he engrosses himself further in despair and despairs over his
weakness” (SUD:93). This is what Anti-Climacus calls the life of “reserve” or
“enclosedness” (Indesluttethed). Here the person despairs over the fact that he
“could have been so weak as to attach such great significance to the earthly” and
so now he withdraws entirely into himself: “our despairer then maintains
sufficient reserve to keep every trespasser, that is, everyone, away from this
matter of the self, while outwardly he is every bit a ‘real person’.” (SUD:95) For
reasons to be explained later, we will defer further analysis of this form of
despair until after our discussion of the next form of despair, that of the active
ethical life.
Rather than avoiding his actual self passively, the ethical person strives to
take active control over his self on the strength of his own self-reliance. The main
pseudonymous advocate for this active ethical life is, of course, Judge Wilhelm.
Yet we should bear in mind that just as the aesthete A represented only one kind
of aesthetic life (the reflective aesthetic “poet-existence”), Judge Wilhelm
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represents just one manifestation of the active ethical life. Anti-Climacus’
analysis of the despair of ‘active defiance’ applies to not only Judge Wilhelm’s
peculiarly existential ethical life, but also the life lived according to more
traditional (e.g. Kantian/Hegelian) forms of ethics from which Judge Wilhelm
wants to distinguish his version of the ethical life (EO II:254).84 Within the active
ethical life we might find the life of commitment to some particular cause or task,
the life of commitment to duty (whether deontological, utilitarian, etc.), and
Judge Wilhelm’s life of commitment to self-development. What these ways of
life have in common is that they all hold the active attainment of ethical well-
being (however this is conceived) as the highest telos. More importantly they all
emphasize the need to attain this highest telos self-reliantly, as a matter of self-
responsibility, autonomy and “sovereignty over oneself.”
What could be wrong with striving for ethical goodness on the strength of
one’s own self-responsibility? For Kierkegaard, what is wrong with this stance
only becomes apparent when we consider what taking responsibility for oneself,
including one’s past, inevitably entails: admitting guilt for at least some past
wrongdoings. The decisive failure and the true despair of every such active
ethical way of life is that it cannot deny guilt, or pretend that guilt is not
important, but neither can it alleviate guilt. Thus, any ethics of self-reliance
stumbles over its inability to deal with the issue of ethical failure effectively.
Anti-Climacus explains that this is because one cannot deal with ethical failure
without coming to the need for forgiveness, and forgiveness lies outside and
beyond the realm of self-reliance.
Yet we should also bear in mind that much of what Judge Wilhelm says
about the best life and the despair of other ways of life is correct, at least if we
take Anti-Climacus as our guide. Like Anti-Climacus, Judge Wilhelm finds that
the failure of the aesthetic life is not the scandalon of pain or boredom, but the
84 The Judge distinguishes both the aesthetic life and his form of the ethical life from “another life-view that
places the meaning of life in living for the performance of duties” where these duties are defined by “a
multiplicity of particular rules” (EO II:254).
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underlying evaluative stance of taking enjoyment as one’s highest telos. The
Judge calls this failure “despair” and understands by this term not only the
collapse of this way of life as a whole, but also the potential corridor toward a
better way of life, a joyful life free of despair (cf. EO II:221-222,228-9). Thus, for
the most part it can be said that Judge Wilhelm understands what despair is and
that the aesthetic way of life is one of despair. However, he misses the fact that
the active ethical life of self-reliance that he advocates is also one of despair.
Nonetheless, there is a central point of disagreement between Anti-
Climacus and Judge Wilhelm about what despair is and why the aesthetic life is
a life of despair. In this difference we find a good introduction to the despair of
the active ethical life. For Judge Wilhelm the despair of the aesthetic life is that it
bases the meaning of life on something beyond and outside of the self, i.e.
beyond the domain of self-reliance. The aesthetic life fails because the attainment
of its highest telos (enjoyment, pleasure, good fortune) does not lie within one’s
own control (EO II:180). In fact, the Judge reads a lack of self-reliance into the
very definition of despair: "every life-view that has a condition outside itself is
despair" (EO II:235). It is precisely on this point that the Judge and Anti-
Climacus disagree. For Anti-Climacus the life of faith has its ‘condition’ outside
of itself and beyond the domain of self-reliance, but it is not a life of despair. To
the contrary, it is the ethical life that is a life of despair, and it is so precisely
because of the ethical person’s unwillingness to surrender his sovereignty over
himself.
Judge Wilhelm claims that anyone who takes possession of himself in
ethical responsibility attains an “inner security” and becomes “infinitely secure
within himself” (EO II:255). This is because the attainment of the ethical
person’s goal (ethical well-being, the fulfillment of commitments, etc.) is always
within the power of his own will. Unlike the aesthetic person, who can only wish
that he will get enjoyment or good fortune from the outside, the ethical person
always finds within his own willpower the ability to attain his goals and the
significance of his life. As the Judge remarks, “the art is not to wish but to will”
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(EO II:252). By holding fast to himself and refusing to surrender sovereignty
over himself, the ethical person can supposedly triumph over any situation: “The
person who lives ethically always has a way out when everything goes against
him; when the darkness of the storm clouds so envelops him that his neighbor
cannot see him, he still has not perished, there is always a point to which he
holds fast, and that point is – himself” (EO II:253). Judge Wilhelm suggests that
one can find significance in one’s life through one’s own will since the “person
who lives ethically knows that what counts is what one sees in each situation,
and the energy with which he considers it” (EO II;252).
But Anti-Climacus suspects that this “inner security” is in fact a deep
insecurity, and that merely self-imposed significance always collapses into
insignificance: “the despairing self is content with taking notice of itself, which is
meant to bestow infinite interest and significance on its enterprises, and which is
exactly what makes them experiments” (SUD:100). The actively defiant person
wants to use his freedom “to rule over himself, or create himself, make this self
the self he wants to be, determine what he will have and what he will not have in
his concrete self” (SUD, 99). The most likely scandalon of this life, according to
Anti-Climacus, is that this person stumbles upon the limits of his ability to rule
over or create himself. One thereby fails to have the self that one wants to have:
“Perhaps, while taking his bearings provisionally from the concrete self, an
experimenting self of this kind, who wants in despair to be himself, stumbles
upon some difficulty or another, something the Christian would call a cross, a
basic fault, whatever that may be” (SUD:101). As always, one common response
to a scandalon in life is to try to ignore it: “The negative self, the infinite form of
the self, may begin by altogether rejecting this, pretending that it is not there,
having nothing to do with it” (SUD:101).
Judge Wilhelm does not exactly ignore this sort of difficulty, but neither
does he accept it for what it is, as a stumbling block to his self-reliant way of life
that cannot be self-reliantly eliminated. He admits that one can make mistakes
or find oneself in situations beyond one’s control, but he insists that the ethical
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person can still deal with these situations self-reliantly: “if he detects that he has
made a mistake, if obstacles are raised that are beyond his control, he does not
lose heart, for he does not surrender sovereignty over himself. He promptly sees
his task and therefore is in action without delay” (EO II:252). But what possible
tasks can a person put into effect in response to a situation that is beyond his
control? Moreover, if a person has made a mistake (especially an ethical mistake)
what possible actions or tasks will rectify this mistake? (As we discussed above,
one can get into a state of guilt self-reliantly, but there is nothing one can do to
get out of guilt self-reliantly.)
For Anti-Climacus, the project of creating oneself can only be fleeting and
illusory since whatever freedom and strength of will is applied to create oneself
is also available to scrap this project and start over again: “The negative form of
the self exerts the loosening as much as the binding power; it can, at any
moment, start quite arbitrarily all over again and, however far an idea is pursued
in practice, the entire action is contained within a hypothesis” (SUD, 100-1).
Here we find a central weakness in the notion of self-reliantly upheld
commitment: it seems that if that which binds you to a commitment is nothing
more than your own willpower, then at every moment this same willpower may
be used as a ‘loosening’ power to abandon this commitment (e.g., if one changes
one’s mind). One can just as easily break as keep a commitment held only by
one’s own self-reliant self-vigilance and willpower. For this reason, Anti-
Climacus thinks that the self-reliant self “is constantly relating to itself only
experimentally, no matter what it undertakes, however great, however amazing
and with whatever perseverance” (SUD, 100). Anti-Climacus sees it as a central
problem with this attempt at self-mastery that the self acknowledges no power
higher than its own decision-making sovereignty: “It recognizes no power over
itself; therefore in the final instance it lacks seriousness and can only conjure
forth the appearance of seriousness, even when it bestows upon its experiments
its greatest possible attention” (SUD, 100).
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A similar challenge to the notion of sovereign autonomy can be found in
Kierkegaard’s journals. Criticizing Kant’s notion of an autonomous person who
“bound himself under the law which he gave himself,” Kierkegaard states: “In a
deeper sense that means to say: lawlessness or experimentation. It is no harder
than the thwacks which Sancho Panza applied to his own bottom. I can no more
be really stricter in A than I am, or than I wish myself to be in B. There must be
some compulsion, if it is to be a serious matter.”85 As a result of this internal
weakness within the life of self-reliance, Anti-Climacus asserts that the attempt
to master or create oneself is only a “fictional” building project in which the self
is “forever building only castles in the air” since within “the whole dialectic in
which it acts there is nothing firm, that is eternally firm” (SUD:100). Anti-
Climacus even refers specifically to the notion of self-mastery and ‘sovereignty’
over oneself as the crux of this despair:
The self is its own master, absolutely (as one says) its own master; and
exactly this is despair, but also what it regards as its pleasure and joy.
But it is easy on closer examination to see that this absolute ruler is a king
without a country, that really he rules over nothing; his position, his
kingdom, his sovereignty, are subject to the dialectic that rebellion is
legitimate at any moment. (SUD:100)
What Anti-Climacus presents here is a powerful critique of self-reliance
and the possibility of sovereignty. This critique applies both to one’s ability to
shape and create oneself and one’s ability to remain committed to particular
projects and promises. (As we shall in discuss a later chapter, this is one of the
most direct and powerful challenges to Nietzsche’s life of the sovereign
individual.) Yet we have not yet fully addressed the despair that underlies this
scandalon of the failure of sovereignty.86 Moreover, if what is said here is to
apply to Judge Wilhelm and the life he advocates, much more will need to be
85 Journals, no. 1041, trans. Drew.
86 I think it is important to note that even if one’s attempts at autonomous self-control and self-formation
were successful, Anti-Climacus would still consider this life to be one of despair. The despair lies in
wanting to be one’s own creator, and this remains whether or not one stumbles upon some scandalon in
trying to be this self-created self.
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said, since the Judge insists quite emphatically that his life of self-sovereignty
should not be confused with an attempt at self-creation (EO II:215, 217, 258, 260,
332). In order to see how the Judge’s life of self-reliant self-responsibility is also
an attempt at self-creation, we will need to confront the deeper failure within this
way of life.
In Anti-Climacus’s analysis, the despair of active defiance matches closely
with the despairing lack of finitude discussed above.87 He states: “In order to
want in despair to be oneself, there must be consciousness of an infinite self.
However, this infinite self is really only the most abstract form of the self, the
most abstract possibility of the self. And it is this self the despairer wants to be,
severing the self from any relation to the power which has established it”
(SUD:99). Wanting to be one’s actual self would involve accepting one’s finite
factual existence along with one’s freedom to attain new possibilities. The
person of active defiance wants to be only a freely choosing self, while eschewing
his finite, factual existence.
As suggested earlier, one of the intended targets of this critique seems to
be Kantian ethics. Anti-Climacus would presumably condemn as despair Kant’s
insistence that we identify ourselves with our purely rational ‘noumenal’ selves.
Aside from the question of whether or not we can ever succeed in acting as a
purely rational self, there is the deeper question of whether we ought to try to be
our purely rational, “disinterested” self to the exclusion of our physical,
“interested,” socially-embedded, particular self. For Anti-Climacus, the attempt
is itself a matter of despair, whether it succeeds or not. It represents a
misrelation to one’s actual self in that one avoids being one’s actual self in
wanting to be just that part of the self one wants to be.
But what about his finite self does Judge Wilhelm, or his ethical hero, not
want to be? Unlike Kant, the Judge believes in an ethics that embraces the full
breadth of a person’s finitude. But there is one aspect of his finitude that the
87 Although the two typologies of despair overlap at points such as this one, in general there is no neat
correlation between the two.
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Judge does not squarely face as a matter of finitude, namely his guilt. It is not
that the Judge pretends to be free of guilt, but rather that he treats his guilt as
something within the domain of his freedom (something he can deal with self-
reliantly, as a ‘task’) rather than as something firmly in the domain of his finitude
(and beyond his own powers to eliminate). True, in committing the act of
wrongdoing the agent acts freely, and thus he becomes responsible for the free
commission of this act. But thereafter the guilt of this wrongdoing is no longer
within the domain of a person’s freedom. Judge Wilhelm believes that one can
take possession of oneself ethically, by assuming responsibility for one’s whole
life, and can thereby reside in the “inner security” of a self-reliant life. But as we
mentioned in the first chapter, the more one takes the notion of responsibility
seriously, including responsibility for one’s past, the more one comes to
understand that one is guilty of at least some past actions and is therefore guilty
per se (guilty in the qualitative sense Climacus discusses).88
The ethical life strives for ethical goodness and promises this goodness to
anyone who genuinely takes responsibility for his or her life. But it thereby
sows the seeds of its own internal collapse, since accepting this responsibility
means accepting oneself as ethically guilty rather than ethically good. Having
brought one to the realization of guilt, ethics can do no more, since it lies beyond
the power of ethics to annul this guilt. (Taking responsibility for guilt does not
thereby annul it, nor does any amount of good deeds in the present and future.)
Therefore, anyone who takes his ethical goodness seriously, as the highest telos,
inevitably finds that he has already failed according to this very criterion. This is
the internal collapse of the ethical life.89
88 Although Nietzsche wants to abolish the notion of guilt proposed here, he is also sensitive to the problem
of an intractable past for the project of creating oneself: “’It was’: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and
most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of
all things past” (Z:2 “Of Redemption”).
89 It seems that for Kierkegaard as well as Nietzsche, the ethical life is a kind of trap: it seems to promise
goodness, but instead always issues a guilty verdict. As we will discuss in the final two chapters, the
difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on this point is that Kierkegaard takes this guilt seriously, as
an actuality, and seeks redemption from it in the Christian notion of forgiveness. In contrast Nietzsche
considers this guilt to be merely a psychological sickness, one promoted by the (Pauline) Christian notion of
forgiveness, and Nietzsche seeks redemption from it in the self-overcoming of the ascetic instincts and
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Moreover, by insisting on self-reliance, the ethical person refuses what
Kierkegaard finds to be the only possible solution to this failure of the ethical life:
forgiveness. Judge Wilhelm admits that he is guilty, but he seems to assume that
one can simply repent and then gain one’s life back again happily without ever
having to leave the safe confines of self-reliance. Yet between repentance and the
joyful life must come forgiveness, and forgiveness cannot come from oneself.
Forgiveness must always be help from the outside, and this means that accepting
forgiveness must mean surrendering precisely that “sovereignty over oneself”
that Judge Wilhelm refuses to surrender. This is why Johannes de Silentio
believes that any “ethics that ignores sin is an altogether futile discipline, but
once it postulates sin it has eo ipso gone beyond itself” (FT:124) As discussed in
the first chapter, in a footnote Johannes de Silentio explains that: “once sin makes
its appearance ethics comes to grief precisely on the question of repentance.
Repentance is the highest ethical expression but for that very reason the most
profound ethical self-contradiction” (FT: 124fn). Self-reliant action can lead one
into a state of guilt and, at most, to the repentance of this guilt. Beyond this one
cannot go on one’s own. Genuine repentance exhausts the whole domain of
self-reliance and still leaves the self in a state of guilt. Thus, the domain of self-
reliant ethics contains its problem (ethical failure), but it does not contain the
solution to this problem (forgiveness).90 Repentance is the highest that ethical
self-reliance can attain, but in genuinely repenting one admits the limitations and
failure of what can be achieved self-reliantly; it is in this sense that repentance is
a “profound self-contradiction” for ethics. In order to gain the joyful life the
Judge imagines on the other side of repentance, one must surrender sovereignty
over oneself in asking for help.
ideals. Both treat guilt as a central problem requiring a radical “redemption” but they strongly disagree on
the nature of this guilt and what its redemption entails.
90 The basis of the “inner security” of the ethical life was supposed to be the defensive wall of self-reliance
that is constructed around the self. Ironically, these efforts only intensify the crisis for the ethical person,
since they only serve to shut in the problem while shutting out the solution to this problem.
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Another aspect of the despair of the active ethical life is self-deception.
The Judge wants the entire matter of his own ethical status to be within his
control, and he begins by wanting to be judge over himself. Oddly, Judge
Wilhelm addresses the obvious worry here, self-deception, even within his
proposal to judge himself. He accuses the aesthete of self-deception, but thinks
he has found a self-reliant way of preventing it in his own life:
I am not ignorant of how deceitful one’s own heart is, how easy it is to
deceive oneself [...]. So when I have encountered something in life,
when I have decided on something that I was afraid would take on
another aspect for me in the course of time, when I have done
something I was afraid I would interpret differently in the course of
time, I often wrote down briefly and clearly what it was that I wanted
or what it was that I had done and why. Then when I felt that I
needed it, when my decision of my action was not as vivid to me, I
would take out my charter and judge myself (EO II:197, my emphasis).
The claim to effectively rule out self-deception by taking careful note of
oneself is patently absurd, since it ignores the fact that there may be self-
deception even in this act of self-vigilance.91 Self-reliant self-vigilance would
require a transparency about one’s self that the Judge admits is impossible: "no
human being can become transparent to himself" (EO II:190). Yet what is truly
despairing and defiant in this claim is the presumption that one could be the judge
of oneself, that one could keep the entire matter of one’s ethical status entirely
within the sphere of one’s own judgment.
Here we see the full extent to which Judge Wilhelm’s ethical life
involves self-creation. Judge Wilhelm acknowledges that the self does not create
itself ex nihilo, that it is not self-established in this sense. But in the life he
advocates, taking possession of this given self on the basis of self-reliant self-
responsibility entails that one tries to close the loop of self-relation that is the self.
In living the active ethical life, one wants to be one’s self, not as one’s actual self
91 Self-deception seems to be the only explanation for how the genuine admission of guilt Judge Wilhelm
claims for the ethical life is also consistent with the sense of self-secured, “inner security and serenity” that
the Judge also claims for the ethical life.
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(i.e. including a relation to God) but as a closed loop, a self-sufficient, self-
enclosed entity. In relating to oneself, one wants to relate only to oneself; one
does not want to relate to God. Specifically, the ethical self does not want to
relate to God with respect to that which the ethical person holds to be within his
domain of self-reliance, i.e. his ethical status.
But for Anti-Climacus ethical status is always something one has ‘before
God,’ since part of what it means that the self is ‘established by God’ as a free self
is that God continues to be both judge and redeemer with respect to one’s ethical
status. Even an ethical person who takes his guilt very seriously, as Judge
Wilhelm appears to do, still fails to face the full import of this guilt: that it is
‘before God,’ that it is in some sense against God. Also, such a person does not
acknowledge that this stance against and away from God is a stance against and
away from one’s actual self, since one’s actual self is not a self-established, self-
enclosed entity. Here we see how the person who wants to be a self-reliant,
autonomous self in fact attempts to create a self that he is not (while avoiding the
self that he actually is.)
The last way of life to discuss in relation to its despair is what I have
broadly called “the life of resignation.” This includes the life of Fear and
Trembling’s ‘knight of resignation’ and the life of “renunciation,” “suffering,” and
“the totality of guilt-consciousness” described by Climacus in the Postscript as
‘religiousness A’ in contrast to Christianity, “religiousness B” (PS:559). In Fear
and Trembling this stance of resignation is considered without respect to the issue
of guilt; there, this resignation was not a repentance for guilt but a renunciation
of the earthly and temporal. What is called “resignation” in Fear and Trembling
corresponds to the “renunciation” part of religiousness A. Climacus’ further
discussion of ‘religiousness A’ reveals what the stance of resignation entails in
relation to the issue of guilt. One might say that the “renunciation” and
“suffering” of religiousness A are resignation with respect to earthly things and
the “guilt-consciousness” of this life is resignation with respect to guilt. What
defines what I have called “the life of resignation” is an overall existential stance
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in which one admits some fault, whether earthly or moral, but one insists on
resigning oneself to this fault, refusing all help in order to cling to self-reliance
and the supposedly secure domain of ‘sovereignty over oneself’.
There is a proper place for both forms of resignation (renunciation and
repentance) in the life of faith, but only when this initial step of renunciation is
coupled with an openness to external help in which one surrenders self-reliance.
Thus, Kierkegaard’s critique is not aimed at resignation or repentance per se, but
rather at the life of resignation or repentance in which these become central and
are not coupled with an openness to outside help. Those living the life of
resignation take up the task of repentance or resignation as another form of self-
reliant achievement, rather than as the furthest expression and exhaustion of self-
reliance. If we compare the active ethical life with the “ethico-religious” life of
resignation, we see a continuation of a familiar pattern: within a level of despair,
one form of despair tries to ignore this despair while another tries to deal with
the despair according to the despairing categories. As explained in chapter one, I
think we can understand both the active ethical person and the resigned person
as living different forms of “the ethical life,” broadly construed, in that they both
uphold self-reliance (what Climacus calls the domain of ‘the immanent’) as the
central stance defining their lives. But whereas the active ethical person tries to
ignore the despair of this life, the person of resignation attempts to deal with this
despair of self-reliance without abandoning self-reliance. Just as the immediate
person despaired by having enjoyment as his “peculiar” attachment and “that
which for the immediate person is his whole life,” the person of resignation
despairs by wanting repentance or resignation to be his whole life. In contrast,
the person of faith repents and resigns himself infinitely, but he has his life in the
grateful joy of forgiveness and loving trust in God. The person of faith has his
central ‘condition’ outside himself, in what God can provide, not within himself
in what he can self-reliantly achieve. Most fundamentally, the life of resignation
is a life of resigned refusal of help, and this is what distinguishes it from
resignation as it occurs within the life of faith.
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Kierkegaard works out this contrast in detail in discourses such as The
Woman Who Was a Sinner and Two Discourses at Communion on Friday. Here
Kierkegaard discusses the despairing sorrow over one’s sins and the kind of
sorrow over sins that is integral to faith: one in which the highest telos is always
finding forgiveness (WA:150-1). He associates self-torment with Judas and
makes clear that neither “self-torment” nor “passionate self-accusation” bring
one closer to God or are pleasing to God. They are instead sinfully
presumptuous in that they imply that one can do something with regard to finding
forgiveness (WA:155-6). In The Sickness Unto Death, the despair of this life of
resignation is discussed in a cluster of related forms of despair.92
Anti-Climacus explores different manifestations of the stance of resigned
refusal of help. Like his pseudonymous predecessors, he differentiates these
forms of refusal according to whether this help consists of aid with some earthly
difficulty or the forgiveness of sins. With respect to the former, he discusses the
despair of “reserve” or “self-enclosedness” (Indesluttethed) mentioned above, the
despair of “resignation,” and the despair of “passive defiance.” In the second
part of the book, which deals specifically with the issue of despair as sin, we find
parallel manifestations of despair as they are applied to the issue of sin, e.g.
“despairing of forgiveness” and “despairing over one’s sin.”
In general, these ways of rejecting help can come in three forms: out of a
pretense that you don’t need help, out of a prideful refusal to accept help, and
out of a spiteful demand not to be helped. The person resigned to earthly
difficulties pretends not to need help with these difficulties just as the person
who despairs of forgiveness pretends not to need forgiveness. The person of
despairing self-enclosedness holds against himself his weakness in being
92 One possible explanation for why the discussion of this form of despair is so extensive and appears in so
many places throughout The Sickness Unto Death is that this is precisely the form of despair Kierkegaard
finds within himself. We know from his journals that he was struggling with his “reserve” and that he was
searching for an understanding of forgiveness that was not simply a relapse back into “resignation” (cf.
Journals trans. Hannay, 11 May 48 VIII I A 649). So The Sickness Unto Death can be read as an extended
confession on his part. Yet, being Kierkegaard, he feels the need to urge a confession from everyone else as
well. As we will discuss at the end of this chapter, Kierkegaard’s thinking here provides a useful internal
critique that can be applied to his own works when he does in fact relapse back into resignation.
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attached to earthly things just as the person who despairs over his sins holds his
sins against himself, presumptuously refusing divine forgiveness because he
refuses to forgive himself. The person of passive defiance spitefully clings to his
“basic fault” or earthly difficulty, and refuses help. As this spite intensifies into
hatred of existence, it becomes “demonic despair.”93 Likewise, as despair over
one’s sin intensifies it also become more and more “demonic” in its refusal of
forgiveness. In what follows we will attempt to trace the connections between
the forms of despair Anti-Climacus sketches in these various discussions.
In a footnote to the passage on passive defiance, Anti-Climacus backtracks
a little and discusses resignation as a form of despair that is between defiance
and weakness. As we have just mentioned, there is a proper place for resignation
as part of a life of faith, when resignation includes a surrender of self-reliance
and an openness to outside help. But when one refuses to go beyond
resignation out of a reluctance to surrender self-reliance, this constitutes a form
of despair. Anti-Climacus points out that “much in the world that glories in the
name of resignation is a kind of despair: the despair of wanting in despair to be
one’s abstract self” (SUD:102fn). Specifically, one wants to be an abstract self
that has “in the eternal everything one needs, thus being able to defy or ignore
suffering in the earthly and temporal” (102fn). One tries to avoid one’s suffering
by “consoling oneself with the fact that this thing may disappear in eternity and
so feeling justified in not taking it on in time. Although the self suffers under it
[whatever it is], the self does not want to admit that it belongs to the self, that is,
will not in faith humble itself under it” (102fn).
Like the despair of active defiance, this form of despair matches the
despairing lack of finitude discussed previously in that one attempts to flee into
an abstraction in order to avoid being one’s actual, finite self. The difference
between despairing resignation and despairing active defiance is that in
resignation one at least does not pretend to have already dealt with the problem
93 Kierkegaard uses the term “demonic” in slightly different ways throughout his works, but in general it
means a conscious, willed refusal or avoidance of what one knows to be good.
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facing the self. The resigned person does not pretend to able to include the
problem in his domain of self-reliance; rather, he pretends to be able to exclude
the problem from the whole domain of his self. Thus Anti-Climacus places
resignation somewhere between the forms of despair of wanting to be oneself
and the forms of despair of not wanting to be oneself: “Resignation, considered
as despair, is thus essentially different from wanting in despair not to be itself,
for it wants in despair to be itself, though with the exception of one thing, in
respect of which in despair it does not want to be itself” (SUD:102fn).
A parallel flight into abstraction can be found with respect to guilt. In his
discussion of those who “despair of forgiveness,” Anti-Climacus discusses those
who reject the notion of forgiveness because they identify themselves with some
abstraction in which the notion of sin is excluded. This can happen either out of
conformist identification with the abstraction of “the crowd” or through
reflective detachment in which one identifies oneself with some abstract idea of
the “generation” or the human race as a whole. Most common are those who
“merge in what Aristotle terms the animal category – the crowd” in order to
avoid their actual self in this “abstraction” (SUD:151). Anti-Climacus thinks this
abstraction of ‘the crowd’ excludes any real notion of sin because we are each
sinners as individuals ‘before God.’ When faced directly, the doctrine of sin “the
doctrine that you and I are sinners” singles each person out as an individual and
“unconditionally splits up ‘the crowd’” (SUD:154). But Anti-Climacus finds that
most people refuse to be split off from the crowd in this way. A despairing
person of this kind does not reject forgiveness because he finds himself innocent
as an individual person, but because he refuses to be an individual altogether.
This resistance to the individuation of Christianity is part of what Anti-
Climacus calls “offense,” a concept that he develops in this section and then at
length in Practice in Christianity. This offended refusal of individuation is
something Anti-Climacus finds at the very heart of Christendom: “the real
situation of Christendom is despair of the forgiveness of sins. But this has to be
grasped in the sense that Christendom is so far behind that its situation is not
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even apparent to it. People have not even arrived at the consciousness of sin”
(SUD:150). With the help of abstractions, people who refuse to face their guilt as
individuals even come to interpret their complacent sense of security as
consciousness of the forgiveness of their sins: “they go on to imagine that this
security is – yes, it cannot be otherwise in Christendom – that it is consciousness
of the forgiveness of sins, a belief which receives every encouragement from the
priest” (SUD:150). Likewise, Anti-Climacus finds that the abstraction of ‘the
crowd’ leads those in Christendom to appropriate the Christian doctrine of the
God-man in a despairing way:
Once people are allowed to merge in what Aristotle terms the animal
category – the crowd, then this abstraction [i.e. the crowd] (instead of being
less than nothing, less than the least significant individual human being)
becomes regarded as some thing. And then it isn’t long before this
abstraction becomes God. And then philosophice, the doctrine of the God-
man comes true. (SUD:151)
Without exculpating those whose conformist desires to merge with ‘the
crowd’ avoid and distort Christianity in this way, Anti-Climacus also blames
intellectuals who propagate such abstractions: “Understandably, many of the
philosophers who were involved in propagating this doctrine of the superiority
of the generation over the individual turn away in disgust when their teaching
has sunk to the level where the mob is the God-man” (SUD:151). Nonetheless,
Anti-Climacus insists that the despair is the same whether it is the elite
intelligensia or the crowd who distorts and avoids Christianity through these
abstractions: “But these philosophers forget that this nonetheless is their
teaching, that it was not more true when accepted in the best circles, when the
elite of the best circles, or a select circle of philosophers, was the incarnation”
(SUD:151).
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Another form this offense against Christianity can take, whether in the
abstract thought of an intellectual elite or in the worldly wisdom of ‘the crowd’,
is the direct rejection of the concept of the forgiveness of sins. Anti-Climacus
admits that this concept is the most paradoxical thought possible (SUD:132). He
therefore finds it understandable that those who cling to worldly wisdom or
rational ethical philosophy reject this concept, but he insists that this is
nonetheless what is demanded of the individual Christian: “it requires an
equally remarkable spiritlessness not to be offended by the very idea that sin can
be forgiven. For a human understanding that is the most impossible thing of all
– not that I should extol the inability to believe it as a mark of genius, for it shall
be believed” (SUD:149). Many try to avoid this command by clinging to the
abstractions of rational ethical thought or worldly wisdom, i.e. by clinging to
self-reliance in matters of thought. Here Anti-Climacus finds defiance
beginning to manifest itself: “When the sinner despairs of the forgiveness of sins,
it is almost as though he were directly putting pressure on God. There is
something almost of the dialogue in this, ‘No, there’s no forgiveness of sins, it’s
an impossibility.’ It has the appearance of a brawl” (SUD:147). Anti-Climacus
later states: “Despair of the forgiveness of sins is a definite position directly
opposed to an offer of divine compassion; sin is now not wholly in retreat, not
merely defensive” (SUD:158).
As this defiance increases, it moves toward what Anti-Climacus calls ‘the
demonic’, which is the most conscious and therefore the most open defiance of
God’s help. But before reaching this point, the despairing self may instead want
to close itself up with its sin or earthly difficulty out of judgmental anger or spite
against itself (rather than out of the spiteful hatred against God and all of
existence that marks the demonic.) This approach we find in the stance of
“reserve” or “enclosedness” already discussed, in which a person holds it against
himself that he could be so attached to earthly things and now withdraws
entirely into himself. Anti-Climacus says of this person: “As a father disinherits
a son, the self will not acknowledge itself after it has been so weak. Despairingly
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it is unable to forget that weakness; somehow it hates itself, it will not humble
itself in faith under its weakness in order to win itself back” (SUD:93). This
person ‘hates himself’ out of a self-righteous judgment of himself, but he will not
“humble himself” by surrendering this power to judge and condemn himself. At
the heart of this seemingly laudable sternness with oneself, Anti-Climacus finds
a despairing form of pride: “as if it was not pride that put such immense
emphasis on the weakness, as though it wasn’t because he wanted to be proud of
his own self that he found this consciousness of his own weakness unbearable”
(SUD:96).
In what Anti-Climacus calls “despair over one’s sins” we find a parallel
stance with respect to guilt. Here one holds one’s sins against oneself and
refuses forgiveness out of a self-righteous insistence on the right to judge and
condemn oneself. Just as reserve was an insistence on being shut in within
oneself in self-judgment, despair over sin is an insistence on being shut in within
oneself with one’s guilt, even to the point of rejecting the ‘good’ of forgiveness:
“it wants to listen only to itself, to have to do only with itself, be shut in with
itself, yes, place itself inside one enclosure more and by despairing over sin
protect against every assault or aspiration of the good” (SUD:142). Anti-
Climacus notes that “it is supposed to be the sign of a deep nature which
therefore takes its sin so much to heart,” but in reality it represents a dangerous
slide deeper into sin and despair:
No, this despair over sin, and especially the more it rages in the
passionate expression that (as he least expects) betrays him in saying
never will he ‘forgive’ himself for having thus sinned (for this way of
talking is close to being the opposite of a contrite heart that prays to God
for forgiveness) – this, his despair over sin, very far from being a
specification of the good, is a heightened specification of sin, the
intensity of which is a deeper absorption of sin. (SUD:144)
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As with reserve, Anti-Climacus finds it a matter of “hidden self-love and
pride” that one clings to self-judgment and self-righteousness by insisting on the
right to judge oneself (SUD:145). Just as there is a close connection between
reserve and ‘the demonic’ (SUD:98), Anti-Climacus finds that this self-enclosed
stance of penitence requires “utmost powers of the demonic “ and involves a
“demonic withdrawal into itself”: “It is a step forward, a heightening of the
demonic, and of course a deeper absorption in sin. It is an attempt to give to sin
some backbone and engagement as a power by its being now for ever decided to
hear nothing of repentance, nothing of grace” (SUD:142,3). This rejection of
genuine repentance and the possibility of grace (forgiveness) can even be found
in one who does not presumptuously pretend to judge himself. Anti-Climacus
discusses the person who sinks into the “darkest melancholy” over his sins but
who “does not say, ‘I can never forgive myself’ (as though he had perhaps
previously forgiven himself for his sins – a blasphemy); no, he says that God can
never forgive him his sin” (SUD:145). Anti-Climacus finds this person “still
more deceptive in his talk” since he pretends to open himself to God’s judgment,
but in reality he only accepts the judgment he wants to have. What is despairing
in the “despair over one’s sin” remains the same: a repentance that closes itself
off to forgiveness and thereby defies God’s help out of a despairing sense of
pride and self-righteousness.
As this “heightening of the demonic” continues, this self-righteous pride
gives way to a resentful spite. Unlike resignation, what Anti-Climacus calls the
despair of “passive defiance” does not involve wanting to be an abstract self
located safely beyond this ‘basic fault’. Nor does the person of passive defiance
reject help out of a misplaced sense of righteous self-severity. Rather, the person
of passive defiance wants out of spite to keep his faults as an inextricable part of
himself: “he wants to spite or defy all existence and be himself with it, take it
along with him, almost flying in the face of his agony” (SUD:102). This person
acknowledges the problem and does not pretend to be able to remove it by
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himself, but he still wants to have sovereignty over himself and over the problem
by insisting that it remain a part of himself. Anti-Climacus explains:
[N]ot being willing to have hope in the possibility of the removal of an
earthly need, a temporal cross, is also a form of despair. That is what the
despairer who wants in despair to be himself is not willing to do. If he is
convinced (whether it is really the case or his suffering only makes it
seem to be so) that this thorn in the flesh gnaws too deeply for him to be
able to abstract from it, then he wants, as it were, to take eternal
possession of it. It offends him, or rather, he uses it as an excuse to take
offense at all existence (SUD: 101-2)
In comparison with the person who wants to be himself in active defiance,
the passively defiant person has a higher degree of consciousness about what his
self is, especially about its faults. But he still considers the whole matter of these
faults to be something within his own domain of self-reliance. Instead of the
overly optimistic dream of self-reliant success we found in the active ethical life,
we now find the bitterly cynical resignation to failure. Instead of the hopeful
pretense of being a flawless self, we now have the spiteful demand to be one’s
flawed self. There is still a pretentious attempt at self-creation here, in that one
claims for oneself the ability to have the self one prefers. But the stance of
spiteful resentment and “offense at all existence” marks a much darker and
more twisted form of ‘wanting to be oneself.’
What is fundamentally defiant in this stance is that one refuses to ask for
help and to have hope of help.94 This person is resigned to a life of suffering
under this fault and he has committed himself to this fate even to the point of
refusing help: “Have hope in the possibility of help, especially on the strength of
the absurd, that for God everything is possible? No, that he will not. And ask
help of any other? No, that for all the world he will not do; if it came to that, he
94 In condemning the stance of spiteful resentment against existence, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are in
agreement, even if the basis of this condemnation is quite different in each case. As we will see in the next
chapter, Nietzsche understands such resentment to be much more widespread than Kierkegaard does. In
the fifth chapter, we will explain how one central critique Nietzsche can levy against Kierkegaard’s life of
faith is that it still represents a form of resentment, despite Kierkegaard’s attempts to differentiate faith from
resentment.
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would rather be himself with all the torments of hell than ask for help” (SUD:
102).
It may seem unclear or even psychologically untenable that a person who
was suffering would refuse to help in relieving this suffering, but Anti-Climacus
points out that this is sometimes nonetheless the case: “And to tell the truth, it is
by no means so true, as is said, that is self-evident that a sufferer will ask for help
as long as someone can help him” (SUD:102). One explanation for why a
sufferer would refuse help is that this help may not come in the form that he
wants it have. Anti-Climacus notes that “someone suffering has usually one or
more ways in which he could wish to be helped,” but often the help one gets (or
the help one really needs) does not match with the help one would prefer to have
(SUD:102). As we have seen, someone suffering from a stumbling block does not
want to abandon the despairing pursuit of his highest telos, but desires only that
the stumbling block removed such that he can continue to pursue this telos. Even
if the despairing person who wants to control what he will have in his self opens
himself up to outside help, he still insists on controlling the kind of help he gets.
In other words, he wants to continue to cling to self-reliance even in asking for
help. The metaphor of physical sickness helps to illustrate this point: someone
suffering from painful symptoms may go to a doctor hoping the doctor will
simply alleviate the painful symptoms, but often the help the doctor has to offer
involves an increase of pain and suffering in order to cure the patient of the
underlying disease. Opening oneself up to the help of others involves accepting
a kind of vulnerability and lack of control that someone who lives for self-
reliance may fiercely resist. Another reason a sufferer might refuse help is a kind
of pride which does not want to humble itself in asking for and receiving this
help:
especially when the help is to come from a superior, or the most exalted
of all – then comes this humiliation of having to receive unconditional
help, in whatever form, of becoming like a nothing in the hands of the
‘helper’ for whom everything is possible, or even just of having to give in
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to some other person, to give up being oneself as long as one is asking for
help” (SUD:103).95
What is offensive to the proudly self-reliant person is the need to accept
help from the outside and to accept this help in whatever form it comes, rather
than as he would have it.96 This person finds significance in being able to suffer
alone, without the need of help, and would therefore much rather continue to
suffer than surrender sovereignty over himself: “Indeed, there is much, even
prolonged and agonizing suffering in this way of which the self does not
complain, and which it therefore fundamentally prefers so as to retain the right
to be itself” (SUD:103).
As this spiteful self-enclosure intensifies into outright hatred of existence,
we find the final “heightening of the demonic.” Demonic despair is not so much
a new form of despair as the terminus in a progression toward more and more
conscious defiance. We have already explained the “heightening of the demonic”
in relation to despairing over one’s sin. Anti-Climacus also discusses demonic
despair with respect to earthly faults and difficulties, as the demonic extreme of
passive defiance:
It usually beings like this: A self which in despair wants to be himself,
suffers some kind of pain which cannot be removed or separated from
his concrete self. He then heaps upon this torment all his passion, which
then becomes a demonic rage. If it should now happen that God in
heaven and all the angels were to offer to help him to be rid of this
torment – no, he does not want that, now it is too late. Once he would
gladly have given everything to be rid of this agony, but he was kept
waiting, and now all that’s past; he prefers to rage against everything
and be the one whom the whole world, all existence, has wronged, the
one for whom it is especially important to ensure that he has his agony
95 In this passage and in the passage preceding it Anti-Climacus alludes to the possibility that this “help” can
come from other people as well as God. Broadly speaking, it seems that the fundamental stance of defiance
as self-reliant refusal of help could be a refusal of human or divine help, whether this help be ‘aid’ in
temporal matters or forgiveness of ethical failings. Although this may not be compatible with Kierkegaard’s
specifically Christian outlook (cf. SUD:155), philosophically it is interesting and valuable to consider the
broader applications of this idea.
96 Nietzsche examines this same psychological phenomenon of humiliation from the other side, discussing
the power relations between the one who pities and the one pitied, e.g. in The Gay Science §13.
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on hand, so that no one will take it from him – for then he would not be
able to convince others and himself that he is right. (SUD:103)
We see here a new form of self-righteousness. It is not the self-deceiving
self-righteousness of active defiance, but neither is it the self-condemning self-
righteousness that we discussed earlier in relation to “reserve” and “despairing
over one’s sins.” Here the person wants to be ‘in the right’ as one who all of
existence has wronged. He sees his rage and hatred against existence as justified,
and he avoids external help because this would deprive him of what he
considers his moral superiority over others and over the whole world: “he is
afraid in case it should take away from him what, from a demonic viewpoint,
gives him infinite superiority over other people, what, from the demonic
viewpoint, is his right to be who he is” (SUD:103). Rather than hating and
condemning himself in presumptuous self-judgment, this person presumes to
judge the worth of existence in toto. Specifically, he wants condemn the whole of
existence out of resentment against his flawed self: “Rebelling against all
existence, it thinks it has acquired evidence against existence, against its
goodness. The despairer thinks that he himself is this evidence. And it is this
that he wants to be; this is the reason he wants to be himself, to be himself in his
agony, so as to protest with this agony against all existence” (SUD:105). Here we
see in what way this form of despair is a way of wanting to be oneself: this
demonic self “wants to be itself in hatred toward existence” (SUD:105).97
The attempt to secure self-righteousness in the life of resignation fares no
better than the attempt to do so in the active ethical life. Refusal of outside help,
which is meant to be the strength of the self-reliant approach to life, instead
becomes its downfall. Most problematically, the problem of guilt that
‘shipwrecked’ Judge Wilhelm’s active ethical life remains unsolved in the ethico-
religious life of resignation. In fact, it is intensified and exacerbated in the refusal
of forgiveness. The structure of internal collapse within the active ethical life
97 This resentment and condemnation of existence as a whole matches quite closely with what Nietzsche calls
ressentiment.
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(that holding self-reliantly achieved ethical goodness as the highest telos only
reveals an ethical guilt that one cannot self-reliantly annul) is repeated and
intensified in the life of resignation. Here one strives for a different kind of self-
reliantly achieved goodness – the goodness of repenting fully. But in clinging to
this self-reliance one in fact fails to repent fully, since true repentance includes a
surrender of self-reliance and an openness to forgiveness.98
§3 DESPAIR AS A ‘CORRIDOR TO FAITH’
Having discussed the despairing ‘internal collapse’ of these different ways
of life, we are now in a position to discuss the more positive aspect of despair:
despair as part of a transition to a better way of life, what Anti-Climacus calls
despair as a “corridor to faith” (SUD:98). One of the most mysterious things
within all of Kierkegaard’s thought is how a person can make a transition out of
a despairing way of life and into a way of life free of despair. This transition is
what Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms call a “metamorphosis,” a
“transfiguration,” or (as is commonly ascribed) a “leap.” Some things about this
transition simply cannot be explained theoretically; as we’ve seen, the life
beyond despair is a life beyond self-reliance in both action and thought.
Importantly, one cannot be convinced to abandon a despairing stance toward life
through arguments; one must be convinced by the failures within one’s own life
to abandon this stance. Perhaps all that can be said about Kierkegaard’s
mysterious notion of a transition to a better way of life is something about how
despair can prepare the way for its opposite.
Yet such a transition is also one of the most important things to consider,
since for Kierkegaard a transition or “metamorphosis” out of despair is the most
important thing, the ‘one thing needful’ for any actual person. (The really
pressing question confronting any actual person is not ‘what is the nature of my
98 This conception of a true repentance within faith that is coupled by a grateful and joyful acceptance of
forgiveness, in contrast to a resigned repentance which does not open itself to forgiveness, is the central idea
in Kierkegaard’s 1850 An Upbuilding Discourse “The Woman Who Was a Sinner” (WA:145-160).
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despair?’ but ‘how do I get out of despair?’) Part of what makes such a transition
mysterious is that it would need to involve a fundamental change both of one’s
highest values and the way one relates to these values. But how could such a
fundamental change take place? What could convince someone to abandon
something she holds as her highest value, as that in which she ‘has her whole
life’? It may seem that this sort of fundamental evaluative shift is simply an
impossibility.
It is in response to this quandary that an understanding of despair as a
path out of despair becomes so important. In order to become free of despair the
collapsing power of despair must be utilized to break down the despairing
evaluative stance, thereby beginning a transition to a better way of life. Both
Judge Wilhelm and Anti-Climacus are in agreement about this possibility and its
importance. Anti-Climacus talks about the possibility of a “despair which is the
corridor to faith” and indicates that the person of faith is always “saved through
having been in despair” (SUD: 98, 54, 57). Judge Wilhelm discusses a
“metamorphosis” or “transfiguration” made possible by despair and declares
that “despair is a person’s true salvation” (EO II:221). Although Anti-Climacus
declares at the beginning of The Sickness Unto Death that this work will deal
solely with despair as the sickness within the self, not as the remedy for this
sickness, he insists that we keep this positive role of despair in mind: “That there
is this dialectical aspect (even if this work only treats despair as a sickness) must
never be forgotten; it is implicit in despair’s being also the first element in faith”
(SUD:36, 149fn). The “dialectical aspect” of despair is that it can be both
something extremely negative (the entire collapse of one’s way of life) and
something positive (an opportunity for a transition to better way of life). Despite
disclaimers that The Sickness Unto Death treats despair only as a sickness and not
a cure, the book contains several interesting indications of what this positive role
of despair might be like. By looking at these passages together with what Judge
Wilhelm says on the subject, we can get a rough idea of how despair makes
possible a metamorphosis to a life free of despair.
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Anti-Climacus and Judge Wilhelm both claim that such a transition out of
despair utilizes despair as a necessary condition. Anti-Climacus says that “the
self is only healthy and free from despair when, precisely by having despaired, it is
grounded transparently in God” (SUD:60, my emphasis). He also says that the
“infinite gain” of becoming transparent to oneself as a self ‘before God’ “is never
come by except through despair” (SUD:57). Judge Wilhelm declares that those
who do not despair “have no presentiment of a metamorphosis” and thus “any
human being who has not tasted the bitterness of despair has fallen short of the
meaning of life” (EO II:190,208). But both Anti-Climacus and Judge Wilhelm
also emphasize that the mere presence of despair is not sufficient for this
metamorphosis to take place. A way of life that is already inwardly collapsing
must be torn down completely in order for a new way of life to be able to emerge.99
This can only be done through despair, but a “half-hearted” or partial despair
will not suffice to bring a person out of despair. As Judge Wilhelm warns, “it is a
matter of how he despairs” (EO II:221).
We have seen many cases in which a person simply resides in a despairing
life, ignoring or misunderstanding this despair. Alternately, as we have seen in
the case of reflective immediacy and despairing resignation, a person may have a
good idea of the despair of a way of life but may try to deal with it without
abandoning the despairing way of life altogether. Thus, Judge Wilhelm says of
the reflective aesthetic life that it is "the result of a despair that was not carried
through, the result of the soul's continuing to quake in despair and of the spirit's
inability to achieve its true transfiguration” (EO II:210). Likewise, Anti-Climacus
criticizes the life of resignation for refusing to abandon self-reliance; he insists
that “for repentance to emerge, a person must first despair with a vengeance,
despair to the full, so that the life of spirit can break through from the ground
up” (SUD:90-1). Judge Wilhelm labels these cases of “despair over a particular”
99 As we will discuss in the next chapter, Nietzsche makes a similar point with respect to values in talking
about the need to ‘push what is already falling.’
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or “finite despair” in contrast to what he calls “authentic despair”100: “if I will my
despair in a finite sense, then I damage my soul, for then my innermost being
does not attain the breakthrough in despair; it locks itself in” (EO II:222).
What way of despairing can “attain the breakthrough in despair,” and
what does this “breakthrough” entail? The answer to these questions seems to
reside in the familiar pattern of giving oneself up in order to regain oneself, a
pattern that figures centrally Christian doctrine and recurs frequently in
Kierkegaard’s thinking. We have seen this pattern already in Judge Wilhelm’s
notion of repenting oneself in order to regain oneself and in Johannes de
Silentio’s notion of the “movement” of resignation followed by a “movement” of
faith in which one regains what has been given up in resignation. Anti-
Climacus finds the same pattern in the kind of despair that can be a “corridor”
out of despair: “The despair which is the corridor to faith is also due to the help
of the eternal; through the eternal the self has the courage to lose itself in order to
win itself” (SUD:98).
Despair can help here because despair is that power by which one loses
oneself. Specifically, what despair can help to break down are the pretension or
evasions which constitute the despairing misrelation to oneself. As we have
seen, despair tends to manifest itself in a scandalon in which one fails to attain or
evade whatever one despairingly wants to attain or evade. In this way, the
despair within a way of life manifests itself as a prompt to face the failure of this
way of life. If one despairs only half-heartedly or finitely, one may try to deal
with this stumbling block while clinging to the underlying despair which causes
it. But if one despairs “with a vengeance” and “to the full,” one will be unable
to continue believing in these despairing efforts and will abandon all hope for a
100 Anti-Climacus also discusses “authentic despair” (SUD: 43), although he does not seem to be using this
term in the same sense (as the kind of despair that can be a “corridor” out of despair). In any case,
qualifying despair as “authentic” obviously presents problems for those who would like to reduce
Kierkegaard’s ideal to a matter of existential “authenticity.” The concept of authenticity as it emerges in 20th
Century existentialism is undoubtedly influenced by Kierkegaard’s notion of despair in contrast to a proper
relation to oneself (e.g. in Heidegger and Sartre). But it should also be clear from the first chapter and from
our reply to the ‘Moral Monster Objection’ that what Kierkegaard takes as his ideal cannot simply be
reduced to being authentic in the sense of being self-consistent or ‘true to oneself.’
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resolution of the problem within despairing categories. Having been completely
broken down and exhausted in this way, one will be able to abandon the
despairing way of life altogether. It is only when the very foundations of a
despairing life have been torn down than new foundations of life without
despair can begin to be constructed.
For Judge Wilhelm what is decisive in order for despair to be a corridor
out of despair is that the person choose or will this despair. He admits that in all
despair there is an element of will, but insists that in authentic despair one wills
despair “in an infinite sense, in an absolute sense”: “Generally speaking, a person
cannot despair at all without willing it, but in order truly to despair, a person
must truly will it; but when he truly wills it, he is truly beyond despair. When a
person has truly chosen despair, he has truly chosen what despair chooses:
himself in his eternal validity” (SUD:221, 213). While the Judge may be right
about the need for the aesthete to will despair (rather than view it as something
that happens to him) in order to abandon the aesthetic life, he is wrong to
suppose that “either a person has to live esthetically or he has to live ethically"
(EO II:68). As we have seen, the ethical life is also a life of despair, and the
despair here is precisely an overemphasis of one’s will. Therefore, for Anti-
Climacus the right way to despair is not so much to will or choose despair as to
face the despair that resides in the overestimation or underestimation of one’s
domain of choice. According to Anti-Climacus, one cannot get out of despair
self-reliantly, on the strength of one’s own will. He seems to have Judge
Wilhelm in mind in warning:
[If] a person in despair is, as he thinks, aware of his despair and doesn’t
refer to it mindlessly as something that happens to him [...], and wants
now on his own, all on his own, and with all his might to remove the
despair, then he is still in despair and through all his seeming effort only
works himself all the more deeply into a deeper despair. (SUD:44)
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This is not to say that Anti-Climacus rejects the idea that one should will
one’s despair ‘to the fullest’; he simply rejects the idea that this willing effort
accomplishes the transition out of despair all by itself. A parallel point is made
by Johannes de Silentio in relation to resignation: “His own strength suffices for
the movement of repentance, but it calls for absolutely all his energies, and it is
therefore impossible for him by his own strength to return and grasp reality”
(FT:125). As Johannes realizes, the step of losing oneself may be achieved by one
who is willing and earnest enough, but the step of regaining oneself lies outside
one’s own powers:
I can see then that it requires strength and energy and freedom of spirit
to make the infinite movement of resignation; I can also see that it can be
done. The next step dumbfounds me, my brain reels; for having made
the movement of resignation, now on the strength of the absurd to get
everything, to get one’s desire, whole, in full, that requires more-than-
human powers. (FT:76)
The same may be said for despair. Having willed one’s despair to the
point of utter collapse, the self has no further strength left to rebuild a non-
despairing life and no evaluative basis on which to “choose” this better way of
life. According to Anti-Climacus, the step of regaining oneself as a person free of
despair must be left entirely to God. What is needed after the despairing self has
been broken down through despair is not some further accomplishment by this
self, but rather the acceptance of oneself as a gift and task from God. Of course
in taking up the “task” of one’s self, one once again becomes active, but the
fundamental shift from the collapse of despair to the life faith is foremost a
matter of passive acceptance.
What the life of faith gained through this corridor of despair is like was
discussed in the first chapter. Anti-Climacus makes it clear that the life of faith
includes a “sense of security and repose” that means that “one has got the better
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of despair and won peace” (SUD:54-5). Despair in the truest sense, as the
misrelation to oneself, is not present in the life of faith, since one relates to
oneself as one truly is (which for Kierkegaard means as a self established by, and
grounded in, God.) That this life is free from the symptoms of despair is also
evident in Anti-Climacus’ statement that “Not to be in despair may mean
precisely to be in despair, and it may also mean having been saved from being in
despair” (SUD:54).101 What he means here is that a life free from the stumbling
blocks or feelings of despair may either be one of despair after all, or it may mean
that one has been saved from despair through faith. The life of faith is free from
all the manifestations of despair we have discussed, but this freedom from
despair is not won ‘once-and-for-all’. Anti-Climacus explains: “Not being in
despair must mean the annihilated possibility of the ability to be in it. For it to be
true that someone is not in despair, he must be annihilating that possibility every
instant” (SUD:45). Part of the “task” of one’s life is to resist slipping back into
these various forms of despair.
Yet there is also a sense in which something of these despairing ways of
life is preserved within the life of faith. This brings us to the final aspect of
despair’s positive role to be discussed: despair’s role in what is not just a
“metamorphosis” but a “transfiguration.” The transfiguration by which a
despairing way of life is superceded follows the dialectic of a Hegelian
Aufhebung: what is cancelled in this process is also in some sense preserved.
What is cancelled is the role of enjoyment or ethical well-being as one’s highest
telos; but enjoyment and ethical well-being are preserved as part of the life of
faith. They find their proper place in life only when they are not taken as a
highest telos, but are treated as subordinate to the telos of faith. Thus Judge
Wilhelm says that the ethical “does not want to destroy the aesthetic but to
101 This is not to say that the life of faith is free of any suffering or misery. To the contrary, as we discussed in
the first chapter, and as Anti-Climacus elaborates in Practice in Christianity, living the life of faith in the
world is to invite suffering and alienation. As Kierkegaard develops in some of the later writings
especially, this suffering is essential to the life of faith because it is part of what it means to live in imitatio
Christi. Yet these sufferings are not incompatible with the “peace and repose” of faith foretold by Anti-
Climacus; rather, living the life of faith means finding peace, repose and joy even amidst suffering.
188
transfigure it” (EO II:253). He insists that “despair is no break but a
transfiguration” in that “all the aesthetic remains in a person except that it is
made an auxiliary and precisely thereby is preserved” (EO II:228-9). Likewise,
as we saw in the first chapter, both ethical responsibility and aesthetic enjoyment
are preserved in the life of faith. In fact, lasting enjoyment, genuine ethical
commitment and sincere repentance only become possible in a life of faith.
I would like to end this chapter by saying a few words about the
usefulness of Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘despair’ for ethics. As I indicated at the
beginning the chapter and throughout, I think the concept of despair allows
ethics to understand ethical failures in a broader, more holistic way (as compared
to what a traditional action-centered or even virtue-centered ethics can offer.)102
Utilizing this concept, we can understand that when a person commits an ethical
wrongdoing, this action did not just appear ex nihilo. Most often it was the
outgrowth of an underlying evaluative stance that had been present even before
the particular misdeed, a stance misaligned toward, or simply aligned against life
(i.e. against oneself, others, and actual existence as a whole). Thus, I think
Kierkegaard’s concept of despair allows ethics to take a deeper look at the
phenomenon of ethical failure. This concept also allows a more expansive
understanding of ethical failure in that we can understand as an ethical failure
not just a violation of an ethical law or principle, but also the internal failure
within certain values, ways of holding values and fundamental life-choices.
Thus, the concept of despair allows ethics to engage in a discussion of what is
often most important for a person: not the fulfillment of moral laws but this
person’s fundamental beliefs, attitudes, and values, and goals. The concept of
despair is also one of the most fruitful meeting points between ethics and
psychology; it allows such things as feelings of disappointment, anxiety,
102 Anti-Climacus himself comments on the holistic breadth of application of his notion of sin as despair (cf.
SUD:113-4). He insists that individual acts of wrongdoing can be understood as following from a
fundamental stance of despair (“willfulness against God”). Moreover, he points out that his definition of sin
as despair encompasses more than just violations of ethical precepts, since “everything, speaking humanly,
can be more or less as it should be in these respects, and yet the whole life be sin” (SUD:113-4).
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desperation, etc. to be treated as psychological phenomena but also understood
in relation to one’s overall ethical stance.
Another significant advantage to an ethics which incorporates the notion
of despair as an ‘internal collapse’ is that we can then discuss ethical failures
without having to rely on some objective ethical standard by which to judge
these ethical failures. This is not to say that Kierkegaard’s notion of despair is
devoid of substantial evaluative presuppositions. But these presuppositions are
employed in the service of showing how a way of life fails by its own criteria,
how this way of life represents a stance in which one misrelates to oneself and to
actuality, thereby inviting the painful disappointments or stumbling blocks
which result from this skewed relation to actuality. This absence of reliance on
an external standard allows a great breadth of applicability for the concept of
despair in the sense that it can deal with failures to relate properly to one’s
choices and values whatever these may be. It thereby allows for common ground in
discussions between proponents of various conflicting beliefs and values.
Lastly, for those who are convinced by the need for greater holism in
ethics and are willing to take Kierkegaard as a guide here, the concept of despair
allows a useful internal critique of Kierkegaard. In suggesting that we take
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as guides, I do not mean to suggest that we should
accept their thinking uncritically. In fact, I think there are many notions in the
works of each thinker that must be questioned and possibly set aside. In the next
chapter we will show how Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment provides a useful
internal critique to allow us to know what to take and what to discard in his
thinking. Likewise, I think we find in Kierkegaard’s account of different forms
of despair the internal critique needed to do the same for Kierkegaard’s thought.
We have already seen several examples of this at work. Our understanding of
the despair of the active ethical life allows us to understand what to take and
what to discard in the thinking of Judge Wilhelm. Similarly, our understanding
of the despair of resignation, reserve, ‘desparing over one’s sins’ and the like
allows us to understand what to take and what to discard in works written from
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the standpoint of resignation and ‘religiousness A’. While this applies most
obviously to the work of Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus, I suspect it
is just as helpful in understanding many of the works written in Kierkegard’s
own name that likewise represent a stance of resignation or ‘religiousness A.’ 103
103 Although elaborating on this internal critique lies outside the bounds of this study, I would include in this
grouping of resigned works books such as For Self-Examination, Judge for Yourself, and much of the material
in Works of Love and the Edifying Discourses. Understood as ‘correctives’ allowing readers to take the first
steps toward faith, these works are indeed valuable. But insofar as they often emphasize resignation and
repentance without faith’s accompanying hope and joy over forgiveness, they can represent a despairing
viewpoint and we should be wary of them as such. Considering these works in the context of the analysis of




NIETZSCHE’S NOTION OF INTERNAL COLLAPSE:
NIHILISM
In the last chapter we saw how a way of life can collapse internally
according to Kierkegaard’s conception of despair. Nietzsche has a similar
conception of how a way of life can collapse internally, thereby allowing a
transition to a new way of life. As usual, Nietzsche has a variety of names for this
phenomenon. In Beyond Good and Evil, he speaks of “decay” (Verfall) and
“diminishment” (Verkleinerung) whereas in the Genealogy he labels this decay
“nihilism” (Nihilismus), and in later works such as Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-
Christ, and Ecce Homo, he settles on the word “décadence.” Despite this plurality
of terms, I think we can find some consistent ideas about internal collapse
attached to each of these terms. Nietzsche himself indicates the connection
between these terms by referring to décadence as a matter of “decay” (Verfalls) or
“diminishment” (Verkleinerung) (TI “Socrates” 2, TI “Reason” 6, TI “Expeditions”
37, A:19), and by using the terms “nihilism” and “décadence” synonymously in
some passages (A:6, A:20).
This does not mean that Nietzsche always uses these terms uniformly; as
other scholars have pointed out, there are a variety of ways in which Nietzsche
approaches the concept of nihilistic collapse.104 Sometimes terms for this collapse
are used to describe the nature of this collapse, sometimes to label particular
examples of it. Sometimes these terms describe the cause of this collapse, or the
collapse itself, and sometimes they describe its effects or symptoms.
Nonetheless, there are some central ideas about this internal collapse that can be
104 For example, Solomon traces ten different uses of the term “nihilism” in Nietzsche. Robert Solomon
“Nietzsche, Nihilism, and Morality” in Robert Solomon, Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 202-225.
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found consistently expressed in a range of works from Beyond Good and Evil to
Ecce Homo. Among the various ways Nietzsche discusses these ideas, he
consistently develops a notion of internal collapse involving: (a) a willed stance
one takes against oneself and against life, and (b) a weariness and loss of a will to
live that comes when we lose our reverence and love for ourselves.
In the first section to follow, I will explore these concepts as a way of
elucidating the notion of internal collapse in Nietzsche’s thinking. I will trace the
connections between Nietzsche’s discussion of “decay” and “decline” in Beyond
Good and Evil, of “nihilism” in the Genealogy, and of décadence” in Twilight, The
Anti-Christ, and Ecce Homo. My point is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of
the way Nietzsche uses these terms in each case, but to develop a workable
sketch of his notion of internal collapse. (For the sake of convenience, I will often
refer to this unified notion of internal collapse simply as “nihilism.”) The second
section will trace the genealogy behind what Nietzsche finds to be a
contemporary crisis of nihilism; this will enable us to understand the nature and
cause of contemporary nihilism and it will provide some clues as to how nihilism
can be overcome. In the third section, I will explore Nietzsche’s notion of “self-
overcoming” and “redemption” in relation to this internal collapse and explain
how its destructive force can be turned against itself in order to bring about a
new, non-collapsing way of life. In the fourth section, I will discuss the
usefulness of the concept of nihilism as a general ethical concept, and I will
address objections to my reading of Nietzsche on this issue. I will end by saying
a few words about how Nietzsche’s account of internal collapse, especially the
notion of ressentiment, can be useful in allowing a critical reading of Nietzsche’s
own works.
§1 NIETZSCHE’S NOTIONS OF DECAY, NIHILISM, AND DÉCADENCE
Concurrent with his early suggestions that we prepare a “typology of
morals,” Nietzsche expresses interest in the morphology by which “value-
feelings and value-distinctions live, grow, beget, and perish” (BGE:186, my
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emphasis.) Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche often uses the metaphor of sickness and
disease to describe the decay and decline of different system of belief
(“moralities”) or the ethical types that embody them.105 In a passage remarkably
similar to Kierkegaard’s analysis in The Sickness Unto Death, Nietzsche discusses
someone whose “inward turned glance” betrays “his will to nothingness,
nihilism”: “’If only I were someone else,’ sighs this glance: ‘but there is no hope
of that. I am who I am: how could I ever get free of myself? And yet – I am sick of
myself!’” (GM III:14) As I shall explain, the sickness of nihilism and décadence, like
the sickness of despair, is primarily a matter of misrelating to oneself, of taking
an existential stance against oneself and against life.
Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche concerns himself with diagnosing the nature
of this sickness and of searching for a cure. Also like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche
often makes a distinction between this sickness itself and the effects or symptoms
of this sickness. For example, Nietzsche often talks about altruistic morality and
‘otherworldly’ religious and philosophical conceptions as symptoms and signs of
decline (GM P6, TI “Reason” 6, A:19, EH “Destiny” 8). Although he sometimes
refers to nihilism as growing out of this morality, it is clear that what declines
and collapses is not a moral theory or a religious theology. These belief systems
are the outgrowth of a particular ‘mode of valuation’ or way of life, and in this
case they are the effects and results of an underlying state of internal collapse.
This is precisely why these belief-systems can function as “symptoms” of this
collapse:
When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the
perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish
values. . . .From this it follows that even that anti-nature of a morality
which conceives God as the contrary concept to and condemnation of
life is only a value judgment on the part of life – of what life? of what
kind of life? – But I have already given the answer: of declining,
debilitated, weary, condemned life. (TI “Morality” 5).
105For Nietzsche, physical sickness is not just a metaphor for the collapse of values. Much more than
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche takes seriously the notion of a physiological dysfunction behind our ethical beliefs
and the stance we take toward life.
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This indicates that internal collapse is not a matter of an internal
inconsistency within a set of ideas. For Nietzsche whatever inconsistencies may
exist between these ideas stem from the deeper conflict within the agent’s way of
life. So Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism, like Kierkegaard’s notion of despair, does
not primarily name a conflict between the agent’s beliefs. Rather, it names a
conflict within the agent, or more specifically, a conflict within the stance the
agent takes with respect to himself and life as a whole (i.e. against himself and life
as a whole). Specifically, for Nietzsche what collapses is what we have already
identified as the ascetic or slavish stance toward oneself and the world.
However he labels it, Nietzsche leaves no doubt as to the magnitude of
the danger posed by this internal collapse: it is “the great danger to mankind”
(GM P5). In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche discusses his contemporary
situation as that of “man in decay, that is to say in diminishment, in process of
becoming mediocre and losing his value” (BGE:203). Nietzsche considers this
process “the collective danger that ‘man’ himself may degenerate” and he indicates
that “Christian-European morality” has helped bring about the “degeneration
and diminution of man to the perfect herd animal” (BGE:203). In the Genealogy
of Morals, Nietzsche concludes that it is the supposedly unegoistic “instincts of
pity, self-abnegation, [and] self-sacrifice” that are the source of this danger: “It
was precisely here that I saw the great danger to mankind, its sublimest
enticement and seduction – but to what? to nothingness? – it was precisely here
that I saw the beginning of the end, the dead stop, a retrospective weariness, the
will turning against life, the tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness”
(GM P5). Nietzsche is also clear that this danger is ubiquitous, at least in
European culture: “my assertion is that all the values in which mankind at
present summarizes its supreme desiderata are décadence values […] values of
decline, nihilistic values hold sway under the holiest names” (A:6).
Although Nietzsche is clearly worried about a collective danger facing all
of Europe (if not also all of humankind), it is also clear that the source of this
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danger lies within us, namely in our instincts and values. Nietzsche uses the
rhetoric of Christianity in calling this collapse the inner “corruption” of man: “It
is a painful, dreadful spectacle which has opened up before me: I have drawn
back the curtain on the depravity of man” (A:6). Yet he makes it clear that this is
not a doctrine of ‘total depravity.’ It is not a corruption in human nature per se,
but rather a corruption in a peculiarly unnatural but currently pervasive form of
human life, namely the ascetic way of life. Nietzsche continues:
In my mouth this word is protected against at any rate one suspicion: that
it contains a moral accusation of man. It is – I should like to underline the
fact again – free of any moralic acid: and this to the extent that I find that
depravity precisely where hitherto one most consciously aspirted to
‘virtue’, to ‘divinity’. I understand depravity, as will already be guessed,
in the sense of décadence: my assertion is that all the values in which
mankind at present summarizes its supreme desiderata are décadence-
values. (A:6)
The danger of nihilism is a widespread collective danger insofar as the
ascetic way of life is so widespread. Although Nietzsche generally confines
himself to the problem of “European nihilism,” he sometimes suggests the
problem is more ubiquitous, remarking that those observing Earth from afar
would think of it as “the distinctively ascetic planet, a nook of disgruntled,
arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with a profound disgust at themselves, at
the earth, at all life” (GM III:11).) Nietzsche locates the ‘disease’ of European
nihilism within a certain set of instincts and values, namely “Christian-
European” (i.e., ascetic) instincts and values. But what exactly is the disease
within these instincts? As mentioned above, Nietzsche primarily expresses two
primary ways in which the decline of nihilism and décadence can be understood.
It can be understood as the conflict within an agent who takes an active willed
stance against himself and against life. Alternately, it can be understood as the
lack of a will to live and a general weariness with life. I will explain each of
these manifestations of internal collapse in turn and then address the
relationship between them.
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In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche declares that “the feelings of devotion,
self-sacrifice for one’s neighbor, the entire morality of self-renunciation must be
taken mercilessly to task and brought to court” (BGE:33). One primary objection
Nietzsche raises to this ascetic morality of self-denial is that it represents a willed
stance against oneself: “The Christian faith is from the beginning sacrifice:
sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit, at the same time
enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation” (BGE:46). Within the morality of
pity Nietzsche senses a fundamental stance of self-contempt: “a hoarse, groaning,
genuine note of self-contempt. It is part of that darkening and uglification of
Europe which has now been going on for a hundred years […] if it is not the cause
of it! The man of “modern ideas,” that proud ape, is immoderately dissatisfied
with himself: that is certain” (BGE:222). As we saw in Chapter 2, the ascetic way
of life also represents a willed stance against the world against and life itself. As
part of the revaluation of noble values, the ascetic mode of valuation seeks to
“reverse the whole love of the earthly and of dominion over the earth into hatred
of the earth and the earthly" (BGE:62). Nietzsche also finds that the ascetic stance
of pity with respect to others, especially when it is glorified “as the fundamental
principle of society,” “at once reveals itself for what it is: as the will to the denial of
life, as the principle of dissolution and decay” (BGE:259).
For Nietzsche, two facts about human nature make the ascetic stance of
pity pernicious and corrupting. First, Nietzsche sometimes suggests that “life is
will to power” and that the ascetic condemnation of any will to power is
therefore a condemnation of life (BGE:259). Secondly, Nietzsche believes that
suffering and hardship, rather than ease and comfort, are the “soil” out of which
great human achievements and excellence most often grow. Nietzsche therefore
sees the ascetic moralists as representing a willed stance against human nature
and human excellence: “we see how man is diminishing himself, how you are
diminishing him!” (BGE:225). Nietzsche’s solution, which will be discussed in
detail in the section on self-overcoming, is to turn pity against pity. By having
pity for all that humankind suffers under the belittling and stultifying effects of
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the ascetic mode of valuation, we will be led to condemn the ascetic morality of
pity: “our pity—do you not grasp whom our opposite pity is for when it defends
itself against your pity as the worst of all pampering and weakening?— Pity
against pity, then!—“ (BGE:225)
Beyond Good and Evil also contains a hint at another conception of decay or
decline. Here internal collapse is understood not so much as a single willed
stance taken against oneself and life as an anarchy of the instincts which gives
way to a general weariness and pessimism with respect to life. For example,
Nietzsche talks about “corruption” understood “as the indication that anarchy
threatens within the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions which is
called ‘life’ has been shaken” (BGE:258). Nietzsche finds that the “man of an era
of dissolution” suffers from the internal war among “contrary and often not
merely contrary drives and values which struggle with one another and rarely
leave one another in peace” (BGE:200). Rather than a willed stance, this collapse
takes the form of a weakness of the will or lack of a will. In Nietzsche’s words,
we find within our contemporary morality a “letting oneself go and letting
oneself fall”: “Today the taste of the time and the virtue of the time weakens and
thins down the will; nothing is as timely as weakness of the will” (BGE:212).
Nietzsche finds that someone in this condition seeks only an end to this internal
conflict: “such a man of late cultures and broken lights will, on average, be a
rather weak man: his fundamental desire is that the war which he is should come
to an end” (BGE:200). This weariness and weakness of will manifests itself as an
evaluative stance which condemns human life in general:
Suppose the abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of
themselves and weary should moralize: what would their moral
evaluations have in common? Perhaps a pessimistic mistrust of the entire
situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man
along with his situation. (BGE:260)
In later works Nietzsche continues to present these two notions of internal
collapse side by side; he now uses the terms “nihilism” and “décadence” to
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describe both a willed stance against oneself and against life and a pessimistic
lack of a will to live. The former meaning is usually directly associated with
ascetic ideals, whereas the latter is sometimes presented as the prompt for ascetic
ideals and sometimes as the result of these ideals. A review of how these two
different conceptions of internal collapse are presented in these later works will
establish my claim that we can find some consistent meanings behind
Nietzsche’s different labels for internal collapse.
First let us review the ways in which internal collapse is understood as a
willed stance against oneself and against life as a whole. In the concluding
section of the Genealogy Nietzsche writes that “all that willing which has taken its
direction from the ascetic ideal” expresses a stance of hatred of oneself and of life
as a whole:
[H]atred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the
material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness
and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change,
becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself – all this means – let us dare
to grasp it – a will to nothingness, an aversion [Widerwillen] to life, a
rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life. (GM III:28)
A similar idea is expressed in Twilight of the Idols, where Nietzsche dubs
Christianity “a rebellion against life” and a “condemnation of life by the living”
(TI “Morality” 5). “Anti-natural morality,” says Nietzsche, turns “against the
instincts of life” and represents “the condemnation of these instincts” (TI
“Morality” 4). Nietzsche is especially critical of the ascetic condemnation of
sexuality, which he sees as a condemnation of the body and of the
presupposition of human life: “It was Christianity, with its ressentiment against
life at the bottom of its heart, which first made something unclean of sexuality: it
threw filth on the origin, on the presupposition of our life” (TI “Ancients” 4).
The fourth proposition of his “Decree Against Christianity” in The Anti-Christ
makes this point even more forcefully: “The sermon on chastity is a public
instigation to anti-nature. Every display of contempt for sexual love, and every
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defilement of it through the concept "dirty" ["unrein"] is original sin against the
holy spirit of life.” Also in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche complains that Christianity
“has made an ideal of whatever contradicts the instinct of the strong life to
preserve itself “ (A:5). He claims that the aim of Christian concepts is “is to
devalue nature and natural values” (A:38).
Nietzsche locates the same life-denying tendencies in modern philosophy,
especially the philosophy of Schopenhauer, which made pity “the virtue, the
basis and source of all virtues. […] this was done by a philosophy that was
nihilistic and had inscribed the negation of life upon its shield. Schopenhauer was
consistent enough: pity negates life and renders it more deserving of negation.—
Pity is the practice of nihilism” (A:7). In this work Nietzsche also develops the
idea that ascetic ideals are rooted in an “instinctive hatred of reality”, where this
reality is understood as the bodily, ‘this-worldly’ existence in which humans
inevitably find themselves: “Once the concept of "nature" had been invented as
the opposite of "God," "natural" had to become a synonym of "reprehensible":
this whole world of fiction is rooted in hatred of the natural (of reality!—)”
(A:30,A:15).
Nietzsche continues this line of criticism in Ecce Homo, writing that when
“seriousness is deflected from the self-preservation and the enhancement of the
strength of the body, that is, of life, when anemia is construed as an ideal, and
contempt for the body as "salvation of the soul," what else is this if not a recipe for
décadence?—“ (EH ‘Books’ D 2) Nietzsche considers the Christian concept of a
transcendent, perfect God to be an attempt to devalue and condemn earthly
reality: “The concept of "God" invented as a counterconcept of life,—everything
harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility unto death against life
synthesized in this concept in a gruesome unity!” (EH “Destiny” 8) Nietzsche
finds the same purpose in the Platonic/Christian notion of a transcendent, ‘true’
world of perfect, unchanging entities: “The concept of the "beyond," the "true
world" invented in order to devaluate the only world there is,—in order to retain
no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality!” (EH “Destiny” 8) As before,
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Nietzsche focuses his attacks on the ascetic morality of pity and altruism: “In the
concept of the ‘selfless’, the ‘self-denier’, the distinctive sign of décadence, feeling
attracted by what is harmful, not being able to find any longer what profits one,
self-destruction is turned into the sign of value itself, into ‘duty’, into ‘holiness’,
into what is ‘divine’ in man!” (EH “Destiny” 8)
Nietzsche considers it his distinctive insight to realize that those who have
hitherto given us moral ideals were one and all décadents: “this is my insight: the
teachers, the leaders of humanity, theologians all of them, were also, all of them,
décadents: hence the revaluation of all values into hostility to life, hence morality”
(EH ‘Destiny’ 7). Nietzsche even stipulates that morality as it presently exists
can be defined by this willed stance against life: “Definition of morality: Morality—
the idiosyncrasy of décadents, with the ulterior motive of revenging oneself
against life—and successfully “(EH ‘Destiny’ 7). As mentioned before, Nietzsche
makes it clear that the corruption does not lie within humanity per se, but rather
in the ideals that have corrupted it: “Christian morality—the most malignant
form of the will to lie, the real Circe of humanity: that which corrupted it” (EH
‘Destiny’ 7). Nietzsche’s objection is not only to the other-worldly and resentful
basis of this morality, but also its claim to universality, a claim which entails
condemning all forms of life strong and self-assured enough to resist these
extreme, world-renouncing values:
What! Is humanity itself decadent? was it always?— What is certain is that
it has been taught only decadence values as supreme values. The morality
that would un-self man is the morality of decline par excellence—the fact,
"I'm perishing," transposed into the imperative, "all of you ought to
perish"—and not only into the imperative! ... This only morality that has
been taught so far, the morality of un-selfing, reveals a will to the end,
fundamentally, it negates life.(EH ‘Destiny’ 7)
Turning now to the second conception of internal collapse, we find that
this notion is also consistently expressed throughout these same texts. As
mentioned before, in the Genealogy Nietzsche declares nihilism the “ultimate
illness” and pintpoints the source of this illness in the ascetic instincts of “pity,
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self-abnegation, self-sacrifice” – “it was precisely here that I saw the beginning of
the end, the dead stop, a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life, the
tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness” (GM P5). Here nihilism is
understood not so much a will turned against life as a general weariness with life
and a lack of reverence and love of humankind brought about by the
degeneration of humankind to something mediocre and weak. In two important
passages, Nietzsche notes that the taming and self-diminishing project of ascetic
morality described above has successfully removed our “fear of man,” but it has
also removed our respect for him:
For this is how things are: the diminution and leveling [die Verkleinerung
und Ausgleichung] of European man constitutes our greatest danger, for the
sight of him makes us weary. [...] Here precisely is what has become a
fatality for Europe – together with the fear of man we have also lost our
love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to
him. The sight of man now makes us weary – what is nihilism today if it
is not that? – We are weary of man. (GM I:12)
What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other
calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound
nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day
to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the
‘last will’ of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. (GM III:14)
The first of these two passages suggests that Nietzsche himself suffers
from this weariness at the sight of his fellow human beings, and a passage from
The Anti-Christ confirms this: “There are days when I am afflicted with a feeling
blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man. And to leave no doubt
concerning what I despise, whom I despise: it is the man of today, the man with
whom I am fatefully contemporaneous” (A:38). In his autobiography, Ecce
Homo, Nietzsche admits that he is himself partly a décadent and he lists this as
one of the reasons he is so good at diagnosing decline and its opposite: “I have a
subtler sense for the signs of ascent and descent than any man has ever had, I am
the teacher par excellence for this—I know both, I am both” (EH “Wise” 1). Yet
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Nietzsche also indicates that he is more the antithesis of a decadent than a
decadent: “I am also its antithesis. My proof for this is, among other things, that I
always instinctively chose the right means against wretched states: while the
décadent typically chooses means that are disadvantageous for him. As summa
summarum [overall] I was healthy, as an angle, as a specialty, I was a decadent”
(EH “Wise” 2). This definition of décadence as instinctively choosing what is
disadvantageous for oneself is one Nietzsche repeats in several places (TI
“Expeditions” 35, A:6, EH “Wise” 2, EH “Destiny” 8). In Twilight Nietzsche even
calls this the “formula” for décadence and indicates how this tendency is related to
the ascetic morality of altruism:
An "altruistic" morality, a morality under which egoism languishes – is
under all circumstances a bad sign. This applies to individuals, it applies
especially to peoples. The best are lacking when egoism begins to be
lacking. To choose what is harmful to oneself, to be attracted by
‘disinterested’ motives almost constitutes the formula of décadence. ‘Not to
seek one’s own advantage’ – that is merely a moral figleaf for a quite
different, namely physiological fact: ‘I no longer know how to find my
advantage’. . . .Disintegration of the instincts! (TI “Expeditions” 35).
As we shall see when we explore the genealogy of this collapse, the ascetic
morality of pity and altruism both grows out of and promotes this disintegration
of the instincts. For Nietzsche, this “anarchy of the instincts” is so widespread in
contemporary times as to almost define what is modern: our “instincts
contradict, disturb, destroy each other; I have already defined what is modern as
physiological self-contradiction (TI “Expeditions” 41). This disintegration of the
instincts is also linked to pessimistic judgments about life. Nietzsche continues
the passage quoted above by suggesting a connection between ascetic altruism
and a pessimistic condemnation of life per se: “Man is finished when he becomes
altruistic. Instead of saying naively, "I am no longer worth anything," the moral
lie in the mouth of the décadent says, "Nothing is worth anything—life is not
worth anything" (TI “Expeditions” 35). Ascetic self-denial in relations with
others (altruism and pity) has at its source the same existential stance as ascetic
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self-denial in relation to the world, which is “now considered worthless as such
(nihilistic withdrawal from it, a desire for nothingness or a desire for its
antithesis)” (GM II:21). This pessimistic judgment of life is linked to the problem
of a lack of meaning in life, especially a meaning for suffering. In the last section
of the Genealogy, Nietzsche labels this crushing lack of meaning “suicidal
nihilism”: “The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse
that lay over mankind so far” (GM III:28).
Nietzsche finds this pessimism not only in modern beliefs but as a facet of
widespread philosophical consensus: “In every age the wisest have passed the
identical judgment on life: it is worthless” a judgment Nietzsche finds to be “full
of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness with life, full of opposition to life”
(TI “Socrates” 1). As evidence, Nietzsche points to Socrates’ last words: “Even
Socrates said as he died: ‘To live—that means to be sick a long time: I owe a cock
to the savior Asclepius.’ Even Socrates had had enough of it“ (TI “Socrates”:1).
Nietzsche diagnoses this pessimistic consensus as stemming from an underlying
physiological condition, namely the anarchy of the instincts just discussed:
“these wisest men were in some way in physiological accord since they stood – had
to stand – in the same negative relation to life” (TI “Socrates” 2). Nietzsche
suggests that in Socrates’ Athens, this condition had become the “universal
danger” for which Socrates seemed to have the cure: “Everywhere the instincts
were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the
monstrum in animo was the universal danger” (TI “Socrates” 9). Later in this
passage Nietzsche clarifies what he takes to have been the “universal exigency:
that no one was any longer master of himself, that the instincts were becoming
mutually antagonistic” (TI “Socrates” 9). Importantly, Nietzsche sees décadence
not only in this anarchy of the instincts, but also in the extreme measures
employed to reign in this anarchy: “The same means in the fight against a
craving—castration, extirpation—is instinctively chosen by those who are too
weak-willed, too degenerate, to be able to impose moderation on themselves” (TI
“Morality” 2). In the case of Socrates, reason is employed to tyrannize over the
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chaotic instincts in order to keep them under control. Nietzsche sees décadence in
both the problem and this remedial solution: “It is not only the admitted
dissoluteness and anarchy of his instincts which indicate décadence in Socrates:
the superfetation of the logical and that barbed malice which distinguishes him
also point in that direction” (TI “Socrates”:4). As Nietzsche later explains: “To
have to fight the instincts—that is the formula of décadence: as long as life is
ascending, happiness equals instinct” (TI “Socrates”:11).
What has been said so far establishes that Nietzsche had a sustained
interest in the process of degeneration and decline he sometimes calls “nihilism”
and sometimes calls “décadence,” and it reveals a consistency among the ideas
presented by these terms. But it does not yet show that these ideas are consistent
with themselves, and it may even suggest the opposite. After all, taking a
persistent, unified willed stance against life is not the same thing as having one’s
instincts in anarchy; they may even seem to be mutually exclusive insofar as this
anarchy could entail lacking a unified will altogether. In addition, my account
leaves open the important question of how the ascetic way of life fits into the
second conception of collapse discussed above, the weary pessimism with life.
How can Nietzsche be consistent in sometimes blaming the ascetic way of life as
the cause of this kind of nihilism while at other times indicating that the ascetic
way of life is a response to this nihilism and even a ‘cure’ for it? The answers to
these questions can be discovered only by tracing the genealogy of nihilism as
Nietzsche sets it out.
§2 THE GENEALOGY OF NIHILISM
We know that Nietzsche intended to trace this genealogy in a separate
work entitled “On the History of European Nihilism,” but this work was never
written (GM III:27). Nonetheless, much of this genealogy can be discerned from
the genealogy of morality and ‘bad conscience’ that Nietzsche traces in the
Genealogy of Morals and other works. In fact, the basic outlines of the genealogy
of nihilism have already been discussed in Chapter 2, where we traced
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Nietzsche’s closely related genealogy of the ‘bad conscience’. The story of
nihilism begins at the inception of large-scale organized societies and with the
means employed in the “taming” process,“the welding of a hitherto unchecked
and shapeless populace into a firm form” (GM II:17). Nietzsche writes that the
‘bad conscience’ of the newly “tamed man” resulted from “the most fundamental
change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found
himself finally enclosed with the walls of society and of peace” (GM II:16).
One challenge was that this newly “tamed man” could not rely on his
natural instincts in trying to navigate the new conditions of ‘civilized’ life: “well
adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure: suddenly all their
instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended’” (GM II:16). The more dangerous
challenge was that these instincts “had not ceased to make their usual demands!
Only it was hardly or rarely possible to humor them: as a rule they had to seek
new and, as it were, subterranean gratifications” (GM II:16). Thus began what
Nietzsche calls “the internalization of man”: “All instincts that do not discharge
themselves outwardly turn inward […] Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in
attacking, in change, in destruction – all this turned against the possessors of
such instincts” (GM II:16). Here we find the beginning of the inward ‘war’
within and with oneself, the inner turmoil of a life “turned against itself, taking
sides against itself” which the ascetic later directs into a unified, willed stance
against oneself and against life as a whole. At this stage, however, we find
merely a “yearning and desperate prisoner” experiencing a desperate,
directionless conflict within himself: “The man who, from lack of external
enemies and resistances and forcibly confined to the oppressive narrowness and
punctiliousness of custom, impatiently lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at,
assaulted, and maltreated himself” (GM II:16). As Nietzsche says, what we find
here is a pathetic, miserable “animal that rubbed itself raw against the bars of its
cage as one tried to ‘tame’ it” (GM II:16). These conditions also gave rise to “the
cauldron of unsatisfied hatred,” the feelings of pent up rancor, rage, and lust for
revenge among those who are powerless to vent these feelings in action.
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It is this dire situation which led to the first crisis of nihilism, the sickness
of “suicidal nihilism” for which the ascetic stance was introduced as a ‘cure.’
Nietzsche says very little about this earlier crisis of nihilism, and it is difficult to
get a clear idea of when he thinks it occurred.106 Yet Nietzsche leaves no doubt as
to its existence, since he thinks the key to understanding the ascetic stance is to
understand how it originated as a ‘cure’ for this earlier crisis of nihilism: “such a
self-contradiction as the ascetic appears to represent, ‘life against life,’ is,
physiologically considered and not merely physiologically, a simple absurdity”
(GM III:13). According to Nietzsche, we must understand that “this ascetic
priest, this apparent enemy of life, this denier – precisely he is among the greatest
conserving and yes-creating forces of life” (GM III:13). Specifically, we must
understand the ascetic priests as acting to preserve life in the face of this earlier
threat of nihilism. Nietzsche says of the person living according to this ascetic
stance: “The No he says to life brings to light, as if by magic, an abundance of
tender Yeses; even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-
destruction – the very wound itself afterward compels him to live” (GM III:13).
As this passage suggests, Nietzsche identifies this earlier crisis of nihilism with
the second type of nihilism discussed above, namely the lack of a goal or a
meaning to life that leads to a lack of a will to live. The value of the ascetic
stance for preserving life is that it provides this meaning:
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so
far. His existence on earth contained no goal; ‘why man at all?’ – was a
question without an answer; the will for man and earth was lacking;
behind every great human destiny there sounded as a refrain a yet
greater ‘in vain!’ This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that
something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void – he
106 In the case of Greek society, at least, we get a hint from Nietzsche’s discussion of Athens in the time of
Socrates. As mentioned above, Nietzsche believes that the “anarchy of the instincts” posed a “universal
danger” for the Athenians for which Socrates appeared to be the cure (TI “Socrates” 9). In general, I think
Nietzsche’s thoughts on the genealogy of nihilism, the ‘bad conscience’ and ascetic morality are less
valuable as a speculative historical account than as a way of understanding the dialectical nature of these
things. I put very little weight on the historical accuracy of Nietzsche’s account, although I think the
dialectical relations set out in this account are key to understanding the process of “redemption” and “self-
overcoming” by which Nietzsche thinks we can address the current crisis of nihilism.
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did not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he suffered
from the problem of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise, he was in
the main a sickly animal: but his problem was not suffering itself, but that
there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I suffer?’ Man, the
bravest of animals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not
repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he
is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering. (GM III:28)
Nietzsche believes that this first crisis of nihilism was averted by means of
a solution or “cure” provided by the ascetic priest. By focusing general feelings
of dissatisfaction and self-contempt into a single, unified, willed stance, the
ascetic both put an end to the anarchy of instincts and provided a meaning and
goal for those facing the “void” of “suicidal nihilism.” This ascetic “cure”
involved several related treatments for the problem of nihilism. First and
perhaps foremost, the ascetic’s notion of moral guilt provided a meaning and
purpose for suffering and for the life of suffering; the ascetic task of discovering
and repenting of one’s guilt gave the powerless and suffering a goal and allowed
them to exercise a will. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the notion of guilt
developed out of the debtor-creditor relationship and originally had no moral
connotations. But the ascetic priest seized on the notion of guilt, especially the
notion of guilt before God, in order to interpret suffering as a meaningful
punishment for guilt: “The chief trick the ascetic priest permitted himself” was
“the exploitation of the sense of guilt” (GM III:20). The sufferer now has an
indication of some meaningful cause for his suffering: “he must seek it in himself,
in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he must understand his suffering as a
punishment” (GM III:13). Nietzsche is clear that this solution does not bring an
end to human suffering; indeed, it brings with it a new form of suffering in that
in addition to the original suffering one now suffers from feelings of guilt.
Within the ascetic solution, “suffering was interpreted; the tremendous void
seems to have been filled; the door was closed to any kind of suicidal nihilism.
This interpretation – there is no doubt of it – brought fresh suffering with it,
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deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive suffering” (GM
III:28).
Interpreting suffering as guilt may be the “chief trick” of the ascetic priest,
but the ascetic’s “cure” for the first crisis of nihilism involves other remedies as
well. The ascetic stance not only provides a meaningful interpretation for the
life of suffering, it also provided some way for the powerless and suffering to
exercise a will. The pessimistic “broken will to live” is replaced by the ascetic
“will to nothingness,” the will to actively engage in the diminishment and
destruction of oneself, the denial and belittlement of oneself and the world:
[T]his hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of
happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance,
change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself – all this means – let
us dare to grasp it – a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion
against the most fundamental presuppositions of life: but it is and remains
a will!. . . And, to repeat in conclusion what I said that the beginning: man
would rather will nothingness than not will.- (GM III:28)
I think we can also understand the ascetic priest’s revaluation of values as
playing a part of this “cure.” As mentioned in Chapter 2, this revaluation
involves what Nietzsche calls an ‘inversion’ of the “aristocratic value-equation
(good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)” (GM I:8).
Everything that was considered a virtue in the noble mode of valuation is
reinterpreted as a vice according to the ascetic mode of valuation. We can
understand this revaluation as an extension of the ascetic conception of moral
guilt insofar as this revaluation aims to portray the nobles as “guilty.”
Moreover, the ascetics sought to poison the conscience of the nobles themselves,
to infect them with feelings of guilt, uncertainty, and “remorse of conscience”
(BGE:62, GM I:13). The ascetic teaches the powerful and powerless alike to have
a conscience against those instincts and that way of living that had hitherto
defined what was ‘noble’ in the ethical sense according to the noble mode of
valuation.
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We can also understand this revaluation of values as helping to ‘close the
door on suicidal nihilism’ in that it provides a meaning and justification to the
lives of those whose powerlessness in the face of life might otherwise lead to a
“broken will to life” (A:50). Their inability to act or to significantly impact the
world is reinterpreted as a ‘good will,’ a deliberate refraining from doing so out
of meritorious consideration for moral goodness. Nietzsche describes the
‘manufacture’ of ascetic ideals as involving weakness “being lied into something
meritorious […] and impotence which does not requite into ‘goodness of heart’;
anxious lowliness into ‘humility’; subjection to those one hates into ‘obedience’”
(GM I:14). It may seem to be one of the many contradictions within the ascetic
“cure” that the powerless are on one hand led to see themselves as guilty, to
interpret their suffering as punishment for guilt, and yet on the other hand they
are led to interpret themselves as good and worthy in comparison with those
who are powerful, joyful and self-assured. Perhaps it is simply the case that the
powerless feel themselves to be guilty of petty (indeed, indiscoverable)
wrongdoings but they feel themselves to be morally superior to those whose
power and joy are considered far more ‘sinful’ (and who do not even repent, as
the powerless do).
Another “trick” used by the ascetic priests to give meaning to the lives of
those threatened by suicidal nihilism is the invention of some ‘other world’, a
perfect unchanging world different from and contrary to the actual lived
experience that the suffering and powerless so abhor. Sometimes this realm is
interpreted as a “heaven” in which those who suffer and are humble now will
live in happiness, ease and exaltation while those who are powerful are excluded
and sent to eternal punishment. As evidence for his claim that Christianity is
thoroughly infected with ressentiment, Nietzsche quotes Aquinas and Tertulian
describing how one of the delights of heaven is that the virtuous get to look
down on the tortures of the damned (GM I:15). Yet Nietzsche finds even the
philosophical (e.g., Platonic) notion of a perfect unchanging realm expresses a
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fundamentally resentful and ascetic stance toward actual life (TI “Reason” 2, TI
“Reason” 6).
Thus we find that the ascetic way of relating to oneself, to others, and to
the world is a response to this earlier crisis of nihilism. According to Nietzsche’s
genealogy, the first type of nihilism discussed above (taking an active stance
against oneself) is a reaction to nihilism of the second type (lacking any unifying
will and therefore having a ‘broken will to live’.) Willed ascetic nihilism is a
reaction to will-less suicidal nihilism; indeed, ascetic nihilism represents a
peculiar kind of “cure” for suicidal nihilism. Given this understanding of
nihilism, it may seem that the nihlism of the ascetic stance is only apparent: the
ascetic stance may appear to being saying ‘No’ to existence and to be taking a
stance against life, but in reality it represents one of “the greatest conserving and
yes-creating forces of life” (GM III:13). In Chapter 2, we said that the ascetic way
of life and the slavish way of life could be considered to be the same thing insofar
as both are organized around the stance of ressentiment brought about by their
inability to vent aggressive drives in action and insofar as after the ascetic’s
revaluation of noble values, the slaves and the powerless live by ascetic values
and adopt the ascetic mode of valuation. But perhaps we could consider these
two ‘types’ or ways of life separately again and say that the slavish way of life
suffers from true nihilism, the suicidal nihilism described above, whereas those
taking the ascetic stance toward existence are thereby saved from nihilism. We
could then conclude that only the (ancient) slavish way of life collapses internally
into nihilism whereas the ascetic life only appears to do so.
Two important considerations tell against this conclusion. First, it is
important to realize that the ascetic “cure” does not in fact cure or get rid of the
original sickness of nihilism. At heart, the original sickness of nihilism is the
ressentiment, dissatisfaction, self-contempt, and self-destruction of the person
who impatiently “gnaws at” and attacks himself. One might say that nihilism is
most fundamentally the state of inner conflict of an organism turned against
itself. Nihilism’s structure of internal collapse, as I have said before, is the
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misrelation to oneself entailed in this antagonistic relationship with oneself. The
ascetic solution involves intensifying this antagonism and self-contempt, fueling
it with a notion of guilt, and thereby turning it into a goal, an active willed stance
against oneself. Far from trying to get rid of the original misrelation (the self
turned against itself) the ascetic ‘solution’ seeks to harness the power of this
misrelation, intensifying it, focusing it, and directing it into a willed stance that
gives both unity and meaning to the life of the ‘man of ressentiment’. As
Nietzsche says, “if one wanted to express the value of the priestly existence in the
briefest formula it would be: the priest alters the direction of ressentiment” (GM
III:15). Specifically, the ascetic seeks “to direct the ressentiment of the less
severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves (‘the one thing needful’) – and in
this way to exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-
discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming” (GM III:16).
Nietzsche adds immediately: “It goes without saying that a ‘medication’
of this kind, a mere affect medication, cannot possibly bring about a real cure of
sickness in a physiological sense; we may not even suppose that the instinct of
life contemplates or intends any sort of cure” (GM III:16). In fact, Nietzsche says
that what “must be our most fundamental objection to priestly medication” is
that this “cure” is merely symptomatic: it combats only the symptoms of the
disease, not its root cause, “the discomfiture of the sufferer, not its cause, not the
real sickness” (GM III:17). As Nietzsche explains in Twilight:
It is self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists to imagine
that by making war on décadence they therewith elude décadence
themselves. This is beyond their powers: what they choose as a means, as
salvation, is itself but another expression of décadence—they alter its
expression, they do not abolish the thing itself. (TI “Socrates” 11)
Building on this first consideration, we must also realize that the ascetic
‘cure’, not only fails to eradicate the original sickness of nihilism, it actually
makes this sickness worse. Not only is the ascetic cure ineffective insofar as it is
merely symptomatic, it is counter-productive in the long run in that “it makes the
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sick sicker” (GM II:20). Nietzsche says that when the ascetic “stills the pain of the
wound he at the same time infects the wound – for that is what he knows best of all,
this sorcerer and animal tamer, in whose presence everything healthy necessarily
grows sick, and everything sick tame” (GM III:15). Nietzsche explains that when
the ascetic’s stance of self-denial and self-diminishment is “chiefly applied to the
sick, distressed, and depressed, it invariably makes them sicker, even if it does
‘improve’ them” in the sense that it makes them “’tamed’, ‘weakened’,
‘discouraged,’ ‘made refined’, ‘made effete’ ‘emasculated’ (thus almost the same
thing as harmed)” (GM II:21). In order to see how the ascetic cure makes the
sick sicker, we must first realize that the genealogy of nihilism does not end with
the advent of the ascetic’s symptomatic “cure” to the first crisis of nihilism. To
the contrary, Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the present crisis of nihilism,
and his genealogy of the first crisis of nihilism is offered as a way for us to
understand the nature of this current crisis. We know that the ascetic stance was
developed as a reaction to original crisis of suicidal nihilism in which internal
disintegration and dissatisfaction resulted in a dangerously ‘broken will to live.’
But the importance of this realization becomes clear only when we realize that
the ascetic solution for this problem has now brought us back to a crisis of
suicidal nihilism.
Nietzsche says that the ascetic solution “closes the door on any kind of
suicidal nihilism,” but it seems that it could do so only temporarily. The crisis of
nihilism Nietzsche finds in his own day is not primarily a matter of the ascetic’s
passionate self-reproach and self-denial. Although he may still worry about the
lingering presence of this ascetic stance in our beliefs and practices, the greater
worry seems to be the weary, pessimistic form of nihilism. This is clearly
Nietzsche’s worry in the passage quoted partially above:
For this is how things are: the diminution and leveling of European man
constitutes our greatest danger, for the sight of him makes us weary. – We
can see nothing today that wants to grow greater, we suspect that things
will continue to go down, down, to become thinner, more good-natured,
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more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more
Chinese, more Christian – there is no doubt that man is getting ‘better’ all
the time. […] The sight of man now makes us weary – what is nihilism
today if it is not that? – We are weary of man. (GM I:12)
We have already discussed how the ascetic ‘cure’ brings about an increase
of suffering, but the more dangerous result of this ‘cure’ is that it continues to
weaken, demean, discourage, and ‘break’ us until we return to the point at which
we no longer have a goal or a will to live. It might be said that the “long reign of
ascetic ideals” finally weakens us to the point at which we can no longer
rigorously uphold ascetic ideals or sustain the stern ascetic stance against life.
The original recipient of the ascetic’s cure was the newly ‘tamed man’ whose
natural instincts continued to exert themselves energetically despite the lack of
an external means to vent these drives. The ascetic harnessed this chaotic
energy, focusing and directing it in the ways described above; we might say that
the energy fueling the ascetic stance was the energy of these unvented aggressive
drives. But as the weakening, diminishing and ‘taming’ effects of the ascetic’s
cure come to fruition in the perfectly tame and mediocre person, the passionate
energy behind the ascetic’s stance is also lost or diminished. In the end, the
victims of the ascetic’s ‘cure’ become the utterly mediocre ‘last men’ described by
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Alas! The time of the most contemptible man is
coming, the man who can no longer despise himself” (Z Prologue 5).
Thus, the genealogy of nihilism reveals that the nihilism of the ascetic
stance is not merely apparent. Nihilism, in an inclusive sense of the term, names
the misrelation to oneself of someone who turns away from and against herself
and life as a whole. While it is clear that the ascetic stance was originally
developed as a “cure” for an earlier threat of pessimistic nihilism, it is also clear
that the ascetic stance always was an intensified and redirected manifestation of
nihilism, and that the ascetic stance eventually leads back to a crisis of pessimistic
nihilism. Both kinds of nihilism could be described by the term “will to
nothingness”; they differ according to how passionate, focused, and unified this
214
“will” is. Pessimistic ‘will to nothingness’ is the weary longing for the end, a
vague but gnawing self-hatred and dissatisfaction with reality, a sense of
meaninglessness and that manifests itself passively in indolence and mediocrity.
In contrast, the ascetic ‘will to nothingness’ is the passionate will to actively
deny, demean and diminish oneself and the world.
To some extent, we can draw a meaningful contrast between the life of
weary pessimism and the life of active asceticism. But this distinction is similar
to the distinction in Kierkegaard between the two forms of the aesthetic life, or
between the two forms of the ethical life. In each case, one version of a way of
life represents an attempt to solve the problem plaguing the other version of this
way of life. As we saw in the last chapter, Kierkegaard, like Nietzsche, thinks
that these remedial measures fail because they do not address the underlying
problem. The active ascetic ‘will to nothingness’ has attempted to solve the
problem of the life of pessimistic nihilism without addressing the root of nihilism
itself. The crisis of values Nietzsche sees in his own time involves both of these
forms of nihilism. Nihilism is present in the mediocre life of the ‘last men’ as
well as in the self-denying life of one who still upholds some version of ascetic
ideals.
I have explained how nihilism in a general sense can be understood as the
state of internal collapse in which one turns away from and against oneself and
life as a whole. So described, we can see that Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism is
structurally very similar to Kierkegaard’s notion of despair. Nihilism and
despair both name a misrelation in one’s fundamental existential stance towards
oneself, others and the world. If we ask what it is that collapses internally, both
thinkers will answer that it is a way of living, a type of person who lives this
way, and the set of beliefs and attitudes that define this ‘type.’ In other words,
as we have defined this term, what collapses internally for both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is a way of life. Both thinkers insist that ethical failure can only be fully
understood on this level, as a failure within the agent’s fundamental stance
towards himself, others and the world. As will be discussed at length in later
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chapters, this shared approach does not mean Kierkegaard and Nietzsche agree
about all aspects of internal collapse or about what ways of life inwardly
collapse. But both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche develop an understanding of how
failing according to one’s own values is the result of an underlying stance in
which one turns against or away from oneself. The fact that the ascetic
condemns himself in condemning will to power is a consequence of the fact that
the ascetic’s evaluations are an expression of a fundamental stance of self-
conflict; as we have seen, for Nietzsche these self-condemning evaluative beliefs
emerge from a more fundamental stance of opposition to oneself.
Also like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche finds the presence of internal collapse to
have some positive potential insofar as it can allow a transition to a way of life
that does not collapse internally. For this reason Nietzsche does not
unambiguously lament the current crisis of nihilism, and he even suggests that
we should ‘push what is falling.’ In response to the question about whether he
is “erecting an ideal or knocking one down” Nietzsche makes clear his intention
to do both and indicates the connection between these tasks: “If a temple is to be
erected a temple must be destroyed” (GM II:24). The positive, ideal-erecting part of
this task has already been discussed in Chapter 2, where I attempt to provide a
sketch of Nietzsche’s ideal figure or way of life. What I only mentioned there
and what I need to explain further now, is the transition by which the crisis of
nihilism is overcome and this new ideal figure emerges. This transition
involves what Nietzsche’s calls “redemption” (Erlösung) and “self-overcoming”
(Selbstaufhebung or Selbstüberwindung) As with Kierkegaard’s notion of a ‘leap’ or
‘metamorphosis’, this transition is one of the most mysterious and little-
discussed ideas in Nietzsche’s work. But its importance in Nietzsche’s overall
schema merits an attempt to survey and analyze what Nietzsche does say about
this possibility for a positive transition between ways of life.
§3 NIETZSCHE’S NOTION OF REDEMPTION THROUGH SELF-
OVERCOMING
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What we learned in the last section and in Chapter 2 about the ascetic’s
attempted solution to the threat of nihilism will also be instructive here, since in
several ways the solution Nietzsche suggests resembles the ascetic solution. For
example, we have learned that the ascetic fights nihilism with a revaluation of
values and the formulation of a new kind of conscience. Likewise, Nietzsche’s
solution involves a revaluation of values and the formulation of a new kind of
conscience. But Nietzsche aims to succeed precisely where the ascetic failed from
the start; Nietzsche aims to address the problem of nihilism at its root, in the
stance of ressentiment by which one turns against oneself and against life.
Therefore Nietzsche proposes that we develop a life-affirming sovereign
conscience rather than a life-denying guilty conscience and he calls for a new
revaluation of values to liberate us from both universal or world-renouncing
values, thereby making possible a truly individual and life-affirming way of life.
Importantly, this transformation represents the self-overcoming of ascetic morality
in that it turns the ‘unnatural instincts’ against themselves, turning pity against
pity and guilt against guilt, as I will explain shortly. The result is not just the
eradication of the conflict of nihilism within (or between) these instincts,
although that also happens. The more important result is that a new, instinctive,
sovereign conscience is “forged”, a conscience comprising a self-affirming sense
of self-reverence and self-responsibility.
As with the last section, a basic account of the transformation to be traced
here has already been given in Chapter 2. In particular, I have already addressed
at length two of the main components of this transformation: a new revaluation
of values and the formation of a new kind of conscience. These components,
along with independence, constitute the defining features of Nietzsche’s ideal as
I have presented it. Yet it is not yet clear how these efforts to overcome the
ascetic way of life represent the self-overcoming of this way of life. In Beyond Good
and Evil, Nietzsche talks about the possibility of ushering in a new “extra-moral”
period in history that would involve overcoming “morality in the traditional
sense” (BGE:62). In the same passage Nietzsche claims that this task will be the
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work of his ideal ‘higher types’, but he also claims that it represents a kind of
self-overcoming on behalf of ascetic morality: “The overcoming of morality, in a
certain sense even the self-overcoming of morality: let this be the name for that
long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest, also
the most malicious, consciences of today (BGE:32). I think the best way we can
make sense of these two claims is to understand that the life Nietzsche takes to
be ideal represents the self-overcoming of the ascetic way of life; Nietzsche calls
on his higher types to have a conscience against the influence of ascetic ideals
still present within themselves. While Nietzsche sometimes heralds this
transformation away from ascetic ideals as a great historical and sociological
event, the ushering in of an “extra moral period,” it is also clear that is this
transformation is primarily a self-transformation on the part of certain
individuals. Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is interested in bringing about a
transformation within the person suffering from internal collapse. Whatever
grander sociological and historical changes Nietzsche hopes will occur, they are
all dependent on this personal type of self-transformation.
Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is interested in using the destructive forces at
work within this internal collapse to bring about a final end to this internal
collapse. This is one of the primary ways in which the transformation Nietzsche
advocates involves a self-overcoming of the ascetic life. For example, in Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche suggests that we can turn the ascetic value of pity
against itself. His strategy of turning pity against pity involves cultivating a
sense of pity for all that is destroyed or diminished by the pampering and
weakening effects of pity, e.g., the creative, proud, joyful instincts:
In man, creature and creator are united: in man there is matter, fragment,
excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator,
sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the
seventh day—do you understand this antithesis? And that your pity is for
the “creature in man,” for that which has to be formed, broken, forged,
torn, burned, annealed, refined—that which has to suffer and should
suffer? And our pity—do you not grasp whom our opposite pity is for
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when it defends itself against your pity as the worst of all pampering and
weakening?— Pity against pity, then! (BGE:225)
Pity against pity represents the self-overcoming of ascetic ideals insofar as
pity is an ascetic ideal that is now be turned against the ascetic stance and
specifically against the ascetic value of pity. Another example of this pattern of
self-overcoming involves the value of truthfulness. Although a full discussion
of Nietzsche’s thoughts on ‘the will to truth’ lies beyond the scope of this study,
it is worth exploring how Nietzsche thinks the self-overcoming of ascetic
morality can be accomplished by means of the ascetic value of truth. In the
Genealogy, Nietzsche asks “What, in all strictness, has really conquered the
Christian God?” (GM III:27) In answering, Nietzsche refers us back to a passage
from The Gay Science in which he claims that the Christian value for truth,
especially in relation to one’s conscience, has become the “scientific” conscience,
the demand for “intellectual cleanliness at any price” (GS:344). The result is that
the “mendaciousness, feminism, weakness, and cowardice” of the ascetic
interpretation of existence now has “man’s conscience against it” and “is
considered indecent and dishonest by every more refined conscience” (GS:344).
The severity of this conscience, a severity and devotion to truth honored in the
ascetic stance, now works against the ascetic stance insofar as it discovers the
falsity and cowardice at work in this stance. Nietzsche leaves no doubt about the
importance of this development or about its nature as a form of self-overcoming:
“In this severity, if anywhere, we are good Europeans and heirs of Europe’s
longest and most courageous self-overcoming” (GS:357). When Nietzsche quotes
this passage in the Genealogy he adds the following commentary by way of
further explaining the nature of this self-overcoming:
All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-
overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of
‘self-overcoming’ in the nature of life – the lawgiver himself receives the
call: ‘patere legem, quam ipse tulisti.” [Submit to the law you yourself
proposed.] In this way Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own
morality; in this same way Christianity as morality must now perish, too:
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we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has
drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking
inference, its inference against itself; this will happen, however, when it
poses the question “what is the meaning of all will to truth? (GM III:27)
As this passage indicates, the standard by which ascetic morality fails and
“must perish” is its own standard, in this case that of truthfulness. The demand
for truthfulness, and in particular the demand that we search our consciences for
the truths about our motives, is premised on a supposedly transcendent basis in
the ascetic life. Truth is demanded by God, or by an unchanging, universal
moral law (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative). Personally, Nietzsche is
ambivalent about whether ‘truth at any price’ really should be held as valuable
in this way, but this is not his argument here. Instead, he merely shows that
asceticism must submit to its own demand for truthfulness and the conscientious
examination of one’s motives and intentions for upholding the ascetic stance and
its value of truthfulness. Doing so, it eventually prompts the kinds of discoveries
that Nietzsche himself works to bring to light, e.g., that the demand for truth
does not have a transcendent basis, or that the basis for ascetic values which
condemn any expression of worldly will to power is itself a form of worldly will
to power. These are realizations the person living the ascetic way of life cannot
absorb without facing the demise of this way of life, since the ascetic stance
demands that our values have a transcendent basis, that they be universally
‘good’ regardless of particular interests of desires.
Moreover, for this very same reason one might be tempted to give up
belief in values altogether. Maintaining the demand for a transcendent basis for
values if anything is to be considered truly valuable, but facing the impossibility
of meeting this demand, one may slip into a state of the pessimistic nihilism in
which nothing seems valuable. In his unpublished notes Nietzsche writes of the
kind of nihilism reached by this self-defeating structure of ascetic values:
“’Everything lacks meaning’ (the untenability of one interpretation of the world,
upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished, awakens the
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suspicion that all interpretations of the world are false” (WP:3). Defining this
kind of nihilism, Nietzsche writes: “What does nihilism mean? That the highest
values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer” (WP I:2).
As the language of this quote suggests, the kind of nihilism Nietzsche is worried
about here is what he describes as “pessimistic” nihilism or “suicidal nihilism” in
the published works. Nietzsche suggests that living the ascetic way of life and
pursuing ascetic values and interpretations eventually leads to the collapse of
this way of life and to the kind of nihilism in which we find nothing valuable.
But Nietzsche has hopes for an alternative outcome to this internal collapse: we
could instead abandon the demand that our values have a transcendent basis
and accept that ethical values have their basis in ‘this’ life. In this case, the
internal collapse of the ascetic conception of values could be turned into a
benefit, allowing for a more life-affirming and individual way of holding values.
In the Genealogy, we find a similar pattern of self-overcoming in the
inversion of the ascetic’s ‘bad conscience’ that Nietzsche hails as a form of
“redemption.” Instead of turning pity against pity, or having an intellectual
conscience against false representations of the value of truthfulness, he now calls
on us to overthrow the ascetic form of conscience altogether – and to do so
utilizing this conscience itself. Specifically he calls us to turn guilt against guilt,
to have feelings of guilt at the pernicious, self-destructive guilty conscience
promoted by the ascetic stance. He calls on a “redeeming man of great love and
contempt” to liberate us from the ascetic guilty conscience and the underlying
mutually antagonistic instincts of the ‘bad conscience’:
Man has all too long had an "evil eye" for his natural inclinations, so that
they have finally become inseparable from his "bad conscience." An
attempt at the reverse would in itself be possible—but who is strong
enough for it?—that is, to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural
inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs
counter to sense, instinct, nature, animal, in short all ideals hitherto, which
are one and all hostile to life and ideals that slander the world. (GM II:24)
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As I suggested in Chapter 2, what emerges out of this reversal of the bad
conscience is the possibility of an independent, sovereign conscience, one which
maintains all the inner strength and resolve of the ascetic life while basing this
strength and resolve on a stance of self-reverence rather than a stance of self-
renunciation. Nietzsche suggests that we can turn the destructive force of the
nihilistic ascetic conscience against itself, destroying it while at the same time
inheriting from it something transformed and life-affirming. Moreover,
Nietzsche is clear that we could not overcome the ascetic conscience without
utilizing the self-doubting and destructive forces within this conscience.
Nietzsche declares: “We modern men are the heirs of the conscience-vivisection
and self-torture of millennia: this is what we have practiced longest, it is our
distinctive art perhaps, and in any case our subtlety in which we have acquired a
refined taste” (GM II:24). It is clearly this skill that makes the reversal of the
ascetic conscience possible: those suffering the need to examine their consciences
and to torture themselves with guilt cannot help but face the pernicious,
resentful and mendacious basis of the ascetic guilty conscience when it is
revealed (e.g., by Nietzsche) and to condemn the ascetic stance according to
ascetic values. For example, the perniciousness of the ascetic stance must be
condemned by the ascetic value of pity, the resentful nature of this stance must
be condemned by the ascetic value of love and forgiveness, and the mendacious
nature of this stance must be condemned by the ascetic value of truthfulness. In
this way we can see that the ascetic way of life fails by its own standards,
whether of not this is consciously realized by a person living this life. One of
Nietzsche’s tasks is to try to make this failure more evident, but I think his more
pressing task is to show how this failure emerges from a more fundamental
failure within the ascetic stance. As I will discuss in detail later, Nietzsche
primary criticism of ascetic morality is not the hypocritical contradiction between
its values and its motivations or even the fact that the values of the ascetic life
condemn the one living this life. These contradictions are the results of the more
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fundamental self-conflict within the agent resulting in the need to develop values
that are contrary to, or condemning of, himself.
There are several other ways that this transformation utilizes what has
been inherited by the long reign of ascetic ideals. Nietzsche credits the influence
of ascetic ideals for the development of personal depth, spirituality, and a sense
of beauty (GM III:9, GM II:18). As Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil, the
constraints of ascetic morality have “educated the spirit”: “the European spirit
was disciplined in its strength, ruthless curiosity and subtle flexibility”
(BGE:188). Moreover, it is only under ascetic ideals that we develop a strong
conscience, including the value for truthfulness as well as the above-mentioned
art of “conscience-vivisection.” All of these are prerequisites for the kind of
transformation Nietzsche calls us to make, and all of these developments remain
in some transfigured form in the life he takes to be ideal. In order to see why it
is so important for Nietzsche that the overcoming of ascetic stance be a self-
overcoming of this stance, drawing on the strengths and skills honed throughout
“the long reign of ascetic ideals,” we must now try to understand the ways in
which Nietzsche understands this self-overcoming as a kind of “redemption.”
The most obvious way this transformation is a “redemption” is that it rids
us of ascetic nihilism insofar as we come to abandon the ascetic stance towards
existence. It also rids us of the threat of pessimistic nihilism that emerged out of
the ascetic stance. Thus, Nietzsche calls his “redeeming man of great love and
contempt” someone “who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning
ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will
to nothingness, nihilism” (GM II:24). As we have seen, this redemption takes
place through the “liberation from the morality of mores” (GM II:2) and the
revaluation of resentful, world-renouncing ascetic values. The result is an
individual, life-affirming way of life, the life associated with Nietzsche’s ideal
figure.
But how is this personal transformation a redemption in any broader
sense, a redemption of the world or of “reality” in the way Nietzsche suggests by
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declaring: “he may bring home the redemption of this reality: its redemption from
the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid upon it” (GM II:24)? Elsewhere
Nietzsche talks about redeeming “the world” by ridding it of the notion of a
transcendent, perfect God who judges us according to ascetic values: “We deny
God, we deny the responsibility in God: only thereby do we redeem the world”
(TI “Errors” 8). But how does Nietzsche see any broader significance to the
personal transformation that occurs within these higher types? A clue is
provided later on this same passage, where Nietzsche calls his redeeming figure
“the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth
and his hope to man” (GM II:24). By becoming something strong, joyful, life-
affirming and able to accomplish great things in the world, Nietzsche’s ideal
figure becomes a goal and source of hope for those who would otherwise sink
down into a hopeless state of pessimistic nihilism. Nietzsche’s ideal figure
therefore serves to restore our faith in humanity. This type of redemption is
precisely what Nietzsche calls his “final hope” in relation to the current threat of
pessimistic nihilism:
[G]rant me the sight, but one glance of something perfect, wholly
achieved, happy, mighty, triumphant, something still capable of arousing
fear! Of a man who justifies man, of a complementary and redeeming
lucky hit on the part of man for the sake of which one may still believe in
man! (GM I:12)
Thus, the broader kind of redemption Nietzsche hopes for does not
require that his ‘highest type’ proselytize any new religion or moral message to
the populace. The redemption from the ascetic ideal and its “curse” of nihilism
are accomplished by the visible excellence and achievements of the sovereign,
creative individual. The self-transformation described above allows the kind of
human excellence that can serve as a new kind of ideal for which we can strive.
Nietzsche’s ideal figure thereby provides the “opposing will” and “opposing
goal” Nietzsche calls for to replace the ascetic ideal (GM III:23).
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There is yet another way that the self-transformation of Nietzsche’s ideal
figure represents a redemption in some broader sense. In order to understand
this kind of redemption and the need for this kind of redemption, we must
understand that for Nietzsche each person embodies the whole of what has come
before her as the genealogy or history that has brought her into existence or
influenced her development.107 In other words, the entire genealogy and history
of which an individual is the fruit is embodied in some form within this
individual. This situation presents an evident problem for the task of accepting a
life-affirming stance towards oneself and existence. Given how thoroughly
infected most of our genealogy and history has been with hatred, ressentiment,
and nihilism, how could we ever affirm ourselves and life as a whole? Even
Nietzsche’s ‘higher types’ have this history and genealogy of “the long reign of
ascetic ideals” within them, as a ‘necessary’ part of who they are. How then can
Nietzsche consistently call on us to affirm the whole of existence while
simultaneously calling on us to recognize this existence as thoroughly infected
with all that he wants us to reject and condemn? Or, on a more personal scale,
how can Nietzsche expect an individual to affirm his whole life if so much of this
life has had its basis in the life-denying, self-hating, resentful instincts?
In addressing these worries, I think we can turn to Nietzsche’s related
notions of amor fati and saying ‘yes’ to eternal recurrence. I understand
Nietzsche’s conception of eternal recurrence – the possibility that everything in
our lives gets repeated for eternity and in exactly the same way – less as a
cosmological thesis than as a test for life-affirmation: if you can will that your life
be repeated as a whole, exactly as it is, then you truly affirm your life as a whole.
Understood as such, this ‘yes’-saying in the face of the possibility of eternal
recurrence expresses the same idea as amor fati, the love of one’s fate as a whole
(GS:276). Both of these concepts signify the new affirmative, ‘yes’-saying stance
107 Kathleen Higgins explains this point in relation to the notion of ‘necessity’ of fate involved in Nietzsche’s
notion of amor fati, which will be discussed shortly. Kathleen Higgins, Comic Relief, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 147.
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that Nietzsche takes to be ideal. But I think they also play a role in Nietzsche’s
notion of redemption through self-overcoming. A proper understanding of these
concepts reveals that the kind of life-affirming stance Nietzsche calls us to take
does not require that we accept and affirm each particular aspect of existence. As
Kathleen Higgins suggests, affirming one’s life in the mode of amor fati and
saying ‘yes’ to eternal recurrence “is certainly not equivalent to surveying the
moments of one’s life without any thought of improvement” (Higgins, 146).
Higgins points out that the idea of amor fati is introduced in a passage expressing
a new year’s resolution, and that one “makes new year’s resolutions precisely in
order to improve the way that one is living one’s life” (Higgins, 146). Thus, we
can affirm the whole of life while rejecting those particular aspects of life that are
hateful, resentful or nihilistic.
Yet it is not clear that these replies are sufficient to fully address the
worries expressed above. After all, the problem is not with a few particular
things here and there that we would want to reject, or even with a great number
of such things; rather, we face the challenge of affirming a totality which has
been overwhelmingly defined, shaped, and ‘infected’ with what is nihilistic,
hateful and full of ressentiment. Moreover, I think the notions of amor fati and
saying ‘yes’ to eternal recurrence are not just a matter of affirming existence
because on balance those things about existence which are healthy and life-
affirming somehow outweigh, if not in frequency of occurrence than in
importance, those things that are hateful and nihilistic. I think Nietzsche
expresses the gravity of these worries and the greater potential for affirmation in
a discussion about the “sickness” of the nihilistic will to find oneself guilty:
Here is sickness, beyond any doubt, the most terrible sickness that has
ever raged in man; and whoever can still bear to hear (but today one no
longer has ears for this!) how in this night of torment and absurdity there
has resounded the cry of love, the cry of the most most nostalgic rapture,
of redemption through love, will turn away, seized by invincible horror. –
There is so much in man that is hideous! – Too long, the earth has been a
madhouse! – (GM II:22)
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I think we can interpret Nietzsche’s reference to “redemption through
love” as alluding to the Christian notion of redemption through God’s love and
forgiveness. If so, then Nietzsche mentions it as an additional irony, since he
interprets the Christian notion of love to be not the antithesis but the epitome
and “crown” of the ascetic stance and its seething ressentiment (GM I:8).
Alternately, I think we can interpret Nietzsche’s reference to “redemption
through love” as an allusion to the kind of redemption he himself hopes for, and
perhaps specifically to redemption through the love of amor fati. I think the key
to understanding amor fati in this way is to view it in relation to the self-
overcoming of the ascetic stance. As I have shown, the transformation that
brings about Nietzsche’s ideal way of living depends upon a number of
developments, skills, and strengths that are only gained (“inherited”) from the
history of ascetic ideals. This transformation involves making something
excellent and life-affirming out of this inheritance, using the negative life-
denying aspects of the ascetic stance to both end this stance and bring about an
excellent replacement. As such, I think we can understand that Nietzsche’s ideal
figure “redeems” and “justifies” the whole of history of ascetic ideals by making
something out of it, by utilizing it as a necessary means to a “higher” “more
spiritual” way of life. He thereby prevents our genealogy and history from
being ‘in vain’; in fact, he makes it valuable and justifiable precisely by making it
into a means to something life-affirming and excellent.
Here we see the significance of Nietzsche’s repeated insistence that ascetic
morality ends not just by a process of overcoming, but by a process of self-
overcoming.108 On one hand we might sees this insistence as a response to a
practical concern: since Nietzsche assumes that we are thoroughly dominated by
108 This point also shows another reason why it is important for Nietzsche that his ideal not be simply
represent a return to the way of life of the ancient ‘masters’. Although his ideal may be closer to the
masterly way of life than the slavish/ascetic way of life that replaced it, a return to the life of the masters
would signal that the whole history since the first ‘slave revolt in values’ has been in vain. A reversion to
the way of life of the ancient masters is not only impossible (TI “Expeditions” 43), but it is not even desirable;
as we have seen, much of what makes Nietzsche’s best way of life excellent depends upon its inheritance
from the ascetic life of which it is the self-overcoming.
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ascetic ideals, he must also assume that these are materials we will have to work
with in developing any new, higher way of life. But it may also be that
Nietzsche foresees the need to affirm in some way the dominance of ascetic ideals
he now wants to overthrow. We can say ‘yes’ to our fate and affirm life as a
whole not despite the sickness and nihilism of our past, but in an important sense
because of it: without it, we could never develop the ideal life Nietzsche calls us to
live. This is precisely the kind of affirmation Nietzsche associates with amor fati
in Ecce Homo:
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is
mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary – but love it. (EH “Clever”
10)
As my account implies, we can affirm the whole of life only once we have
begun to turn the ascetic stance into something higher; doing so justifies and
makes affirmable for the first time much of our history and much of who we are.
This conclusion recalls Nietzsche’s thoughts on ‘great health’ by which he means
not the absence of anything unhealthy but the fundamentally healthy ability to
turn even weakness and sickness into sources of strength. Nietzsche calls us to
make something out of our long sickness of ascetic ideals, to make of this sickness
a pregnancy by which something great and life-affirming is born. Likewise, this
conclusion recalls Nietzsche’s famous dictum that “whatever does not kill me
makes me stronger” (TI: ‘Maxims’ 8). Of course, taken as a general maxim, this
idea is patently false. But the phrase with which Nietzsche begins of this maxim
(“From the military school of life”) may already indicate that it is not meant for
everyone. Furthermore, when we consider how this phrase is presented in Ecce
Homo, we realize that the situation it names is part of the self-strengthening or
self-replenishing existential stance Nietzsche identifies only with his ideal way of
life: “He guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad
accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger” (EH
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‘Wise’ 2). In other words, I think this dictum only applies to those with ‘great
health’ and even then it applies less as a prediction of fact than as an indication
of one’s general stance of openness, creativity and resiliency in the face of all that
life brings with it.109
The existential stance Nietzsche’s identifies with his ideal figure allows
this figure to benefit where he can from misfortunes, but more significantly it
allows him to benefit from all that the ascetic stance rejects and condemns. This
idea is confirmed by Nietzsche’s description of “that economy in the law of life”
that is open to finding advantage in everything the ascetic morality rejects
(natural strengths, joy, pride, etc.) as well as in the ascetic stance itself (through
its self-overcoming, including the self-overcoming of moralists into Nietzsche’s
‘immoralists’) (TI: ‘Morality’ 6). This openness is part of the self-strengthening
‘economy’ or cycle at work within Nietzsche’s ideal way of life in which a
fundamentally affirming stance towards oneself and the world leads to
accomplishments in the world which further justify this affirmation. Such a self-
strengthening or self-replenishing cycle within a way of life contrasts with the
self-conflicted disharmonious cycle of nihilism, in which a person loathes and
attacks himself, thereby making himself weaker, thereby making himself more
loathsome. One might say that the self-overcoming Nietzsche hopes for aims at
reversing the direction of this cycle, creating a self-strengthening stance toward
life, one that benefits both from the long reign of ascetic ideals and from
everything that these ideals rejected and condemned.
§4 INTERNAL COLLAPSE VS. INTERNAL CRITIQUE
I think Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism has value as an ethical concept for
the same reasons that Kierkegaard’s notion of despair has this value. First,
nihilism describes a kind of ethical failure that is much more fundamental than
we find in the notion of a singular act of wrongdoing or an isolated vice. For
109 Nietzsche ends the passage just quoted by claiming this description applies to himself. So maybe we
should take the singularity of his statement ‘whatever does not kill me makes me stronger’ more seriously.
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Nietzsche, ethical failure takes place at the level of one’s whole way of life. More
specifically, it is the failure within one’s existential stance toward oneself, others
and the world which manifests itself in the more particular kinds of failures
condemned by other approaches to ethics (acts of wrongdoing, or vices). I think
we can find in Nietzsche’s thoughts on nihilism further support for my central
thesis about Nietzsche’s ethical project: unless we understand that Nietzsche is
concerned to analyze and evaluate different ways of life considered as a whole,
we can understand neither his notion of nihilism (or decadence), nor his hopes
for some kind of redemption through self-overcoming. I believe we can
understand what is declining and what must be overcome in order to reverse the
direction of this decline only if we understand that Nietzsche’s ethical project
focuses on ways of life, not particular actions or even particular ‘drives’ or
character traits.
Secondly, I think that Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism as a kind of internal
collapse allows for an evaluative analysis of these different ways of life without
the need for some kind of independent standard of evaluation existing outside
any of these ways of life and their modes of valuation. Nietzsche need not rely
on his own prejudices and value-judgments in taking ascetic morality
‘mercilessly to task’. He can rely on the values of ascetic morality itself to
condemn the motivations behind this morality; more substantially, he can
analyze the structure of desperate inner conflict which gives rise to self-
condemning moral beliefs. Thus, Nietzsche can give us grounds for
overthrowing ascetic morality and overcoming the ascetic stance without
needing to formulate some other supposedly universal evaluative standard; the
ascetic life is condemnable by its own standards and it collapses from the force of
its own internal conflict.
I have suggested that Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism has strong parallels
with Kierkegaard’s notion of despair in that they both describe the internal
collapse of a way of life. To my knowledge, this reading has not yet been
suggested by scholars of either thinker. But there is nothing new in the idea that
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Nietzsche’s ‘attack’ on Christian/ascetic morality involves some kind of internal
criticism of this morality; as he have seen, the texts themselves bear this out.
Walter Kaufmann establishes what may be the standard view of Nietzsche’s
internal critique in his book Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ. Yet
there are other scholars who object to putting any emphasis on the idea of an
internal problem within ascetic morality. Brian Leiter, for example, believes that
Nietzsche’s only real concern is with his “nascent higher human beings” and that
Nietzsche is critical of traditional morality only because it harms or hinders the
flourishing these higher types, not because it fails internally (Leiter, 174-177).110
Leiter gives a series of arguments against the “internal critique interpretation” of
Nietzsche that he finds in Kaufmann’s work, as well as in the work of Raymond
Geuss and Phillipa Foot. In concluding this chapter, I will address Leiter’s
objections, but I will also show some differences between my reading of nihilism
as internal collapse and these other notions of ‘internal critique.’ I will end by
saying a few words about the usefulness of an ‘internal critique’ of Nietzsche
when faced with some of Nietzsche’s more problematically resentful passages.
Kaufmann claims that the revaluation of values Nietzsche hopes for in the
future constitutes an “internal criticism: the discovery of what Nietzsche
variously refers to as ‘mendaciousness,’ ‘hypocrisy,’ and ‘dishonesty.’
(Kaufmann, 111-112). Kaufmann thinks that this revaluation simply involves
the realization of the inconsistencies within traditional morality, inconsistencies
that are already destroying this morality. In his view, Nietzsche “points out how
our accepted morality is dying of internal inconsistencies. His No consists in the
acceptance of a fait accompli. The philosopher only lays bare the cancerous
growth” (Kaufmann, 112). Yet Kaufmann also seems to suggest that the work
Nietzsche does to reveal this ‘cancerous growth’ of inconsistencies has some role
to play in bringing about an end to this morality, claiming that Nietzsche
provides “a sudden and terrifying illumination about the true nature of our
110 Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (New York: Routledge, 2002).
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traditional values – an illumination which these values cannot survive”
(Kaufmann, 113). In either case, Kaufmann is clear that Nietzsche is not
criticizing traditional morality by his own standards of value or by any external
standard whatsoever; rather, he is pointing out how traditional morality fails “by
its own standards”:
The revaluation is thus the alleged discovery that our morality is, by its
own standards, poisonously immoral: that Christian love is the mimicry of
impotent hatred; that most unselfishness is but a particularly vicious form
of selfishness; and that ressentiment is at the core of our morals.
(Kaufmann, 113)
Raymond Geuss gives a parallel account in his book The Idea of a Critical
Theory.111 Geuss says that Nietzsche gives a “genetic” criticism of Christianity in
the sense that this is a criticism of the “‘origin’ of Chrisitianity – that Christianity
arises from hatred, envy, resentment, and feelings of weakness and inadequacy”
(Geuss, 44). Geuss assumes that Nietzsche’s account of this origin of
Christianity is not meant to be a historical account of the origin of Christianity,
since Geuss finds that “it is unclear what critical import such a statement could
have” (Geuss, 44). Instead, Geuss thinks that Nietzsche’s account names the
origin of Christianity within each adherent, aiming “to make a general statement
about the typical motivation of Christians” (Geuss, 44). Like Kaufmann, Geuss
emphasizes that Nietzsche’s criticism of these motivations need not be based on
Nietzsche’s own standards, since these motivations for Christianity are
condemnable by Christianity’s own standards:
Nietzsche, in presenting this criticism, need not himself be committed to
the view that hatred is in general, or always, or even ever an unacceptable
motive for action. It is sufficient for the critical enterprise that the
Christian cannot acknowledge hatred as an acceptable motive for beliefs,
preferences, and attitudes. Since it is a central doctrine of Christianity that
agents ought to be motivated by love, and not by hatred, resentment,
111 Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
232
envy, etc, Christianity itself gives the standard of ‘acceptability’ for
motives in the light of which it is critiqued. (Geuss, 44)
In her essay “Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values,” Phillipa Foot is
generally in agreement with Leiter that the revaluation of values Nietzsche calls
for is meant to serve the interests of Nietzssche’s higher types, that it is “for the
sake of the ‘higher’ man that the values of Christian morality must be
abandoned, and it is from this perspective that the revaluation of values takes
place” (Foot, 162).112 Nonetheless, Foot points out that Nietzsche attacks
Christianity on several grounds. First, she thinks Nietzsche is suggesting that
“what is praised as Christian virtue is largely a sham, and that true goodwill
would be produced not by teaching the morality of compassion but rather by
encouraging ‘a healthy egoism’” (Foot, 159). Secondly, Foot claims that
Nietzsche “is saying that judged by its own aims this morality is bad. Men suffer
pity as a sickness, and by their pity they do more harm than good” (Foot, 159).
To some extent these critiques match the pattern of “internal criticism” found in
Kaufmann and Geuss. But rather than saying that Christian morality is self-
condemning in that its typical motivations are condemnable by its own standards,
Foot says that Christian morality is self-defeating in that its aims of promoting
‘goodwill’ and benefits to others are contrary to the means it employs in
promoting these ends. Compassion and pity do not express or promote
goodwill or provide benefits to others. Just the reverse: in Nietzsche’s account,
compassion and pity express resentment and hatred, and only serve to harm
those whom it affects. Foot suggests that Nietzsche’s proposed ‘healthy egoism’,
although it is condemned by a morality of compassion, would do a much better
job of promoting and expressing this goodwill and of actually benefiting others.
In opposing what he calls these ‘internal critique’ interpretations of
Nietzsche, Leiter cites these the above-mentioned works and develops three
arguments against the idea that Nietzsche critiques ascetic morality (what Leiter
112 Phillipa Foot, “Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values” in Robert Solomon, Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical
Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 156-168.
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calls “MPS” – morality in a pejorative sense) “on the grounds that its own
proclaimed standards (e.g. ‘love one another’) require a condemnation of MPS
itself given its typical motives (e.g., hatred)” (Leiter, 174). His first argument
claims that this view is guilty of a kind of genetic fallacy. Just because ascetic
morality arose out of resentment and hatred does not mean that it still arises
from these motivations, and “only if MPS is still motivated by hatred would it
seem that a “morality of love” would have any reason to condemn itself” (Leiter,
174). Leiter makes a good point that revealing hatred and ressentiment as the
historical origins of ascetic morality may be embarrassing for this morality, but by
itself such a historical account does not reveal anything about the motivations
behind ascetic morality today. Nietzsche himself warns against making this
kind of genetic fallacy (GM II:12, GS:345). Those scholars who think Nietzsche is
presenting an internal critique of present day morality would have to show that
according to Nietzsche this morality is still motivated by hatred and ressentiment.
Contrary to this view, Leiter makes the surprising claim that “it is not at all clear
from the text of the Genealogy that he is claiming that present-day morality is
motivated by hatred or ressentiment” (Leiter, 174).
Although this claim is perhaps true in a strictly literal sense, I think it is
surprising because it seems to go against the whole tenor of the Genealogy.
Although Nietzsche may not come right out and tell us that our morality is still
thoroughly infected with ressentiment, this is certainly implied in several points
throughout the book. I think that Nietzsche is not so subtle that this point could
be missed by any careful reader. For example, Nietzsche declares that he finds
“palpable today” “bearers of the oppressive instincts that thirst for reprisal” (GM
I:11), and he calls moralists of his day (like Eugene Dühring) “men of
ressentiment” (GM III:14). He also declares that the ascetic mode of valuation, in
which there “rules a ressentiment without equal” “does not die out” but is rather
“one of the most widespread and enduring of all phenomena” (GM III:11).
To give another example, in his dramatic conclusion of the first essay of
the Genealogy, Nietzsche tells us that the struggle between the “opposing values,”
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the noble versus the ascetic mode of valuation, is “as yet undecided” in some
places today. Nietzsche chooses as the “symbol” of this struggle “Rome against
Judea, Judea against Rome” and he makes clear that Judea can still symbolize the
ascetic mode of valuation because the Jews were “the priestly nation of
ressentiment par excellence” (GM I:16). Moreover, Nietzsche is clear that
ressentiment is not strictly an ancient phenomenon. Nietzsche calls the Protestant
Reformation, the values of which were still prevalent in Nietzsche’s day (as he
knew all-too-well), a “ressentiment movement” (GM I:16). Also, Nietzsche
complains that with the shining exception of Napoleon, the “popular instincts of
ressentiment” triumphed in the French Revolution. Nietzsche ends the essay by
implying that unless “the ancient fire” of noble ideas that Napoleon represented
is rekindled, we will be left with the enduring “triumph” of ressentiment (GM
I:17). Nietzsche reveals that his polemic aim is to keep this from happening by
getting us to “will” and “promote” that which opposes this triumph of
ressentiment (GM I:17). It would be very hard to read these passages without
concluding that in Nietzsche’s view the morality he opposes is still a morality of
ressentiment.
We reach the same conclusion if we consider what it is that is named by
ressentiment. In the passage just cited, Nietzsche identifies ressentiment with “the
will to the lowering, the abasement, the leveling and the decline and twilight of
mankind” (GM I:16). From what we have already learned in this chapter, we
know this description matches perfectly the crisis of nihilism Nietzsche thinks
we face today. More specifically, ressentiment as Nietzsche describes it is not
simply the motivation of vengefulness, it is the internal state of someone whose
natural aggressive instincts cannot be vented in actuality so they vent themselves
inwardly (against themselves) or indirectly against others and the world (GM
I:10). Ressentiment is the state of internal war against oneself (“anarchy of the
instincts,” “instincts that are mutually antagonistic, “the bad conscience”) and
the state of indirect, cowardly, or “spiritualized” war against others and against
existence itself (e.g., through world-renouncing ascetic values). Understood as
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such, we can readily see that Nietzsche believes our current morality to be a
morality of ressentiment, since these are precisely the conditions Nietzsche sees
prevalent in our values today.
It seems Leiter’s reading may get some support from the fact that
Nietzsche often complains not about the passionate hatefulness and vengefulness
behind contemporary values, but about their expression of an utter lack of
passion and will. But I have already shown that both this sort of weary
pessimistic nihilism and the more passionate ascetic nihilism are based most
fundamentally in same the physiological or psychological state of ressentiment
described above: they are both expressions of the fact that one is at war with
oneself and existence. This may be a ‘low-level civil war’ within a person whose
pettiness and self-abnegation lead to a state of mediocrity, or it may be an ‘all-out
civil war’ of the ascetic whose lust for self-torment and hatred of reality reach
more passionate heights. In either case, ressentiment is present in the instincts
turned against themselves, and Nietzsche leaves no doubt that this state of
ressentiment is precisely what he (still) finds objectionable in ascetic values today.
Leiter is right to worry about the genetic fallacy since Nietzsche maintains
that it is often the case that “the cause and origin of a thing and its eventual
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds
apart” (GM II:12). But consider that for there to be a genealogy of something,
this something must persist in some form or another throughout this genealogy,
e.g. in the genealogy of punishment the practices of punishment remain
relatively stable while the meanings and uses of these practices change
throughout history. What is it that remains relatively stable throughout the
genealogy of morals? On one hand, it is the values of ascetic/slavish morality,
‘unegoistic,’ world-renouncing values. But Nietzsche is clear that what persists
behind these values, and what explains their continued persistence, is the
internal state of ressentiment. Thus, Nietzsche declares that the various meanings
and manifestations of the ascetic stance testifies to the enduring need for this
stance, namely as a response to the inability to vent one’s will in actuality: “That
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the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, is an expression of
the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal – and it will rather
will nothingness than not will” (GM III:1). This “basic fact of the human will,” the
situation within the agent such that there is the need to will nothingness rather
than not will at all, is precisely the situation of ressentiment in which instincts that
cannot be vented outwardly in action must be vented in some other way.
Leiter’s second argument against the internal critique interpretation of
Nietzsche is somewhat more convincing, if also less damning. Leiter claims that
“while Nietzsche clearly wants his readers to appreciate the irony that a morality
of ‘love’ should have its origins in hatred, careful examination of Nietzsche’s
texts reveals that he does not seize upon this contradiction (even in the
Genealogy) in mounting his criticism of MPS” (Leiter, 174-5). In a footnote, Leiter
immediately adds two qualifications to this argument which serve to weaken it
significantly. First, Leiter acknowledges that Nietzsche does sometimes
emphasize a contradiction between the principles advocated by morality and the
motivations for this morality. Leiter cites a passage from The Gay Science as
evidence for this: “the fundamental contradiction in the morality that is very
prestigious nowadays: the motives of this morality stand opposed to its
principles” (GS:21). But Leiter insists that the context of this passage makes it
clear that the contradiction Nietzsche has in mind here is in no way central to his
criticism of this morality. According to Leiter, the fact that the ‘unegoistic’ is
praised for egoistic reasons is not central to Nietzsche’s criticism of these ideals:
he does not dwell on this hypocrisy or contradiction in pressing his case against
ascetic ideals. Furthermore Leiter claims that this is not the “’contradiction’
commentators have in mind when they attribute an internal critique to
Nietzsche,” and Leiter cites Geuss as an example (Leiter, 175 fn).
Although Leiter is right to say this is not the contradiction Geuss has in
mind, it is clearly one of the contradictions Kaufmann has in mind. Kaufmann’s
lists as one of the self-condemning contradictions of ascetic morality “that most
unselfishness is but a particularly vicious form of selfishness” (Kaufmann, 113).
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But Leiter’s overall point in this second argument is a good one. In general,
Nietzsche’s criticism of ascetic morality does not center on the mendacious,
hypocritical contradiction between the motivations of this morality and its own
principles, although he does occasionally point out this hypocrisy and
mendaciousness. Where Leiter goes wrong is in inferring from this fact that
Nietzsche is not primarily interested in problems internal to ascetic morality, just
that ascetic morality harms nascent higher types. Here I think we can make an
important distinction between the notion of an internal critique, in which
contradictions between motives and principles are exploited for argumentative
purposes, and internal collapse, which describes a way of life fundamentally at
odds with itself. Nietzsche only occasionally employs an internal critique when
arguing against ascetic morality. But as we have seen in this chapter, Nietzsche
is very much interested in revealing the internal collapse of the ascetic way of
life.
The internal contradiction within the ascetic life is not primarily a matter
of “‘mendaciousness,’ ‘hypocrisy,’ and ‘dishonesty,” contrary to what Kaufmann
suggests (Kaufmann, 113). Contradictions between principles and actual
motives are just the results and symptoms of the deeper inner contradiction
within the agent and between the agent’s instincts. As I hope to have shown in
this chapter, Nietzsche’s primary criticism of the ascetic morality is that it is an
expression of nihilism, the inner conflict within an organism that takes sides
against itself. We could say that Nietzsche’s central problem with ascetic
morality is not that its principles can be shown to contradict each other, or that
they condemn the motives for holding these principles, but that this morality
represents a fundamentally self-conflicted and self-condemning existential
stance. In other words, the internal problem with ascetic morality is much more
immediate and fundamental than advocates of the internal critique
interpretations seem to realize. The hypocrisy and theoretical contradictions
within the ascetic stance are results of the nihilistic self-conflict within this
stance. The real problem is not that one fails to live up to ideals of pity,
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selflessness and the like; the real problem is that one holds these values in the
first place, that one needs to hold them because one needs to lash out at oneself
and life through one’s values. It is the state of self-conflict, not the expression of
this self-conflict a hypocritical or self-condemning morality, that marks the true
danger and failure of the ascetic life.
Leiter’s second qualification to his argument points to the passages in
which Nietzsche explains how ascetic morality “self-destructs” by means of the
ascetic value for truthfulness. Leiter acknowledges the importance of this idea
for Nietzsche, but insists that it does not amount to an internal critique of ascetic
morality since this morality “is criticized from a broadly ‘scientific’ and ‘truth-
seeking’ standpoint, a standpoint which is not internal to Christian morality, but
which Christian morality helped produce” (Leiter, 175n). In reply, one might
quibble with the claim that for Nietzsche the ‘scientific’ ‘truth-seeking’
standpoint is not really internal to Christian morality even if this morality helped
to produce it. Nietzsche is quite clear that most of what constitutes the
‘scientific’ ‘truth-seeking’ standpoint of his own day is not just a product of ascetic
morality, but is in fact “the latest and noblest form of it” (GM III:23). More
importantly, Nietzsche repeatedly insists that the process by which ascetic
morality is brought down by its own value of truthfulness is a process of “self-
overcoming” (GS:357, GM III:27, EH “Destiny” 3). If the truthfulness which
accomplishes this destruction were not internal to ascetic morality, how would
this process be a case of “self-overcoming”?
The more decisive reply to Leiter builds on the distinction between
internal collapse and internal critique just established. Nietzsche does not
criticize ascetic morality for having a value that undermines this morality; if
anything, he welcomes this situation. In point of fact, Nietzsche sees himself as
the embodiment of this situation: it is through him that the value of truthfulness he
has inherited from the reign of ascetic ideals is used to reveal the internal
collapse within these ideals: “The self-overcoming of morality out of
truthfulness, the self-overcoming of the moralist into his opposite—into me—that
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is what the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth.” (EH ‘Destiny’ 3)
Although Nietzsche might be most worried about the ‘sickness’ of this internal
collapse infecting nascent higher types, he clearly thinks that it is important to
reveal the internal conflict within the ascetic stance. We are prepared to
understand the strengths of will and conscience needed by these higher types,
and the redeeming self-overcoming of ascetic morality that they represent, only
when we recognize the internal collapse of nihilism at work in both ascetic
morality and slavish mediocrity.
This brings us to Leiter’s third and final argument against the internal
critique interpretation. Leiter claims that “one typical interest of an internal
criticism of any view is that it should force those who hold the view to reconsider
their commitment” (Leiter, 175n). But according to Leiter this is not one of
Nietzsche’s interests: “Nietzsche is explicit that this is not his aim: he does not
want to force the majority of people (the ‘herd’ as he often calls them) to abandon
MPS; to the contrary, he claims that MPS is, indeed, appropriate for certain types
of people” (Leiter, 175n). Leiter is surely right that Nietzsche does not want to
force the majority of people to abandon ascetic morality; as I have suggested
above, Nietzsche’s aim is not to have his ‘higher types’ proselytize to the masses.
But what Leiter’s account generally overlooks is the fact that the “nascent higher
types” that Nietzsche is concerned about are themselves at least partially under
the sway of ascetic morality. They are, at best, “battlegrounds” in which the
ascetic ‘mode of valuation’ needs to be challenged and overcome (GM I:16). As I
have demonstrated in this chapter, Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the internal collapse
within the ascetic stance is meant to provide the grounds for a self-overcoming in
which those under the sway of this stance use its strengths and destructive
potential to bring about an end to this stance and the beginning of a more life-
affirming, individual stance towards life. So not only does Nietzsche want (at
least some of) his readers to “reconsider their commitment” to ascetic morality,
he wants them to utilize the strengths of this commitment as part of a process of
self-transformation. In general, Leiter’s rigid differentiation of ‘higher’ and
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‘lower’ types overlooks the fact that what Nietzsche really aims for is a self-
transformation within someone with unrealized potential to be a higher type.
Realizing this potential is not a matter of inevitable or natural development; it
requires the kind of dramatic self-transformation I have described above.
Although I think the notion of an internal critique in Nietzsche’s writings
is primarily valuable as part of a broader understanding of the internal collapse of
the way of life that Nietzsche critiques, I think the notion of an internal critique of
Nietzsche himself, or at least of Nietzsche as an author, can be quite valuable. I
ended the last chapter by showing how reading Kierkegaard in light of his own
self-examination, especially his insights about the despair of resignation, yields a
kind of internal critique of Kierkegaard. Truly learning from Kierkegaard entails
being wary of some of the things Kierkegaard says. This internal critique allows
us to read Kierkegaard well by being attentive to those places in his writings
marked by resignation and despair. I think a parallel case could be made with
respect to Nietzsche. I hope to have shown that overall Nietzsche’s writings
express a joyful, hopeful, life-affirming message. But there is no question in my
mind that Nietzsche sometimes slips into a mood more reflective of ressentiment
than of joy. For example, several of the passages about women or about
Germans in Beyond Good and Evil and other works seem to display not just his
usual passionate zest for critique but a lingering, rancorous resentment with
respect to these subjects. I agree with Solomon that Nietzsche is grateful for the
developments he attributes to ressentiment like inwardness and spirituality, and
for the fact that Nietzsche was able to harness his own ressentiment in productive
ways, namely by focusing it against the morality of ressentiment (turning
ressentiment against ressentiment, as it were).113 But I think that there are passages
in which we find a ressentiment that is not this kind of ‘spiritualized’ and useful
113 Robert Solomon, Living with Nietzsche, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103-105.
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ressentiment-turned-against-itself, but rather the old-fashioned, petty,
smoldering-grudge kind of ressentiment that Nietzsche calls us to reject.114
Thus, I think that learning from Nietzsche about ressentiment and its
manifestations provides us with an internal critique by which we can discern
which passages are problematically resentful. We can therefore learn to read
Nietzsche well, and learn to ‘weather his moods’, by applying what he has taught
us to his own writings. Far from undermining the views of either of these
thinkers, the internal critique they make possible strengthens our ability to
understand and evaluate their ideas for ourselves. We thereby learn from them
to be the kind of individually-minded, critical readers they both long to have.
114 For example, I think we can appreciate Nietzsche use of ressentiment in a passage like GM I:14 in which
Nietzsche gets us to feel his own nausea at ascetic ideals by describing the “bad air” of the ‘cave’ in which
ascetic ideals are “manufactured.” In contrast, it is hard to see the same kind of merit in passages like
BGE:147: “From old Florentine novels, moreover – from life: ‘buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.’
[good women and bad women need beating] Sacchetti, Nov. 86” or in BGE:232: “Woman has so much
reason for shame; in woman there is concealed so much pedanticism, superficiality, schoolmarmishness,
petty presumption, petty unbridledness and petty immodesty […] which has fundamentally been most
effectively controlled and repressed hitherto by fear of man.”
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CHAPTER 5
CONTRASTING KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE
In this chapter I will address some of the more significant and interesting
points of contrast between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that have emerged from
my exposition in the previous four chapters. The exposition of despair and
nihilism in the last two chapters will now be used to establish the critiques each
thinker could bring to bear against the other’s ideal life. In other words, we will
see how Kierkegaard might accuse Nietzsche’s sovereign individual of despair
and how Nietzsche might accuse Kierkegaard’s person of faith of nihilism. As I
will show, the fact that both thinkers are asking the same fundamental question
but presenting such different and opposing answers to this question opens up an
interesting ethical dialogue between their respective ideas. This dialogue
converges on such topics as responsibility, autonomy, guilt, and the relation
between spirituality and ethics. These topics are not only greatly significant to
each thinker, they also constitute the central points of disagreement between
them. My point is not to end this dialogue by showing how one of these
thinkers refutes or defeats the other, but to establish where the lines of
disagreement in this dialogue actually lie. Only by delineating this differences
clearly can we benefit from the critical insights each thinker can offer the other.
It will also help to suggest the kinds of the topics and discussions that any ethics
focusing on ways of life would need to address.
§1: REVIEWING OTHER STUDIES OF KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE
I will begin this chapter by addressing a number of recent and historical
comparisons of these two thinkers.115 Some of these studies have usefully
115 I will list these studies here and thereafter refer to them parenthetically. Allastair Hannay,
“Nietzsche/Kierkegaard: Prospects for dialogue?” Kierkegaard: Sellected Essays, (Routledge, 2003); James
Kellenberger, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, (MacMillan Press, 1997); Gregor Malantschuk, “Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche,” Transl. Grieve, A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Johnson & Thulstrup, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962),
116-129; John Powell Clayton, “Zarathustra and the Stages on Life’s Way: A Nietzschean Riposte to
Kierkegaard?” Nietzsche-Studien, 14 (1985) 179-200; Gerd-Günter Grau, “Nietzsche and Kierkegaard,” Transl.
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detailed particular points of intersection between the thinking of Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche, but none have focused on the broad convergence between these
thinkers in their approach to ethics as I have presented it. The motivation of
many studies comparing Kierkegaard and Nietzsche has been to articulate how
one of these thinkers might be used to attack the other. As I will demonstrate,
this eagerness to find a decisive reply to one thinker in the work of the other
(usually by a scholar already championing one of them) has the tendency to
oversimplify and under-appreciate the work of one (and usually both) of these
thinkers. In turn, these tendencies have the result of artificially closing what
would otherwise be a fruitful and compelling dialogue between their ideas.
The most common problem with the Kierkegaard scholarship in these
comparisons is a failure to respect the distinction between Kierkegaard’s life of
resignation (religiousness A) and his life of faith (religiousness B). This problem
is especially conspicuous in studies which seem to champion Nietzsche over
Kierkegaard (Cinelli, Hinman, Clayton, Grau), but it is appears in less biased
studies as well (Jaspers, Deleuze). Jaspers presents Kierkegaard as espousing
“an otherworldly Christianity which is like Nothingness and shows itself only in
negation (the absurd, martyrdom) and in negative resolution” (Jaspers, 25).
Later he reiterates that for Kierkegaard the leap into this Christianity is
conceived as a “decision for utter world negation and martyrdom” (Jaspers, 36).
In Chapter 1 we saw that Kierkegaard does not espouse an “otherworldly
Christianity”: Abraham has faith ‘for this life’ and the person of faith is joyfully
present to herself in faith. Jasper’s term “negative resolution” is in fact Judge
Wilhelm’s term for what he considers an alternate approach to the ethical life:
Wendy Rader, Studies in Nietzsche and Judeo-Christian Tradition, ed. O’Flaherty, et. al. (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1985), 226-251; Albert Cinelli, “Nietzsche and Kierkegaard on Existential
Affirmation,” Southwest Philosophy Review, 1989; 5:135-141; Lawrence M. Hinman, “Temporality and Self-
Affirmation. A Kierkegaardian Critique of Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same,”
Kierkegaardiana XI 1980, p. 93-119; Karl Jaspers, “The Origin of the Contemporary Philosophical Situation:
The historical meaning of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,” in Reason and Existenz, Transl. Earle, 3rd Edition (New
York: Noonday Press, 1955); Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Transl. Paul Patton, (London: Athlone
Press, 1994 orig. 1968), 1-27. Conrad Bonifazi, Christendom Attacked: A Comparison of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, (London: Rockliffe, 1953); Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Transl. Justin O’Brien, (New York:
Vintage, 1991, orig. 1955).
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instead of the “positive resolution” (commitments to marriage and life-tasks)
there is “negative resolution” (commitment to ascetic world-renunciation) (SLW,
112). As I have shown in the previous chapters, for Kierkegaard it is essential to
distinguish the life of “world negation” and “negative resolution” from the life of
faith, since in relation to faith such resignation is a form of intense despair.
However much faith includes a ‘movement’ of resignation, the overall stance of
faith is one of joyful acceptance of finite, everyday life.
A similar problem is found in Deleuze, where the discussion of
Kierkegaard focuses on Abraham as a hero of resignation: “Job is infinite
contestation and Abraham infinite resignation, but these are one and the same
thing” (Deleuze, 7). Deleuze does not seem to take into account the central
contrast in Fear and Trembling between faith and resignation. Moreover, it is
unclear how Abraham’s unquestioning obedience of God and Job’s contestation
of God could ever be “one and the same thing.”
Cinelli’s study suffers from a similar misunderstanding. Although he
acknowledges that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche propose some sort of life-
affirmation, he thinks that for Kierkegaard the finite can only be affirmed
provisionally, on the basis of a hope that it will be transcended: “The knight of
faith can be as comfortable as he is with the finite because his faith allows him to
believe that the finite will ultimately be transcended” (Cinelli, 138). He contrasts
this half-hearted life-affirmation with the “more bold” affirmation of Nietzsche
(Cinelli, 138). Certainly there are interesting differences between Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche regarding the basis and nature of life-affirmation, as we will
discuss in greater detail later. But there are no grounds for claiming that
Kierkegaard’s knight of faith affirms finitude only on the absurd hope that it will
be transcended; Abraham’s “faith for this life” is not a hope that his finitude will
be transcended, but that he will regain “exactly the same finitude” as a gift and
task from God. For Kierkegaard, what is absurdly grasped in faith is that the
transcendent makes itself manifest in the finite. This is exemplified in the
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Incarnation but also in Kierkegaard’s call for the person of faith to “transform the
leap in life to a gait, to express the sublime in the pedestrian absolutely” (FT:70).
Cinelli also makes mistakes in understanding Kierkegaard’s other ways of
life, locating an “existential question of choice” within the aesthetic life, where it
has not yet developed (EO II:167), and declaring that the ethical life is “enslaved
to decorum” and “becomes a mere following of rules” (Cinelli, 135-6). He takes
Kierkegaard’s term ‘finitude’ to refer to these rules of decorum rather than to
everyday existence in the world, as Kierkegaard uses it. On the basis of this
error, he quite bizarrely groups Kierkegaard’s life of resignation with Nietzsche
ideal of going beyond “herd morality” (Cinelli, 140). Since he takes the life of
resignation’s rejection of finitude to be a rejection of these rules, the life of
resignation is supposed to match with Nietzsche’s life ‘beyond good and evil’ in
which these rules are rejected.116 In these misreadings Cinelli misses the much
more obvious comparison of Kierkegaard’s resignation with Nietzsche’s ascetic
life, since both center on world-renunciation, suffering, and the consciousness of
guilt. In contrast to such world-renunciation, both Kierkegaard’s life of faith and
Nietzsche’s life of creative sovereignty stand as positive alternatives in which
one affirms everyday existence with gratitude and joy. Rather than exploring
these alternatives on an equal level, Cinelli takes Kierkegaard’s ideal to be a half-
hearted anticipation of Nietzsche’s and reaches the biased conclusion that
“Kierkegaard, one can argue, puts forth his doctrine of faith because he is unable
to bear what is involved with an acceptance of atheism” (Cinelli, 140).
Lawrence Hinman also stumbles over the failure to distinguish
Kierkegaard’s life of faith from his life of resignation, and this clouds both his
comparison and his contrast of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Hinman reads
Kierkegaard’s Christianity as like Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence in that it
becomes “the greatest stress, the heaviest burden” for a person by “increasing the
116 For different reasons, Kellenberger also identifies Nietzsche’s ideal with Kierkegaard’s resignation:
“Kierkegaard might well have seen Zarathustra’s acceptance as very like infinite resignation, for it is a
matter of one’s own willing effort” (Kellenberger, 122). The main mistake here, to be discussed at length
later, is that Zarathustra’s acceptance is less a matter of willing effort than it is a cessation of willing.
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tension between the finite and the infinite” (Hinman, 115). While there is some
truth to saying the Kierkegaard’s Christianity is a “burden,” Hinman does not
address how for Kierkegaard faith offers a relief from this burden and reconciles
the finite and the infinite. In fact, a harmony between the finite and the infinite
as “factors” of the self is one of the defining traits of a faithful self in The Sickness
Unto Death, as explained in my Chapter 3. This mistake translates into a
mistaken conception of how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche fundamentally diverge.
Hinman argues that the “fundamental point of divergence between Nietzsche
and Kierkegaard” is that for Kierkegaard only God, as the “infinite and
absolute,” can be affirmed with infinite passion. In contrast, for Nietzsche, man
can be affirmed as an infinite and absolute subject instead (Hinman, 116). Here
Hinman relies on what is said from the point of view of religiousness A in the
Postscript without considering that in faith the infinite and finite are brought
together, reconciled (on the strength of the absurd), and mutually affirmed.
John Powell Clayton seems to make a similar mistake in his attempt to
match Kierkegaard’s highest way of life with what is symbolized by the camel in
Zarathustra’s ‘Thee Metamorphoses.’ Clayton writes that Kierkegaard’s
“severe” religious type is appropriately represented by this camel “as a beast of
burden which falls to its knees in order to be laden” (Clayton, 190). “Willing to
pay any price, bear any burden, this akward [sic] beast lumbers its way along
life’s via dolorosa looking for yet heavier weights to be placed upon its back” (C,
190). Again, the severity and burden of Christianity are certainly a part of
Kierkegaard’s ideal life of faith, but Clayton would have to consider the
distinction between this burden as it manifests itself in faith and as it manifests
itself in resignation. Clayton seems to have blocked this distinction by insisting
that “as is well known” for Kierkegaard there are “three and only three modes of
human existence or ‘stages on life’s way’,” namely the aesthetic, the ethical and
the religious (C, 185). Since Clayton identifies the ‘ethical’ here with the ethical
life of Judge Wilhelm, he does not seem to be able to account for the difference
between resignation and faith that is so important for Kierkegaard.
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In Clayton we also find another mistake common to several comparisons
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the mistake of matching Nietzsche’s (highest)
aesthetically creative life with Kierkegaard’s (lowest) aesthetic life. This
suggestion may be found in a number of studies (Malantshuk, Hannay,
Kellenberger)117 but it is best represented in Clayton’s work. Clayton’s thesis is
that each stage of Zarathustra’s metamorphoses represents one of Kierkegaard’s
stages on life’s way, but that Nietzsche presents them in reverse order as a kind
of riposte to Kierkegaard. Thus, Clayton finds that Nietzsche’s ideal life,
symbolized by the ‘baby’ and the ‘sacred Yes’, matches with Kierkegaard’s
aesthetic life: “Like Kierkegaard’s aesthete, this child-like ‘second innocent’ is
governed by fate, by fortune and misfortune” (Clayton, 191). What Clayton
seems to overlook is that the aesthetic life is also and primarily the hedonistic
life, the life of pleasure. This dependence on the accidents of ‘fate’, on fortune
and misfortune, is the aesthetic person’s despairing inability to secure pleasure
and relief from boredom. It is not the actively engaged ‘amor fati’ that Nietzsche
proposes, which might be better matched to the concept of “divine governance”
that Kierkegaard finds governing his own authorship in Point of View.
In general, I think Clayton’s way of contrasting Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is a false lead, one based on an equivocation regarding the term
‘aesthetic.’ What Nietzsche’s ideal has to do with “aesthetics” is not that it is the
life of enjoyment or pleasure, but rather that it involves the creation of works of
art (or of oneself as something like a work of art), and Nietzsche expects that this
creation may well entail a painful spiritual struggle. Nietzsche makes clear his
disdain for the “pleasure-seeking and lack of conscience” of what Kierkegaard
would call the aesthetic life (D:P4). His emphasis on “great responsibility” and
“autonomy” clearly distinguish his ideal from the hedonist. Furthermore,
Nietzsche applauds artists and creators for their inner strength and integrity,
precisely the qualities that Kierkegaard’s aesthete lacks.
117 See Malantschuk, 124; Kellenberger, 124; and Hannay, 210,212.
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A final example of a Nietzsche scholar being unfair to Kierkegaard in his
comparison of the two can be found in the work of Gerd-Günter Grau. In his
recent 1997 work comparing Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, a collection of essays
entitled Venunft, Wahrheit, Glaube: Neue Studien zu Nietzsche und Kierkegaard Grau
repeats an interesting thesis he had presented at several earlier points.118 Grau
would like to see Kierkegaard’s notion of faith collapse according to Nietzsche’s
notion of the self-dissolution of Christianity in which its value for truth is finally
turned against Christianity, revealing Christianity’s worldly basis (GS:357, GM
III:27). This is an intriguing thesis, and certainly Nietzsche’s notions of internal
collapse can be brought to bear on Kierkegaard’s life of faith in interesting ways
(as we will explore later in this chapter.) But Grau starts out on the wrong foot
by focusing on the issue of the “rational confirmation” “verifiability” or “proof of
validity” of Kierkegaard’s Christianity (Grau, 236,237,240,244,246,249,251). He
portrays Kierkegaard as trying, but continually failing, to provide such a proof of
validity, and this is what he imagines to be Kierkegaard’s Christian self-
dissolution.
Grau speculates on Kierkegaard’s personal life in order to find evidence
for the failure of Christianity to provide such a proof. He says that Kierkegaard
did not get the divine intervention he had hoped for, namely giving him Regina
back again “as the reward, as it were, for the ‘obedience’ involved in breaking it
off. It is the point of his analysis in Fear and Trembling of the story of Abraham,
who is spared the sacrifice of Isaac, that the ‘father of faith’ had the courage to
believe in “this life,” that is, to expect to receive concrete proof for his faith in the
here and now” (Grau, 245-6). Grau thinks that the fact that this proof is not
forthcoming is the central crisis for Kierkegaard’s Christianity and the prompt
for him to turn to a belief on the basis of the absurd. In reply, it seems Grau
118 Grau first presented this thesis in his Die Selbstauflösung des christlichen Glaubens: Eine religionsphilosophische
Studie über Kierkegaard (Franfurt am Main: Schulte-Bulmke, 1963). This thesis was published in English in
his “Nietzsche and Kierkegaard” Transl. Wendy Rader, Studies in Nietzsche and Judeo-Christian Tradition. Eds.
O’Flaherty, et. al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 198) pp.226-251, to which I make
reference here. Most recently, this thesis appears in Grau’s Venunft, Wahrheit, Glaube: Neue Studien zu
Nietzsche und Kierkegaard, (Würtzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997), p. 90-94.
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misunderstands Fear and Trembling entirely if he takes the regaining of Isaac to be
“concrete proof” for Abraham’s faith, as if Abraham has a theory that Isaac will
be spared and his actually being spared is confirming evidence for this theory.
For Kierkegaard, nothing could be more ridiculous than to demand or even seek
‘proof’ that one’s faith in God is rationally justified. In fact, his position from the
start is that it is not rationally justified. Moreover, it is far from clear how the
ram appearing in the thicket could be taken as rational proof for Abraham’s faith.
For Johannes de Silentio, it is not even the sparing of Isaac that is significant, but
rather the fact that Abraham receives him back with joy; he can imagine a
resigned Abraham (an Abraham without faith) who is also spared Isaac, but who
finds ‘joy no more’ in his life. Likewise, while Kierkegaard may have hoped for a
divine intervention that would bring Regina back again, he certainly did not
demand this as proof of his faith, nor did he suffer some kind of crisis of faith
because he did not receive divine intervention, as Grau suggests. The entire
notion of a “reward” for being faithful seems totally foreign to Kierkegaard’s
understanding of faith.
I would add that Grau seems to misunderstand Nietzsche if he thinks
Nietzsche would press anyone for a proof and rational verification of religious
beliefs. As we learned in the last chapter, for Nietzsche the dangerous truth that
Christianity discovers through its own value of truthfulness is not that it lacks a
rational proof of God, but rather that its belief in God and transcendent, world-
renouncing values are in fact based on world-embracing motivations (the will to
power.) In other words, Christianity collapses because it cannot maintain its
strict division between the transcendent and the worldly in which the worldly is
to be despised on the basis of transcendent values. But Kierkegaard’s
Christianity claims to reconcile the transcendent and the worldly. As I will
explain later in this chapter, there is indeed an interesting application of
Nietzsche’s notion of internal collapse to Kierkegaard’s Christianity, but the
grounds of this application have nothing to do with the “proof” or “rational
verification” of Christianity.
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Grau also greatly misunderstands Kierkegaard’s life of faith, especially his
notion of “the instant” in relation to faith. He takes it as a failure on
Kierkegaard’s behalf that, having criticized the aesthete for living only in the
moment, he now returns to this idea in the mode of faith (Grau, 244, 247).119
Discussing the either/or between ‘the ethical’ and aesthetic “‘instants’ of fleeting
‘highs’” Grau says:
Nevertheless, at the end of his journey of faith Kierkegaard will be forced
to proclaim this very ‘instant’ Christian as well, and he will have to pay
for this regression with the admission that the synthesis of finite and
eternal, which had at one time appeared verified to him only in Christian
faith, is indeed unattainable.” (244)
The most obvious problem here is that Grau has failed to take into account
the difference between the ‘instant’ in the life of faith and the ‘instant’ in the
aesthetic life, which is the vast difference between ‘first immediacy’ and ‘second
immediacy’. The ‘instant’ of the aesthetic life is the fleeting moment in which the
aesthete flees from himself and from any continuity in time. In contrast, as we
learned in Chapter 1, the ‘instant’ of the life of faith means being present to
oneself and unified within oneself in one’s concrete, everyday situation; it means
being at peace with the passage of time and with oneself. As a result of this
misunderstanding, Grau sees it as a “regression” for Kierkegaard to return to the
notion of an instant.
Grau’s misunderstanding of Kierkegaard as trying but failing to rationally
prove God’s existence can be set in contrast to what was once the standard point
of comparison between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Existentialists in the 20th
Century like Jaspers and Camus looked to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as early
“irrationalists” who challenged and overthrew traditional philosophical attitudes
about the efficacy of systematic reasoning (Jaspers, 25, Camus,22). Although
this reading is valid insofar as it goes, a focus on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as
119 See also Grau’s discussion of this point in Venunft, Wahrheit, Glaube: Neue Studien zu Nietzsche und
Kierkegaard, (Würtzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997), p. 93.
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“defenders of the rights of the irrational” has the tendency to overlook their
carefully reasoned dialectical explanations of how ways of life collapse internally
(or succeed in escaping such internal collapse). Thus, although Camus shows
great deference for Kierkegaard (“Of all perhaps the most engaging,
Kierkegaard, for a part of his existence at least, does more than discover the
absurd, he lives it”), Camus nonetheless critiques Kierkegaard for abandoning
and escaping the absurd by sacrificing the intellect altogether. He reads
Kierkegaard as substituting God for the absurd and then abandoning lucidity in
the face of the absurd altogether.
Camus locates his own position on the absurd as counter to this, stating
that “if I recognize the limits of reason, I do not therefore negate it, recognizing
its relative powers. I merely want to remain in the middle path where the
intelligence can remain clear” (Camus, 40). Yet it is unclear how Kierkegaard
might be cutting short the exercise of the intelligence in its “relative powers.”
For Kierkegaard, the only things that the intellect fails to grasp are the paradoxes
of Christianity and the view of human selfhood this Christianity represents. The
intellect exercises considerable “relative powers” with respect to everything else,
and is even helpful in leading us to these paradoxes when we try to apply the
intellect to understand faith. Moreover, consider how closely what Camus calls
“lucidity” in the face of the absurd matches with Abraham’s state of mind in
Fear and Trembling. Although he lacks a rational account to justify or explain
himself, Abraham seems to have a lucid understanding of his situation vis-à-vis
God and how he ought to fulfill the demands of his faith.
Having discussed problems within the Kierkegaard scholarship of studies
comparing Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, we are now ready to turn to problems
within the Nietzsche scholarship of these same works. Several sources of error
which tend to plague Nietzsche studies more generally are in evidence here. For
example, we find the problematic dependency on Nietzsche’s unpublished
Nachlass, compiled under the title The Will to Power. Malantschuk draws heavily
from this work in elucidating his view of Nietzsche, calling it “one of his major
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works” (Malantschuk, 117). To a lesser extent, Hinman also relies upon these
notes to support his reading of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence (Hinman,
100,107,111,115). Other studies tend to rely heavily on the author’s own
interpretations of passages from Thus Spake Zarathustra without conferring with
Nietzsche’s other works to see if these interpretations fit with Nietzsche’s
explicitly stated ideas. As we have already seen, John Powell Clayton’s
comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche depends entirely on his interpretation
of the ‘three metamorphoses’ passage. Failure to consider other texts or even
other passages within Zarathustra leads Clayton to mistaken notions of
Nietzsche’s ideal, which will be discussed shortly. Likewise, Kellenberger’s
analysis of Nietzsche’s joyful life-affirmation depends upon his interpretation of
a single passage in Zarathustra. The fact that Zarathustra participates in the
‘second dance song’ is taken as sufficient evidence for the view that for Nietzsche
joyful self-affirmation is a result of one’s will.120 Specifically, his literary
interpretation of this single passage allows Kellenberger to conclude that the joy
of Nietzsche’s ideal life is a willed entrance into Dionysian frenzy in order to
(self-deceptively) escape the horrible truths one knows about the world
(Kellenberger, 110).
Related to this, and by far the most common weakness of the Nietzsche
scholarship in these studies, is an undue reliance on interpretations of
Zarathustra’s figure of the Übermensch to articulate Nietzsche’s ideal for how to
live (Malantschuk, Hannay, Kellenberger, Clayton, Cinelli, Bonifazi, Jaspers,
Deleuze). As discussed in Chapter 2, the few mentions of the Übermensch in
Zarathustra are insufficient to ground any clear picture of Nietzsche’s ideal. In
the absence of any substantial grounding, scholars tend to project onto the
Übermensch whatever they want (or fear) Nietzsche to mean by this figure.
120 In Part Two of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra encounters girls dancing in the woods and he sings for
them a song about Life and Wisdom (personified as women), but does not participate in the dancing (Z:2
“The Dance Song”). In Part Three of the book, the section entitled “The Second Dance Song,” begins with
Zarathustra being compelled to dance by the personification of life: “Twice only did you raise your castanets
in your little hands – then my feet were already tossing in a mad dance” (Z:3 “The Second Dancing Song”).
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Gregor Malantschuk finds the Übermensch to represent Nietzsche’s ideal of a
dictator who rules by might: “For ‘the many-all too many,’ as Nietzsche says, the
superman must create laws, he must govern them with might” (Malantschuk,
121). Although Malantschuk is opposing Nietzsche and Clayton is defending
him, they both read the Übermensch as someone who is free from any ‘thou shalt’
and “is not bound by lasting commitments” (Malantschuk, 120;Clayton, 191). If
these authors had taken a broader look at Nietzsche’s works, or even at other
passages in Zarathustra (as we did in Chapter 2), they might have realized that
for Nietzsche to be free of any commitments is not an ideal. Clayton mentions
Nietzsche’s ideal of someone who is “his own lawgiver and judge” but
apparently does not understand this lawgiving as generating any lasting
commitments (Clayton, 191). As we saw in Chapter 2, Nietzsche’s ideal is the
ability to form and keep one’s own autonomous commitments.
Other readings of the Übermensch vary widely. Kellenberger talks about
this figure as a substitute for God, while Cinelli finds him to be the “final result
of the evolutionary process of man” (Kellenberger, 78; Cinelli, 138). More
problematically, Hannay finds the Übermensch to represent the purely naturalistic
values of what he calls ‘the scientific project’ (Hannay, 212). Hannay complains
that this naturalism “sides with science, mechanizes man, and then pitifully
leaves us with a still impotent ‘Overman’ who has freed himself from the
resentments of first philosophy only to settle for the unexamined values
propelling the scientific project” (Hannay, 212). Hannay leaves it unclear what
these scientific values might be, why they are unexamined, why they are
associated with the ‘Overman’, and why the ‘Overman’ is impotent to do
anything but adopt them. Oddly, Hannay associates Nietzsche not only with
science but also with irrationalism, arguing that “for Nietzscheans the question is
where now to look for the universal in reason’s so called other” (Hannay, 211).
What is problematic here is not so much the familiar labeling of Nietzsche as an
irrationalist, but the suggestion that Nietzsche wants to create universal values.
He explains that even after “dispensing with the universal in its Socratic form”
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we still have “the ability to create our own exemplars” (Hannay, 211). Yet it is
unclear why these exemplars should be universal exemplars, given Nietzsche’s
attacks on universals and his insistence that values need not be taken as
universal in order to be respected.
Parallel to these loose readings of the Übermensch, several studies are
based on questionable readings of Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche scholars often debate whether Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrence
should be thought of as an ontological or “cosmological” thesis (that the world
actually repeats itself), as Nietzsche seems to suggest in some of his later,
unpublished notes, or whether it should be taken simply as an existential
question (testing whether we affirm the world as it actually is). Hinman does an
excellent job of distinguishing these readings (Hinman, 97). But then he seems to
blur them together in arguing that the cosmological reading can be maintained,
but not “as a realists thesis about the world as such” (Hinman, 101). Instead,
Hinman uses a notion of the will to power as interpretation found in the Nachlass
to argue that for Nietzsche the question is whether “we can – in thought as well
as in action – impose the cosmic doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same on
existence” (Hinman, 101). By acting and thinking as if the world repeats itself,
by interpreting the world as doing this, Hinman thinks we can “attempt to make
the cosmic doctrine true by embodying it” (Hinman, 101). Hinman seems to
suggest that we can somehow bring about eternal recurrence as a cosmological
fact simply by interpreting our lives as eternally recurring. Although I find
Hinman’s solution intriguing, he leaves it unclear how we are to act and think as
if the world repeats itself. Moreover, it is not clear that Nietzsche would be
comfortable with the notion that eternal recurrence as a cosmological thesis is
somehow dependent on how we act and think.
Other authors are less careful in discussing the notion of eternal
recurrence. Malantschuk suggests that Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrance
is a desperate and failed attempt to regain something eternal in the absence of
God. He believes that for Nietzsche, we find ourselves faced with the fact we
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are “between two voids” – our non-existence in the infinite past before we
existed and our non-existence in an infinite future after we die. “A sinister
nothingness and annihilation await the individual who does not believe in
eternity, as this alone can withstand the river of time. In a desperate attempt to
escape this, Nietzsche clutches at the doctrine of eternal repetition or recurrence”
(Malantshcuk, 121-2).
The first point to make clear is that Nietzsche does not seem to be worried
about the ‘nothingness’ after death, let alone the nothingness that preceded birth.
Malantschuk states that “I agree with the interpreters of Nietzsche who maintain
that this belief in eternal recurrence is adopted by him as a surrogate for the
immortality of the soul. In order to save his individual existence from perdition
and extinction in nothingness, he is forced to have recourse to a belief in eternal
recurrence” (Malantschuk, 122). Yet how could the nothingness after death be a
“perdition” for Nietzsche? To foist on Nietzsche the need to have some kind
immortality is to overlook one of his central ideas, namely that we should affirm
life as it is, as something impermanent, and that all values which uphold
permanence as a condition of value are life-denying. Malantschuk is simply
being unfair in suggesting that Nietzsche is desperately trying to find some
substitute for the doctrine of immortality, since this doctrine is one of the life-
denying beliefs Nietzsche wants to overthrow. If Malantschuk’s point is simply
that we all have a psychological desire to feel that we are immortal, it is not clear
how this can be made into an objection against Nietzsche since Nietzsche could
either claim that eternal recurrence fulfills this need (or that this need is one of
the ‘unnatural’ and life-denying instincts of asceticism that needs to be
overcome).
Deleuze runs into similar problems because of his own loose reading of
eternal recurrence. He attributes this doctrine to Nietzsche as an ontological
claim, claiming that Nietzsche “conceives of repetition in the eternal return as
Being” (Deleuze, 6). Deleuze then goes on to claim that “Nietzsche’s leading
idea is to ground the repetition in eternal return on both the death of God and
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the dissolution of the self. However, it is a quite different alliance in the theatre
of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of an alliance between a God and a self
rediscovered” (Deleuze, 11). It is unclear how eternal recurrence is grounded in
the death of God, although it may be motivated by a desire to find some ‘eternal’
meaning in a life without a notion of an eternal God and eternal soul. More
importantly, it is unclear in what way Nietzsche believes in the “dissolution of
the self”, except as either nihilism in the negative sense (dissolution through
weakening, self-hatred, and decadence) or as the overthrow of the (Kantian)
notion of a subject.121 But for Nietzsche there is clearly a strong belief in at least
the possibility of an individual self, if only as a rarity and an ideal. For both
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard there is a “rediscovered self” on the other side of the
spiritual crisis they warn us about, however much this “self” differs from the
conceptions of selfhood prevalent in traditional Western philosophy.
Two other studies also make the mistaken suggestion that in contrast to
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche does away with all individual selfhood. Malantschuk
warns that:
One consequence of Nietzsche’s outlook is that the individual disappears
entirely as an independent being and becomes a mere cog in the huge
machinery of the world with its eternal repetitions. The German
philosopher therefore retreats into the last refuge of paganism, a belief in
an inexorable fate, in which man is entirely at the mercy of blind forces.
(Malantschuk, 123)
Whatever Nietzsche’s view of freedom and determinism, this view would
never amount to a rejection of individuality, at least as an ideal. At the very
least, this is true for the simple reason that for Nietzsche ontological theses about
such topics as free will always follow from one’s values, rather than serve as the
rational ground of these values. While Nietzsche does talk about ‘fate’ (each
121 Deleuze seems to be suggesting the post-modern reading of Nietzsche in which Nietzsche is denying
individuality and selfhood. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, although Nietzsche is indeed dismissing the
usual (Kantian) notion of a ‘free subject’, he is by no means dismissing individuality. As we saw in a review
of what Nietzsche says about his ideal ‘higher type’ in a range of works, Nietzsche holds individuality as
essential to this ‘higher type.’
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person is at bottom a substratum of spiritual fate) this fate does not take the form
of vast impersonal, blind ‘forces’ – one’s fate is one’s character, one’s instincts,
one’s individuality. In other words, Nietzsche’s notion of fate never amounts to
the individual becoming a mere ‘cog’ in a vast cosmic machine. To the contrary,
Nietzsche pairs strong individuality and a “trusting fatalism” in which the whole
is affirmed (TI “Expeditions” 49).
Like Malantschuk, Hannay suggests that Kierkegaard’s notion of “the
particular individual” is nowhere to be found in Nietzsche. Unlike Malantschuk,
Hannay offers some defense this reading. He says that for Kierkegaard “what
one essentially is, if anything, lies beyond and above, and is therefore no longer
protected by, any finite role or character description” (Hannay, 215). Whether or
not we accept Hannay’s desciption of the Kierkegaardian self as essentially
beyond any finite role or character description, Hannay’s unstated and highly
questionable premise here is that Nietzsche’s notion of an individual is
something completely encompassed by finite roles and character descriptions.
Given Nietzsche’s emphasis on a ‘free spirit’s’ ability to liberate himself from
societally-imposed ideas and norms, I think Hannay would have a difficult time
defending this characterization. Certainly there may be a sense in which what
Kierkegaard calls “spirit” may be missing from Nietzsche’s account; Nietzsche’s
notion of selfhood is undoubtedly more naturalistic or animalistic than
Kierkegaard’s. But Hannay seems to suggest that for Nietzsche there is nothing
spiritual about the self at all, a point Nietzsche would contest. (Nietzsche is clear
that his ‘higher type’ is supposed to represent “a more spiritual nature” (GM
I:17).) What this difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche amounts to is a
different conception of what a human self is and what it takes to be an
individual, although they converge in holding this individuality to be not only
possible but ideal.
Having discussed this and other particular problems within Hannay’s
study of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I will now to turn to Hannay’s central
thesis, in which I find a direct challenge to one of my central claims. Hannay
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maintains that “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are in such fundamental
disagreement on the matter that interests them most that it is closer to the truth
to describe any apparent similarities and parallels ultimately as differences”
(214). Although he acknowledges a point I take to be central to my study,
namely that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer us two “alternative views of
human fulfillment,” he also maintains that there is no possibility of a fruitful
“dialogue” between these thinkers (Hannay, 215). Hannay insists that “there is
no denying, and no amount of strategically selective ‘dialoguing’ should obscure
the fact, that these are thinkers with fundamentally very different ideas about
what the new world needs. Not one via positiva. Possibly two in parallel. But
not so that you can have a foot in each” (Hannay, 216). According to Hannay,
what is fundamentally blocking any such “dialogue” is the fact that behind
Nietzsche’s ideals and Kierkegaard’s ideals there are “different metaphysical
structures.” Hannay says that for Kierkegaard the project is “still recognizably
moral, its telos, or ‘excellence’, the formation of genuinely social intention, while
Nietzsche’s is not that. The two notions have different metaphysical structures.
That the metaphysical frameworks differ means that most seeming parallels are
at bottom illusory” (Hannay, 216).
In response, I would say that for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the
central issue is still ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’, as Hannay seems to acknowledge in
saying that “I feel sure Kierkegaard would have recognized in Nietzsche a
genuinely moral thinker” (Hannay, 216). It remains unclear what Hannay
means by saying the telos of Kierkegaard’s struggle is “the formation of a
genuinely social intention.” I suspect it might be difficult to find such a social
intention as the telos of Kierkegaard’s work, or at least to show that Kierkegaard
has more of a social intention than Nietzsche. The second point is that while
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche may in fact be buying into different metaphysical
frameworks, this should not in itself preclude a valuable dialogue between them.
As I just discussed, neither put any emphasis on getting one’s metaphysics
straight as a kind of foundation for ethical thought. Moreover, many thinkers
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who do not share a metaphysical framework have been able to engage in a
productive dialogue (e.g. Kant and Hume, Plato and Aristotle).
It seems that what Hannay really objects to in dismissing any “dialogue”
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is what Kierkegaard would call
“mediation.” Certainly, no amount of mediation between Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche will succeed in conflating their very different ideals together, nor
would this be desirable. As I have maintained throughout, what makes the
possibility for a dialogue between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche so valuable is that
they maintain such strong disagreements while still pursuing the same
questions. What I mean by a “dialogue” between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is
not mediation between them such that we converge on a single answer to the
question of what way of life is best. Rather, I see this dialogue as spelling out
the points of disagreement between two thinkers mutually pursuing this ethical
question and project.
§2: KIERKEGAARD vs. NIETZSCHE ON THE BEST WAY OF LIFE
Having reviewed some of the most recent and influential studies of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I now take up the task of drawing my own points of
contrast between these thinkers. Bearing in mind these other studies of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I should begin a note on my methodology. Of the
scholarly comparisons of these figures that I have read, several have made this a
comparison of these men personally, or worse yet, a comparison of one man’s
actual life with the other’s ideal life. In what follows I will stick to a comparison
of the ideals of these two thinkers, however much an ad hominem approach is
tempting and even ironically fitting, given their own frequent uses of this
approach.
The most obvious point of disagreement between Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is, of course, religion. Kierkegaard believes that there really is a God
and Nietzsche believes that there really is not a God. Since the reality or
unreality of God is so central to the work of each of these thinkers, one might
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think that any supposed ‘dialogue’ between them would immediately reach a
stalemate (as Hannay would predict). This might be true if Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche were typical philosophers, if they took this metaphysical thesis about
the existence of God as conceptually foundational, as a ‘first premise’ from which
all their other ideas are based. But this is the case for neither Kierkegaard nor
Nietzsche. Neither put any stock in arguments made either for a metaphysical
thesis about God’s existence, or on the basis of such a metaphysical thesis.
A similar point can be made with respect to the proclamation that ‘God is
dead,’ which seems like an obvious point of disagreement between Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche. This supposed point of disagreement is not so obvious if we
consider what Nietzsche means by ‘God’ in this sentence. What I take Nietzsche
to mean by declaring ‘God is dead’ is that the concept of God is ‘dead’ in that we
can no longer rely on this concept as the conceptual foundation for our thinking
on ethics, natural science, etc. (It would be bizarre to read Nietzsche as saying
that there had been a divine entity but that this entity had died. Likewise, if
Nietzsche intended to propose the metaphysical thesis there never was any
divine entity, it is not clear why he would associate this idea with a current crisis
in values.) All the dramatic weight of the idea that ‘God is dead’ seems to come
from the lost usefulness of the concept of God as a foundation for our thinking
about ethics, etc. This seems to be what he has in mind in declaring that if God
is dead, one loses the right to Christian morality. But understood in this way, I
think Kierkegaard may well agree with Nietzsche that this ‘God’ is indeed dead,
and has never existed. Kierkegaard is just as eager as Nietzsche to attack the
idea that God should be relied upon as a conceptual foundation in this way. As
we have seen, Kierkegaard is opposed to any rationalist conception of religion in
which a metaphysical thesis about God’s existence neatly grounds a system of
ethics; for Kierkegaard, God is precisely what confounds and destabilizes our
ordinary understanding of ethics.
So while the issue of God’s existence is certainly an irreconcilable
difference between them, and may well be the final point of disagreement at
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which discussions of various topics eventually come to a dead-end, I don’t think
it precludes a meaningful dialogue between them. Instead of meeting head-on
over the question of whether or not God truly exists, I think each thinker would
take a more subtle and artful approach. Each thinker would formulate a critique
using his schema of internal collapse: Kierkegaard would try to locate
Nietzsche’s highest way of life as a form of despair and Nietzsche would try to
locate Kierkegaard’s highest way of life as a form of nihilism or ressentiment.
Let us begin with Kierkegaard’s potential critiques of Nietzsche’s ideal life
of creative sovereignty. In doing so we will take as our guide the typologies of
despair Anti-Climacus traces in The Sickness Unto Death. An obvious match
with Nietzsche, as Malantschuk points out, is the final form of despair described
at the very end of the book: the “height of despair” in which one commits the
“sin of abandoning Christianity modo ponendo [positively], of declaring it to be
untruth” (SUD:158). He thinks the positive denial of Christianity is a matter of
offense: “abandoning Christianity as a falsehood and a lie is offensive warfare”
and this “sin” is “the positive form of being offended” (SUD:159). It is certainly
true that Nietzsche denies Christianity positively, even if this is not the meaning
of ‘God is dead’ and even if Nietzsche does not try to establish this denial as the
endpoint of a rational proof. It is also true that Nietzsche is ‘offended’ at
Christianity in much the way Kierkegaard expects. But it is not clear how
Kierkegaard’s account of this form of despair could be leveraged to attack
Nietzsche’s position. Kierkegaard thinks trying to establish God’s existence
positively is by nature impossible; moreover, he regards all such philosophical
defenses of Christianity to be offensive to Christianity. Since, for Kierkegaard, to
want to positively establish or deny Christianity philosophically are both forms
of ‘offense’, he would have no philosophical grounds for objecting to Nietzsche’s
rejection of the idea of God’s existence. This issue of positive assertions or
denials of the ‘truth’ of Christianity is something that both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche generally want to avoid. Since this issue leads a comparison between
them immediately back to the dead-end of the ‘God question’ (whether God
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exists or not), it may not be as helpful for exploring their differences as it would
seem.
More fruitful, perhaps, is the consideration of Nietzsche’s ideal in relation
to the very lowest levels of despair. In his firm denial that we are anything more
than our natural, animal self, Nietzsche’s ideal individual seems to be ripe for the
charge of ‘spiritless despair’: “the despairing ignorance of having a self and an
eternal self” (SUD:73). Since Nietzsche rejects the notion of an eternal soul, Anti-
Climacus might declare that Nietzsche’s highest type has “no conception of
being spirit” and has gone no further than the conception of the self held by
“paganism and the natural man.” Whether Anti-Climacus would consider
Nietzsche’s highest type to be in the despair of ‘pagan spiritlessness’ (as
Nietzsche might prefer) or ‘Christian spiritlessness’ (since Nietzsche’s highest
type, unlike the pagans, has at least been exposed to Christianity), I do not know.
In either case, I think Nietzsche could reply that what really lacks “lofty
spirituality” is Kierkegaard’s notion of spirit as requiring something above and
beyond finite, “worldly” reality. Nietzsche repeatedly contends that his life-
affirming individual represents a “higher spirituality” and “more spiritual
nature” than the Christian.122 He also claims that Christianity, specifically its
moral condemnation of those who love their earthly life, “is the favorite form of
revenge of the spiritually limited on those who are less so” (BGE:219). Thus, I
think this charge of spiritless despair would open up an interesting discussion
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on what counts as ‘spirit’ and what way of
life represents the highest form of spirituality. Within their disagreements on
these topics, I think we can find an interesting dialogue on the relation between
spirituality and ethics. (This avenue of dialogue will be continued in the next
chapter.)
122 See for example GM I:16, BGE:213,219,201. A full discussion of what ‘spirit’ and ‘spirituality’ mean for
both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche lies beyond the scope of this study, but we will return to this topic in the
next chapter.
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As we discussed above, scholars comparing Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
often point out that Nietzsche puts a very high value on aesthetics, whereas for
Kierkegaard the aesthetic life represents a lower form of despair. So we might try
to locate Nietzsche in the same form of despair as we find Kierkegaard’s
aesthete. Anti-Climacus associates the spiritless despair just mentioned with
“the aesthetic individual” who is “totally dominated by his sensuous and
psycho-sensuous reactions; he lives in the categories of the sensate, the pleasant
and the unpleasant” (SUD:76,73.) Alternately, we might also try to locate
Nietzsche’s ideal within the despair of not wanting to be oneself, the despair of
the “immediate person” who understands himself only as “something included
in the scope of the temporal and worldly” and whose “dialectic” is therefore:
“the pleasant and the unpleasant” “good fortune, misfortune, fate” (SUD:81-2).
(The difference between spiritless despair and this form of despair seems to be
that in the latter, the immediate person runs up against some kind of scandalon,
an earthly need or misfortune.) The problem with locating Nietzsche’s best way
of life within Kierkegaard’s despair of the aesthetic life has already been
discussed: Nietzsche’s idea is contrasted with both the pleasure-seeking and
spiritless conformity that Kierkegaard identifies with the despair of immediacy.
Next we might consider Nietzsche’s sovereign individual as falling within
the category of ‘demonic despair.’123 (There is a certain dramatic sexiness to
declaring Nietzsche’s ideal life ‘demonic.’) We have some indirect support for
this reading: Anti-Climacus says that denying Christianity is “the height of
despair” and “the highest intensification of sin;” he also says that despair is sin,
and that demonic despair is “the most heightened form of despair” (SUD:158,
165, 104). So it would seem to follow that those who deny Christianity
positively are in demonic despair, according to Kierkegaard’s schema.
123 Variants of this suggestion are found in Kellenberger, 124, and to lesser extent in Malantschuk, 125. As
we discussed in Chapter 3, what Kierkegaard means by “demonic” shifts slightly throughout his works, but
in general it refers to the conscious refusal or avoidance of what one knows to be good.
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Yet Nietzsche’s life-affirming sovereign individual does not fit Anti-
Climacus’ most extensive description of demonic despair found at the end of
Part I of the book. Nietzsche’s ‘higher type’ can hardly be described as a person
who “prefers to rage against everything and be the one whom the whole world,
all existence, has wronged” (SUD:103). Rather than describing Nietzsche’s ideal
life, this description matches almost exactly the life of ressentiment with which
Nietzsche’s sovereign life is contrasted.124 The same problem arises if, as
Kellenberger suggests, we try to locate Nietzsche’s ideal in the domain of
“passive defiant despair” in which one “takes offense at all existence”
(Kellenberger, 123). Like the person of passive defiant despair, Nietzsche’s
highest type realizes that there are some parts of himself that he cannot change,
but this does not lead him to “take offense at all existence” (cf. GS:290 and
SUD:102 ).
Lastly, we should consider Nietzsche’s best way of life in relation to what
Anti-Climacus calls “active defiant despair.” I believe it is here that Nietzsche’s
ideal finds its greatest challenge from Kierkegaard. This despair involves
wanting to be oneself, specifically wanting to be the self one creates. As Anti-
Climacus explains, the person of defiant despair wants to use his freedom “to
rule over himself, or create himself, make this self the self he wants to be,
determine what he will have and what he will not have in his concrete self”
(SUD:99). This description matches well with Nietzsche’s notions of self-
mastery and the self-creation involved in ‘giving oneself style’ (GS:290). Anti-
Climacus finds this attempt at self-creation to fail of its own internal
contradictions since this self “is constantly relating to itself only experimentally,
no matter what it undertakes, however great, however amazing and with
whatever perseverance” (SUD:100). The problem is not only that this self relates
to itself only experimentally, but that since it lacks any notion of authority
superceding its fleeting and sometimes contradictory whims, it cannot undertake
124 Here I think we can see the importance of evaluating Nietzsche’s ideal way of life, rather than Nietzsche
himself, since the case could be made that Nietzsche does not fully escape this form of ressentiment.
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anything with the seriousness necessary to bring this undertaking to completion:
“It recognizes no power over itself; therefore in the final instance it lacks
seriousness and can only conjure forth the appearance of seriousness, even when
it bestows upon its experiments its greatest possible attention” (SUD:100). It
certainly seems to be part of Nietzsche’s notion of sovereignty that the sovereign
individual is “liberated” from any power over him or her.
As we discussed in Chapter 3, a similar challenge can be found in
Kierkegaard’s journals. Criticizing Kant’s notion of an autonomous person who
“bound himself under the law which he gave himself” Kierkegaard says: “In a
deeper sense that means to say: lawlessness or experimentation. It is no harder
than the thwacks which Sancho Panza applied to his own bottom” (Journals,
Transl. Dru, no. 1041). The central weakness with the attempt to master or create
oneself is that this becomes only an arbitrary, “fictional” building project in
which the self is “forever building only castles in the air” since “the negative
form of the self exerts the loosening as much as the binding power; it can, at any
moment, start quite arbitrarily all over again and, however far an idea is pursued
in practice, the entire action is contained within a hypothesis” (SUD:100-1). For
this reason, Anti-Climacus is suspicious of precisely the kind of “sovereignty”
that Nietzsche claims for his ideal figure. Anti-Climacus refers specifically to the
notion of self-mastery in a way that matches well with Nietzsche’s call for
someone who is happily conscious of his own power and mastery over himself
and over circumstances: “The self is its own master, absolutely (as one says) its
own master; and exactly this is despair, but also what it regards as its pleasure
and joy” (SUD:100). As I argued in Chapter 3, I believe that what Anti-Climacus
presents here is a powerful critique of self-reliance and the possibility of
sovereignty, and this critique applies both to one’s ability to shape and create
oneself and one’s ability to remain committed to one’s projects and promises. As
such, it is a powerful challenge to the very basis of Nietzsche’s hopes for his
sovereign individual.
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Turning now to Nietzsche, I will begin by saying a few words about how
Nietzsche might respond to this challenge, and then I will describe how
Nietzsche might critique Kierkegaard’s life of faith. Nietzsche might begin by
saying that sovereignty is not about ‘spanking yourself.’ As we saw in Chapter
2, sovereign self-mastery is not the same as ascetic self-control. Unlike the
ascetic, Nietzsche’s self-affirming individual is not divided within himself, he
does not turn against his own natural drives. I think Nietzsche could use
Aristotle’s schema to say that the sovereign individual is more like the
‘moderate’ man whose drives are already in line with what he knows to be good
than the ‘self-controlled’ man whose drives would lead him astray from what he
knows to be good unless he controls and suppresses them.
Nietzsche might also reply that if there is a ‘loosening power’ in the
sovereign individual’s life, it is not the same as the ‘binding power.’ The
binding power is one’s ‘dominating instinct,’ one’s greatest passion in life;
whatever drives or wishes might run contrary to this as a ‘loosening power’ are
not as strong as the dominating drive. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Nietzsche’s
highest type has a dominating instinct or sovereign conscience that sets the other
drives to order, at least to the extent necessary to maintain a unified self directed
at fulfilling one’s commitments. Nietzsche seems to allow that some people may
have more than one dominating drive, as in his suggestion that the soul is an
oligarchy of different drives. But if this oligarchy does not hold the whole self in
unity or harmony, if the self splinters into an anarchy of competing drives, this
would be a case of what Nietzsche calls decadence, “the anarchy of the instincts”
(TI “Socrates” 4,9,11). It is also decadence if one’s supposedly ‘dominating
instinct’ changes frequently and arbitrarily, thereby prohibiting what Nietzsche
calls an all-important “protracted obedience in one direction” (BGE:188).
As for the charge of arbitrariness, from an external perspective there may
be something arbitrary about what a person’s greatest passion in life happens to
be. Likewise, and along with this, it may seem arbitrary what commitments a
person happens to take upon herself. But in the life Nietzsche advocates, once
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one comes to have this passion and enter into these commitments, they cannot
just as easily or arbitrarily be done away with. The self-reverence with which he
makes a promise insures that the promise will not be broken arbitrarily or on a
whim, even for the sake of something else that this figure desires or values. The
sovereign individual does not fulfill his commitments out of pursuit of “narrow
utility,” which would allow for such wavering as the needs of narrow utility
change. Rather, he fulfills his commitments because he values and respects
himself enough to keep his word. Whatever these competing desires and values
may be, they do not override his value and respect for himself as someone
capable of upholding commitments. Thus, the sovereign individual does not
arbitrarily break commitments or enter into conflicting commitments - as
Nietzsche says, the sovereign individual makes promises only very warily (GM
II:2).
Moreover, regarding the ‘creation of the self’, as Nietzsche makes clear in
the ‘giving oneself style’ passage of Gay Science, this is not a matter of sudden,
arbitrary attempts to restructure or revamp the self as a whole. Nor is everything
about one’s self able to be changed. There are some things that simply must be
accepted (e.g. for Nietzsche, his debilitating sickness), although one can perhaps
make something valuable out of these hardships. Moreover, what can be
changed is changed only “through long practice and daily work at it” (GS:290).
For Nietzsche, this task of becoming oneself by becoming a sovereign individual
is not something achieved in the moment of choice or decision, but a long and
difficult process of growth and personal development. It is, in fact, the work of
a lifetime.
Having outlined some of the defenses Nietzsche could supply against
Kierkegaard’s critiques of sovereignty, let us now to examine what critiques
Nietzsche could levy against Kierkegaard’s ideal life. This is not easy to
discover since many of Nietzsche’s usual critiques of Christianity fail to apply to
Kierkegaard’s life of faith. Primary among Nietzsche’s criticisms is that
Christianity is a matter of conformity and ‘herd mentality’; Kierkegaard’s fiercely
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individualistic Christianity would not fall easily into this picture.125
Kierkegaard’s life of faith also seems to escape Nietzsche’s critique of the
Christian life as one of joyless self-loathing and resentment against the world. As
we have seen, Kierkegaard’s life of faith involves a joy in the everyday, and an
affirmation of finitude as a gift and a task from God. Thus, it seems that
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche agree in renouncing renunciation. Kierkegaard’s best
way of life is contrasted with the life of ascetic renunciation (‘resignation’ or
‘Religiousness A’) that Nietzsche locates at the heart of Christianity.
Yet I think Nietzsche would still find a deep ressentiment and nihilism
within the life Kierkegaard is proposing. In Chapter 4 we saw that ressentiment
for Nietzsche means the simmering resentment, discontent and hatred within
those who are powerless against themselves, the world, and (most of all) those
who are powerful, self-affirming and happy. By “nihilism” he means, among
other things, a will to one’s own self-annihilation, or an exhausted will to ‘give
up’ entirely on life. There are three inter-related aspects of Kierkegaard’s life of
faith in which Nietzsche might find lingering ressentiment or nihilism: the
insistence on conceiving of oneself as “nothing at all before God,” the belief in
one’s own guilt (presupposed even in the belief in forgiveness), and the
willingness to renounce the world as the first movement of faith (or even the
renunciation implied by the need of divine benediction in order to affirm the
world).
One of the most straightforward definitions of nihilism for Nietzsche is
“the will to nothingness.” This will to nothingness grows out of a resentful
“aversion to life” and represents “a rebellion against the most fundamental
presuppositions of life,” a “hatred of the human, and even more of the animal”
(GM II:24, III:28). Nietzsche explains this will to nothingness as the “will to self-
belittlement” and self-torture in which a weak and resentful person vents his
125 I suspect this is one of the reasons why Nietzsche was interested in writing a psychology of Kierkegaard.
From what Nietzsche read about Kierkegaard in Martensen’s Christian Ethics, Kierkegaard stood out as an
exception to the overall picture of Christianity that Nietzsche was developing.
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aggression against himself (GM II:28,25). Although Kierkegaard’s life of faith
involves accepting your life in the world as a gift and task from God, it also
involves accepting yourself as ‘capable of nothing’ and the will to “make yourself
nothing, become nothing before God” (WA, 10). If this is so, it is clear how
Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism in this sense still applies to Kierkegaard’s life of
faith.
In a similar vein, Nietzsche might also accuse Kierkegaard’s person of
faith of a certain self-hating dishonesty here: he does not want to face the fact of
his own will to power, his own exercise of will, but even this renunciation of
himself as ‘nothing,’ even this will to be nothing ‘before God’ represents a
manifestation of one’s will. In the same way, this apparent self-depreciation is a
form of self-appreciation since, as Nietzsche puts it “He who despises himself
still nonetheless respects himself as one who despises” (BGE: 78).
One of the most dangerous forms that the nihilistic will to self-belittlement
can take is self-accusation, the belief in one’s own guilt. For Nietzsche, such self-
judgments are not really about regret for actual acts of wrongdoing. Rather, guilt
is a psychological and sociological phenomenon in which those who are
powerless preserve some sense of their power by venting their aggressive drives
either against themselves, or against others in a form of “imaginary revenge” (by
making others feel ‘guilty’ for being happy or strong). So for Nietzsche what
came first, at the inception of society, was ressentiment, the miserable newly
“tamed” man’s drive to torture himself and to exact revenge upon those who are
not as powerless or miserable. The concept of guilt (which in Nietzsche’s
explanation originally meant simply an awareness of a debt and contained no
connotations of wrongdoing) was later seized upon by these powerful drives as a
means to self-torture and revenge.
Nietzsche singles out the notion of guilt before God, a notion on which
Kierkegaard puts so much emphasis, as representing a particularly vicious form
of this self-hating ressentiment: “Guilt before God: this thought becomes an
instrument of torture to him. He apprehends in ‘God’ the ultimate antithesis of
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his own ineluctable animal instincts; he reinterprets these animal instincts
themselves a form of guilt before God” (GM II:22). Although Kierkegaard’s life
of faith goes farther than Religiousness A in believing in the forgiveness of sins ,
the notion of one’s ‘total guilt’ before God is not removed in the transition
between Religiousness A and Christianity. In fact, it is only through the
acknowledgment and repentance of one’s total guilt that one can accept faith and
forgiveness, since one cannot genuinely accept forgiveness where one does not
find oneself guilty. So it seems that Nietzsche’s critiques of ‘guilt before God’ as
representing ressentiment and nihilism apply to Kierkegaard’s life of faith.
Lastly, despite Kierkegaard’s insistence that through faith one regains the
world and the ability to participate fully and joyfully in it, for Nietzsche there is
still a form of world-hatred in this stance. He could argue that the ressentiment
here is evident in the fact that one is willing to renounce the world, and that one
needs to get the world back again as a gift and task from God in order to accept it.
Nietzsche believes that the hatred and revenge discussed above is eventually
expanded and turned against “existence in general, which is now considered
worthless as such” (GM II:21). I think Nietzsche could argue that in Kierkegaard’s
life of faith we are in fact finding the world worthless as such, which is why it
needs to be redeemed by God. This need for divine redemption and this
willingness to renounce the world signal the continued presence of world-hating
ressentiment.
How might Kierkegaard respond to these critiques? He may have many
responses, but I will consider just two. First, he could respond penitentially to
these attacks on penitential Christianity by confessing that many people
(including, perhaps, himself) living an apparently ‘Christian’ life actually act out
of resentment, desire for revenge, etc. just as Nietzsche says they do. But he
could maintain that this does not reflect in any way on the ideal of Christianity,
which remains a life of genuine love. For Kierkegaard, Christianity requires not
just the appearance of love, freedom from hatred, etc., but the reality of these
things in the whole of one’s life. So Kierkegaard could use Nietzsche’s
271
accusations to further intensify our repentance and to prompt the confession he
so often wants us to make: that what we call Christianity is the opposite of what
Christianity really is. But Kierkegaard could make these concessions to Nietzsche
while still maintaining the ideal of the life of faith presented above. For
Kierkegaard, these awful realizations are not a prompt to overthrow the notion
of guilt and embrace Nietzschean self-affirmation and faith in oneself, but rather
just the opposite. For Kierkegaard, this type of self-affirmation and faith in
oneself are precisely what need to be given up in order to be cleansed of
whatever hatred, resentment, and desire for revenge we might have.
Another response Kierkegaard could make is a counter-attack against
Nietzsche’s notion of guilt. Simply put, Nietzsche seems to have no way of
dealing with what we might call ‘actual guilt.’ “Guilt” may be a widespread
sociological phenomenon, and it may arise from the historical and psychological
conditions Nietzsche says it does. But as Nietzsche admits, the sociological and
psychological phenomenon of guilt has little or nothing to do with actual guilt
from particular acts of wrongdoing. Yet Kierkegaard would insist that in each
individual’s life there are particular acts which the individual recognizes as
‘wrong’ by his own standards (whatever these may be). Unless Nietzsche makes
the implausible claim that his higher types would never do anything wrong
according to their own beliefs and standards, the problem of guilt in a very
straightforward sense arises. Nietzsche certainly cannot do away with all
notions of ‘wrongdoing’ without making all ethical evaluative judgments of
human life impossible; as Johannes says in Fear and Trembling, “[a]n ethics which
ignores sin is an altogether futile discipline” (FT:124). Therefore, the past that
needs redemption is not just the grand-scale historical past redeemed by the
accomplishments of Nietzsche’s ‘creative spirit’. Even this ‘creative spirit’ has a
past, a personal history in which there are particular acts of wrongdoing. So
Kierkegaard’s ‘problem of guilt’ at least begins. If it is not to be resolved through
divine forgiveness of sin, how could Nietzsche attempt to resolve it through self-
reliance alone?
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What I hope this chapter has revealed are the lasting points of debate
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In keeping with the Socratic distance
insisted upon by both of these thinkers, this study does not present an answer to
the question of which thinker is right about the best way of life. Instead, I have
found in their disagreements the grounds for a dialogue about some the most
important issues within ethics, such the limits of self-reliant self-responsibility
and autonomy, the proper relation to guilt, and the grounds for self-affirmation
and affirmation of human existence generally. This is not to mention what is
perhaps the most obviously (but also the most enigmatic) difference between
them, regarding the relation between spirituality or religion and ethics.
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CHAPTER 6
COMPARING KIERKEGAARD & NIETZSCHE
In the last chapter, we examined several points of disagreement between
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and ended by summarizing some of the most
significant points of divergence between them. These included the limits of self-
reliance, the source of joy and life-affirmation, and the relationship between
spirituality and ethics. As we shall see in this chapter, these points of
disagreement not only abide but figure centrally even within the points of
overlap and agreement between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Thus, the important
differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche discovered in the last chapter
cannot and should not be dismissed or theoretically ‘mediated’ out of existence
(as Hannay fears). Just as in the last chapter I did not conclude by declaring one
of these thinkers victorious over the other, here I will not conclude by declaring
that they are somehow identical. To the contrary, it is necessary to bear these
differences in mind in order to see how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche stand in a
useful relation to each other.
There are many ways that the ideals of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche happen
to coincide or agree, but I will focus on what I take to be three of the most
significant points of agreement. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche agree that the best
way of life is a life of individual responsibility, a life of joyful life-affirmation,
and a life of deepest spirituality. In what follows I will review these points of
agreement between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as well as the abiding differences
inherent even within these similarities. This will establish that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche offer parallel, but by no means identical, visions of the best way of life.
§1: THE BEST LIFE AS A LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both hold that the best way of life is a
distinctively individual life in several respects: a) in contrast to a life of
conformity, b) in that the best life is a life of personal responsibility, and c) in that
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only in the best life does one attain a unity and integrity of the self. One
important sense in which the life of faith and the life of creative sovereignty are
both individual is in their contrast to a life of conformity. Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche are both stridently opposed to social conformity and to a life in which
one demands of oneself nothing more than to conform to the expected norms of
one’s society. As we saw in the first two chapters, both condemn any life in
which one’s values and self-understanding are simply based on the ‘common
understanding’ of how life should be lived. Kierkegaard’s hero of faith and
Nietzsche’s creative hero are both portrayed as standing beyond and sometimes
even opposed to these norms.
Having said this, it should also be said that neither Kierkegaard nor
Nietzsche is a solipsist or an isolationist. Both recognize the (Hegelian) point
that one’s self-identity is in some part determined by one’s social atmosphere.
Yet they both emphasize a strong contrast between the person who simply lets
himself be dissolved into this ‘social atmosphere’ and the person for whom this
social atmosphere is beneficial in allowing and supporting individuality. Even
Judge Wilhelm, representing a position of self-reliant individualism more
extreme than Kierkegaard finds in the life of faith, acknowledges that the
individual must understand himself as “this specific product of a specific
environment” and as a “product of this social milieu” (EO II: 251). Likewise,
Nietzsche writes that his ideal individual is the “ripest fruit” of a long history of
social developments and the product and achievement of his society (GM II:2).
It should also be said that neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche place
emphasis on the uniqueness, peculiarity, or eccentricity of their ideal individuals.
However much these thinkers were themselves eccentrics, they did not consider
‘standing out from the crowd’ as a valuable in itself. Rather, they expected that
the excellence and strength of their ideal figures would itself distance them from
the crowd (even if unnoticeably so, as Kierkegaard suggests in Fear and
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Trembling).126 This also gets to an underlying issue in their mutual opposition to
conformity: both considered the inevitable result of such conformity to be
mediocrity in contrast to personal excellence. In fact, both emphasize that the
pressure to conform to societal norms is actually pressure to become mediocre.
(This is the phenomenon they each call “leveling.”) What is individualistic about
the hero of faith or creative sovereignty is not just that they stand out as
different from other people, or even that they stand as paragons of what is
normally accepted as excellence, but that they stand as paragons of an excellence
that may well go against the grain of commonly accepted norms. One of the
things Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each seek to do is to illustrate this alternative
notion of excellence through their respective portraits of the best way of life.
As we have seen by reviewing these portraits in chapters 1 and 2,
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both believe that such individuality is rare. They
each maintain that individuality is not a simply a given; a person is not born an
individual nor is this individuality an inevitable result of maturing to adulthood.
As Kierkegaard explains, individual selfhood does not come as a natural
development like growing one’s wisdom teeth, a beard, and that sort of thing.
Individuality is attained only through difficult spiritual struggle and
development, not as a natural part of ‘growing up.’ Nietzsche maintains that
individuality is gained only through difficult spiritual struggle, both through
history and within the individual. Although Nietzsche is a naturalist in the sense
that he understands the human self as a natural organism, he does not think that
individual selfhood is an inevitable part of natural development. In fact,
Nietzsche worries that that the potential for individuality may well go
unrealized in this “decaying” self-doubting present (GM II:24). The ‘ripest fruit’
126 Earlier in his writing career, Kierkegaard emphasized that ‘hidden inwardness’ was the distinctive mark
of faith that, by its very nature, could not be an external mark of faith. And yet in his later writings he
turned directly against this notion of ‘hidden inwardness’ and emphasized that the works of love and
confrontation with ‘the establishment’ in Christendom would necessarily make the person of faith
outwardly distinguishable from other people. Yet Kierkegaard’s understanding of what faith is remained
centrally focused on the inner life of the person in question. His definition in The Sickness Unto Death is that
faith is having a self that relates to itself as something transparently grounded in God.
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of human society may never appear; hence Nietzsche’s exhortation for us to will
this highest possibility for humanity. So for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,
individuality is something one must strive to attain. To simply live as an
individual in this highest sense is itself an accomplishment, whatever other
qualities are also demanded in the lives of such an individual.
Yet there is a difference of degree between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on
this point. Nietzsche sometimes seems to deny that most human beings are now
or ever could be individuals, whereas Kierkegaard paints a more generous picture.
Kierkegaard portrays a situation in which each person is, deep down, an
individual self, even if this selfhood is corrupted and thwarted by a despairing
will not to be oneself or to be a self one creates. In other words, while
Kierkegaard holds the attainment of individual selfhood as an ideal synonymous
with the attainment of faith, he also assumes an ontology in which each human
being is fundamentally a singular, individual being who only fails to be an
individual self in the highest sense through his or her own (individually) willed
despair. Faith is not the creation of individuality but the acceptance of an
individual selfhood that has been avoided and resisted in all other ways of life.
In contrast, whatever ontology of personhood we may find in Nietzsche, he
seems to be far less generous. In his repeated references to the ‘herd’, he
sometimes seems to suppose that most people do not exist as individual beings
at all, but are simply part of what might loosely be called the single organism of
‘the herd’. Nietzsche also sometimes seems to suggest that some people are
naturally endowed with the potential to become individuals in his highest sense,
while others are not, such that not everyone is ‘free’ to become an individual in
this sense (GM I:13).
This brings us to two issues that have lingered in the background of this
and other comparisons of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but have never, to my
knowledge, been squarely addressed. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche clearly have
strong disagreements about the nature and extent of human freedom and about
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the importance of human history for individual development.127 Let us first
examine their differences regarding freedom. To put the matter simply,
Nietzsche often seems to be much more of a determinist than Kierkegaard.
Nietzsche sometimes suggests that one cannot simply choose one’s way of life,
that what way of life one lives is a natural, unchosen outgrowth of one’s
physiological or psychological constitution.128 This suggests that for many
people, a transition between ways of life is not a real possibility. Moreover,
among those for whom such a transition is possible, it is attained not through a
momentary choice but only through a long struggle or “through daily work at it”
(GS:290). In contrast to several of Nietzsche’s suggestions, Kierkegaard would
reject any notion that people would need to be ‘destined’ or naturally endowed
with what it takes to live the best way of life.
Nonetheless, I think both would be skeptical of the extreme notions of
freedom of later Existentialists such as Sartre. Nietzsche’s biological conception
of human agency leaves no room for the kind of freedom Sartre calls
“transcendence” in contrast to “facticity.” It is not clear how Sartre’s notion of
“transcendence” could be made to square with Nietzsche’s insistence that our
actions and thoughts are all the product of largely unconscious instincts or
drives. For Kierkegaard, whose ‘factors of the self’ discussion is one of the
patterns for Sartre’s “transcendence/facticity” distinction, a person is never
without freedom even though the limits of ‘necessity’ are also a factor in the self
that should not be ignored. But for Kierkegaard there are other threats to
freedom than the encroachment of external facts and causes.
For Kierkegaard, freedom is importantly limited by guilt. Insofar as we
can get into, but not out of, a state of guilt by the exercise of freedom, the domain
of freedom is limited with respect to what we would want from it. We would
127 Like the topic of their respective ontologies of human selfhood, a complete discussion of the topic of how
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche understand the nature and limits of human freedom lies beyond the bounds of
this study. An entire dissertation could be written on each of these topics. Nonetheless, it would be
negligent of me not to mention these two important differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
128 For example, this seems to be the point of his parable about sheep and birds of prey (GM I:13).
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like to attain ethical excellence within this domain of freedom and the ethical life
seems to promise that by our freedom we can avoid being guilty. But anyone
old enough to take ethics seriously will find themselves guilty to at least some
degree and therefore (in Kierkegaard’s understanding) guilty per se. Since to
take freedom seriously as part of an ethical life is to take one’s own guilt or
goodness seriously, guilt ‘shipwrecks’ the attempt to achieve goodness by means
of one’s freedom.129 This means that freedom is problematically limited in its
scope. In addition, for Kierkegaard freedom is limited in that the highest
accomplishment available to human kind (i.e. faith) is only partly the
accomplishment of human freedom – it also requires the grace of God. So while
Nietzsche may be much more of a determinist than Kierkegaard, even
Kierkegaard acknowledges certain limitations on human freedom that later
Existentialists did not.
But it should also be said that neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche are
primarily interested in articulating a philosophy of mind with respect to the
ontology of the self or the nature of human freedom. Nietzsche would be
suspicious that all such metaphysical speculations are secondary to the values
one already holds. Kierkegaard would be suspicious of any systematic
philosophical attempt to understand freedom insofar as he believes this freedom
is to be found only within the individual self, and he believes philosophical
systems are incapable of taking the individual self into account. Furthermore,
neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche thinks questions about freedom need to be
resolved first before addressing questions about the best way of life. (The person
who sets out to solve the theoretical problem of free will first, and only thereafter
grapple with ethical problems in actual life, is precisely the kind of speculative
129 It think it could also be argued that Kierkegaard follows the Augustinian tradition in holding that sin
corrupts one’s freedom to choose. As Anti-Climacus says, every despair is in some small part demonic,
meaning that it is in some way a situation of willing what one consciously knows to be bad or despairing.
Despair is the situation in which one’s will is entrapped in what one knows to be wrong (at least to some
degree). For Kierkegaard, the despairing self does not just happen to sin, nor does it just momentarily will to
sin, its will is in fact wedded to sin. In some cases at least, the despairing self is not just attracted to, but
addicted to, doing what it knows to be wrong. Since it has entrapped itself, this limit on its freedom is not in
any way exculpatory.
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thinker both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche ridicule.) Of course, it might be
interesting to explore their different notions of freedom, and some
understanding of this difference may be necessary in order to understand the
arguments and recommendations each makes with respect to the question of the
best life. But it cannot be said that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ideals of how to
live cannot be compared because they have different ontological notions of
freedom or personhood (as Hannay seems to suggest). In fact, I suggest that it
is precisely by comparing their ideals for how to live that their respective notions
of freedom can be best understood.
Another issue that divides Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is the role that
history plays in the development of individuality. Both portray the best life as a
life in which one continually maintains and develops one’s individuality as a
self. But, as is often the case, Nietzsche is more interested than Kierkegaard in
the historical development of this individuality. Nietzsche seems to suggest that
while there have been noteworthy ‘lucky hits’ on the part of nature in the past,
some of which produced strong, creative individuals of the kind he admires,
there is also the project of actively willing and trying to produce such
individuals, namely by making such an individual out of oneself. This is one
way of stating what I take to be the goal of the ‘revaluation of values’ – to create
an evaluative environment in which sovereign individuals can flourish and those
who are not yet fully sovereign individuals may be aided in becoming so.
Nietzsche often talks as if this development is only now becoming a historical
possibility, the result of those long developments in values and in the human self
that he traces genealogically.
In contrast, Kierkegaard does not engage in a historical genealogy of
how individuality can become possible. Reacting against the Hegelians of his
time, Kierkegaard often scoffed at intermixing historical speculation and
knowledge with serious thinking about existing life. Like Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard is keenly interested in diagnosing the state of ‘modernity,’ and
Kierkegaard often reflects on the differences between modern life and life in
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antiquity or the middle ages. But for Kierkegaard, an overemphasis on
historical explanations is one of the problems of modernity to be overcome.
Kierkegaard’s main interest in history is how to overcome historical thinking in
order to conceive of oneself as an actually existing individual capable of being
‘contemporaneous’ with Jesus as the ‘prototype’ for how to live.
This difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the issue of
history is certainly pervasive, but I think it is best understood as a difference in
the means employed to bring about a shared philosophical task. Both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are primarily interested in the present and in a
certain crisis of spirituality and values in ‘the present age’; each strives to bring
about the individuality of his readers in the present time. For Nietzsche this
requires us to grapple with our social history, whereas for Kierkegaard it
requires only that we grapple with our personal histories as individuals.
Returning now to the issue of conformity we find the task just articulated
to be plagued by a Socratic worry, shared by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, that
they will fail to stimulate individuality in their readers if their readers become
mere followers and disciples. The aim of bringing about someone else’s
individuality contains a challenge, if not a paradox, in that any influence one
may exert to push someone else toward individuality may itself interfere with
this goal. This concern is the basis of Kierkegaard’s use of ‘indirect
communication’, and Nietzsche frequent exhortations against becoming a mere
follower of his ideas.
Here we find one reason why each thinker keeps to a minimum his sketch
of what the best way of life entails, and what the person living this like is like.
As we have seen, what we get from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is something like
a formal outline into which many different content-rich descriptions of actual
people might fit. Neither thinker tries to establish what someone living the best
way of life will believe with respect to most particular issues, and neither
attempts to prescribe particular actions for particular situations. As we shall
discuss in the next chapter, unlike action-centered ethicists, Kierkegaard and
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Nietzsche do not try to provide a blueprint of how one should act. Both might
agree with Aristotle that this sort of precision is more than we should ask of
ethics.
For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the task of ethics is not to tell you how to
act, or to provide a pre-digested answer for moral dilemmas. Instead,
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are both engaged in the project of singling out and
speaking to their readers as individuals. In fact, it may be said that for
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the primary goal is to bring about the individuality of
their readers. They do so in part by addressing these readers as individuals in
the tradition of Socrates. But Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are also Socratic in that
both are concerned to preserve this fledgling individuality by eschewing any role
as an authority. Thus, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche not only oppose conformity
by requiring individuality as part of the best way of life, they are also careful that
their own philosophical practices respect and preserve this individuality.
Another important way that Kierkegaard’s life of faith and Nietzsche’s life
of creative sovereignty are both individualistic has to do with responsibility. Part
of what it means for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to try to bring about the
individuality of their readers is that they try to impress upon their readers the
need to take responsibility for the way of life that they live and for addressing
the internal collapse of this way of life, if need be. Both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche regard the best way of life to be a life of great individual responsibility.
Both also regard the progression toward this life (from other ways of life) to be
one of accepting greater and greater responsibility, not only for particular
commitments in life but for the existential stance that comprises one’s way of life.
For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it is often the case that people are unable or
unwilling to entertain the notion of different ways of life, and they thereby
consciously or unconsciously avoid responsibility for the way of life they live.
Of course this comparison regarding responsibility needs some
qualification since, as we’ve seen, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche disagree as to the
nature and limits of self-responsibility. For Kierkegaard, self-responsibility is the
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cornerstone of the ethical way of life in contrast to the best way of life, the life of
faith. We have seen how Kierkegaard’s concept of the despair of the ethical life
can be brought to bear as a powerful critique of the kind of sovereign self-
responsibility Nietzsche praises. In Kierkegaard’s ethical life, responsibility is
understood as the self maintaining control over itself in the present, owning up
to its past, and projecting itself into the future by way of promises and
commitments. In the Aufhebung of the ethical way of life and the transition to
the life of faith, self-responsibility is cancelled as the highest telos and the mode
of relating to one’s values, but it is also preserved in a transfigured way. Just as
there is an ‘ethics on the other side of faith,’ namely a way of comporting oneself
toward others and oneself that is entailed by faith, there would seem to be a
‘responsibility on the other side of faith’. But what exactly is responsibility in a
life of faith, and how does it differ from the responsibility in the ethical life?
The primary difference between what we might call ethical responsibility
and religious responsibility is that in the former, self-reliance is understood as a
central and required condition for responsibility. To take responsibility for a
task in the ethical sense is to understand oneself as solely able and obligated to
fulfill one’s particular commitment to the task. However much this task may
also depend on unforeseen circumstances or require the help of others, there is a
point at which one must accept sole responsibility for one’s own share of the
effort. In this sense, success or failure in relation to a commitment to a task is
necessarily considered as depending on nothing beyond one’s self, even if the
success or failure of the task itself also relies on other contingencies beyond one’s
control. Excellence in the life of ethical responsibility means successfully
maintaining this commitment on the strength of one’s own self-reliant resolve
and willpower. In contrast, excellence for the person of faith means surrendering
the claim to be able to maintain commitments on one’s own strength of resolve.
Put simply, the person of faith always assumes that she needs help, not just
externally (as a supplement to her own self-reliant efforts) but inwardly as well.
By relating to God as something within the self-referential relation that is the
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human self, Kierkegaard’s person of faith refuses to circumscribe any purely self-
reliant area of resolve or willpower within herself.
From the ethical perspective to “surrender sovereignty over one’s self,” as
faith requires, is to shirk one’s responsibility, to give up the very grounds for
being responsible. From the perspective of faith, the truly responsible thing to
do is to admit that the ethical notion of self-reliant responsibility is untenable in
actual life. (Kierkegaard’s view here seems to be influenced by his Lutheranism,
as Luther taught that the moral law is unfulfillable. If the law is unfulfillable,
one’s responsibility to fulfill the law is likewise unfulfillable.) 130 But I think that
Kierkegaard’s broader point is not that we cannot successfully fulfill any
commitment on the strength of our own resolve; it seems plausible that we could
do so, at least for more minor commitments. Rather, I think Kierkegaard thinks
it is impossible to achieve moral excellence by relying on one’s self-reliant efforts,
since however much good one may do, this would not address the main threat to
one’s moral excellence: past guilt.
What then is meant by religious responsibility? We get some
understanding of it from the definition of faith as a life in which one recognizes
oneself as ‘a gift and task from God.’ To accept oneself as a task from God is to
accept responsibility for oneself. This means accepting responsibility for the
task of ‘becoming oneself’ as well as all the particular tasks this may involve (i.e.
there is the general task of relating more and more truly toward oneself and God,
and then there are the many particular tasks that Kierkegaard thinks a faithful
life in the world calls us to fulfill). With respect to one’s task in both the general
and specific sense, taking responsibility for oneself does not entail accomplishing
these tasks within and by means of an enclosed domain of self-reliant agency.
One does not just receive oneself from God once-and-for-all and then proceed to
take sole custody of this self; rather, one continually turns to God for help and
guidance.
130 Luther’s influence is also evident in Kierkegaard’s emphasis on trusting in God rather than in oneself.
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One might say that the ethical person takes responsibility for
accomplishing the task all by himself, whereas the religious person takes
responsibility for asking for help and for becoming the vehicle through which
God’s strength accomplishes the task. This is what Johannes means when he
marvels that what Abraham did “requires more-than-human powers“ (FT:76).
In relation to other people, Abraham “walks alone with his dreadful
responsibility,” but his strength comes not from himself alone, but from God
(FT:107). Thus, while Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might agree about the need
for individual responsibility in the best way of life, they have very different
understandings of what this responsibility entails.
A final point about the individuality of Kierkegaard’s life of faith and
Nietzsche’s life of creative sovereignty involves what we might call the unity or
integrity of the self. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it is only in the best
way of life that a person can attain a life in which one is not divided against
oneself. For Kierkegaard, despair is always a matter of turning away from
oneself and against oneself as one actually is. The aesthetic self tries to dissolve
itself in pleasure only to find its actual self an inextricable burden, while the
ethical self either tries to create itself in its own hopeful image or tries to
renounce this self as hopelessly depraved and worthless. In contrast, faith is
defined as a way of living in which one relates to oneself as the self one actually
is, and accepts this self wholly and gratefully. Since the self is its relation to
itself, and since faith is the only way of relating to oneself that is not a despairing
misrelation, it follows for Kierkegaard that only in faith does a person become a
self in the fullest sense.
In The Sickness Unto Death, one formula for faith is the life in which each
of the ‘factors’ that comprise the self (possibility/necessity, infinitude/finitude)
is acknowledged in its fullest and truest sense. The life of faith is the life in
which each of these factors finds its place and there is a harmonious relation
between them such that the self comes together into a whole for the first time.
The more decisive formula for faith is a life in which “in relating to itself and in
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wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that
established it” (SUD:79). As we have seen, for Anti-Climacus this means that in
faith one accepts oneself in one’s full actuality, since the self is actually grounded
in the power that established it, i.e. God. It also means that God must be
included in this loop of self-relation. For Kierkegaard, a human self only
becomes whole and complete when it is not self-enclosed, but rather when it
allows God within itself to such an extent that it relates to itself through God.
For Nietzsche, the human self can never accept itself in its actuality as
long as a belief in God remains, since to posit an otherworldly perfection is to
denigrate this world and oneself as an actual, worldly entity.131 Thus, Nietzsche
offers a different but parallel account of how one faces and accepts one’s
actuality as a person only in the best way of life. For Nietzsche, the self attains
integrity within itself only when it ceases to turn against and away from itself,
i.e., when it gives up ressentiment and ascetic values. Nietzsche’s physiological
or psychological portrait of internal collapse is one in which a person is either
internally dominated by a self-destructive drive to attack one’s self, or by a
complete anarchy of the drives which disintegrates the self. In contrast,
Nietzsche’s best way of life represents a situation in which one not only achieves
a harmony within oneself. One also achieves a self-strengthening cycle within
oneself and in one’s relations with the world. A dominating, self-affirming
drive sets the other drives to order and organizes the self into a whole such that
this unified self can accomplish great things. This integrity within the self is the
work of the dominating instinct or guiding passion that we have called a
“sovereign conscience.”
For Nietzsche, an important part of the transition from a self-hating to a
self-affirming relation to oneself is the acceptance of one’s natural, bodily reality.
It is a rejection of this side of our nature that he finds in all Platonic and Judeo-
131 As we’ve already noted, for Kierkegaard faith is not a matter of having ‘otherwordly’ concerns.
Abraham’s faith, as the model for all faith, is ‘faith for this world.’ Yet it may be that for Nietzsche the fact
that Kierkegaard acknowledges that there is a transcendent God, and that this God has such a central role in
his conception of the best life, is sufficient grounds for objecting to ‘otherworldliness’ of this conception.
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Christian (i.e. “ascetic”) ways of thinking and valuing. While it is true that in
Nietzsche’s account the ancient nobles accepted and affirmed their naturalness
and escaped the internal collapse of ressentiment and nihilism, Nietzsche does not
believe that a return to the situation of the ancient nobles is possible. For
Nietzsche, the only way to regain an acceptance of our actual selves is to reverse
the ascetic bad conscience and forge the new, sovereign conscience described
above. Although Nietzsche rejects the idea that the self is in any way dependent
upon God, neither does he hold the self-enclosed self as an ideal. Nietzsche
would join Kierkegaard in condemning what Kierkegaard calls Indeslutthed “self-
enclosedness.” The self-strengthening cycle that we have identified with the
sovereign individual includes a relation to the world, specifically one’s
accomplishments in the world. Far from a self-enclosed solipsism or Stoicism,
Nietzsche’s ideal life includes a Dionysian openness and unity with the world.
As I have suggested, Nietzsche description of Goethe’s ideal describes his own:
“A spirit thus emancipated stands in the midst of the universe with a joyful and
trusting fatalism, in the faith that only what is separate and individual may be
rejected, that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed – he no longer
denies” (TI “Expeditions” 49)
§2: THE BEST LIFE AS A LIFE OF JOYFUL LIFE-AFFIRMATION
The issue of openness and unity with the world brings us to our second
broad area of comparison between Kierkegaard’s life of faith and Nietzsche’s life
of creative sovereignty. Both of these ways of life involve a fundamentally
joyful stance of life-affirmation, including an affirmation of the natural world
and of oneself. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both believe that the best life is one of
deep and abiding joy, gratitude for existence, and a passionate love of life.
Contrary to their reputations as gloomy or ‘dark’ thinkers, Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche emphasize the ethical importance of joy, perhaps more than any other
thinkers. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the best life is centrally
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characterized by this fundamental stance of joyful affirmation since one’s values,
goals, virtues, and beliefs emerge out of this stance.
It has been suggested that what we find in Kierkegaard is an ‘ethics of
love’, and I believe the same could be said for Nietzsche.132 Of course, given how
little either Kierkegaard or Nietzsche discuss active relations with other people,
and given their own disastrous personal histories with respect to romantic love,
what this “love” consists in needs further explanation. Both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche would be wary of a diffuse, purely abstract ‘love of others’ in general.
The individual Kierkegaard and Nietzsche regard as ideal has an overflowing
love of life that manifests itself in particular loving relations. In both
Kierkegaard’s life of faith and Nietzsche’s life of creative sovereignty, this love of
life manifests itself as a (sometimes “severe”) “benevolence” and “goodwill”
toward others. I believe we find a peculiar, subtle but nonetheless robust love of
humanity in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s own severe rebukes of their
contemporaries. For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, one’s stance toward others is
founded in a love of life in all its diversity and particularity, a welcoming, open
posture that is eager to greet one and all as a dignified equal.133 For both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, genuine love of other people can only grow out of a
stance of love toward life as a whole and a love for ourselves as part of this
whole. Having clarified the stance of joyful gratitude and life-affirmation urged
by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I think we can understand at least one sense
in which both of these thinkers can be said to propose an ‘ethics of love.’
For Kierkegaard, the centrality of joy in his conception of the best way of
life is demonstrated in his insistence that “every man who truly wants to relate
himself to God and be intimate with him really only has one task – to rejoice
always” (JP 2186 VIII, A 12 [1847]). As we have seen, it is Abraham’s joy that
132 Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's ethic of love : divine commands and moral obligations, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
133 This does not mean that they assumed that everyone was already dignified and equal. Nietzsche was
especially suspicious of the notion of political equality that made this assumption. By saying that he was
“eager” to greet others as a dignified equal, I mean that he was eager for them to become a dignified
sovereign individual such that they would be equal to other sovereign individuals.
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singles him out as a ‘knight of faith.’ We also saw how important it was for
Kierkegaard that, unlike other religious conceptions of joy, this is a joy in ‘this
life’ and for ‘this life.’ Abraham’s joyful regaining of Isaac represents how in
faith one passionately accepts everyday life as something for which one is
joyfully grateful and in which one passionately invests one’s whole self. Thus
the modern-day Abraham strolling through the streets of Copenhagen “takes
pleasure, takes part, in everything”; he is at home in the world because faith
brings him into an active, loving engagement with the world as the place in
which the divine becomes manifest (FT:68). In fact, faith can be said to involve
the continual incarnation of the divine in one’s own life in the world; I think this
is what it means that faith is the ability “to express the sublime in the pedestrian
absolutely” (FT:70). Likewise, in Kierkegaard’s later work the issue of joy
resurfaces as central to his conception of “what it is to be a human being and
what religiously is the requirement for being a human being” (WA, 4). For
Kierkegaard, this joy of faith involves an overflowing sense of gratitude for one’s
life that emerges when this life – and actuality as a whole – is understood as a
gift and a task from God. The joy of this life is also found in the stance of
grateful acceptance of one’s forgiveness that Kierkegaard finds so important, and
so challenging, about the life of faith.
For different reasons, but with equal passion and devotion, Nietzsche’s
best way of life also involves a joyful affirmation of oneself and the world. For
Nietzsche this is a joy for ‘this life’ not as something hallowed by the presence of
God but as something hallowed by its value and sanctity even in the absence of
any such divinity. In Nietzsche’s best life, one accepts the natural world and the
whole of one’s own naturalness with joyful affirmation. Only by loving the
world as it actually is, and by loving one’s self as one actually is, can one throw
off ascetic resentment and come to the stance of amor fati and saying ‘yes’ to
eternal recurrence. The love within amor fati and the love for life expressed in
saying ‘yes’ to eternal recurrence represents the underlying stance of life-
affirmation that is at the crux of Nietzsche’s own ‘ethics of love.’ Only against a
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background of overflowing love for life can people really come to “love one
another” where this is not just (at best) an empty phrase, or (at worst) a disguised
way of hating and resenting one another.
The joy of Nietzsche ideal life also includes the joy of creation.
Nietzsche’s highest type finds joy within the act of creating, of accomplishing
what is difficult or challenging, of attaining personal excellence, and of pursuing
the ‘joyful wisdom’ of philosophy. More broadly, it is a general ‘zest for life’:
the joy one takes in being alive, the joy of growing, of becoming stronger, etc.
More broadly still, this joy is also the Dionysian joy in which one finds one’s
unity with the whole and affirms it all, despite (or rather because of) its tragedy
and suffering.
It would be incorrect to assume, as Kellenberger does, that the source of
joy for Nietzsche’s highest type is “momentary frenzy” in which one attempts to
escape from a reality one realizes is painful and tragic (Kellenberger, 108-9). This
reading undercuts the whole exuberant generosity of Nietzsche’s life-affirmation:
one loves the whole of reality and one’s place as inescapably within it. This much
is required if we are to affirm human existence. Importantly, this is not to say
that Nietzsche’s joyful affirmation precludes any act of denying and condemning
in making particular judgments. We can affirm life and yet condemn what is
mediocre, for example. In describing his (and Goethe’s) ideal of someone who
“no longer denies” Nietzsche makes clear that “only what is separate and
individual may be rejected” but “that in the totality everything is redeemed and
affirmed” (TI “Expeditions” 49). Likewise, while this joyful stance toward
existence involves an affirming stance toward oneself, this does not preclude
ambition or self-criticism. As we have seen, one way this joy manifests itself is as
a sovereign conscience in which one maintains a kind of self-strengthening
relationship between oneself in the world. This conscience includes a vigilance
over oneself and a commitment to continually work to develop one’s “style”
“through long practice and daily work at it” (GS:290). Faith in oneself and self-
affirmation lead to ability to act resolutely, independently and with a unified self
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in order to achieve excellence in the world, and a recognition of this excellence in
actuality further reinforces this faith in oneself and self-affirmation. But the
sovereign conscience also allows us to look upon our shortcomings as tasks to
work on (either to remove them or make something out of them) rather than as
excuses for attacking and condemning ourselves.
From what we have said so far, it is clear that the source of this overall
stance of joy differs for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. For Kierkegaard the source
of this joy is a faith in God and a sense of God’s transfiguring presence in the
everyday world. In contrast, for Nietzsche the source of joy is a faith in oneself
and a Dionysian faith in the affirmability of the whole of existence, despite the
absence of God. For Kierkegaard we are joyful because the divine manifests
itself in actual life, whereas for Nietzsche we are joyful because actual life is
sacred and spiritual just as it is, despite (or even because of) the absence of any
divine presence. For Kierkegaard, this joy includes relief of being able to ‘cast all
our cares’ onto God, to trust in God completely, and to trust in ourselves only
insofar as we have given ourselves completely over to God. In contrast, for
Nietzsche, this joy involves reclaiming for ourselves all the credit we have
previously given to God for our own accomplishments. Nietzsche’s joy involves
the feeling of pride and self-satisfaction toward one’s own achievements and
excellence. This is the joy of the ‘good conscience’; joy might be thought of as the
affirmation of the self-affirming conscience. In contrast, although Kierkegaard
also sees the need to go beyond the ‘bad conscience’ in the sense of obsessive
self-recrimination, the joy of faith does not include this kind of self-satisfaction
for one’s achievements in the world.
Despite these differences regarding the source of this joy, I would argue
that the fundamental stance of joy manifests itself in similar ways in the ways of
life each of these thinkers takes to be best. In both, joy manifests itself in an
overall stance of love of life, openness toward the world and its diversity, and a
grateful acceptance of ourselves as the particular people we are. The joy of
Kierkegaard’s life of faith and the joy of Nietzsche’s life of creative sovereignty
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overlap in three other important ways as well: a) in contrast to (mere) pleasure or
‘happiness’, b) in contrast to ascetic renunciation, and c) as the appropriate
stance to take toward the overcoming of guilt.
For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche this joy should not be confused with
pleasure or ‘happiness’ as this is usually understood. In fact, for both, joy within
the best life is most often a joy amidst great pain and tragedy. For Kierkegaard,
the joy of the ‘second immediacy’ gained through faith is not the enjoyment of
the ‘first immediacy’, the aesthetic life. Far from being a life devoted to seeking
pleasure, Kierkegaard believes the life of faith brings with it an increase of
suffering and persecution. As I have argued elsewhere, to confuse the joy of
faith with aesthetic pleasure is also to misunderstand the directionality of this joy:
pleasure is taken in and from the world, whereas joy is received inwardly and
then manifested outwardly as a way of being and living in the world. There may
be a sense in which the joy of faith includes taking joy in the simple things of
everyday life. But such moments are not the basis of one’s acceptance and
affirmation of life in the world; life is not affirmable because of its many little
‘simple joys.’ Rather, such moments are the result of an overall stance of joy;
they require that we first approach the world with a joyful openness to its wealth
of diverse and unforeseen particularities.
Likewise, for Nietzsche saying ‘yes’ to eternal recurrence is not a matter of
finding what recurs pleasant, painless, or comfortable. Although Nietzsche
spends less time than Kierkegaard detailing the internal collapse of the life of
pleasure, Nietzsche does recognize the dangerous ‘letting oneself go’ of the
hedonistic life. He also expresses disdain for those who seek happiness in the
sense of mere comfort and pleasantness. In Nietzsche’s best life, one squarely
faces the misery, pain and meaningless stupidity of much of human life. One
nonetheless affirms life because one recognizes that what is important is not
freedom from pain but the ability to persevere in the face of it and make
something meaningful out of the totality of one’s experiences. Nietzsche’s
Dionysian joy is a joy amidst suffering and pain that may even welcome pain and
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suffering in general as inevitable components of human life and as a necessary
condition for one’s creativity, spirituality, or personal excellence. As Nietzsche
points out, it is pain and strife, rather than comfort and the absence of pain, that
is the “soil” in which human greatness tends to flourish. Just as ‘great health’ is
the not absence of sickness but the ability to make something of this sickness, joy
in life is not the absence of pain and suffering but the ability to affirm life not
despite, or because of, this pain and suffering.
Given this description of joy amidst (and partly because of) suffering, it is
also important to point out how this joyful stance toward life contrasts with
ascetic renunciation of life, since the ascetic may also experience a kind of blissful
joy amidst suffering. As we have already noted, one of the most sustained areas
of agreement between the thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is to be found
in their mutual condemnation of the ascetic, world- and self-renouncing life.134 I
think the issue of joy brings out the central contrast between this life and the
lives Kierkegaard and Nietzsche take to be best. For Kierkegaard, it is the joyful
acceptance of life in the world that differentiates faith from the despair of
resignation and religiousness A. Writing from the standpoint of resignation,
Johannes de Silentio claims his life contains its share of happiness: there is a
peace of mind to be found in the safety and security of the ascetic withdrawal
from the world. Yet Johannes is also clear that this kind of happiness is quite
different from (and inferior to) the happiness of faith (FT:63).
This happiness-within-resignation, unlike the joy of faith, cannot be
something that is manifested in one’s interactions within the world, since it is
achieved only by isolating oneself from the rest of the world. The ascetic can
feel joy amidst pain and suffering only by denying or denigrating the whole
realm in which this pain and suffering exists. In contrast, the joy of faith is
something manifested only within an active, engaged life in the world. Unlike
134 This reading may be more surprising in the case of Kierkegaard than for Nietzsche, and it may be that
Kierkegaard’s best life would still be fundamentally ascetic from the point of view of Nietzsche’s ideas. But
I think my textual analysis has demonstrated that the struggle against ascetic renunciation of oneself and
‘this life’ is central to the ideal life presented by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
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the ascetic’s happiness, the joy of faith is not some purely internal phenomenon
that one feels in isolation, but is rather something one expresses outwardly, in
community with others.135 In fact, this joy is the fundamental, underlying
commitment to engaging in the world with love and openness. The joy of faith
requires that we accept pain and suffering for what it is (even if this also means
fighting it in concrete ways). The person of faith would find joy in the struggle
against pain and suffering, or their debilitating effects, rather than finding peace
of mind in surrendering this struggle or considering oneself ‘above’ it. In
comparison with the hedonist, the ascetic’s life may be one of strictness, self-
severity, and brave renunciation of the pleasures and comforts of worldly life.
But as Kierkegaard learned in his own life (and it was one of the hardest lessons
he learned), compared with faith’s courageous openness toward life, the stance
of resignation is one of self-indulgent comfort, cowardice, and despair.
Nietzsche’s notion of joyful life-affirmation is also presented in contrast to
the stance of ascetic renunciation. In fact, the stance of joyful affirmation is
Nietzsche’s positive alternative to the fundamental stance of ressentiment that
structures the ascetic and slavish way of life. In many ways, what Nietzsche
recommends can be considered as some form of inverted Stoicism. For Nietzsche,
joy is not achieved by accomplishing the strict divide between self and world
recommended by Stoicism, but precisely by abolishing this distinction. Unlike
the Stoic, who seeks to preserve himself with a conscience that separates his
inner self from the external world, Nietzsche’s ideal figure has a conscience that
involves an engaged relationship with the world. In this relationship with the
world, a person can be strengthened by misfortunes and failures as much, if not
more than, by good fortune and successes.
135 Kierkegaard is clear that one’s fundamental Christian duty is to “be joy itself” and to be “nothing but joy”
to others. Of course, what this amounts to is not trying to ‘cheer up’ other people. In Kierkegaard’s case,
this joy was expressed in harsh rebukes aimed at getting people to abandon their shallow mediocrity in
favor of a more spiritual life. According to Joakim Garff, Kierkegaard was seldom more joyful than when
he was launching his most venomous polemics against the Danish church.
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It may seem puzzling that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, both famous for
their astute and prophetic understanding of modernity, should be so concerned
with the stance of ascetic world-renunciation, since this is a stance we would
normally associate with the Middle Ages. In general, I believe both use the
comparison of the modern age with the Middle Ages partly for its shock value:
although the modern sensibility is flattered by a comparison with Greek
antiquity, nothing offends it more than being compared with the ‘dark ages’.
But the ascetic life each worries about is not the life of the medieval ascetic monk
or anchoress; it is not a life in which one outwardly removes oneself from the
world. In Kierkegaard’s case, the life of resignation means becoming inwardly
withdrawn and remaining aloof from any attachments or interests in the world,
while remaining outwardly active in one’s everyday life. In Nietzsche’s case, the
ascetic life means living by life-denying, self-hating values, which is something
he finds endemic to the modern age (perhaps even more so than in the Middle
Ages).
Each in his own way, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche address the ascetic life
as the central contrast to the best way of life, if not also the central obstacle to
living that life. For Nietzsche most people are infected with ascetic values and
live a slavish, mediocre way of life. Nietzsche finds ascetic self-denial, or its
result the self-withering of the “last men,” not only in the ethical values of his
European society, but in its art and science as well. Moreover, what is ascetic in
the ethical values he critiques is not just their content, although Nietzsche does
think that the values being supported by Kant or Mill are in content that of
Christian-Platonic morality. Their form is also ascetic. Nietzsche finds the
depersonalization and universalism of these forms of philosophy and ethics to
represent the same ascetic self-denial and world-renunciation as he finds
prevalent throughout the history of Platonism and Christianity.
Whereas Nietzsche suggests that most people in the modern world live
some variant of the ascetic life (especially its ultimate manifestation in the ‘last
men’), Kierkegaard suggests that most people live some form of the aesthetic life
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(conformist, hedonist, etc.) and only a very few live the ascetic life (the life of
resignation and ‘religiousness A’). Nonetheless, as Kierkegaard learned in his
own case, this life of resignation is particularly seductive to those who might
otherwise choose faith. In Kierkegaard’s schema, anyone who genuinely
commits himself to the ethical life and pursues it with integrity will wind up in
the life of resignation as that which follows the ‘shipwreck’ of this life on the
issue of guilt. Thus the central struggle of Fear and Trembling is between the
‘knight of resignation’ and the ‘knight of faith,’ although there is a stern warning
that not many can come as far as resignation, which is a prerequisite to faith.
Like Johannes de Silentio, Kierkegaard all too often ‘fled back to the pain of
resignation,’ and this inward struggle bears its mark on several of his most well-
known texts. But Kierkegaard thought this kind of ascetic renunciation was
quite rare. More numerous, but still comparatively rare, are the speculative
philosophers and academics who indulge in a self-denying retreat into
abstraction. But overall, Kierkegaard’s recurrent interest in contrasting the
ascetic life with the life of faith probably has to do more with his own personal
situation than with an assessment of the kind of struggle most people face.
The last issue to address in relation to the stance of joy proposed by both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is how this stance is understood in relation to the
issue of guilt. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, although in very different
ways, this stance of joy represents the overcoming of guilt. For Kierkegaard, as
we have seen, guilt is the central problem for anyone who has enough spirit and
integrity to come as far as the ethical life. In the life of religiousness A, one
dwells on one’s guilt as definitive for one’s relationship with oneself and with
God. In the life of faith, by contrast, one repents but also opens one’s heart to
accepting forgiveness. Hence for Kierkegaard the most proper response to
ethical guilt is to adopt a joyful stance of gratitude for one’s forgiveness by God.
Of course this joyful gratitude would include within it the pain of repentance,
without which one may not feel the pressing need for forgiveness, but the joy of
forgiveness encompasses this pain rather than vice-versa. Moreover, there is a
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connection between this joy over one’s forgiveness and the joyful participation in
the world discussed above. As Kierkegaard understands it, the fact that God
forgives (and “forgets”) one’s wrongdoing is precisely what allows for a joyous
participation in the world, since without such forgiveness any self-affirmation or
affirmation of life would seem to either ignore or discount the reality of one’s
guilt. So joyful gratitude toward forgiveness is necessary, and maybe even
foundational, to the joyful gratitude one feels toward one’s life and existence as a
whole.
Nietzsche also envisions the stance of joy as the proper response to the
issue of guilt, although as we have seen, for Nietzsche guilt should be treated as
a psychological and sociological phenomenon. The stance of joyful life-
affirmation represents the overcoming of the belief in guilt that is central to the
ascetic approach to life. As Nietzsche explains it, the notion of guilt was first
presented as a distinctively moral problem by the ascetic priests in an attempt to
give life meaning. The belief in guilt serves two important functions. First, it
answers the most pressing question: ‘why do I suffer?’ The ascetic explanation is
that suffering is just punishment for wrongdoing. Secondly, spreading a belief in
the (comparatively greater) guilt of the powerful is utilized as a means of taking
‘imaginary revenge’ on the powerful and of making the powerless seem more
worthy by way of contrast.
As discussed in chapter 4, the ascetic notion of guilt can be overcome by
turning ‘guilt against guilt’ just as we can overcome pity by turning ‘pity against
pity.’ The notion of ‘guilt against guilt’ or ‘feeling guilt for guilt’ is part of
Nietzsche’s notion of a sovereign conscience: one has a conscience against the
self-hating and vengeful tendency to find oneself and others ‘guilty’. Nietzsche
might say: if we are guilty of anything, it is imposing the torturously destructive
notion of guilt on ourselves and others. So like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche
considers the redemption from guilt one of the central features of the stance of
joy found in the best life. But for Nietzsche this redemption comes not from
taking our guilt seriously as an objective state of moral inadequacy before God,
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but in seeing it as a pernicious but reversible psychological and sociological
tendency. This is why the “creative spirit” who reverses the ascetic bad
conscience (i.e. guilty conscience) is hailed by Nietzsche as a “redeeming man of
great love and contempt” (GM II:24) It is out of a joyful love of life and love of
one’s self that Nietzsche’s hero finds proper contempt for the belittling and self-
destructive effects of ascetic conscience-poisoning.
§3: THE BEST LIFE AS A DEEPLY SPIRITUALITY LIFE
In mentioning “redemption” as a concern for both Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, we have already touched upon the third major area of comparison
between their respective ideals. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the best life
is also the most spiritual life. In this study I have compared Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche as ethical thinkers, but one could also compare them as spiritual and
religious thinkers. Indeed, a comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the
more narrow topic of Christianity in modern life could fill several books.136 On
the other hand, given that neither thinker believes there is much we can say
about ‘spirituality’ or spiritual matters beyond how they are manifested in
human life, I suspect that an examination of how spirituality - or the lack thereof
- manifests itself in how we live (i.e., ethically) may be the most we can solidly
discuss.
What I will concentrate on here are some important ways that the issue of
spirituality appears in ethical thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, especially
in their respective visions of best way of life. To a great extent, the deep
spirituality of Kierkegaard’s life of faith and Nietzsche’s life of creative
sovereignty manifests itself in those common aspects we have just discussed. For
both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche what is spiritual about the best life has much to
do with the individuality of this life and with the stance of overflowing joy and
136 It would be especially interesting and useful, given the current state of affairs, to compare Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche in their respective critiques of Christianity as it exists in the modern world. Unfortunately,
such a comparison lies outside the scope of my project here.
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gratitude it represents. In addition, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both find
spirituality in the process of self-overcoming and ‘becoming what you are’
which marks both the transition to this best life and a continuing presence within
it.
The first point to notice is how central the issue of spirituality is for the
ethical ideals of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. It is probably not surprising
that Kierkegaard regards the life of faith to be the most spiritual way of life. But
it may be surprising that I consider Kierkegaard’s remarks on faith to be not
much theological as ethical, especially given that he is famous for so contrasting
faith and ethics, e.g. in Fear and Trembling. However, as I have suggested before
and will clarify here, this contrast between faith and ethics depends upon
erroneously conflating ethics as such with ‘the ethical’ in Kierkegaard more
narrow sense. In fact, most of what Kierkegaard says about faith is not
theological, but ethical in the sense that it is about how the person of faith
comports himself in daily life. Given Kierkegaard’s rejection of rational
theology, and what we learned about faith in Chapter 1, it should be clear that
for Kierkegaard faith is not a matter of adopting a set of theological beliefs. Faith
is not a belief in a religious doctrine, let alone mere membership in a religious
organization. For Kierkegaard, faith is a way of comporting oneself in everyday
life. As I have explained it, faith is a way of relating to oneself, others (including
God) and the world in thought and action. Faith is a fundamental relationship
or orientation toward oneself and everything else. As such, faith is an ethical
concept in the broader sense of the term ‘ethical’ I have been using.
What may be even more surprising, especially for those who mistake
Nietzsche for a hard-nosed materialist who wants to do away with all talk of
‘spirituality’, is that Nietzsche also considers his ideal life to be one of deep and
passionate spirituality. In fact, Nietzsche calls us to live an even more spiritual
life than what we find among religious believers. One of Nietzsche’s most
insistent and powerful critiques of modern Christianity is that it is not spiritual
enough. Nietzsche associates“spirit” with “culture” but also with such things as
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“integrity” “virility and pride” “beauty and freedom of the heart,” (A:22,46).
Nietzsche finds that it is this more robust, life-affirming understanding of
spirituality that which is denigrated and attacked by Christianity: “Christianity,
finally, is the hatred of the spirit, of pride, courage, freedom, libertinage of the
spirit” (A: 21). By way of contrast, Nietzsche envisions his ideal figure as “a
‘higher nature,’ a more spiritual nature” (GM I:16).137
In what follows I will demonstrate how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each
understand spirituality as, among other things, an ethical concept. It is an ethical
concept in that it involves the individual human self, the development of this
self, and how this individual comports himself in daily life. It is important for
both thinkers that the best life they advocate is deeply spiritual life, and both
critique traditional ethics and traditional religion as lacking this deepest form of
spirituality.
Although Kierkegaard believes spirituality also involves a relationship
with God, and he would clearly regard God as a spiritual being, Kierkegaard
mainly equates ‘spirit’ and ‘spirituality’ with the individual human self. When
Kierkegaard writes about “the world of spirit” this refers to the realm of human
freedom and action, not some ethereal or transcendent ‘other’ world. For
example, when Johannes says that “no cheating is tolerated in the world of
spirit” or that “in the world of spirit the only people who are tricked are those
who trick themselves” he is clearly referring to the ‘world’ of human inwardness
and action, not some transcendent realm (FT:107,125,110). Anti-Climacus makes
clear the connection between ‘spirit’ and individual selfhood in the famous
opening lines of The Sickness Unto Death: “The human being is spirit. But what is
spirit? Spirit is the self” (SUD:43). Elsewhere, Anti-Climacus uses the terms
“spirit” and “self” synonymously (SUD:46,57,114). What is specifically spiritual
about the self is the free determination of how one will live and how one will
relate to oneself, as well as the passion with which one does so. Thus, Anti-
137 The German term Geist can mean either intellect or spirit, but context makes it clear that N is talking about
spiritual and not (just) intellectual superiority.
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Climacus declares that the “accountability” of despair (i.e., that your despair is
your own fault, rather than a mere misfortune), is due to “the fact that the
relation [relating to itself] is spirit, is the self” (SUD:46).
Kierkegaard’s understanding of spirituality can also be seen by way of
contrast to what he considers to be lacking in spirituality. What Kierkegaard
describes as “spiritlessness” is the state of passionless mediocrity in which one
attempts to ignore one’s selfhood and abdicate responsibility for oneself. Thus,
a person living a life of shallow ‘immediacy’ “lives in the categories of the
sensate, the pleasant and the unpleasant, poo-poos spirit, the truth, etc.; he is too
sensate to have the courage to risk and endure being spirit” (SUD:73). The
category of “ignorant despair,” in which one is ignorant of oneself and unwilling
to accept responsibility for oneself, is called “spiritless” despair. Kierkegaard is
particularly critical of what is sees as the widespread lack of spirituality in the
lives of those who claim to be Christians. He suggest that while the ancient
‘pagans’ were at least moving toward greater spirituality, most people who
practice religion in Christendom are moving in the other direction. For
Kierkegaard, few lives are less spiritual than the life of the modern-day
Christian.
This is not to say that someone living a life of ‘spirtless despair’ is not in
any way ‘spirit’. To the contrary, as we saw in chapter 3, the scandalon of this life
is that one cannot escape one’s self as spirit, and the despair of this life is that one
misrelates to oneself in trying to do so. Hence, while Anti-Climacus calls
someone living this shallow life “spiritless” and lacking a self, speaking more
exactly he explains that this person ignores and avoids the fact that he is and
remains spirit.138
138 We might compare this spiritlessness to physical atrophy. Avoiding the use of a muscle certainly makes
this muscle weaker, but never to the point of justifying this avoidance by making the muscle non-existent;
the problem is and remains the atrophy of the neglected muscle. In a similar way, ‘spiritless despair’ may
be described as the atrophy of selfhood in which the self is weakened and diminished but by no means
annihilated.
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Anti-Climacus suggests that the complacency and mediocrity he finds in
modern life is due to this ignorance or avoidance of ourselves as spirit. He
explains that “the normal situation is this: that most people live without being
properly conscious of being characterized as spirit – and to this one can trace all
the so-called security, contentment with life, etc., which is exactly despair.”
(SUD:56) This “spiritless sense of security” deprives a person of the aspiration
for anything greater than comfort or pleasure (SUD:74). For this reason, Anti-
Climacus insists that however “vain and conceited people may be, the
conception they usually have of themselves is very humble; that is, they have no
conception of being spirit, the absolute that a human can be” (SUD:73).139 Part of
what is exalted about the human self considered as spirit is one’s freedom to
determine and take responsibility for oneself. In Either/Or Judge Wilhelm
explains that what gives the human self dignity is its ability to freely determine
itself and to thereby have a ‘history.’ But for Kierkegaard what is most exalted
about this spiritual conception of the self (so exalted that it is even offensive) is
that spiritually considered, the self is ‘before God.’ From the point of view of
faith, what truly gives the self dignity and worth is that it has within itself, at its
very core, a relationship with a loving, caring God. The life lived in ignorance or
avoidance of oneself as spirit is therefore a life lived in ignorance or avoidance of
this relationship. Anti-Climacus explains that faith’s view of the self is so
exalted that it causes offense. In contrast to this exalted view of the self, Anti-
Considers finds pathetic the life lived according to a more mediocre view of the
self:
the only life wasted is the life of one who so lived it, deceived by life’s
pleasures or its sorrows, that he never became decisively, eternally,
conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or what is the same, he never
became aware – and gained in the deepest sense the impression – that
139 In a note on this passage, Hannay usefully explains the difference between the notion of spirit in
Kierkegaard and in Hegel: “The phrase points to the contrast between ‘spirit’ in Hegel’s world-historical
sense, in which individuals merely participate, and in terms of which Absolute Spirit is an ideal projected
into an indefinite future, and ‘spirit’ in Kierkegaard’s individualistic sense, according to which every person
potentially is and both can and should become spirit” (SUD:172).
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there is a God there and that ‘he’, himself, his self, exists before this God.
(SUD:57)
This is not to say that a conception of oneself as spirit is all that is required
for faith. The path between this shallow ‘spiritlessness’ and the deep spirituality
of faith includes a variety of different forms of despair, each one progressively
“more spiritual.” The fact that Kierkegaard discusses “spiritual” forms of
despair shows that for him mere ‘spirituality’ is far from sufficient for a life of
faith. In his later works in particular, Kierkegaard fills in the details of the
specifically (and peculiarly) Christian understanding of spirituality he holds as
ideal. For Kierkegaard, this specifically Christian life is the most deeply spiritual
life because in it selfhood is most fully developed and one is transparently aware
of one’s self as including a relation to God as ‘the power that established it.’
Although the life of faith is the most spiritual life for Kierkegaard, he
acknowledges that spirituality is to be found not only in the life of faith. The self
is spirit, and therefore human life is a spiritual enterprise, whether we treat it as
such or not.
But what it is to treat human life as spiritual is not to suppose some
mystical otherworldliness at work behind or above human life. For Kierkegaard
(as for Nietzsche), what is spiritual are the struggles of human passion and
personality, especially the struggle to develop and enhance our inwardness, our
selfhood, and our ways of interacting with all that lies beyond us. Even the
despairing struggle to avoid oneself or create a new self is “spiritual” for
Kierkegaard, which is why he is clear that “despair is a qualification of spirit.”
Hence, we can see that Kierkegaard mainly understands spirituality as an ethical
concept in our broader sense of the term ‘ethical.’ We can also see how central
this concept of spirituality is for Kierkegaard’s overall ethical project; indeed, it is
a central issue for all ways of life, not just the life of specifically religious or
Christian spirituality.
Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche understands spirituality in relation to human
life and ethics in this broader sense. Also like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche thinks of
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the best life as the most spiritual life and criticizes lives lived according to
traditional ethics and religion for being spiritually mediocre. Nietzsche often
talks about “integrity in matters of spirit” and “conscientiousness in matters of
spirit” by which he means having a conscience for one’s moral judgments and
their foundation: “that one makes of every Yes and No a matter of conscience!”
(A:50,see also A:5,53). This sort of ethical conscientiousness is what Nietzsche
calls honesty, claiming it as “the most spiritual will to power” and the distinctive
virtue of his ideal ‘free spirits’ (BGE:227). Thus, what Nietzsche means by
‘spirit’ and ‘spirituality’ is not anything ethereal and otherworldly; to the
contrary, Nietzsche specifically associates ‘spirituality’ with this-worldly health,
beauty, strength and integrity (A:46,62). He also associates spirituality with
culture (A:22). For Nietzsche it is artistic creation and creation in the realm of
values, rather than religious adherence, that is the paradigm of spirituality. Thus
we can understand in what way Nietzsche expects his ideal figure to have “a
more spiritual nature” than what Nietzsche finds in his contemporaries (GM
I:16).
By way of contrast, Nietzsche ridicules the notion of a “pure spirit” above
and beyond human life: “’pure spirit’ is pure idiocy” (A:14). He argues that such
transcendent notions of spirituality represent the contempt for the spirituality of
human life by those who are “spiritually limited.” Those who posit a perfect,
unchanging, transcendent world necessarily degrade ‘this’ world by way of
contrast: “insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’ – look, must they not by the
same token negate the counterpart, this world, our world?” (GS:344) This is
why Nietzsche thinks that Christianity represents “hatred of the spirit, of pride,
courage, freedom, libertinage of the spirit [libertinage des Geistes]; Christian is the
hatred of the senses, of joy in the senses, of joy itself [Freude überhaupt]...” (A:21).
Nietzsche goes so far as to say that Christianity “utters a curse against the spirit,
against the superbia of the healthy spirit” (A:52). He is particularly critical of the
Christian conception of a transcendent God (God as ‘pure spirit’), which he sees
as a nihilistic condemnation of actual human life. Among other conceptions of
304
the divine, Nietzsche consider the Christian conception of God “the low-water
mark”:
God degenerated into the contradiction of life, instead of being its
transfiguration and eternal Yes! God as the declaration of war against life,
against nature, against the will to live! God—the formula for every
slander against "this world," for every lie about the "beyond"! God—the
deification of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy! ...
(A:18)
Likewise, as we saw in Chapter 4, Nietzsche is critical of any conception of
ethics that claims to have (and need) a transcendent basis. Nietzsche finds this
conception of spirituality and ethics to be the “embodiment of mortal hostility
against all integrity, against all elevation of the soul, against all discipline of the
spirit, against all frank and gracious humanity” (A:37). Christianity, according to
Nietzsche, is a conspiracy of the spiritually mediocre “against health, beauty,
whatever has turned out well, courage, spirit, graciousness of the soul, against life
itself” (A:62). He blames the Christian conception of values for corrupting “even
those strongest in spirit by teaching men to consider the supreme values of the
spirit as something sinful, as something that leads into error – as temptations”
(A:5).
Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, thinks there is a more spiritual life than the
life lived according to the ethical notions of duty and self-responsibility.
Nietzsche associates his ideal ‘free spirits’ with a “loftly spirituality.” Nietzsche
clearly agrees with the claim that “'a lofty spirituality is incompatible with any
kind of worthiness and respectability of the merely moral man'” even if he finds
it more advantageous to “flatter” his ‘merely moral’ reader by portraying
accepted morality as a means to this lofty spirituality:
[A] lofty spirituality itself exits only as a final product of moral
qualities; that it is a synthesis of all those states attributed to the
'merely moral' man after they have been acquired one by one
through protracted discipline and practice, perhaps in the course of
whole chains of generations; that lofty spirituality is the
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spiritualization of justice and of that benevolent severity which
knows itself empowered to maintain order of rank in the world
among things themselves - and not only among men. (BGE:219)
The idea that ascetic values can be affirmed as a means to a higher type is
undoubtedly part of Nietzsche’s attempt to seduce us away from ascetic ideals.
But nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter 4, it is important to see how the
movement away from ascetic ideals is a self-overcoming, and how these ideals
are to be used as means of something higher, since this is precisely the
‘redemption’ Nietzsche calls for.
What is most spiritual for Kierkegaard is the redemption of the self by
God and the struggle by the self to accept this redemption. Likewise, I think
Nietzsche finds the greatest spirituality in the redemption of human life from the
self-hating “curse” of ascetic ideals. Just as the issue of forgiveness is the central
issue of redemption for Kierkegaard, for Nietzsche redemption is understood as
overcoming ascetic bad conscience. There is a kind of forgiveness or
reconciliation in Nietzsche’s thinking as well, at least insofar as we come to
affirm the whole of our history (amor fati), including the reign of ascetic ideals,
since this whole history can be the means to Nietzsche’s ideal figure as the
“ripest fruit” of human development. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the
most spiritual life is only attained by progressing beyond (and in some way




In the first part of these conclusions, I will summarize and clarify the
ethical project I claim Kierkegaard and Nietzsche mutually share. In the next
section, I will explain how this ethical project fits with the projects already
pursued in contemporary ethics, specifically the projects of deontology,
utilitarianism and virtue ethics. In the final section, I will discuss what further
research possibilities emerge once we include the ethical project shared by
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in our curriculum of contemporary ethical projects.
Throughout this chapter, I will consider objections to my readings of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and to my central thesis about the project they have
to offer contemporary ethics.
§1 THE ETHICAL PROJECT OF KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE
I will begin by summarizing the ethical project that I explored at length in
chapters 1-4. Simply stated, this is the ethical project of illustrating, analyzing,
and evaluating different ways of life. In what follows, I will explain each of these
sub-tasks in turn. The first point to clarify is what is meant by a ‘way of life.’ As I
see it, we can often helpfully identify a way of life according to its central,
guiding telos or highest value (or set of highest values). Ultimately, though, what
is most germane to a way of life is the way that this telos or value is pursued or
upheld. More specifically, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche what distinguishes a
way of life is the fundamental existential stance someone living this life takes
toward existence as a whole: their stance toward themselves, toward other
people, and toward the natural world. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,
particular values, beliefs, principles, character traits, and practices can be traced
back to this fundamental stance and can be understood as manifestations of this
same single stance, differentiated according to situation. For this reason,
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each engage in the ethical project of identifying and
developing a typology of such stances. Each considers a person’s existential
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stance or way of life to be the central ‘unit’ of ethical concern; for both, success or
failure, ethically speaking, comes as a whole, as the success or failure of a way of
life considered as a whole.
One helpful way of classifying a way of life is according to its central or
highest concern. In Kierkegaard’s schema, the different ways of life can be
defined by their central and characteristic telos or value.140 The aesthetic life (in
its various forms) is the life in which enjoyment is the central and highest value.
The ethical life (in either its ‘active’ self-righteous form or ‘passive’ self-
renouncing form) is the life in which ethical righteousness is the central and
highest value. Likewise, the religious life (‘religiousness B’) is the life in which
faith, understood as a loving, open relationship with God, is the central and
highest value. I think this form of classification works less well for Nietzsche,
but Nietzsche does sometimes refer to the ascetic and slavish mode of valuation
as ‘the morality of pity,’ singling out pity as the central and characteristic value.141
In contrast, we might think of the life of the ancient nobles as centering on the
value of honor. In the same way, we might think of the life of creative
sovereignty as revolving around the central value of responsibility or creative
excellence. So as a kind of shorthand way of classifying a way of life, it may be
helpful to refer to a highest telos or value, and it seems clear enough that this
highest telos or value plays an important role in shaping and guiding one’s
particular actions, beliefs, and decisions within everyday life.
Nonetheless, this method of classification is further refined by both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and for good reason. One problem with this
classification method is that a value may appear in more than one way of life, so
140 It may be helpful to return to our comparison with Aristotle to understand how this works. Aristotle
differentiates his ‘three most prominent’ ways of life according to the characteristic activity pursued in each
(the pursuit of enjoyment, political and social activities, or contemplation). He thereby also differentiates
these lives according to the highest telos of each (attaining enjoyment, political/social excellence, or
contemplative excellence).
141 As Nietzsche declares in The Antichrist: “One has ventured to call pity a virtue (- in every noble morality it
counts as a weakness -); one has gone further, one has made of it the virtue, the ground and origin of all
virtue – only, to be sure, from the viewpoint of a nihilistic philosophy which inscribed Denial of Life on its
escutcheon” (A:7).
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identifying a way of life according to that value can be misleading. For example,
in Nietzsche’s schema, honesty (without further qualification) is a virtue in the
life he rejects as well as the life he holds as ideal. To say ‘the life of honesty’ is
therefore ambiguous, as will be discussed in detail below. As applied to
Kierkegaard’s schema, this method of classification runs into a similar problem.
It is conceivable that someone hold faith or ethical righteousness as a central
ideal and yet do so experimentally, i.e., within an aesthetic way of life. (We can
imagine the aesthete A’s response to the advice Kierkegaard’s ethical and
religious authors offer: “Yes, everyone ought to live as an ethical person or a
religious person… but only for a while, otherwise it would become boring.” )
Likewise, it seems possible to pursue religious faith as one’s highest telos but
pursue this telos as a self-reliantly achieved personal accomplishment, i.e. as part
of what he calls the ‘ethical way of life’. As we saw in chapter 3, the life of
resignation or ‘religiousness A’, properly classified as a form of the ethical life, is
a case in point: here one’s relation to God is understood entirely within ethical
categories.
One might object that what faith really is can only be central to the
religious life, and what ethical righteousness really is can only be central in the
ethical life. One could say that to really hold faith or ethical righteousness as a
central value in one’s life is incompatible with holding this as an aesthetic ideal, as
something pursued for the sake of conformity, or as an interesting but temporary
experiment. But this talk of “really” holding something as a central value
suggests that what is important in a way of life is not so much the content of
these highest values, but how they are pursued and upheld. What is crucial for
defining a way of life is the form the pursuit of this value takes. (As I hope to
have shown, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are primarily concerned with the form
rather than the content of our beliefs, goals and values.) For Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, it is of central importance to determine how a person obtains and
upholds his or her values, beliefs, and goals. While a lot could be said about how
values are pursued and upheld within each way of life, I have shown that
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Kierkegaard and Nietzsche converge in explaining this ‘how’ as a central,
fundamental existential stance that underlies a person’s particular values, beliefs,
actions and character traits.
I have called this an evaluative stance for two reasons. First, this stance
involves a kind of underlying evaluative conception and judgment with respect
to one’s life considered as a whole. Simplifying somewhat, we could say that for
both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, such a stance involves a fundamental
evaluative affirmation or condemnation of one’s actuality. One can try to avoid,
denigrate, or deny oneself and one’s actuality, or one can embrace and affirm
oneself and one’s actuality.142 In each case, a fundamental value-judgment or
value-orientation is established. Secondly, this fundamental stance is evaluative
in that it shapes and guides one’s other, more particular evaluations. For both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche one’s values, beliefs, judgments, conceptions,
commitments, and character traits flow from this fundamental stance. In other
words, the evaluative judgment in the fundamental stance translates into a whole
variety of particular evaluations. This stance is a way of manifesting one’s
conceptions of life, one’s goals and ambitions for life, and one’s most deeply held
values; one might say that this stance is the underlying structure of one’s
commitments to these things. To name a few examples from Nietzsche, this
stance determines whether these values are manifested as a way of lashing out at
oneself or others (ressentiment), or as a way of escaping oneself and others (ascetic
nihilism). Alternately, one might hold values as a way of respecting oneself and
others (creative sovereignty). Kierkegaard examines the stance of holding values
out of conformity or self-debasing, immediate desire (aesthetically), out of self-
responsibility or self-reproach (ethically), or out of joyful gratitude (by faith). In
142 Of course the dialectical structure of this affirmation and denial is much more complicated than these
simplified descriptions suggest. For Kierkegaard, there are various ways of ‘wanting not to be oneself’
including ‘wanting to be the self one creates’. As we saw in the chapter on despair, one can deny and try to
escape oneself by affirming and embracing another self one would like to have had instead. Likewise, for
Nietzsche, it is possible to adopt a life-denying stance as a way of preserving and saying ‘yes’ to life
(asceticism as saving us from the first crisis of nihilism), even if this way of preserving life in the short term
is life-denying and counter-productive in the long term (bringing about the current crisis of nihilism.)
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each case, there is an evaluative content to the fundamental stance which in some
way guides and shapes the evaluative content of the particular judgments, beliefs
and values the person holding this stance manifests in daily life. Both
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche portray these more particular evaluations as
manifestations of one’s overall evaluative stance.
I have also called this fundamental stance an existential stance, in part
because it is a stance toward existence as a whole and in part because it
structures and informs one’s everyday existence. Kierkegaard sometimes refers
to a way of life as a ‘worldview’ in reference to the fact that this evaluative stance
impacts not only normative claims, but one’s conceptions about life in general.
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are both interested in how one’s fundamental stance
manifests itself in the minutiae of everyday life. They both trace the
manifestation of this stance to almost absurd levels of particularity (e.g. for
Nietzsche, what foods one eats and for Kierkegaard, whether and how one reads
the newspaper). Whether or not we accept these extreme examples, it is
valuable to note that for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, one’s way of life colors
the entire phenomenology of one’s everyday existence.
Although calling this stance an “existential” stance may call to mind the
later, 20th Century Existentialists, I suspect that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have
in mind an ancient model for how such a stance evaluatively shapes the
everyday life of one who holds it. In particular, I think Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche may have Stoicism in mind. The Stoic stance of resignation regarding
‘externals’ and resolution regarding one’s own moral stature is just such an
overall ‘existential’ stance. In Stoicism, this fundamental stance is a way of
relating to oneself (drawing a strict divide between the self and everything else),
a way of relating to others (out of compassion, if also resignation), and a way of
relating to the world (as Stoicism maintains, it is a proper relation to the facts of
the world). Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each include something like this Stoic
stance in their respective typologies (as the life of resignation or asceticism), and
both position this stance as the central alternative to the best way of life they
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advocate instead. 143 As I discussed in the last chapter, I think both Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche can be understood as advocating something like an inverted
Stoicism: a stance embodying all of the Stoic’s inner strength while nonetheless
remaining resolutely open and engaged with the world of ‘externals’ from which
the Stoic resolutely withdraws.
Another source of this idea of a fundamental existential stance might be
found in the theological tradition to which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both
respond. Augustine famously presents the situation of the human soul as
suspended between the divine and the bodily; what determines the agent’s
ethical situation is whether he or she takes a willed stance toward God or away
from God (conversio or aversio).144 Kierkegaard modifies this picture by showing
that the human self can also turn toward itself or away from itself. The willed
stance of conversio or aversio toward oneself is related to the Augustinian stance
of conversio or aversio toward God, since according to Kierkegaard it is only by
turning towards God (as “the power that established the self”) that one can turn
towards oneself. For Kierkegaard, despair is an aversion (aversio) to both oneself
and God. I think we can find something parallel in Nietzsche in his idea that
one can either turn towards life or away from life. For Nietzsche, the best life is
one in which one takes a willed stance of acceptance and affirmation toward
oneself. But this stance can only be accomplished if one also takes a stance of
acceptance and affirmation toward the whole context of one’s existence. For
Nietzsche there is also something like the ideal of acknowledging the ‘power’
that has established one’s self, namely the genealogy of one’s ideas, beliefs and
values, one’s physiology and psychology, and the sum of one’s experiences. As
we discussed in Chapter 4, for Nietzsche it is only by affirming these factors that
143 Kierkegaard makes explicit reference to Stoicism in relation to both forms of the ethical life. In The
Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus labels the despair of ‘wanting to be oneself’ (both actively and passively):
“If a common name were to be applied to this form of despair, one might call it Stoicism, though not just in
the sense of the sect” (SUD:99). Although Nietzsche obviously rejects the ascetic bent of the Stoic stance, he
admires its inner strength or ‘hardness.’ In Beyond Good and Evil, he exhorts his fellow ‘free spirits’: “let us
remain hard, we last of the Stoics!” (BGE:227).
144 Vernon Bourke, Ed., The Essential Augustine, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974), 43-36.
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one can affirm one’s self since a self is not the disconnected, disembodied subject
of Enlightenment thought but is rather the embodiment of everything that
established it.
Calling this stance a ‘fundamental existential stance’ also indicates that I
do not want it to be confused with the kind of particular stance one might take in
the course of life, e.g. the stance one takes on a particular ethical issue like the
death penalty, animal rights, or abortion. Certainly one’s fundamental
existential stance will affect this more particular kind of stance towards an issue,
just as it will affect all one’s commitments and values. Possibly one’s devotion to
such causes will be the central focus one one’s life, and thus form a highest telos
for which one lives. But even then the question remains: how do you relate to
this telos? The ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche asks: do you relate
to this telos as a manifestation of a general stance of self-hatred or of self-respect?
Does it flow from a stance of ascetic self-denial or stance of joyful self-acceptance,
a stance of resentment towards others or a stance of respect and love towards
others?
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche ask these questions not just of particular
stances, but of particular principles, beliefs, character traits, and actions. These
are not just questions about what motivates these particular things, but rather
questions about the sort of general evaluative schema or context from which
these particular things emerge. A way of life is the normative context within
which we must understand such particular things. For Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, the fundamental unit of ethical concern is not particular actions,
principles or motivations, or even character traits; rather, their concern is the
fundamental existential stance underlying a person’s entire way of thinking,
experiencing, and evaluating. They each develop a typology of different
fundamental stances and they each spend considerable effort illustrating how
particular beliefs, actions, principles and character traits are regarded or upheld
within these different stances. As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, this task of
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depicting different ways of life is largely a matter of showing how such a
fundamental evaluative stance manifests itself in a person’s everyday reality.
The fact that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are primarily interested in the
underlying stance behind such particulars helps to explain the frustration
scholars sometimes face when trying to derive prescriptions for particular
actions or principles from their work. Although I think their work may contain
unique and valuable insights with respect to such specifics, often Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche leave us with a formal picture out of which more than one
particular prescription (or proscription) could be derived. Moreover, I think we
miss the greater potential to be found in their work as long as we try to make
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche serve the ethical tasks currently pursued in
contemporary philosophical ethics. The usefulness of their provocative, witty
and psychologically astute insights on particular issues already debated in
contemporary ethics should not to be discounted. But if we instead insist on
meeting Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on their own territory, I believe we will find
that they are undertaking quite a different ethical project than we see prevalent
in ethics today. It is not without important connections and points of overlap
with debates in contemporary ethics, as I will discuss shortly. But I think the
ethical project proposed and followed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is
importantly different from the projects pursued by contemporary ethics, and I
think it is in proposing and pursuing this project that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
can offer the most benefit to contemporary ethics.
However much Kierkegaard and Nietzsche may look to ancient Greek
ethics as the model for this project, there seem to be two distinctive features of
their approach that could be considered distinctively ‘modern.’ First, they each
address the historical developments in values that have precipitated the
contemporary ‘crisis’ of values they each address, namely the medieval
establishment of Christendom and the challenges (and reformulations) of
Christianity by the Enlightenment. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both attempt to
diagnose and address what they see as the modern situation of ethics. I think it is
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clear that their efforts are just as valuable for confronting our contemporary
situation in ethics as they were in their own time, as perhaps more so. Secondly,
and more importantly for our purposes, there is something fittingly modern in
the ethical pluralism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s project. Each present us
with different ways of life understood as different paradigms of value, and they
each deny that there is any objective, rational, universally valid way of
determining which paradigm of value is correct or best. Each way of life has its
own notion of what makes life ‘good’ or ‘bad’; even an ethically unconcerned
aesthete like Kierkegaard’s A has standards of quality for how one should live.
For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, there is no independent, rationally grounded
‘meta-paradigm’ of value that determines which of these paradigms of value is
‘correct’ or superior to the others. This is because there can be no such objective,
evaluative ‘view from nowhere’ outside of and beyond a particular way of life
and its paradigm of values by which one could derive an objective judgment of
this kind.
How, then, could Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer any kind of
interesting, non-arbitrary analysis and evaluation of different ways of life? How
is it that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can deny any objective, universal standards
of ethics and yet embark on the task of evaluating different ways of life? Given
their mutual denial of any objective evaluations in these matters, what more
could we expect from the analysis and evaluation offered by Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche other than their own subjective preference regarding these ways of
life?
As I see it, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche employ two main methods for
addressing this challenge. One method, to be discussed in detail later, is to take
the challenge in stride and admit the subjectivity of the ideas and evaluations
presented to the reader. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche often openly engaged in
polemics, writing in such a way that their own subjective preference for a way of
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life is scarcely hidden, even if it is not directly declared.145 Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche both try to move their readers, to repell them from ways of life they
hold as inferior and pernicious and entice them toward ways of life they hold as
superior. (If they each generally refrain from expressing their own preferences
too directly, it is because this can hamper the development of individuality,
which they each consider to be a significant aspect of this superior way of life.)
These attempts to polemically move readers toward a better way of life
undoubtedly reflect Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s own personal preferences, but
this effort does not rest on these preferences alone. What Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche have to say about the worth of different ways of life does not depend
upon an unargued bias or prejudice. In order to see why, we must examine the
other main method Kierkegaard and Nietzsche employ to meet this challenge.
This is the method of analyzing ways of life according to the concept of internal
collapse.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche analyze the intricate dialectical interrelations
by which some ways of life internally collapse, while others are internally self-
strengthening. As I understand it, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche may be
subjectivists about values but they not subjectivists about facts. Ways of life may
be adopted subjectively, but they must adequately accord with what Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche present as objective facts about human life, on pain of becoming
self-defeating. As I showed in chapters 3 and 4, some ways of life fail according
to their own standards, and they are guaranteed to do so because they represent
an antagonistic or escapist relation to oneself and the actuality of human life.
Simply put, a subjectively chosen way of life can fail by its own subjective
standards when these standards represent an underlying stance of antagonism or
escapism with respect to some basic objective facts about the human being
145 In his early pseudonymous writings Kierkegaard is undoubtedly more guarded than Nietzsche about
expressing his own views; but it is arguable that even within the works of ‘indirect communication’
Kierkegaard’s subjective preferences are made manifest. Moreover, Kierkegaard engaged in ‘direct
communication’ of a polemic nature (openly advocating for a religious way of life) throughout his
pseudonymous period in the form of edifying discourses. His later work became more openly polemic still,
as shown by the fierceness of his views in The Moment, which he self-published as a broadside.
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holding these standards. Thus, the concept of internal collapse cuts across the
question of subjectivity or objectivity of values in an interesting way. Here I
think we can understand the primary value of the concept of internal collapse for
contemporary ethics. The notion of internal collapse offers a way of making
ethical evaluations of ways of life without relying on independent, universal,
objective principles but also without abandoning the expectation of something
more than an unarguable, subjective preference. In other words, evaluation
according to the notion of internal collapse shows how one can abandon reliance
on (contentious) objective evaluations without abandoning the notion of
objective facts and without abandoning the expectation that ethical evaluations
go beyond an emotivist expression of merely subjective preferences.
In showing how the concept of internal collapse can accomplish this, I will
first clarify the kind of objective facts Kierkegaard and Nietzsche call upon in
analyzing ways of life. These facts can be grouped into two broad categories:
general facts about human selfhood and more specific facts about the inner
workings of a particular way of life. This first category includes the fairly ‘thin’
conceptions of human nature we find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. It may
seem surprising to claim that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have a conception of
human nature at all, given their reputation as existentialists and given that
‘existentialism’ is often defined by its dismissal of any notion of human nature or
‘essence.’ Nonetheless, I think it is clear that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each
rely upon what they take to be some basic, objective facts about human selfhood.
For example, for Kierkegaard all ways of life must answer to the fact that one
cannot either escape oneself or create oneself. For Nietzsche, all ways of life
must answer to other fundamental facts about the human self, such as the fact
that one is inescapably an embodied, natural organism with certain interests and
needs.
Obviously, these minimal facts fall short of a full-bodied anatomy of
human nature, and they seem far from sufficient to ground a positive
recommendation of a whole way of living. (In this way Kierkegaard and
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Nietzsche differ from Aristotle, for whom a much more substantial notion of
human nature serves as the evaluative standard against which different ways of
life can be judged. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche generally avoid the teleological
view of human nature that we find in Aristotle.) Of course, it is true that for
Kierkegaard the best life is one that accords with the fact that one cannot escape
or create oneself, and it is true that for Nietzsche the best life is one that accords
with the fact that one is an embodied, interested natural organism. But what
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have to say to positively recommend these ways of
life goes far beyond this correlation with the basic facts of human nature.146 Often
these thin conceptions of human nature can bear on the value of a particular way
of life only when combined with the second category of objective facts: facts
establishing a much thicker conception of the dialectical ‘inner workings’ of this
particular way of life. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche spend considerable effort
exploring facts of this second kind.
Some of these facts about the ‘inner workings’ of different ways of life are
presented as psychological facts. This should not be surprising since
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both saw themselves as psychologists (not in the
contemporary, clinical sense, but in the ancient sense in which Plato is also a
psychologist.) In their mutual search for an understanding of the inner workings
of a way of life, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche present probing psychological
portraits of those living this life. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche seek to develop
descriptions of ways of life accurate enough such that people living this way of
life will recognize themselves in these descriptions. They also seek to establish
an understanding of what Nietzsche calls the “morphology” of values, i.e. the
dialectical changes and interrelations by which ways of life come to be and cease
to be. In pursuing these tasks, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche rely on what they
146 Nietzsche famously allows that deception, an avoidance of the facts of a situation, may be useful for life
(e.g. in avoiding the meaninglessness of life by positing a meaning for suffering.) So ‘being true to the facts
of life’ is not an unqualified value for him. Nonetheless, it is clear that his ideal is a figure who joyfully
accepts his own ‘naturalness’ (including suffering) without the need of fallacious supernatural explanations
to give it meaning.
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take to be objective facts about the psychology of agents living a certain way of
life.
For example, in Kierkegaard’s account, the person living the aesthetic life
faces the psychological fact that something that has immediate interest does not
always have lasting or repeatable interest. What we called ‘the problem of
means’, the need for ever more interesting and enjoyable moments in order to
keep oneself minimally entertained, rests on such psychological observations.
Here Kierkegaard is making very similar points to those that Plato makes in his
psychological portraits of the democratic man and of the tyrant in the Republic.147
Kierkegaard also presents us with what he takes to be a deeper psychological
insight into the aesthetic life, namely that one who pursues enjoyment as the
highest goal does so as a way of avoiding and escaping oneself. Moreover,
Kierkegaard is careful to draw the connections between these deeper facts about
the underlying aims and goals of a way of life and its more immediate surface
phenomena. As we discussed in chapter 3, the symptoms of dissatisfaction and
failure that may surface within a way of life (the scandalon or stumbling block
over which someone recurrently stumbles) can be traced back to whatever of the
self one fails to avoid or whatever of one’s self one fails to create as one would
like to have it. For example, in Kierkegaard’s analysis the recurring boredom
and dissatisfaction that haunt the aesthetic life results from the fact that one
cannot ever avoid or escape oneself. One seeks satisfaction in entertainment as a
way of losing oneself, but since one can never fully lose oneself, one can never be
fully satisfied. Thus, the immediate failure within the aesthetic life (the scandalon
that one is bored or dissatisfied) is the manifestation of the deeper failure of
adopting the aesthetic life in the first place (in a futile attempt to escape of avoid
oneself). The real problem is not that one is bored, but that one seeks
entertainment as one’s highest value in the mode of trying to escape oneself.
147 Plato portrays these men as slaves to their own ever increasing and conflicting desires (Republic 561d,
577d).
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Yet not all facts contributing to the accounts of internal collapse in
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are psychological facts. For example, what
Kierkegaard says about the ‘guilt trap’ plaguing the ethical life does not rest on
straightforwardly psychological facts. His point that any particular guilt entails
total guilt cannot be understood as saying that whenever one feels guilt for one
misdeed one therefore feels totally guilty. The observation is about the dialectical
nature of guilt, the logical relationship between a particular act of wrongdoing
and guilt as a qualitative state of being. This relationship holds whether or not
there is a corresponding psychological phenomenon. Likewise, Kierkegaard’s
point about the asymmetry of self-reliance with respect to ethical status, that by
one’s own self-reliant actions, one can get oneself into guilt, but not out of guilt,
is not primarily a psychological observation. It is an observation about the
dialectical structure of guilt and the human will. Facts contributing to an account
of internal collapse can also be historical facts, especially for Nietzsche.
Nietzsche’s account of the genealogy of the ascetic and slavish mode of
valuation, e.g. that it evolved out of a revaluation of the earlier noble mode of
valuation, is presented as a historical account, even if it includes the history of a
psychological phenomenon (e.g. ressentiment). For want of a better term, we may
call all these specific facts about a way of life ‘dialectical facts’ since they pertain
to the dialectical structure of a way of life.
In order to understand how exactly these various kinds of objective facts
contribute to the internal collapse of a way of life, we need to understand that
whether or not a subjectively chosen way of life collapses internally is not up to
the person living this life. The presence or absense of internal collapse is a
factual matter, not a matter of subjective judgment. For Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, whether or not a way of life collapses from despair or nihilism is an
objective fact, even if the subject matter of this objective fact is a subjectively
chosen stance. This internal collapse of a way of life is guaranteed by (and
explained by) a conflict between the factual assumptions and requirements of
this way of life and the actual facts of agent’s existence. As we saw in chapters 3
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and 4, a way of life can be shipwrecked on its own requirements if it runs afoul
of objective facts about human nature and about the internal dialectics of this
way of life. We can learn as an objective fact that a fundamental stance is self-
defeating if this stance turns the agent against himself in such a way that what
success in this way of life would require from the agent is necessary ruled out by
a combination of facts about who the agent is as a human being and facts about
what success according to this way of life would really entail. From factual
premises about human existence in general and about the specifics of a particular
way of life (including what is of greatest value in this way of life and how this
value it is pursued) we can come to a factual conclusion that this way of life fails
according to its own values and standards.
For example, if it is a dialectical fact of the aesthetic life that one seeks
enjoyment as a way of escaping oneself and one requires a complete escape from
oneself in order to be aesthetically satisfied, and if it is a fact of human nature
that one cannot escape oneself, then we know that the aesthetic life will
necessarily fail to attain its goals of self-escape and aesthetic satisfaction. Of
course, it may be that only sophisticated (cynical) aesthetes like Kierkegaard’s A
realize this structure of failure and consciously condemn the aesthetic life as a
failure. Kierkegaard would expect that most people living this life would not
come to this point of conscious realization or condemnation, but the structure of
this life is self-defeating nonetheless.
Of course, analysis based on objective facts does not get us all the way to
an objective evaluation of the way of life in question. We face Hume’s is-ought
problem if we try to draw an evaluative conclusion from these factual premises.
Just because a way of life can be objectively, factually guaranteed to
(subjectively) condemn itself does not mean that we are entitled to the evaluative
conclusion that such a way of life is objectively ‘bad,’ inferior, or unworthy.
Importantly, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do not try to sneak an objective
standard into the picture by assuming that whether or not a way of life collapses
internally is a new objective evaluative standard by which to judge ways of life.
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How then can the analysis of different ways of life contribute to the evaluation of
these ways of life?
The elegance of the notion of internal collapse is that it reveals an inter-
subjective concurrence on the failure and unworthiness of this way of life. By
definition, a way of life that collapses internally fails by its own standards. We
also know that this way of life is judged as ‘bad’ or at least inferior according to
the standards of every other way of life. (This follows by definition, since a way
of life is defined and differentiated from other ways of life by its standards for
how to live. Two ways of life that agree in these highest standards are not in fact
distinct.) Therefore, we can conclude that an internally collapsing way of life is
deemed inferior or unworthy from all available evaluative perspectives, even if
there is no objective evaluative standpoint by which to condemn it non-
perspectivally.
For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, careful analysis of a way of life and of
human nature can yield factual premises from which we can reach a factual
conclusion that there is inter-subjective condemnation of a way of life. In
pursuing this reasoning, we do not violate the is-ought or fact-value divide
because what we derive from the factual premises and conclusions about the
collapse of a way of life is not an evaluative judgment. It is the factual
conclusion that all available subjective standards concur in condemning this way
of life. We know that a way of life is, in point of fact, condemned by all
evaluative perspectives, even if do not know whether, objectively speaking, it
ought to be condemned.
Yet in an important sense, this inter-subjective condemnation settles the
evaluative question of whether or not this way of life is ‘good’ or worthy of being
adopted. Far from facing complete evaluative indeterminancy regarding the
worth of different ways of life, as entailed by the extreme subjectivist reading of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the notion of internal collapse allows us to have an
important and decisive indicator for evaluating different ways of life. It allows
us to see that the worth of a way of life is not completely isolated from the facts
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about this life and about human existence; subjectively chosen values need to
face up to certain objective facts about human existence. However much
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche may be subjectivists regarding values (in the sense
that they deny an objective standard of ethical value), they are objectivists with
respect to certain relevant facts, facts which can bear on the internal collapse of
ways of life.
Importantly, what I have called inter-subjective concurrence should not be
confused with a unanimous agreement about the worth of a way of life. The
concurrence I am referring to is inter-subjective in the sense that all fundamental
subjective standards concur in condemning a way of life, not in the sense that all
human subjects actually, consciously agree in condemning it. As I just explained
in the example of the aesthetic life, the internal collapse of a way of life is not
always, and perhaps not often, known to a person living this way of life. Those
living an internally collapsing life will therefore often affirm this life as the best
life. (This would seem to follow from the definition of a way of life as an
evaluative stance). But whether or not the standards of a way of life condemn
themselves and whether the fundamental stance defining this way of life is self-
defeating is not merely a subjective judgment on behalf of the person living this
life. My analysis shows that a way of life can have standards and goals which
condemn themselves or guarantee their own failure regardless of whether or not
someone living this life consciously condemns himself or considers his life a
failure. The underlying cause of the self-condemnation of an agent’s standards is
the agent’s stance of antagonism or aversion toward himself; this antagonism
and aversion may be present regardless of whether or not the agent consciously
pursues this antagonism or aversion.
The metaphor of disease favored by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
further explains this important point. Just as a disease need not manifest itself in
noticeable symptoms, the internal collapse of a way of life need not manifest
itself in noticeable symptoms of failure. For example, the ethical person in Judge
Wilhelm’s model may think that he is innocent or ethically excellent; he may not
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feel any guilt at all. But according to Kierkegaard, this does not mean that he is
not guilty or that his way of life does not suffer from the internal collapse that
this guilt represents. To use another metaphor favored by Kierkegaard, internal
collapse is the ‘shipwreck’ of a subjectively upheld stance as this stance runs
aground on the actuality of the agent’s existence. This shipwreck is guaranteed
by the fact that the agent’s way of life represents a willed stance of avoidance or
denial of the agent’s actuality. Therefore, it is not necessary that these agents
consciously condemn themselves or this way of life; the standards of this way of
life can condemn this way of life. There can be inter-subjective concurrence
according to the standards of various ways of life even if there is not a conscious
unanimous agreement among the actual human subjects adopting these
standards.
Before continuing on to discuss the evaluation of ways of life more fully, I
will pause to consider two related objections to what has been said so far about
the ethical project I ascribe to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The first objection is
regarding the descriptive part of this task. It would seem that the ethical project I
attribute to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche includes an attempt to ‘pigeonhole’
actual individuals, classifying them according to a theoretically worked out
typology of different ways of life. But how can this square with their mutual
advocacy of individuality discussed in the last chapter? Can we really ascribe to
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche precisely the kind of reductive philosophical project
that they each so often ridicule?
In illustrating the diverse typology of existential stances, Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche do not assume that the typologies they establish in their writings will
‘pigeonhole’ each actual individual. Kierkegaard’s use of first-person
pseudonyms, and his repeated insistence on the failure of systematic thought to
address the individual self in its concrete particularity, testify to the efforts he
makes to distance himself from such a view. Likewise, however much Nietzsche
may generalize, he is also clear that he is not presenting a systematically
complete or final typology of ways of living. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
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would probably admit to the crudity and incompleteness of their respective
typologies. This is because both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche recognize that the
endless diversity of life, combined with the often inexpressible particularity of an
actual human life, will always make a mockery of attempts to reduce this
diversity and particularity to a theoretically complete typology. As I will
discuss shortly, the aim of the ethical ‘types’ Kierkegaard and Nietzsche present
is not to reductively ‘pigeonhole’ the individual into a neat conceptual system,
but rather to serve as general guideposts for our ethical self-knowledge and
navigation.
The second objection pertains to the way this ethical project analyzes
failure in terms of internal collapse. Usually we think of ethical failure as the
failure to live up to some ethical standard. If it is true instead that ethical failure
is the built-in weakness and collapse of a way of life, how does this leave room
for personal responsibility? Is it ‘bad’ to fail to live up to standards which are
themselves failing and ‘bad’? More importantly, how can a person be culpably
responsible for living a way of life that just happens to collapse internally,
especially if this person is unaware of this internal collapse? It would seem that
someone living an internally collapsing way of life is no more morally culpable
for this collapse than someone living in a building that is internally collapsing is
morally culpable for the collapse of this building.
For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, an agent’s primary responsibility is not to
fulfill whatever standards one happens to adopt, but to adopt standards that
express a stance of self-acceptance and transparency regarding the facts of
human actuality, rather than a stance of self-avoidance or self-denial. One’s
primary responsibility is to accept the reality of one’s self and one’s life,
including one’s past and one’s potential for the future. Someone who adopts a
stance of self-avoidance or self-denial may be quite ‘responsible’ in fulfilling the
particular duties within this stance, but they still fail to have the kind of
individual responsibility Kierkegaard and Nietzsche espouse.
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Moreover, ethical failure is not that one happens to have a way of life with
an internal flaw; after all, this internal flaw is a willed stance of self-avoidance or
self-denial. Each individual is responsible for willing whatever stance toward
existence he or she adopts. The possibility of changing one’s stance makes this
responsibility more acute: to remain in a failing way of life means to continually
will to remain in this way of life. One’s degree of culpability in continuing to
will to avoid or attack oneself is proportional to the degree to which one is
consciously aware of this will. But this does not mean that some people are so
ignorant of themselves and their way of life that they are in no way culpable for
adopting or continuing a despairing or nihilistic way of life. As Kierkegaard
rightly argues, ignorance of one’s actuality as a self can never be so complete as
to be exculpatory since complete ignorance of one’s self must involve a willed
and culpable self-deception.148 So the internal collapse of a way of life might be
endemic to that way of life, and this can be thought of as an internal flaw in this
way of living, but this does not in any way detract from the personal
responsibility of those who adopt or continue in this way of life. Although it is
a fact that a way of life collapses, what this means if we spell it out further is that
within this way of life it is a fact that one willfully turns away from or against
oneself. The ethical failure is this willful stance, and this willful stance is clearly
a matter of the agent’s individual responsibility.
The next point to discuss is what I have called the polemic element of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s project; this project is polemic in the very broadest
sense that it has the practical aim of moving readers to recognize something
about their ethical situation and to improve this situation (if need be).
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche provide illustrations of different ways of life that
they hope will be accurate enough such that their readers can recognize
148 As we saw in Chapter 3, Kierkegaard discusses the most intense form of despair as ‘the demonic’ in which
a person is fully conscious of the despair of his way of life but continues to will it out of spite. In both The
Sickness Unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard also explores the case of someone who has only
the vaguest notion of doing wrong; Kierkegaard suggests that even in these cases, persisting in willing what
is wrong is a culpable failure.
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themselves somewhere within these illustrations. Clearly, one purpose of these
types is to aid with self-knowledge. We can think of the different ethical types
discussed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as different guideposts or terrain
markers offered as a way of roughly mapping out the various territories of
human existence. These terrain markers are especially useful for locating
oneself ethically, i.e., for understanding the way of life one currently lives.149 The
deep analysis of these ways of life offered by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche also
allows readers to understand the inner workings of the life they live. This
analysis may help the reader to realize the deeper failure behind recurrent
disappointments or failures within the reader’s way of life.
These terrain markers can be useful not only for locating oneself within a
way of life, but also in navigating between ways of life. After all, Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche both believe the human self to be something dynamic rather than
static; human life is a matter of continual becoming, not of static being. For
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the true question is not ‘what kind of ethical type am
I?’ but ‘what kind of ethical type am I becoming’? The illustrations and analysis
offered by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche allows us to understand what Nietzsche
calls the “morphology” of how we come to adopt or abandon different ways of
life. With the help of the rough maps of ethical terrain provided by Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche, one can better navigate this process of becoming. Of course
neither Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer an exact prescription for how to make
the switch to a better way of life; as we have seen, their analysis of this change as
somehow emerging from the collapse of a way of life remains somewhat scant.
Nonetheless, it is evident that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are concerned to
prompt such a change, and it is clear that the ethical types they provide can help
one to navigate this change.
Moreover, the analysis showing that some ways of life collapse internally
may also help to motivate someone living a collapsing life to abandon it.
149 As the metaphor of guideposts suggests, there is no need to find oneself in the exact position of these
‘types’ in order to take one’s bearings from them; one can take bearings from a guidepost at quite a distance.
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Likewise, the analysis showing that other ways of life are self-strengthening
could motivate someone to adopt such a life. This motivation is part of the
overall polemic task of moving the reader from one way of life to another.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do this by providing the reader with positive
portraits of what they take to be the best way of life and scathingly negative
portraits of other ways of life. The reader is meant to recognize himself within,
and be repelled by, Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the various forms of the
aesthetic and ethical ways of life and Nietzsche’s descriptions of the various
forms of the ascetic or slavish ways of life. But the reader is also meant to aspire
toward the life of faith or the life of creative sovereignty that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche respectively propose as positive alternatives. Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche do not just establish guideposts so that readers can locate themselves
and navigate through the different territories of human existence. They also
polarize these posts such that their readers are attracted to the ways of life
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche take to be best and repelled from ways of life they
take to be inferior.
This attraction and repulsion is achieved partly through the dramatic and
rhetorical presentations Kierkegaard and Nietzsche give to the ways of life they
illustrate. Neither offers a straightforwardly descriptive account of a way of life.
These descriptions always include rhetorical coloring meant to serve their
polemic aim of prying the reader away from his attachment to a collapsing way
of life and enticing the reader to adopt what Kierkegaard or Nietzsche take to be
a higher, more worthy way of living. But this task is not accomplished by
dramatic and rhetorical tricks alone; the polemic side of their project is not the
task of getting others to live according to the author’s own ideals for how to live.
It is important to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that their readers not just blindly
obey their rhetorical prompting or ‘take their word for it’ with respect to how to
live. They each urge a deep searching within oneself for the truth of one’s
situation, and they each urge a way of life that is transparently (if not
consciously) aware of this situation.
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This is another reason why the factuality of their analysis of ways of life is
so important. As I have said, it is important that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
present portraits of different ways of life that are accurate enough that someone
living this life can recognize himself in the portrait provided. Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche also seek to provide objective analysis of the inner workings of these
ways of life, revealing their internal weaknesses or strengthens, such that their
readers can recognize underlying, fundamental sources of failure that may not be
apparent otherwise. If it is true that the entire descriptive task of illustrating and
analyzing different ways of life is meant to serve the polemical task of moving
the reader from one way of life to another, this does not impugn the factuality of
these descriptions. Nor does the polemic task of moving the reader toward one
way of life and out of another impugn the autonomy of this individual.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are careful to seduce their readers in such a way that
they can Socratically withdraw from the reader’s decision; each carefully avoids
any claims to authority that would allow their readers to become mere followers
of teachers of individuality rather than individuals in their own right.
One important method Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both use to
polemically ‘move’ their readers is what I have elsewhere referred to as a kind of
Socratic ‘trick.’ Consider the method Socrates adopts in the Phaedrus. Socrates
wants to persuade the young and impressionable Phaedrus to abandon his love
of rhetoric and to adopt a love of wisdom (i.e. philosophy) instead. His method
of persuasion is a kind of teleological trick: he leads Phaedrus to believe that if he
really wants to pursue rhetoric, “true rhetoric,” he needs to know the different
types of souls and what is good for each, i.e. he needs to pursue philosophy. In
other words, Socrates sells philosophical inquiry as something valuable as a
means to rhetorical skill. Of course Socrates does not think that philosophy is or
should be the handmaiden of rhetoric; he suggests otherwise only because he
believes that once Phaedrus pursues philosophy he will realize the superiority of
the pursuit of wisdom to the ability to manipulate opinion. In other words,
Socrates uses the values and goals that Phaedrus currently has to ‘trick’ him into
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adopting other values and goals. We can understand this trick as a form of
irony: Socrates suggests something that he does not straightforwardly believe
because in doing so he will bring Phaedrus to his own realization of the truth.
This is a use of Socratic irony that I think Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
both employ frequently. Consider how Kierkegaard’s Judge Wilhelm confronts
the aesthete A: he does not argue directly for the ethical life. Rather, he argues
that the aesthete’s life can never attain satisfaction, and that aesthetic satisfaction
can only be attained in the ethical life. The first part of this argument relies on
the aesthete’s current values in order to prompt the aesthete to realize the failure
of his way of life. The second part of this argument relies on the aesthete’s
current values in order to prompt the aesthete to adopt a different way of life.
As we have seen, in Kierkegaard’s schema the central telos or value of each
despairing way of life is only fulfilled in a higher way of life, once this telos or
value is no longer central. For Kierkegaard, the ethical project we are
discussing is Socratic in that it aims to confront people where they are in their
lives and lead them, by their own current goals and values, into a better way of
living.150 In a similar manner, there are a number of element’s to Nietzsche’s
writings which have the structure of this Socratic ‘trick’. For example,
Nietzsche’s call for us to turn pity against pity and guilt and against guilt utilizes
the values we currently have in order to lead us to new values. As we saw in
Chapter 4, the “art of conscience-vivisection” that is has been refined in the long
reign of ascetic ideals can utilized in trying to turn us against the ressentiment
behind these ascetic ideals. Likewise, I think it is clear that Nietzsche appeals to
his reader’s admiration for antiquity in his attempts to turn them against the
ascetic ideals of Christianity. Perhaps most famously, Nietzsche utilizes the
150 We can think of this as the evaluative equivalent to the elenchus in which Socrates confronts someone’s
currently held beliefs. Using these beliefs, Socrates leads his interlocutor through a series of steps to a thesis
different from (and even opposed to) these initial beliefs. One difference between the evaluative and the
epistemic version of this ‘trick’ might be that in the evaluative version one aims not at an eventual
contradiction, but an eventual shift from one way of valuing to another.
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ascetic commitment to the value of truthfulness in order to reveal the self-
contradictory and self-defeating nature of the ascetic mode of valuation.
§2 THE VALUE OF THIS ETHICAL PROJECT FOR CONTEMPORARY ETHICS
My central thesis is that the most valuable thing that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche have to offer contemporary ethics is the ethical project just described
in §1. I am tempted to say that if I have done an adequate job of tracing and
explaining this ethical project, the value of this project should already be plain
for all to see. Nonetheless, it may help to summarize some of the more
significant advantages to be gained by adding this ethical project to the
curriculum of ethical projects currently pursued. In short, I believe Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche’s project allows a deeper, more comprehensive, and more
personal or individual view of ethics than we often find in contemporary ethical
thinking. It allows a deeper view of ethics in that it explores the evaluative
foundation underlying the particular entities which form the concern of other
ethical projects, i.e., particular actions, principles, and character traits. It allows a
more comprehensive view of ethics in that it explores the broader context within
which such particular things find their full meaning, including the personal,
historical, psychological, and physiological context of ethics often ignored by
these other ethical projects. Lastly, it allows a more personal or individual view of
ethics in that it takes into account the individual’s own particular goals and
values. Instead of addressing the ethical agent qua human being, as most ethical
projects do, the ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche addresses the agent
as a particular individual with particular commitments and values that shape the
ethical reality of this individual’s life at the most basic level.
I believe that the substantial aspects of these claims have already been
demonstrated, i.e., that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche present us with an ethical
project that is admirably deep, broad, and individual in the ways just discussed.
What remains to examine is the comparative aspects of these claims, namely that
the project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is deeper, broader, and more individual
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than alternative approaches to ethics currently predominant in philosophical
ethics. As we shall see, these comparative claims are most applicable with
respect to the forms of principle-based, action-centered ethics dominant today,
namely Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. The ethical project
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is quite explicitly critical of these ethical projects
and can even be read as a reaction against them. In contrast, the ethical project
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is much more in harmony with the project of
contemporary virtue ethics. Since I believe we find something very much like
the ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in Aristotle, and since Aristotle
is often taken as the paradigm virtue ethicist, it can even be argued that the
ethical project I am presenting somehow fits within, or is some version of, the
ethical project of virtue ethics. However strong this comparison may be, I think
important differences remain between the ethical project I find in Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche and some of the more usual projects of contemporary virtue
ethics.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each have a wide range of attacks on
traditional forms of ethics, especially deontology and consequentialism. An
exploration of their critiques (especially Nietzsche’s) has already been the subject
of several extensive studies.151 I hope to have added to this discussion by
showing (in chapters 3 and 4) that what is most fundamentally wrong with the
predominant forms of ethics, according to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, is that a
life lived according to these ethics collapses internally. But to accept this
criticism requires that we accept the overall project in which it is found. Our
task now is to give a kind of broad-strokes defense of my claim that the ethical
project we find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche should be pursued since it is often
comparatively deeper, more comprehensive, and more individual than the
151 On the Nietzsche side, consider Simon May, Nietzsche’s Ethics and his War on Morality, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), and Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (London: Routledge, 2002). On the
Kierkegaard side, consider Klaus-M Kodalle, “The Utilitarian Self and the ‘Useless’ Passion of Faith,” in
Hannay and Marino, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), and Bruce Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” in Davenport and
Rudd, eds. Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2001), 191-210l.
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ethical projects of deontology or utilitarianism. Despite their manifest
differences, I will treat deontology and utilitarianism ‘of a piece.’ My reason for
doing so is that they share what is most germane to the comparison with
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, namely an ethical project that seeks to establish
universal rational principles for distinguishing right from wrong actions.152
I should clarify from the start that I do not think the ethical project of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is necessarily exclusive of ethical principles or ethical
thinking about the worth of particular actions. My thesis is not that the ethical
project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche somehow can or should replace these more
traditional ethical projects. To the contrary, I am inclined to believe that these
traditional projects are valuable and even necessary to ethics as a whole.
Ultimately, I advocate a kind of pluralist approach to ethics in which the projects
of action-centered ethics, virtue ethics and way-of-life ethics are all pursued
simultaneously. I even believe that the ethical project of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche can have positive contributions to make to deontology and
utilitarianism, despite the hostility Kierkegaard and Nietzsche themselves may
have had to them. For example, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche could both
contribute greatly to the understanding of autonomy and its relation to human
dignity, which is central to Kantian theory. Likewise, their respective
conceptions of the best way of life could contribute to the understanding of the
‘utility’ that we would want to maximize in consequentialist theories.
The ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offers a deeper view of
ethics than we often find in principle-based, action-centered ethical projects in
the sense that it reveals something more fundamental at work behind these
actions and principles. For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the central unit of
ethical concern is a way of life considered as a whole. For them, the evaluative
basis of one’s particular actions and judgments is not a universal principle but
rather the fundamental existential stance that defines this way of life. Actions
152 Although there may be other forms of deontology and utilitarianism, this is the ethical project of the
forms of deontology and utilitarianism I will be discussing.
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and principles flow from the agent’s overall existential stance and can be fully
understood only as manifestations of this stance. For Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, the worth of a given action or principle depends largely upon the
worth of the existential stance within which this action or principle is found.
Thus, an ethical project that explores these existential stances provides a deeper,
more fundamental view of ethics than an ethical project that explores only those
things that emerge from these stances.
For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, to examine an action according to
the intentions behind this action or the consequences that follow from it leaves us
with a partial and relatively shallow understanding of the ethical situation at
hand. Both one’s intentions and the value one places on these consequences
emerge from more deeply held beliefs or principles, as Kant and Mill (separately)
acknowledge. Indeed the central thrust of Kant’s deontology and Mill’s
utilitarianism is to set out the fundamental principles upon which the worth of
particular intentions or consequences are based. Yet Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
insist that these fundamental principles (the categorical imperative, the utility
principle) in turn emerge from an even more deeply held evaluative stance, a
fundamental evaluative orientation one takes toward oneself, others and the
world. Deontology and consequentialism do not dig deeply enough into the
ethical situation to find the evaluative basis of either the kinds of actions these
theories evaluate or the principles they use to evaluate them.153
Another way to express this point is to say that for Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, it is not enough to evaluate actions in terms of their correlation with a
universal ethical principle, however foundational this principle may be and
however we spell out the nature of this correlation. Since both one’s actions and
one’s principles flow from the same fundamental stance, it will not suffice to
simply demonstrate an appropriate correspondence between these actions and
153 Moreover, according to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, deontology and consequentialism are digging in the
wrong place; an emphasis on finding principles that are universal and rational can come at the cost of
missing the diverse ways that someone can uphold such principles.
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principles. This is because an ethical principle (e.g. the categorical imperative or
the utility principle) may be an expression of a stance of despair or ressentiment.
If so, then showing that an action fulfills the categorical imperative or the utility
principle does not yet get us all the way to understanding either the nature or the
worth of this action.
Now it may be objected that Kant and Mill also dig deeper than the
foundational principles they offer. Kant grounds the categorical imperative in
the ‘good will,’ and Mill grounds the utility principle in the utilitarian
conscience. I think Nietzsche has a reply to this objection, however. In
Nietzsche’s schema, an action or principle may be an expression of what Kant
calls ‘the good will’ or it may be an expression of the kind of utilitarian
‘conscience’ Mill advocates. But if this ‘good will’ or ‘conscience’ are themselves
grounded in an even deeper will to self-effacement and self-avoidance, then
these actions may be contemptible after all despite, or rather because of, their
successful correspondence with this ‘good will’ or ‘conscience.’ An analysis that
stops short of exploring this deeper, existential stance will necessarily give us a
shallow and flawed assessment of the ethical situation at hand. Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche both believe that much of what is praised by traditional ethics is in fact
not worthy of praise, and may even be contemptible. Their complaint is not so
much that people hypocritically fail to act on their own principles, but rather
than both these actions and these principles may be fundamentally flawed, e.g. if
they emerge from a fundamental existential stance that is nihilistic or
despairing.154
One might also claim that the ethical project pursued by Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche is deeper than deontology and consequentialism in the sense that it
explores the issue of spiritual depth and its relation to ethical excellence, as
154 This is another reason why I think that emphasizing the notion of ‘authenticity’ in relation to Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche may be misleading. Neither thinker accepts that ‘being true to one’s principles’ is sufficient
for ethical excellence, or that hypocritically failing to live up to one’s principles is the primary form of
ethical failure. One may dutifully fulfill all one’s deeply, genuinely, ‘authentically’ held principles, but if
these principles are themselves expressions of despair or nihilism, this strict adherence is an expression of
despair and nihilism, and hence of ethical failure.
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discussed in the last chapter. Certainly I think it is an advantage to be able to
explore such issues, but in claiming that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical
project is deeper than traditional ethical projects, I would like to preserve the
philosophical sense of ‘deeper’ in the sense of ‘more fundamental’. I believe
this point about addressing spirituality can be best understood alongside a
cluster of similar concerns as part of my second claim that the ethical project of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche provides us with a more comprehensive view of ethics
than we find in deontology and utilitarianism. It is more comprehensive in the
sense that it takes into account the broader context in which ethics manifests
itself in the actuality of lived experience. For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,
particular actions and principles must be understood not only as emerging from
a more fundamental ethical stance, but also as fitting into a rich and often
complex ethical context. This context includes the interconnections between
different aspects of one’s life and between one’s various types of values (e.g.
aesthetic or religious values). As we saw in chapters 1 through 4, Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche trace a complex map of the dialectical and evaluative
interconnections within a way of life. In doing so, they provide a rich context in
which the meaning and value of particular actions, beliefs and principles can be
more fully understood.
Importantly, this ethical context also includes the historical context in
which one’s values are formed and adopted, whether this be the personal history
of the agent or the cultural history of the agent’s society, or both. For
Kierkegaard, ethical projects that are action-centered and based on universal
principles fail to address the individual agent in the temporal context of the
agent’s life. Of particular importance for Kierkegaard is the fact that these
theories always present us with a view of ethics in which the agent is about to act
and the central question is how to ensure that the agent goes on to act in a
morally good or permissible way. For Kierkegaard, however, a central question
facing the ethical agent is how to deal with one’s past (in particular, one’s guilt
for past misdeeds) and how to deal with one’s future (in particular, how one
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relates to one’s future hopes and goals). In other words, Kierkegaard is
interested in the personal context which comprises the ethical reality for the
agent. For Kierkegaard, the ethical meaning of a particular action or belief
should always be understood within this context. This view contrasts sharply
with the standard versions of deontology and consequentialism, which discount
consideration of this broader context as ethically irrelevant.
The emphasis on universal principles in deontology and consequentialism
also neglects the kind of genealogical understanding of values developed by
Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s genealogical studies usually explore the social history of
ethical values, but Nietzsche is also interested in the personal history of agents,
e.g., as they revaluate their values and overcome themselves. In either case, the
notion of a genealogy of morality means that the precepts of morality are not
timeless, ‘eternal’, universal values. According to Nietzsche, approaches to
ethics that do not take this context into account necessarily fail to grasp the
meaning and value even of the moral beliefs and principles they hold most dear.
Nietzsche seeks a broader view that examines ethics without abstracting from the
context of actual lived experience, as ethical projects based on universal
principles typically do.
Similarly, Nietzsche complains that these approaches to ethics fail to grasp
the physiological context within which ethical evaluations arise. We do not have
to go so far as to wonder about the moral affects of food, as Nietzsche does, to
recognize that there is an important, bodily aspect to human agency often
ignored by traditional forms of ethics. Nietzsche addresses the important
question of what physiological, social, and psychological conditions are required
for autonomy and individuality. Likewise, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are
interested in the psychological aspects of ethical situations, another issue often
ignored by principle-based approaches to ethics. I see it as a great advantage
that the ethical project I am advocating that it is more attentive to these areas of
human existence and that it is open to knowledge about these areas gained from
337
psychology, psychiatry, physiology, etc. In doing so, this project is better able to
address ethics within the full breadth of its context within human experience.
As my point about incorporating the historical context of values suggests,
the ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche incorporates the important issue
of substantial evaluative change in a way that seems anathema to ethical projects
based on universal principles. As we have seen, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are
primarily interested at a change in values at the most fundamental level, i.e., a
change in one’s fundamental stance and way of life. For Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, other more superficial changes, e.g. amending one’s principles
without abandoning the collapsing stance behind them, are like symptomatic
treatments for an illness: they may well make the root cause of the symptoms, the
disease itself, much worse. We have seen how trying to modify a collapsing
way of life instead of abandoning it can often further intensify the despair or
nihilism of this way of life. Thus, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pursue not only a
typology of different ways of life but also the morphology of these ways of life,
how they “live, grow, beget, and perish,” as Nietzsche says (BGE:186). As I
discussed in section 1 of these conclusions, the polemic side of their task includes
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s attempts to enact or prepare the way for this
change. But they are also interested in observing what the various dialectical
paths by which values and ways of holding values evolve (or more often,
devolve.) It seems that this attentiveness to changes in ethics and the
importance of change at a fundamental level is systematically neglected in an
ethics based in supposedly timeless, universal principles.155
Following from what has already been said, a final way that the ethical
project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is more comprehensive than these other
projects lies in their ability to incorporate a plurality of different evaluative
perspectives and to understand that the agent’s ethical actuality always presents
155 Traditional rationalist ethics can account for change only in the sense that an agent can come to do what is
ethically correct, or can lapse in a commitment to do what is ethically correct. The complex dialectical
changes of values traced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are not usually considered.
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itself within one or another of these perspectives. This sort of ethical
perspectivism is valuable but is largely absent from contemporary ethical debate.
One of the ways that the thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is peculiarly
(perhaps even prophetically) able to address the contemporary ethical situation
is in their foundational assumption of a plurality of different ethical perspectives,
“moralities,” or life-views corresponding to a plurality of different ethical ‘types’
or ways of life. Kierkegaard’s project of exploring different ways of life from
within, in the first person perspective of someone living this life, and his Socratic
refusal to play the judge among the various ways of life he depicts, testifies to his
commitment to this ethical pluralism. Likewise, Nietzsche’s perspectivism and
rejection of universalism testify to his own commitment to this ethical pluralism.
As I have shown, the fact that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can consider a
plurality of evaluative perspectives, none of which is deemed objectively,
universally right or wrong, does not cripple their ability to provide compelling
evaluations of these various perspectives. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are
perspectivists but not utter relativists; in fact, few writers are simultaneously so
passionately opinionated and yet so opposed to proclaiming these opinions as
universal truths.
In large part as a consequence of taking this deeper, more comprehensive,
and more pluralistic approach to ethics, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can offer an
ethical project that is more individual or personal than universalist ethical
projects, which typically strive to be impersonal. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
acknowledge the need for ethics to address individuals as the particular
individuals they are and not merely as instances of the general type ‘human
being’. Unlike deontology and consequentialism, which deliberately exclude
such things from consideration, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche take the agent’s
personal goals and values into account. In fact, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,
the ethical reality of the agent’s situation is in large part set by this agent’s
individual goals and values insofar as the agent’s way of life is an expression of
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the agent’s goals and values. Their approach is therefore more attuned to the
personal, individual aspects of ethics in actual human life.
Kierkegaard gives an interesting existentialist critique of principle-based
ethics that further explains this point about individuality. In The Present Age,
Kierkegaard complains that “nowadays people are supplied with rules of careful
conduct and ready-reckoners to facilitate judgment” (PA:35). The moral calculus
offered by different principles, e.g. Kant’s categorical imperative or Mill’s utility
principle, provides a universal test by which any rational agent can determine
the worth of an action. Perhaps such a calculus could be useful for informing
individual, autonomous decision-making, but Kierkegaard thinks it is all too
often used as a substitute for such individual decision making. These ‘ready
reckoners’ function like some kind of ethical pocket calculator: given an
abstracted, depersonalized description of the agent’s situation as input, these
principles automatically calculate the output in the form of a recommendation or
requirement for how to act. They thereby allow an agent to avoid a passionate,
individual response to the ethical situation: “‘On principle’ a man can do
anything, take part in anything and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate”
(PA:74). The person who treats others via abstract duty becomes a cold and
inhuman abstraction. This person thereby lacks what Kierkegaard takes to be
human decency: “It is acting ‘on principle’ which does away with the vital
distinction which constitutes decency. For decency is immediate […] It has its
seat in feeling and in the impulse and consistency of an inner enthusiasm”
(PA:74). According to Kierkegaard, an agent who lacks such passion and
enthusiasm lacks human decency no matter how acceptable or meritorious the
action done ‘on principle’ may be. Kierkegaard concludes that acting ‘on
principle’ can be an escapist attempt to “avoid all personal responsibility”
(PA:74). Since Kierkegaard thinks that ethics properly conceived is a matter of
one’s particularity, passion, and inwardness, to rely on abstract universal
principles to determine one’s decisions constitutes an avoidance of one’s
responsibility to face life ethically in the fullest sense.
340
Nietzsche also has specific critiques of impersonal principles. Like
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche thinks that acting on such principles is anathema to
individual responsibility in the fullest sense. As we have seen, Nietzsche’s ideal
of responsibility is a sovereign conscience guided not by a consideration of
universal principles but rather by one’s own most deeply personal passions,
goals, and interests. The sovereign individual’s autonomy is, as Nietzsche says,
“mutually exclusive” of the ‘moral’ approach to ethics relying on impersonal
principles (GM II:2). Nietzsche also sees the will to an impersonal, unegoistic
approach to ethics as a sign of declining vitality:
A word on Kant as moralist. A virtue has to be our invention, our most
personal defence and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger.
What does not condition our life harms it: a virtue merely from a feeling
of respect for the concept ‘virtue,’ as Kant desired it, is harmful. ‘Virtue’,
‘duty’, ‘good in itself’, impersonal and universal – phantoms, expressions
of decline, of the final exhaustion of life […] What destroys more quickly
than to work, to think, to feel without inner necessity, without a deep
personal choice, without joy? as an automaton of ‘duty’? (A:11)
Although aimed at Kant in particular, Nietzsche’s criticism is clear that
what is objectionable is “any sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction” (A:11). The
ethical projects of deontology and consequentialism seem structurally unfit to
provide the kind of depth, breadth and individuality that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche demand from ethical thinking.
Of course we should not ignore the value that the impersonal approach to
ethics offers. This abstraction gains ethical projects like Kantian deontology or
Millian utilitarianism the ability to be universal and wide-ranging (applying
always and to everyone) while also being specific and decisive (telling the agent
exactly how to act.) On one hand, we might question whether this universality
and specificity is even attainable (this is surely one of the concerns Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche share). But even supposing it were attainable, the various
objections just raised show that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would still condemn
this approach to ethical thinking. For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it is not worth
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trading passionate interest and personal engagement for universality, nor is it
worth trading individual responsibility for action-guiding specificity. Even
supposing we could have an ethical calculator that would unfailingly calculate
our duty in any given instance, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche give reasons why
relying on this ethical calculator would not be a good way to live. This is not to
say that they believe the ethical recommendations of deontology and
utilitarianism are wrong. I think the best way to express their objection is to say
that these approaches to ethical are insufficient, that without reflecting on ethics
in a deeper, broader and more individual way, ethical thinking remains
unprepared to understand or respond to the ethical actuality of people’s lives.
Turning now to a comparison with virtue ethics, we find that much that
serves as a basis of contrast between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical project
and action-centered, principle-based approaches to ethics instead serves as a
basis of comparison with virtue ethics. Like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, virtue
ethicists often insist upon understanding actions as flowing from a more
fundamental basis (an agent’s character) and as having meaning only within a
rich personal and social context. This comparison was suggested in the
introduction, where I introduced the ethical project I find in Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche by pointing to some similar ideas in ancient Greek virtue ethicists like
Plato and Aristotle. Other scholars have already explored a number of ways in
which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, considered separately, can be understood as
contributing to the continuing tradition of virtue ethics.156 I believe the
comparison between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that I have drawn further
elucidates a deep connection between these thinkers and virtue ethicists. To my
knowledge, no one has yet pointed out that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche share
156 For example, with respect to Nietzsche and virtue ethics see Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), Robert Solomon, Living with Nietzsche, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), Robert Solomon & Kathleen Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, (New York: Schocken Books, 2000).
With respect to Kierkegaard and virtue ethics see Davenport and Rudd, eds. Kierkegaard After MacIntyre,
(Chicago: Open Court Press, 2001), and Robert C. Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of
‘Virtue Ethics’” in Matustik and Westphal, eds. Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1995).
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something very close to Aristotle’s question of the worth of different ‘ways of
life’ (bios) in the Nicomachean Ethics. I believe the insights gained from comparing
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s pursuit of this question can yield valuable
contributions for contemporary virtue ethics.
For example, I think that incorporating Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s
ethical project allows virtue ethics to answer a number of objections that it
frequently faces. Consider three objections that Robert Louden raises in his essay
“On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics”157:
a) Negativity Objection: “Most of the work done in this genre has a
negative rather than a positive thrust” (VE, 204). As I discussed above, this
objection is also frequently pressed against Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In reply,
I hope to have shown that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each present us with a
unique and compelling positive vision of the best way of life. In fact, I would
argue that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do more than any other modern thinker to
develop a unique and compelling positive ideal for how to live in the modern
world. Although I think there has been much work done in virtue ethics to
answer this objection independently, I think virtue ethics could answer this
objection much more forcefully if it incorporated the positive ideals presented by
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
b) Modern Pluralism Objection: “There is no general agreed upon and
significant expression of desirable moral character in such a world. […] Our
world lacks the sort of moral cohesiveness and value unity which traditional
virtue theorists saw as prerequisites of a viable moral community” (VE, 215).
Louden suggests that it is an advantage of rule-based ethics over virtue ethics
that these universal rules are abstract enough to be able to apply to people who
hold various different conceptions of “human purposes and moral ideals” (VE,
215). Leaving aside the Nietzschean objection that rule-based ethics such as
Kantianism and utilitarianism may not be as open to pluralism as Louden
157 Robert Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” originally published in American Philosophical Quarterly,
21 (1984), 227-36, reprinted in Crisp and Slote, ed. Virtue Ethics, Oxford, 1998, 201-216.
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suggests, it does seem that Aristotelian virtue ethics, with its singular conception
of the natural telos of human life and ‘the good life,’ is ill-suited to our
contemporary situation, which lacks the kind of cohesive evaluative unity
Louden thinks Aristotle’s ethics requires. Of course, many virtue ethicists see
this prevalence of modern pluralism as pernicious, false, and to a great extent the
central problem facing modern ethics. To a certain extent Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche agree (e.g., insofar as they would both reject the ‘leveling’ effect of a
total relativism regarding values.) Yet I hope to have shown that the evaluative
method based on the notion of internal collapse allows Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche to address this pluralism while avoiding outright relativism. Unlike
most forms of virtue ethics, they are able to do so without having to rely on any
supposedly objective (but inevitably contentious) universal evaluative standard.
c) Firm and Fixed Character Objection: “Once we grant the possibility of
such changes in moral character, the need for more ‘character-free’ way of
assessing action becomes evident. Character is not a permanent fixture, but
rather plastic” (VE:209). This objection seems aimed at Aristotle’s insistence on
the need for a “firm and fixed character.” As we have seen, Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche both have a much more dynamic view of character than Aristotle.
They both explore the kinds of changes by which a person comes to fail
according to his own values and the kinds of changes by which a person adopts
entirely new values. Their ethical project thereby allows for more flexibility in
understanding the notion of character. Importantly, this does not mean that
they abandon the importance of personal integrity and continuity over time; for
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche only the aesthete or the decadent lacks such
continuity. But I think the way Kierkegaard and Nietzsche describe
fundamental changes in the agent’s character and way of life could be quite
beneficial at answering the kind of worry Louden expresses here.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s notion of a fundamental existential stance
can also help to answer some important questions within virtue ethics. For
example, I think the ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche yields a new
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look at the ancient question of the unity of the virtues. The idea that the various
virtues are somehow unified can take many forms, but the structure of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical project suggests what might be called an
existential account of unity of the virtues, one that is weaker than the strong
notion of unity found in Aristotle.158 For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, an agent’s
virtues are unified in the sense that they are all manifestations and expressions of
the same fundamental existential stance. For example, Nietzsche’s sovereign
individual may have the virtues of courage, honesty, forbearance, gratitude, and
creativity. What unifies these character traits within the agent is that they are all
the manifestation of the agent’s fundamental stance of life-affirming, individual
sovereignty. Depending on the situation, this fundamental stance manifests
itself in different particular character traits. Likewise, consider some of the
virtues we might ascribe to Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’: love, trust, gratitude,
steadfastness, honesty, and courage. For Kierkegaard, these are different
character traits but they are unified in that they are all manifestations of the same
fundamental stance of faith. What faith will demand of the agent at any given
time cannot be specified in advance, as the Abraham story shows. But faith can
manifest itself in these various character traits depending on the situation.159
This conception of the unity of the virtues is helpful for addressing an
important problem that arises when we try to bring the thinking of Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche to bear on virtue ethics. For both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, a
virtue may appear in more than one way of life, at least by name. Consider, for
example, the list of Aristotelian virtues Solomon ascribes to Nietzsche’s ideal. In
158 At one point in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that all the virtues are manifestations of the
virtue of practical wisdom since practical wisdom is necessary and sufficient for any of the other virtues
(1144b32-1145a2).
159 This unity of character traits goes beyond the unity that may be presumed if we consider that the agent’s
different character traits are, after all, all traits of the same character. As I have just discussed, Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche have a more dynamic view of character than we traditionally find in virtue ethics. This
notion of character provides what (following Anti-Climacus) we might call a ‘negative unity’ in the sense
that what unifies the virtues is not itself some further cause or entity (SUD:43). In contrast, Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche propose a ‘positive unity’ in which the virtues are unified around some central willed stance.
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almost every case there is a virtue by this same name in the way of life Nietzsche
rejects, the ascetic or slavish life of Christian/Platonic morality:







pride (megalopsychos) VS. humility
courtesy courtesy
friendship friendship
wittiness (a sense of humor) (deemed too insignificant?)
At first glance, the widespread concordance between these lists threatens
to undermine the value of turning to Nietzsche for an account of the virtues. If a
character trait appears as a virtue in both the way of life he praises and the way
of life he despises, then what can we conclude about the value of this character
trait? Fortunately this objection rests on a misunderstanding: it assumes that the
character traits named in one list are the same as the character traits named in the
other list. According to Nietzsche, this is not the case. In fact, the widespread
concordance between these lists should not be surprising to Nietzsche scholars.
Nietzsche suggests that the ‘revaluation of values’ by which ascetic values came
into being involved cleverly retaining the same virtue-terms used in noble
morality while nonetheless radically inverting the meaning of these terms. This
is what it means to “invert the aristocratic value equation.” Nietzsche is clear that
what is named as ‘good’ in these two value-paradigms are quite different things:
“it is not the same concept ‘good’” (GM I:7, I:11). It is one of the goals of
Nietzsche’s genealogical project to uncover the original (noble) meanings of our
value terms, which he believes are still discernable in their etymological roots.
We might think of Nietzsche as pursuing Confucian or Socratic project of
‘rectifying the names’ in which the supposedly true meaning of value terms is
restored. But it could be that he simply wants to show us the plurality of
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meanings that value terms can have; accepting the plurality of different value-
paradigms behind this plurality of meanings would already constitute a
significant step toward rejecting the claims of universality made by traditional
morality.
The issue of multiple-listed virtues shows why the ethical project I have
been exploring should be pursued alongside the project in virtue ethics of
identifying and explaining character traits as virtues and vices. For Nietzsche,
the fact that the virtues of the ascetic life and the virtues of the noble life share
the same name means that when speaking of a virtue it is crucial that we specify
whether we mean the ascetic/slavish version of this virtue or the noble version
of it (or, alternately, the sovereign version of it.) Thus, the project of explaining
the different existential stances underlying these different virtues is necessary if
we are to speak unambiguously about virtues in Nietzsche. Of course, it might
be possible to address each virtue separately and in each case explain the
difference between this virtue as a manifestation of a stance of life-denying
ressentment and this virtue as a manifestation of a stance of sovereign or noble
life-affirmation. But philosophically speaking, it seems more efficient to start
out by explaining the fundamental differences between these ways of life,
thereby eliminating the need to explain this difference again and again for each
particular virtue. If we begin by drawing the distinction between the ascetic life
and the sovereign life, for example, we can then more easily understand the
difference between ascetic courage and sovereign courage, ascetic honesty and
sovereign honesty, ascetic temperance and sovereign temperance, and so on.
For Nietzsche, character traits sharing the same name but appearing in
different ways of life may be vastly different in nature. But it would go too far to
say that these character traits share only a name; they may also share some
general similarities such as the kinds of situations to which they are a response.
For example, sovereign courage and ascetic courage may both be responses to
situations of danger. The agent may respond to one and the same situation of
danger with either sovereign self-certainty or ascetic self-denial and resignation,
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depending on the agent’s way of life. So it is not entirely misleading to call both
of these character traits ‘courage’. Nonetheless, the difference between
sovereign virtue and its ascetic counterpart is a difference in kind, not a
difference of degree. Sovereign courage is as radically different from ascetic
courage as self-reverential self-certainty is radically different from resigned self-
denial. Likewise, sovereign honesty and ascetic honesty are not just different
versions or shades of the same thing: they are fundamentally different in kind.160
In the same way, for Nietzsche ascetic integrity (a stern self-control accomplished
by self-denigration and self-laceration) represents an affront to sovereign
integrity, which is instead a joyous and instinctive sense of self-reverence and
self-responsibility. But it is also true that this joyous, open, self-affirming kind
of integrity is an affront to ascetic integrity, which would probably condemn it as
fleeting vanity and self-delusion.
A similar pattern can be found in Kierkegaard’s thinking. Some virtues,
such a courage, steadfastness, conscientiousness, and honesty, may be found in
the active ethical life, the life of resignation, and the life of faith.161 But the nature
of the character traits named by these terms will vary greatly between ways of
life, even if they share some broad similarities. For example, steadfastness in any
of these ways of life may be a character trait responsive to situations of external
opposition, or exhaustion, or weakness within oneself. But how steadfastness as
a manifestation of faith is responsive to such a situation is almost the opposite of
how steadfastness as a manifestation of ethical self-reliance is responsive to this
same situation. Ethical steadfastness entails resolutely relying only on one’s
self-enclosed sphere of self-reliant achievement; it is thus different in kind from
the steadfastness of faith, which is a joyful, passionate openness to what lies
beyond oneself. Among other things, the steadfastness of faith includes a
160As discussed in Chapter 4, Nietzsche thinks that the Platonic notion of ‘truthfulness’ as a transcendent
value, and as aimed at eternal, unchanging, universal truths is in fact a lie; it is a violation of the sovereign
value of truthfulness as having an intellectual conscience.
161 For example, throughout Fear and Trembling Johannes de Silentio comments on the difference between his
kind of courage (the courage of resignation) and “the courage of faith” (FT:63,77,99,100,101).
348
consistent resistance to the temptation to lapse into the stance of resignation or
the stance of active self-reliance. Likewise, the openness of faith may seem to be
a lack of steadfastness from the point of view of either version of the ethical way
of life (e.g. Abraham’s steadfastness seems like an ethical lapse from the point of
view of the ethical life). So for Kierkegaard, as with Nietzsche, virtues sharing
the same name in different ways of life may not only be vastly different in
nature, they may also be mutually condemning.
In each of these cases, the actions the agent takes may be outwardly
identical regardless of the agent’s way of life, but the difference in the agent’s
fundamental existential stance makes all the difference for what kind of character
trait is being manifested in this action. Thus, although two agents may act in
identical ways, if their actions stem from different existential stances, their ethical
situations may differ dramatically. One might say that the ethical actuality of the
situation for the agent is established by the agent’s way of life. The agent’s
fundamental existential stance manifests itself in various character traits which in
turn manifest themselves in particular actions. What Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
mean by a ‘way of life’ is the whole network of dialectical relationships by which
a fundamental existential stance manifests itself in virtues and actions, as well as
in beliefs, principles, goals, etc.
As this discussion implies, I read Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical
project as relativizing the virtues in a way that differs greatly from the typical
projects of virtue ethics. For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, not only does the
nature of a supposed virtue change between ways of life, but the value of a given
character trait cannot be assessed outside the domain of one or another way of
life. For example, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche it can be said that in actual life
there is no such thing as courage per se, and the value of a given form of courage
(e.g. ascetic courage) will be assessed differently in different ways of life. In
Nietzsche’s thinking, ascetic courage (the character trait predisposing the agent
to carry on in the face of fear or danger out of a stance of resigned self-denial) is a
virtue in the ascetic life insofar as it is praised as an excellent character trait by
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the values of this way of life. It may even be said that in an immediate sense
ascetic courage is good for the agent living an ascetic life insofar as it promotes his
highest goals and values (e.g. strengthening one’s resolve by insulating one’s self
from what lies beyond it). But insofar as these goals and values represent
internal collapse and nihilistic decline, ascetic courage cannot be said to be a
virtue per se or in any objective sense. (Indeed, it is regarded as a vice from the
perspective of the sovereign way of life.) Thus, Nietzsche would insist that the
value of a given character trait is dependent upon the value of the fundamental
existential stance of which it is a manifestation. This does not mean that
Nietzsche’s evaluation of character traits is merely subjective; as I hope to have
shown, Nietzsche (like Kierkegaard) avoids relativism or subjectivism through
the notion of internal collapse. Moreover, much of what is valuable in a given
character trait may be preserved in the transformation to a new way of life, e.g.
the inner strength of ascetic courage is preserved in sovereign courage even if the
application and nature of this inner strength has changed fundamentally. So
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can make sense of the fact that we might find
character traits within a collapsing way of life laudable even if they reject the
notion of a non-perspectival evaluation of a character trait as a virtue or vice.
Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard would consider the value of a given character
trait to depend upon the value of the fundamental existential stance of which it is
a manifestation. To return the example just mentioned, the steadfastness of the
active ethical life may be a good thing for the agent living this life in the sense
that it promotes and supports the goals and values of this way of life (e.g.
achieving righteousness self-reliantly). But insofar as this goal itself constitutes a
despairing misrelation to oneself, the various virtues which are a manifestation
of this stance are also manifestations of despair. From the point of view of faith,
the steadfastness in the ethical life is a sign of its demonic resistance to faith; the
agent steadfastly clings to the despairing stance of self-reliance. Thus,
Kierkegaard talks about the “splendid virtues” of the ethical life by which a
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fundamentally despairing stance may manifest itself in character traits and
actions that may seem to be meritorious:
it is so easily forgotten that everything, speaking humanly, can be more or
less as it should be in these respects, and yet the whole life be sin, that
notorious kind of sin: the splendid vices, a willfulness which, either
spiritlessly or shamelessly, remains, or wants to be, in ignorance of in how
infinitely far deeper a sense a human self is under an obligation to obey
God. (SUD: 114)
The ethical project I find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche entails that the
worth of the agent’s character traits (a) depends upon the agent’s way of life,
and, like the worth of the agent’s way of life, (b) cannot be determined by any
objective, universal standard. Relativizing the virtues in this way may not be
anathema to virtue ethics per se, but it is certainly incompatible with some central
projects within virtue ethics. In particular, it seems to be incompatible with the
project of grounding the evaluative worth of the virtues in an objective, universal
notion of human flourishing. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have some basic
notion of human flourishing, but they do not treat this notion of flourishing as
any kind of objective standard by which to judge ways of life.162 They thereby
forego the advantage virtue ethics typically claims for itself in being able to
justify the worth of the virtues on the objective grounds that that these virtues
are good for the agent qua human being since they contribute to (or constitute)
human flourishing.
This difference also reveals a difference between the way virtue ethics
typically pursues the question of ‘the good life’ and the way Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche pursue the question of ‘the best way of life’. Prima facie, this might
162 For example, Kierkegaard clearly regards relating to oneself through God as a form human flourishing; it
is the way of living that is most compatible with the facts of what the self is and the potential for the self to
attain excellence. But Kierkegaard’s strategy is not to fault other ways of life for failing to match the higher
standards of faith; rather, he explores how they collapse inwardly in the ways I have discussed. Likewise,
Nietzsche clearly regards relating to oneself with the openness, honesty, reverence and loving affirmation of
the sovereign individual as a form of human flourishing; it is also regarded as the way of living that is most
compatible with the facts of what the self is and the potential for the self to attain excellence. Like
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche’s strategy is not to fault other ways of life for not living up to the high standards of
his creative, sovereign individual; rather, like Kierkegaard, he also explores how these ways of life collapse
inwardly.
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seem to be one of the closest points of comparison between Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche’s ethical project and virtue ethics. It might even be objected that the
ethical project I claim Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can (re)introduce to
contemporary ethics is already part of contemporary ethics since it is already a
part of virtue ethics. I think this objection can be answered if we consider the
important differences in the way the evaluation of ways of life is pursued in
these different projects. In virtue ethics, the question of ‘the good life’ usually
assumes a singular, objective standard of goodness which establishes one way of
life as the good life. Then the question of the good life centers on the question of
how this objectively established moral merit relates to other aspects of the
agent’s life, in particular how it relates to the agent’s happiness or sense of
satisfaction.163
In contrast, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche consider a plurality of evaluative
paradigms, each with its own conception of ‘the good life’. The task of exploring
the question of the best way of life involves examining each of these conceptions
on its own terms and discerning the inner strengths or points of collapse within
them. To some extent, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are interested in a sense of
satisfaction gained by living the best life (e.g. in Kierkegaard’s notion of the joy
of being in the moment through faith, or in Nietzsche notion of the joy of feeling
one’s power and excellence.) But overall Kierkegaard and Nietzsche direct us
away from supposing any neat connection between a sense of pleasurable
happiness and satisfaction164 and the kind of ethical merit they attribute to living
the best life. Kierkegaard is clear that the life of faith involves inviting great
suffering upon oneself. Likewise, Nietzsche is clear that great suffering is often a
prompt for the kind of excellence he expects from this highest types; his joy is a
joy amidst suffering (a “tragic” joy, in his terminology).
163 Swanton nicely summarizes the views of other virtue ethicists on this question (Swanton, 56-60).
164 As I discussed at length in the last chapter, the important notion of joy in the ideals of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche should not be confused with pleasure or a sense of immediate satisfaction.
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To further understand this point of difference between virtue ethics and
the ethical project of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, consider Aristotle’s treatment of
the question of the best way of life. Aristotle does seem to consider different
evaluative paradigms in that he considers the life of pleasure, the life of moral or
social virtue (the military or political life), and the life of intellectual virtue (the
contemplative life.) Each of these seems to have its own understanding of
excellence in life and its own conception of eudaimonia. But Aristotle has an
objective evaluative standard to arbitrate between these competing evaluative
standards, namely the notion of a natural human telos and a universal standard
of human eudaimonia. Moreover, consider that the virtues of the contemplative
life do not conflict with the virtues of the active political or military life the way
virtues in different ways of life conflict for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. For
Aristotle, the person living the contemplative life needs to manifest the social
virtues as well, and the person living the military and political life also needs to
manifest the intellectual virtues. What distinguishes between different ways of
life is not that different character traits are considered virtues or vices in each,
bur rather what virtues are emphasized as central to the particular conception of
success and flourishing that define this way of life. Success in the military or
political life requires outstanding excellence in courage or ambition whereas
success in the contemplative life requires outstanding excellence in wisdom
(sophia). So the different paradigms of goodness are not radically different in
the way they are for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Rather, for Aristotle there is a
uniform set of character traits that are good for the agent qua human being; ways
of life vary according to what character traits within this single, coherent list of
virtues are emphasized as of central importance.165
165 It may be, as some commentators have pointed out, that some virtues such as magnificence are not
necessarily available to the person living the contemplative life, say for lack of means. The lack of this virtue
may signal the failure of the active life but not the contemplative life. Nonetheless, I think we are far from
the ethical pluralism assumed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in which competing paradigms of value have
mutually contradictory versions of the virtues.
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I think these differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical
project and virtue ethics are enough to dispel the objection that the contribution I
think Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can make to contemporary ethics is unneeded
since it is already a part of virtue ethics. But these differences are not so strong
that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical project and virtue ethics become
mutually exclusive. Although there may be some points of strong disagreement,
as I have shown, ultimately I think these ethical projects can be mutually
beneficial to each other.
Robert Louden concludes his critique of virtue ethics by insisting that the
field of ethics open itself to all available, valuable insights, in his case by
pursuing both virtue ethics and action-centered ethics. From a certain
philosophical standpoint it may seem advantageous and even obligatory to
sacrifice this breadth of consideration for the greater consistency and economy
that relying on only one approach to ethics may provide. But Louden is correct
to say that this kind of philosophical economy is bought at too great a cost: “The
theoretician’s quest for conceptual economy and elegance has been won at too
great a price, for the resulting reductionist definitions of moral concepts are not
true to the facts of moral experience” (VA, 216). I would simply expand
Louden’s call for openness to include an openness to the ethical project found in
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I believe that ethics, understood both as a practice
and as an academic discipline, has much more to gain in opening itself to a
plurality of approaches – even at the cost of being unable to fully reconcile their
differences – than it has to gain from remaining steadfastly committed to only
one approach. My central thesis is that the ethical project pursued by
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche should be included in our ethical thinking alongside
the ethical projects we currently pursue.
§3 AVENUES FOR RESEARCH WITHIN THIS ETHICAL PROJECT
The last thing to discuss, briefly, is what kinds of further research and
thinking are called for if we accept Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical project
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into the curriculum of ethical projects currently pursued. I do not want to leave
the impression that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have somehow done all the work
for us, and that we need only read their works in order to answer the questions
their project asks. As discussed already, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each have a
number of ways of condemning, resisting and evading those among their readers
who would be mere philosophical followers. The proper response to the ethical
thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is to open oneself to the questions they
pursue, not to close these questions by insisting dogmatically on the answers
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have already offered. An exploration of the answers
they give to these questions is valuable only as a means to our own pursuit of the
question we learn from them. Moreover, their strong differences on some crucial
matters make it impossible for a reader to slavishly adopt both of their
philosophies regarding the best way of life. These differences demand a
confrontation with the thinking of one or the other thinker, and preferably with
both. I take it as a strength of the ethical project I am presenting that it does not
argue dogmatically for a single response to the questions posed in this project.
Instead, it critically explores the interesting dialogue that emerges between
different responses to these questions.
Exploring this dialogue further might involve introducing new ways of
life to be compared alongside the ways of life Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
explore. Or it may involve introducing new ways of understanding the task of
developing a typology and morphology of different ways of life. It might also
involve further critical analysis of the way Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
understand the notion of a way of life. Of particular interest, I think, is the way
they conceive of some ways of life as somehow unified and directed by a
fundamental guiding passion. Of course Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do not claim
that everyone has such a unifying element in their lives; in fact, they sometimes
suggest that disintegration rather than unification is the norm. In either case,
though, I think a lot more work could be done in explaining how this unity
within a person might be possible, and how disunity and internal collapse
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manifests itself in other aspects of the agent’s life. Much more work could be
done in explaining what I have called a “fundamental existential stance” and
exploring how this stance manifests itself in particular actions, beliefs, goals and
character traits.
Further research might also take a critical look at how Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche describe and analyze various ways of life. It may be, for example, that
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are both unfair to the life of pleasure. We might also
question the assumption of guilt that plays such a big role in Kierkegaard’s
explanation of the despair of the ethical life, among other things. Likewise, we
might also question whether Nietzsche is fair to Christianity and Platonism,
either for lumping them together, or of accusing them of being born out of “the
cauldron of unsatisfied hatred” (GM I:11). Alternately, it may be that
Kierkegaard’s depiction of the ethical life does not necessarily include all ways of
life centered on duty, utility or personal excellence. Critical analysis might also
explore the way Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s ethical project attempts to avoid
both relativism and a reliance on an objective, universal standard of evaluation.
I think ethics could greatly benefit from a further exploration of the notion of
internal collapse and the notion of ethical failure at this fundamental level, as a
way of understanding particular misdeeds and vices holistically, in their relation
to a personal, social, or historical context.
In order to broaden the philosophical context in which we can both
understand and pursue the ethical project I am presenting, I think it would
benefit us to explore how this project can be found in other thinkers. After all, I
do not think Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are unique in pursuing this project, even
if they have unique responses to it. The project I have describe is obviously
strengthened by the addition of other voices. Aside from a few discussions of the
ancient Greek predecessors of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, I have left aside the
task of tracing the philosophical genealogy of the ethical project Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche share. (Addressing the question of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s
sources was obviously beyond the scope of this investigation.) But it would be
356
interesting to see to what extend we can find traces of this project in thinkers
such as Hume, Kant and Hegel.
Likewise, I think it would be interesting to explore the legacy of this
project in thinkers who came after Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In this respect the
most obvious place to look may be in the thinking of 20th Century Existentialists.
Although thinkers like Heidegger and Sartre are greatly influenced by
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s pursuit of this project, I do not read them as
pursuing this project directly. Camus does not pursue this project in his
discursive work, although it is evident in his fiction.166 Perhaps the clearest
evidence of this project in the work of 20th Century Existentialists can be found in
the writings of Martin Buber. Buber’s description of the Hasidic life of faith can
be read as a response to Kierkegaard’s description of the Christian life of faith
informed by Nietzsche’s notion of a life-affirming spirituality. We can also find
the legacy of this project in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein who, along with
Buber and Camus, is one of the 20th Century’s best readers of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche.167
I think Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s pursuit of this ethical project could
also have valuable contributions to make to particular issues in contemporary
ethical debate. For example, there has been recent interest in the issue of
individual autonomy.168 Some thinkers, like Karl Ameriks, defend the traditional
166 For example, consider the different responses to the plague that Camus illustrates in his novel The Plague.
The difference between the stance taken to the plague by Dr. Rieux and Father Paneloux illustrate a divide
between the fundamental stance of otherworldly resignation and the stance of humanistic resolve.
167 Traces of their ethical project can be found in Wittgenstein’s comments on the world ‘waxing and waning
as a whole’ and the world of the ‘happy man’ being a different world from the world of the ‘unhappy man’
(Tractatus, 643). We know that Wittgenstein purchased an eight-volume set of Nietzsche’s collected works
in the fall of 1914, and that he was much impressed with Nietzsche’s understanding of Christianity as a
fundamental attitude rather than a set of beliefs. (Ray Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York:
Penguin Books, 1990), 121-2). Of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein declared “Kierkegaard was by far the most
profound thinker of the last century” and is said to have learned Danish in order to read Kierkegaard in the
original. For a lengthy discussion of this topic, see James Conant, “Putting Two and Two Together:
Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their Work as Authors” in Tessin and von der Ruhr,
eds. Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 248-331.
168 J.B. Schneewind gives an overview of this topic in his The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
357
Kantian notion of autonomy.169 Other thinkers, like Keith Lehrer and Marilyn
Friedman, press for a reconsideration of this issue in the light of recent Cartesian
thought in the case of Lehrer and feminist thought in the case of Friedman.170 I
hope to have shown, contrary to Brian Leiter’s lengthy assessment of this issue,
that Nietzsche has a robust notion of individual autonomy, even if it is one that
differs greatly from the traditional Enlightenment notion of autonomy. What
makes Nietzsche’s notion of autonomy so valuable, I think, is the fact that he
takes into account the physiological and psychological conditions that are
required for autonomy and he rightly shows the tension between a robust notion
of individual autonomy and any approach to ethics relying on universal rational
principles. I also hope to have shown that Kierkegaard has an interesting and
challenging critique of autonomy, both in the Kantian sense and in Nietzsche’s
sense as well.
Lastly, and perhaps most obviously, I think the ethical project of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche could be continued by developing new typologies of
different ways of life with new formulations of what way of life is considered
best. The most fitting response to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would be to
undertake the ethical project they undertake and to work alongside them in
formulating an original response to this project. Even here, however, I would
expect that anyone undertaking this project would have much to learn from
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s response to this project. We can regard the work of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both as training in how to pursue this project and as
helpfully setting out some of the key issues that any pursuit of this project would
likely encounter.
169 Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
170 Keith Lehrer, Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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